Problem: the hexagonal refactor churns the backend tree for nine more phases; the UI delivery stack (web/ SPA, cmd/desktop Wails wrapper, compose/web image) must move to its own repo first so doc/layout rewrites land once on a backend-only tree. Change: - New repo git.hubris.network/dtoro/oikos-web (v0.33.0): web/, desktop/ (updateURL repointed to oikos-web releases), compose/, own CI (web + desktop jobs), own deploy script (CI-green gate, TOCTOU guard, version-tagged images, prune-to-3), own webhook receiver on :9798 + launchd unit, own compose project publishing the same 8091:80. - Cutover executed on mac-mini in order: oikos stack's web service stopped+removed, oikos-web project brought up on 8091; outer Caddy untouched (targets the published port) — serving + Authentik flow + /wails 404 quirk verified post-cutover. - Stripped from oikos: web/, cmd/desktop/, compose/web/, desktop CI workflow, ci.yml web job, Makefile ui/desktop/desktop-package/install targets, the compose web service, oikos-web from deploy.sh's fallback prune list; wails + go-keyring dropped from go.mod, vendor synced. - README / CONTRIBUTING / AGENTS.md / .agents dev+operations docs now point at the new repo; mbse + mascot design docs carry a path note. Risk: production SPA serving depends on the new pipeline now; rollback is versioned-image re-up of the old web service from a pre-split checkout (port 8091). Desktop builds installed before the split still check dtoro/oikos releases — one manual reinstall, noted in the oikos-web release notes. Verification: go vet, make test (race), make generate-check, golangci (no new findings; baseline down 400→365); post-cutover curls — localhost:8091 200, /wails/runtime.js 404, outer Caddy 302 Authentik.
83 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
83 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
# postcss-selector-parser [](https://github.com/postcss/postcss-selector-parser/actions/workflows/test.yml)
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> Selector parser with built in methods for working with selector strings.
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## Install
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With [npm](https://npmjs.com/package/postcss-selector-parser) do:
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```
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npm install postcss-selector-parser
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```
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## Quick Start
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```js
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const parser = require('postcss-selector-parser');
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const transform = selectors => {
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selectors.walk(selector => {
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// do something with the selector
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console.log(String(selector))
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});
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};
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const transformed = parser(transform).processSync('h1, h2, h3');
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```
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To normalize selector whitespace:
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```js
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const parser = require('postcss-selector-parser');
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const normalized = parser().processSync('h1, h2, h3', {lossless: false});
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// -> h1,h2,h3
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```
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Async support is provided through `parser.process` and will resolve a Promise
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with the resulting selector string.
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## API
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Please see [API.md](API.md).
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## Security
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### Selector nesting depth (CVE-2026-9358)
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The parser walks the selector AST recursively, both when parsing and when
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serializing it back to a string (`.toString()`). In versions up to and
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including `7.1.1`, a selector with extreme nesting — for example thousands of
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nested `:not(...)` — could recurse deeply enough to overflow the call stack and
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throw `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`, a potential
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denial-of-service when processing untrusted CSS.
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This is now bounded by a maximum nesting depth (default: `256`). Beyond that
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depth, parsing and serialization throw a regular, catchable `Error` at a
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predictable point instead of relying on the runtime hitting its stack limit.
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The default is far above any realistic selector, so it does not affect normal
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use.
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**Practical impact is low.** The only attacker-controlled input is the selector
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string itself, which is now capped by the default limit. The limit is
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adjustable through the `maxNestingDepth` option, but that option is trusted
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configuration provided by the integrating code — it is never derived from the
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parsed CSS, so a malicious selector cannot change it:
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```js
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// Tighten the limit when parsing untrusted input:
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parser().processSync(untrustedSelector, {maxNestingDepth: 128});
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```
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Raising `maxNestingDepth` to a very large value is an explicit, informed choice
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and can reintroduce the stack-overflow risk in environments with a small call
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stack (e.g. browser workers). The default is recommended unless you have a
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specific need.
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## Credits
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* Huge thanks to Andrey Sitnik (@ai) for work on PostCSS which helped
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accelerate this module's development.
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## License
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MIT
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