docs: correct file naming convention — foundational docs are ALL-CAPS

The previous naming guide was incomplete. The actual convention is:

**Foundational docs:** ALL-CAPS
- Root entry-points: AGENTS.md, README.md (discovery paths)
- Agent instruction: .agents/OIKOS.md, .agents/HERMES.md (docs agents read first)
- Reference docs: GLOSSARY.md (like classic repo files: LICENSE, CHANGELOG)

**Content pages:** lowercase-with-dashes
- Containers: <id>-<name>.md (ID from inventory)
- Infrastructure: <topic>.md (system description)
- Plans/investigations: YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md (date-sorted)
- Section indices: README.md (conventional)

**Skills:** special pattern
- <name>/SKILL.md where <name> is lowercase-with-dashes
- SKILL.md filename is always uppercase — signpost for tools and humans

Uppercase is reserved for foundational/signpost docs; all paths otherwise use
lowercase with hyphens (no underscores).

Updated page-templates.md with expanded explanation, and updated AGENTS.md +
README.md to reference the corrected convention.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.agents/HERMES.md

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+# HERMES.md — Agent persona for homelab clients
+
+This file is the canonical agent persona for **all** AI agents running on
+machines in the **hubris** homelab. It prescribes behaviour, token-efficiency
+conventions, and the source-of-truth hierarchy.
+
+## Source of truth
+
+The homelab-context repo at `/opt/homelab-context/` is the single source of
+truth for:
+- Fleet topology (`inventory.yaml`, `hosts/*.yaml`)
+- Service endpoints and credentials (via `homelab secret`)
+- Agent behaviour and conventions
+- Everything in this file
+
+When in doubt, check `/opt/homelab-context/` first.
+
+## Runbooks — load, don't rediscover
+
+For the canonical workflows (service health check, config change +
+deploy, client enrollment, incident investigation, and each node
+lifecycle transition), read the matching `.agents/skills/<name>/SKILL.md` before
+acting. Each skill carries its risk class, required inputs, the
+verification command, and a docs-update checklist in its frontmatter —
+classify against `oikos/policy.yaml` using that risk class before any
+mutation. Don't re-derive topology or the mutation path by grepping the
+wiki when a runbook already encodes it. See [OIKOS.md](OIKOS.md) for the
+operating model these runbooks execute inside (OODA loop, risk classes,
+approval flow, ontology).
+
+## Agent type — how this file gets loaded
+
+| Agent | Loading mechanism |
+|-------|------------------|
+| **Hermes** | `tools/setup-hermes-soul.sh` (auto-setup) → provisions `~/.hermes/SOUL.md` from this file |
+| **Goose** | `.goosehints` symlink at `~/.config/goose/.goosehints` → `/opt/homelab-context/HERMES.md` |
+| **Claude Code / Codex** | Symlink or copy this file into the project's `CLAUDES.md` / `.claude` instructions |
+
+**Do not edit SOUL.md or .goosehints directly.** Edit this file in the
+homelab-context repo instead. Changes propagate to all clients on the next
+sync (`sudo homelab sync`).
+
+---
+
+## Token efficiency (caveman skill)
+
+All homelab agents use the **Caveman + RTK** token optimization approach from
+https://github.com/adityahimaone/hermes-agent-rtk-caveman.
+
+### Before running any CLI command, ask:
+
+1. **Is there a caveman wrapper equivalent?** Use the wrapper for token-efficient
+   output. Available wrappers (installed at `~/bin/caveman_wrapper.sh`):
+   - `~/bin/caveman_wrapper.sh git-status` — compact git status
+   - `~/bin/caveman_wrapper.sh git-log [n]` — compact git log
+   - `~/bin/caveman_wrapper.sh lint [target]` — compact lint results
+   - `~/bin/caveman_wrapper.sh test-results [cmd]` — compact test results
+
+2. **If no caveman wrapper exists, pipe through `rtk`** to compress output:
+   ```
+   rtk <command>
+   ```
+   RTK (Rust Token Killer) strips redundant whitespace, trims long paths, and
+   deduplicates repeated lines. This reduces token usage by 60-90% on CLI
+   operations.
+
+3. **For homelab operations**, prefer the `homelab` CLI or MCP tools over
+   raw SSH/shell — they're already token-optimized.
+
+### Templates
+
+Caveman templates live at `~/templates/`:
+- `git_status.txt` — compact git status format
+- `git_log.txt` — compact git log format
+- `lint_results.txt` — compact ESLint format
+- `test_results.txt` — compact vitest/jest format
+
+### When to skip caveman/rtk
+
+- Interactive commands (editors, prompts) — let human-readable output pass
+- Commands with no output — skip entirely
+- When you need the exact raw output for post-processing
+
+### Verification
+
+```bash
+ls ~/bin/caveman_wrapper.sh && echo "caveman ready"
+```
+
+## Important note for Hermes agents
+
+If you are reading this as a Hermes agent, your SOUL.md was auto-provisioned
+by `tools/setup-hermes-soul.sh`. This file is the canonical original — you
+can verify the content matches or re-provision by running:
+
+    bash /opt/homelab-context/tools/setup-hermes-soul.sh

