oikos/plans/2026-07-10-general-gated-execution.md

# 2026-07-10 — General gated execution: from fixed actions to unlimited-but-gated

**Status:** In Progress — audited 2026-07-11. Done: `ClassifyCommand` risk
classifier, general `run` MCP tool, chat-assent approval (no button
required), blast radius on approval cards, session digest, global activity
feed (`Ops.svelte` "Executions" tab, risk-badged), Learning view
(success-rate trend). Still open: retire the fixed `request_execution`
action enum (`restart, systemctl, pct_exec, apt_upgrade, pct_create` still
hard-coded alongside `run`), and revive auto-act — `internal/actuator/actuator.go:125`
is still a literal `{"success": true, "message": "stub execution"}` stub.

## Goal

Make Nomos able to do **anything** needed to maintain the homelab — provision
LXCs, deploy services, debug, restart, fix configs, investigate — without that
capability being a fixed enum of hand-coded actions. The action space is
unlimited; the *gate* on it is a risk classifier + operator approval, not a
whitelist of tricks. Knowledge (the graph + runbooks) supplies the *how*; the
agent's reasoning supplies the *what*; the classifier supplies the *may I*.

Operator directive (2026-07-10): **"The number of actions the agent should be
able to do is unlimited. We need logic to gate destructive actions, but we
should not limit what the agent can do."**

Chosen autonomy posture for v1: **approve-most (cautious)** — only genuinely
read-only commands auto-run; anything that changes state requires operator
approval. We can relax later once the classifier and ledger have earned trust.

Operator directive #2 (2026-07-10): **"I want to see the system come alive and
learn and get better."** Observability is a first-class deliverable, not a
side-effect. As a user I must be able to see, in real time: what is being
executed, on what, and why; how it was classified and routed; what the outcome
was; and — crucially — **what knowledge the session created** (new runbooks,
patterns, resolved signals, ledger entries) so the system's growth is visible.

Operator directive #3 (2026-07-10): **approval is granted by chat assent, not a
button.** When Nomos proposes a plan/action and the operator replies "go ahead"
/ "yes" / "do it" in the chat, that assent *is* the approval. No separate
Approve button for the normal case. (Destructive actions still require an
explicit typed confirmation phrase — see Safety.)

## This is a realignment, not a new idea

[.agents/OIKOS.md](../.agents/OIKOS.md) already specifies this exact model:

> The classifier scores **risk class × blast radius × confidence** and routes:
> auto-act / escalate / queue. The classifier can only *lower* autonomy relative
> to policy, never raise it. When in doubt, escalate.
> Act — execute through `homelab` commands or **runbooks** (never ad-hoc SSH).

So the target architecture is the *documented* architecture. The problem is the
implementation diverged from it on the agent's action path.

## Gap analysis (grounded in code)

| Designed (OIKOS.md) | Actually implemented today |
|---|---|
| Classifier routes every action by risk × blast × confidence | [`internal/policy/classify.go`](../internal/policy/classify.go) `ClassifySignal()` only classifies **Signals** (the Observe pipeline), by entity+action-type. It is **not** called by the agent's mutation path. |
| Agent acts through unlimited **runbooks** | Agent acts through `request_execution` with a **hard-coded enum**: `restart, systemctl, pct_exec, apt_upgrade, pct_create` ([`internal/mcp/server.go`](../internal/mcp/server.go)), each bespoke Go, gated by per-action `if`s, not the classifier. New capability = new Go + redeploy. |
| Runbooks/skills are executable data | `skills` table + `.agents/skills/*` + `knowledge_entities` exist and are *readable* (`get_skills`), but **nothing executes a runbook**. The knowledge is inert w.r.t. action. |
| Auto-act loop consumes classified signals and acts | [`internal/actuator/actuator.go:124`](../internal/actuator/actuator.go) is a literal `"stub execution"` — it marks work done without doing it. |
| "Never ad-hoc SSH" | `pct_exec` **is** ad-hoc SSH (arbitrary shell in a container) and **auto-runs with no approval or classification**. |

Net: the elegant model exists as scaffolding (classifier, policy schema, risk
classes, blast-radius graph walks, skills-as-data, ledger, and the
approval+feedback plumbing hardened in the 2026-07-09/10 sessions), but the live
agent→action path is a bag of tricks that bypasses all of it. Everything added
in the recent LXC-deploy work (`pct_create` + DNS/VMID/template logic) made the
bag *bigger* — reliable, but on the wrong axis.

**Bones that already exist and get reused:** `internal/policy` (classifier +
`computeBlastRadius`/`blast_radius()` SQL), `risk_classes`/`action_risk` tables,
`seeds/policy.yaml`, `executions`/`approvals`/`audit_log`, the MCP SSH machinery,
and the inline approval + execution-status feedback loop (chat polls
`GET /executions/{id}`).

## Target architecture — three layers

### Layer 0 — one general gated primitive (the foundation)

Collapse the fixed enum into essentially one tool:

```
run(target, command, purpose, [declared_risk])
```

- `target` — any host or LXC slug; resolves to SSH (host) or `pct exec` (LXC).
- `command` — arbitrary shell.
- `purpose` — the agent's stated intent (shown to the operator, feeds classify).
- `declared_risk` — optional agent self-assessment.

