Standard baseline for an enrolled workstation-class client, matching mac-mini/republic-laptop/etc: the bootstrap decrypt-test secret plus the write-scoped Gitea PAT so strong can push to the wiki repo on its own (homelab client add/remove, wiki edits from that host). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
secrets/
SOPS-encrypted YAML files. The plaintext lives only in transit and in the operator's head — committed files are always ciphertext.
Conventions
- One file per logical grouping (e.g.
gitea-tokens.yaml,webhook-hmacs.yaml,api-keys.yaml). - Recipients are declared in
../.sops.yamlby path-regex, not per-file. - The plaintext schema inside each file is free-form YAML; the consumer code
decides what it expects (e.g.
gitea-tokens.yamlcontains{"<host>": "ghp_xxx"}).
How to add a secret
# 1. Decide which clients should be able to decrypt it; edit ../.sops.yaml to
# list their age public keys for the new path_regex.
# 2. Create the plaintext, encrypt in place:
sops -e --in-place secrets/my-thing.yaml
# 3. Commit + push. The 5-min sync propagates to every recipient.
How to consume a secret
# On any client that's a recipient:
homelab secret my-thing # prints plaintext
# Or programmatically:
sops -d /opt/homelab-context/secrets/my-thing.yaml
The mcp tool list_my_secrets(caller_pubkey) returns the names of secrets
the caller can decrypt. The MCP server never reads plaintext — decryption
stays client-side.
Granting / revoking access
To grant a new recipient: edit ../.sops.yaml to add their age pubkey, then
re-key every affected file:
sops updatekeys -y secrets/my-thing.yaml
To revoke: remove the recipient from ../.sops.yaml and sops updatekeys —
but remember this only protects future ciphertext. Past plaintext the client
already decrypted is gone from your control. Rotate the underlying credential
if compromise is suspected.
homelab client remove <name> does the recipient removal + updatekeys for
you, and prints the rotation checklist as a follow-up.
hello.yaml — bootstrap decrypt test
secrets/hello.yaml is encrypted to every enrolled client. Used by Phase 3a
verification to confirm the end-to-end decrypt path works on a freshly-
bootstrapped machine. Content is intentionally trivial:
greeting: hello from the homelab