.agents/OIKOS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+# Oikos — the operating model
+
+Oikos (Greek: *household*) is the agent operating system layered on this
+repo. It is not new infrastructure: `inventory.yaml` is the kernel data
+structure, the `homelab` CLI and MCP server are the syscall surface, and
+this page defines the rules everything above them follows.
+
+Read this after [AGENTS.md](../AGENTS.md). Machine-readable companions:
+[oikos/ontology.yaml](../oikos/ontology.yaml) (systems model),
+[oikos/policy.yaml](../oikos/policy.yaml) (risk & approval).
+
+## The kernel loop: OODA
+
+Every Oikos activity — scheduled probe, agent task, operator request — is
+one pass through **Observe → Orient → Decide → Act**:
+
+1. **Observe** — probes, drift detectors, and agent findings produce
+   **Signals** (structured records, not loose messages): pending updates,
+   high temperature, low disk, service down, cert expiry, stale backup,
+   inventory drift.
+2. **Orient** — walk the ontology graph: what entity is affected, what
+   depends on it (blast radius), its lifecycle state, whether a runbook
+   matches, what the ledger says about past attempts.
+3. **Decide** — the classifier scores **risk class × blast radius ×
+   confidence** and routes:
+   - **auto-act**: within autonomy policy, high confidence, contained radius
+   - **escalate**: operator approval via Matrix (✅/❌ reaction) or the
+     Oikos Console's `/approvals` page (destructive actions additionally
+     need a typed confirmation phrase either way)
+   - **queue**: informational — console + reports
+   The classifier can only *lower* autonomy relative to policy, never raise
+   it. When in doubt, escalate.
+4. **Act** — execute through `homelab` commands or runbooks (never ad-hoc
+   SSH), then **verify** with the action's verification command, write a
+   **ledger** entry, resolve the Signal, and update docs in the same session.
+
+## Primitives
+
+| Primitive | What it is | Lives in |
+|---|---|---|
+| Host / Service | topology entities | `inventory.yaml` (+ generated `hosts/*.yaml`) |
+| Secret | SOPS+age encrypted value, per-client recipients | `secrets/` + `.sops.yaml` |
+| Runbook | executable workflow with risk class + verification | `.agents/skills/<name>/SKILL.md` |
+| Signal | something needing attention, with lifecycle | `signals/` ledger (Week 3) |
+| Change | one mutation: who, what, risk, approval, verification | `ledger/` (Week 2) |
+| Approval | short-TTL signed grant for a gated action | approval engine (Week 3) |
+| Incident | investigation narrative | `knowledge/sources/investigations/` |
+| Plan | design doc for non-trivial work | `plans/` |
+| Agent | enrolled client identity = its age pubkey | `inventory.yaml` + `.sops.yaml` |
+
+## Risk classes (enforced, not advisory)
+
+From [oikos/policy.yaml](../oikos/policy.yaml):
+
+- **read_only** — status, logs, docs, inventory. Unattended.
+- **reversible_low** — restart, cache clear, sync pull. Unattended + ledger.
+- **config_mutation** — tracked-config edits (commit+push, never local),
+  deploys, upgrades, DNS/ingress changes. Operator approval.
+- **destructive** — destroy, format, wipe, rotate, revoke. Approval +
+  typed confirmation phrase.
+
+Lifecycle gates modify these: `provisioning` nodes are freely mutable
+(nothing depends on them); `deprecated` nodes accept no new dependents;
+anything touching a `destroyed` node is drift.
+
+## The systems model
+
+Eight domains — physical, compute, network, storage, software,
+identity & access, operations, external — cover everything in the lab;
+entities are connected by typed edges (`hosts`, `provides`, `mounts`,
+`stores-on`, `routes-to`, `can-decrypt`, `depends-on`, `backs-up-to`, …)
+defined in [oikos/ontology.yaml](../oikos/ontology.yaml). Rule of
+completeness: **if it can break, be changed, or hold data, it has an
+entity and edges.** Blast-radius questions ("what breaks if strong goes
+down?") are graph walks, not doc archaeology.
+
+Nodes move through an explicit lifecycle —
+`planned → provisioning → active → migrating → deprecated → destroyed` —
+stored as `state:` in inventory (absent = active). Destroyed nodes live in
+the `archaeology:` section. Each transition is a runbook checklist;
+deprecation completes only when inbound edges reach zero.
+
+Generated views: [infrastructure/topology.md](../knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/topology.md)
+(Mermaid, regenerated from inventory) and the live, clickable version at
+`oikos.hubris.network/graph` once the Console is deployed.
+
+## Conventions carried forward
+
+- Inventory is the truth; live state wins over narrative docs.
+- Prefer `homelab` CLI and MCP over ad-hoc SSH.
+- Meaningful changes update docs in the same session.
+- Secrets are decrypted locally via per-client keys; never into docs/comments.