Every call flows through:

1. **Classify** the command → `read_only | reversible_low | config_mutation |
   destructive`. Rule-based:
   - read-only **allowlist** (e.g. leading verb in `cat, ls, stat, journalctl,
     systemctl status|is-active, pct config|status, df, free, uptime, ip, ss,
     docker ps|logs, git status|log`) → `read_only`;
   - destructive **denylist** (`rm -rf`, `dd`, `mkfs`, `wipefs`, `pct destroy`,
     `qm destroy`, `shutdown`, `reboot`, `> /dev/`, `:(){ :|:& };:`, secret
     exfiltration, piping remote scripts to a root shell) → `destructive`;
   - anything writing state / installing / editing configs → `config_mutation`;
   - **default → escalate** (`config_mutation`) when unsure.
   The classifier may only make `declared_risk` **stricter**, never looser
   (mirrors "can only lower autonomy, never raise").
2. **Route** (approve-most posture):
   - `read_only` → auto-run + ledger, no approval.
   - `reversible_low` / `config_mutation` → **operator approval via chat assent**
     (v1 gates all state changes; a later posture can auto-run `reversible_low`).
   - `destructive` → approval **+ typed confirmation phrase**.
3. **Execute** (existing SSH/`pct exec`), **verify** (optional check command),
   **ledger** (`executions` + `audit_log`), **stream feedback to chat** (reuse
   the `GET /executions/{id}` polling + `InlineApproval` phases already built).

### Approval by chat assent (replaces the Approve button)

The operator is already authenticated in the chat session, so their words are
the authorization — a separate button is redundant friction. Flow:

- Nomos proposes an action/plan; the gated `run` calls sit in `pending_approval`
  (created in the same turn, tied to that turn's `correlation_id`).
- The operator's next message is checked for **assent** ("go ahead", "yes",
  "do it", "proceed", "ship it") scoped to *that* proposal. On assent, the
  pending approvals from that turn are granted and execute.
- Mechanism: Nomos detects assent and calls an `approve_pending(correlation_id)`
  action; the backend flips the linked approvals → the existing
  `executeApprovedAction` path runs. The **grant is recorded with the exact
  operator message** that constituted assent (audit).
- Guards: assent only applies to approvals from the immediately-preceding turn
  (no stale "yes" approving something old); ambiguous replies ("maybe",
  "later", a follow-up question) do **not** grant — Nomos re-confirms;
  **destructive** actions ignore loose assent and still require the typed
  confirmation phrase.
- The inline UI still *shows* the pending action and its classification (so the
  operator sees what they're assenting to) and reflects the grant — but the
  primary path is "say yes," with the button demoted to an optional affordance.

Layer 0 alone delivers "the agent can attempt anything; state changes are gated."

### Layer 1 — runbooks as executable data (reliability without rigidity)

The hard-won procedures become **runbooks in the knowledge DB**, retrieved and
executed step-by-step via Layer 0 — not frozen Go:

- `pct_create` + its DNS-self-heal / VMID-collision / template-resolution /
  locale logic becomes the canonical **"provision LXC" runbook** (parametric
  steps the agent fills in and runs through `run`). The reliability survives as
  documented, reusable steps rather than a compiled handler.
- New capability = **new runbook (data)**, no redeploy.
- Keep a *small* set of mechanical helpers where a shell step is genuinely
  fiddly (e.g. "pick a free cluster VMID"), exposed as callable sub-tools — but
  the flow is agent-driven, not enum-driven.

This is the crucial **both/and**: the general primitive is the unlimited escape
hatch; curated runbooks are the reliable fast-path so the agent doesn't
re-derive DNS/VMID/docker every time (the exact thing that failed repeatedly in
the 2026-07-09 sessions).

### Layer 2 — learning closes the loop

Successful ad-hoc `run` sequences get promoted into runbooks/patterns (the
`learning` engine + `skills` table already exist for this); the failure ledger
informs retries. The system grows more capable **as data**, not as code.

## Layer 3 — Observability: watch the system come alive

The user must *see* the OODA loop working, not just trust it. Four surfaces,
built on data the loop already produces (`executions`, `audit_log`, `signals`,
`skills`, `knowledge_entities`) — the job is to make it visible, live, and
legible, not to invent new telemetry.

**1. Live action feed (in the chat turn).** Every `run` renders a card as it
happens: `target` · `purpose` · **risk badge** (green read-only / amber
config / red destructive) · status (queued → running → ok/failed) · collapsible
output. Streams in real time (SSE, extend the existing execution-status feed).
The operator watches Nomos *work*, step by step, with the reasoning (`purpose`)
and the classifier's verdict on every step.

**2. "What this session did" digest.** At the end of a task/turn, a summary
card: N commands (X auto / Y assented / Z denied), entities changed (linked),
signals resolved, and **knowledge created** — new/updated runbooks, patterns
promoted, notes written — each linked to its record. This is the "what did the
agent actually change and learn" answer in one glance.

