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oikos/web/node_modules/postcss-selector-parser/README.md
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feat: Phase 1 — extract the client (web SPA + desktop) to dtoro/oikos-web
Problem: the hexagonal refactor churns the backend tree for nine more
phases; the UI delivery stack (web/ SPA, cmd/desktop Wails wrapper,
compose/web image) must move to its own repo first so doc/layout
rewrites land once on a backend-only tree.

Change:
- New repo git.hubris.network/dtoro/oikos-web (v0.33.0): web/, desktop/
  (updateURL repointed to oikos-web releases), compose/, own CI (web +
  desktop jobs), own deploy script (CI-green gate, TOCTOU guard,
  version-tagged images, prune-to-3), own webhook receiver on :9798 +
  launchd unit, own compose project publishing the same 8091:80.
- Cutover executed on mac-mini in order: oikos stack's web service
  stopped+removed, oikos-web project brought up on 8091; outer Caddy
  untouched (targets the published port) — serving + Authentik flow +
  /wails 404 quirk verified post-cutover.
- Stripped from oikos: web/, cmd/desktop/, compose/web/, desktop CI
  workflow, ci.yml web job, Makefile ui/desktop/desktop-package/install
  targets, the compose web service, oikos-web from deploy.sh's fallback
  prune list; wails + go-keyring dropped from go.mod, vendor synced.
- README / CONTRIBUTING / AGENTS.md / .agents dev+operations docs now
  point at the new repo; mbse + mascot design docs carry a path note.

Risk: production SPA serving depends on the new pipeline now; rollback
is versioned-image re-up of the old web service from a pre-split
checkout (port 8091). Desktop builds installed before the split still
check dtoro/oikos releases — one manual reinstall, noted in the
oikos-web release notes.

Verification: go vet, make test (race), make generate-check, golangci
(no new findings; baseline down 400→365); post-cutover curls —
localhost:8091 200, /wails/runtime.js 404, outer Caddy 302 Authentik.
2026-08-15 22:27:52 +02:00

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2.6 KiB
Markdown

# postcss-selector-parser [![test](https://github.com/postcss/postcss-selector-parser/actions/workflows/test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/postcss/postcss-selector-parser/actions/workflows/test.yml)
> Selector parser with built in methods for working with selector strings.
## Install
With [npm](https://npmjs.com/package/postcss-selector-parser) do:
```
npm install postcss-selector-parser
```
## Quick Start
```js
const parser = require('postcss-selector-parser');
const transform = selectors => {
selectors.walk(selector => {
// do something with the selector
console.log(String(selector))
});
};
const transformed = parser(transform).processSync('h1, h2, h3');
```
To normalize selector whitespace:
```js
const parser = require('postcss-selector-parser');
const normalized = parser().processSync('h1, h2, h3', {lossless: false});
// -> h1,h2,h3
```
Async support is provided through `parser.process` and will resolve a Promise
with the resulting selector string.
## API
Please see [API.md](API.md).
## Security
### Selector nesting depth (CVE-2026-9358)
The parser walks the selector AST recursively, both when parsing and when
serializing it back to a string (`.toString()`). In versions up to and
including `7.1.1`, a selector with extreme nesting — for example thousands of
nested `:not(...)` — could recurse deeply enough to overflow the call stack and
throw `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`, a potential
denial-of-service when processing untrusted CSS.
This is now bounded by a maximum nesting depth (default: `256`). Beyond that
depth, parsing and serialization throw a regular, catchable `Error` at a
predictable point instead of relying on the runtime hitting its stack limit.
The default is far above any realistic selector, so it does not affect normal
use.
**Practical impact is low.** The only attacker-controlled input is the selector
string itself, which is now capped by the default limit. The limit is
adjustable through the `maxNestingDepth` option, but that option is trusted
configuration provided by the integrating code — it is never derived from the
parsed CSS, so a malicious selector cannot change it:
```js
// Tighten the limit when parsing untrusted input:
parser().processSync(untrustedSelector, {maxNestingDepth: 128});
```
Raising `maxNestingDepth` to a very large value is an explicit, informed choice
and can reintroduce the stack-overflow risk in environments with a small call
stack (e.g. browser workers). The default is recommended unless you have a
specific need.
## Credits
* Huge thanks to Andrey Sitnik (@ai) for work on PostCSS which helped
accelerate this module's development.
## License
MIT