**3. The learning view — "the system is getting better."** A dedicated page:
runbooks and their **success-rate trend**, newly promoted skills, pattern
confidence (Wilson bounds already computed by the learning engine), recent
auto-acts that succeeded unattended, and a **capability timeline** ("2026-07-11:
learned to deploy Compose stacks; success 4/4"). Growth made tangible.

**4. Global activity/ledger stream.** A live feed of every action across the
fleet — command, target, classification, decision (auto / assented-by-whom),
outcome — the audit log rendered as a heartbeat. Filterable by entity, risk,
outcome.

These reuse existing tables; the work is API endpoints + SSE fan-out + Svelte
views, plus writing knowledge-creation events into the ledger so the digest has
something to show.

## Safety model (the whole point of the gate)

- **Default-escalate.** Nothing is *forbidden*; risky things need the operator's
  "yes." Unknown/unparseable risk → approval.
- **Hard denylist** for catastrophic patterns → always typed confirmation, even
  if the agent declared them safe.
- **Blast radius at approval time** — graph walk (`blast_radius()` exists):
  "this restarts caddy → 8 downstream services."
- **Preview / dry-run** where the command supports it.
- **Kill-switch** (`global.auto_act`, per-target `never_auto_act.*`) already
  exists; extend to a global "require approval for everything" flip.
- **Full audit ledger** — every command, its classification, decision, actor,
  output. Non-negotiable.
- **Scope guards** — resolve `target` to a real entity first; refuse commands
  against `destroyed`/unknown targets; cap output size (already done).

## Honest risks / tradeoffs

- Trades a small vetted surface (5 actions) for arbitrary root across the fleet,
  LLM-driven, gated only by classifier + approval. Classifying arbitrary shell
  perfectly is impossible; **default-escalate + hard denylist + always-on audit**
  is the mitigation, not perfect classification.
- Approve-most means more operator clicks initially. Acceptable while trust is
  built; the posture is a config knob, not a rewrite.
- Runbook-as-data can drift from reality like any doc; the ledger + verify step
  + learning loop are the correction mechanism.

## Migration path (incremental, each step shippable)

1. **Command classifier** — extend `internal/policy` with
   `ClassifyCommand(cmd, declaredRisk) → riskClass` (allowlist/denylist/default-
   escalate + can-only-escalate rule). Unit-tested against a corpus of safe /
   mutating / catastrophic commands.
2. **`run` tool** — new MCP tool routing classify → gate → execute → the
   existing feedback path. Ship alongside the current tools (no removal yet).
3. **Live action feed (UI)** — render each `run` as a streaming card in chat:
   purpose, target, risk badge, status, output. This is the first "come alive"
   win and validates the SSE fan-out.
4. **Chat-assent approval** — assent detection scoped to the last turn's
   `correlation_id` → `approve_pending`; grant records the operator's message;
   destructive still needs the typed phrase. Demote the Approve button.
5. **Approval context** — surface risk class + blast radius + purpose inline so
   the operator sees what they're assenting to.
6. **Session digest + activity stream (UI)** — "what this session did / created"
   card and the global ledger feed; write knowledge-creation events to the
   ledger so there's something to show.
7. **Runbook execution** — a "provision LXC" runbook (ports the current
   `pct_create` logic) executed via `run`; validate parity with today's handler.
8. **Learning view (UI)** — runbook success-rate trends, promoted skills,
   capability timeline.
9. **Retire the enum** — convert remaining hard-coded actions to runbooks; make
   `request_execution` a thin deprecated alias or remove it.
10. **Revive auto-act** — replace the actuator stub, reusing the *same*
    classifier for the Observe→Act direction (signals), still approve-most.

## Verification

- Classifier corpus test: read-only commands auto-pass; a set of known
  catastrophic commands always route to destructive+confirmation; ambiguous
  commands escalate. No command auto-runs that mutates state.
- End-to-end: operator asks Nomos a novel task **not** in the old enum (e.g.
  "tail caddy's error log and restart it if it's flapping"); Nomos composes
  `run` calls; read-only steps auto-run and **stream as live cards**; the restart
  gates; the operator types "go ahead" and the restart executes (no button);
  ledger records each command + classification + the assent message.
- Observability: the session ends with a digest listing what ran, what changed,
  and any knowledge created; the learning view shows the run's contribution.
- Parity: "provision an LXC with a service" via the runbook path matches the
  reliability proven for the `pct_create` handler (free VMID, DNS, install,
  verify), then destroy.

## Open questions for the operator

- **Reversible-low posture:** keep gating restarts/syncs in v1 (chosen), or
  auto-run them once the classifier is trusted?
- **Confirmation phrase:** per-action typed phrase for destructive, or a global
  one? (Assent covers non-destructive; destructive keeps the typed phrase.)
- **Assent detection:** rule/keyword match, or let the model judge assent (with
  a re-confirm on ambiguity)? How strict — does "yeah do the restart but not the
  upgrade" partially grant?
- **Runbook authorship:** operator-authored only, or may Nomos propose new
  runbooks (subject to approval) from successful ad-hoc sequences?
- **Blast-radius threshold:** should a large blast radius force approval even for
  otherwise-reversible actions?