+- Tracked configs change by commit + push, not local edits.
+- Netbird is the preferred mesh path for new traffic.
+- Agents are terse ([caveman.md](shared/caveman.md)), verify claims, and fix
+  collateral drift when found.
+
+## Build status (30-day roadmap, started 2026-07-05)
+
+- **Week 1**: policy, ontology, service contract, archaeology, topology
+  generator, this brief. Shipped.
+- **Week 2**: context cards, `homelab service <name> …`, change ledger,
+  `node relations`, runbooks. Shipped.
+- **Week 3**: ops scheduler + state cache (`homelab service <name> health`
+  is cache-first, `--live` forces a probe), drift detectors, signal engine
+  (`homelab signal …`), decision classifier (`homelab decide …`), approval
+  engine (`homelab approval …` — shared-HMAC grants; Matrix delivery is
+  Hermes's existing `@dtoro:avispero` send path, not a new bot, see
+  `oikos/approve.py`), daily brief + weekly report (`oikos/report.py`).
+  Shipped, except: Prometheus is still `planned` (see
+  [plans/2026-07-05-oikos-prometheus-lxc.md](../plans/2026-07-05-oikos-prometheus-lxc.md)) —
+  trend signals (disk-full prediction, temp creep) wait on that LXC; the
+  scheduler's disk check today is point-in-time only, and CPU/NVMe
+  temperature isn't probed at all yet (no confirmed sensor path on
+  hubris/strong). DNS-vs-inventory and generic tracked-config-cleanliness
+  drift checks are also deferred (see `oikos/drift.py` docstring).
+- **Week 4**: Oikos Console v0 shipped — signals landing page, service
+  grid + detail, node/blast-radius view, live Mermaid graph, drift view,
+  approvals queue (approve/deny, destructive confirmation-phrase
+  enforced), daily/weekly reports. Server-rendered FastAPI + Jinja2, no
+  SPA build chain, tested end-to-end against live production data (see
+  `oikos/console/`). Deploys as a third webhook on `dtoro/Homelab-Docs`
+  (`/opt/oikos-console`, port :9831) — see
+  [oikos/console/deploy/README.md](../oikos/console/deploy/README.md) for
+  the Caddy route and Gitea webhook registration this repo can't do for
+  itself. Approval grants are now single-use (a second `check_grant` call
+  for the same request fails even within the TTL) and already exact-bound
+  to request id + entity + action.
+  **Not shipped as originally planned:** per-agent *age-key-signed*
+  request authentication — age has no signing primitive (it's an
+  encryption-only keypair format), so "age-key-signed" wasn't
+  buildable as stated. The real alternative (SSH-key signing via
+  `ssh-keygen -Y sign`/`-Y verify`, using each host's already-provisioned
+  SSH key) is real and buildable, but needs SSH public keys recorded in
+  inventory first — not there today. Moved to the 60/90-day backlog.
+  Authentik step-up re-auth on the approve/deny route is documented but
+  needs a live Authentik instance to configure — also backlog.
+  Docs pass done (this file, AGENTS.md, operations/commands.md); found
+  and fixed two more stale references while at it (DNS section still
+  pointed at destroyed LXC 124/dnsmasq instead of Technitium on 107, and
+  a `claudio-monitor` reference that's been deprecated since 2026-06-04).
+
+### Real drift found while building Week 3 (unresolved, needs operator action)
+
+The drift detectors surfaced genuine, currently-true findings on first
+run against production — recorded here rather than silently fixed, since
+each is a `config_mutation`/`destructive`-class decision:
+
+- `republic-laptop` has no `age_pubkey:` in `inventory.yaml`, but its real
+  age key is granted on nearly every shared secret in `.sops.yaml`
+  (`age1vf8h7...`) — the enrollment write-back to inventory never
+  happened. Fix: `homelab client add republic-laptop --finalize-pubkey
+  age1vf8h7s8mqsn2q5eadgpdupsj4mwn8zguc77d85ws3xj40sl9rgksx2rxw6`.
+- `grimmory` has an `age_pubkey` in inventory but is missing from
+  `secrets/hello.yaml`'s recipient list — incomplete enrollment the
+  other direction. Fix: re-run `homelab client add grimmory
+  --finalize-pubkey <its key>`.
+- `pve_id 131` exists live on hubris (`pct list`) with no inventory entry
+  — investigate before assuming it's a stale ID (see the Prometheus LXC
+  plan doc above, which flags this explicitly).
+- Three `lifecycle-pve-id-reuse` info findings (100, 106, 107 each shared
+  between an active host and an archaeology entry) — expected/benign ID
+  reuse after destroy, no action needed.
+
+## 60/90-day backlog
+
+Derived from gaps observed while building the 30-day roadmap, not
+guesswork. Roughly ordered by what unblocks the most:
+
+- **Fix the oikos-console deploy webhook's signature mismatch.** Console
+  is live on apps (105) via a manual `deploy.sh` run, but Gitea webhook
+  14's deliveries all 403 with a signature mismatch for a cause not yet
+  found — the secret is confirmed synced correctly on both sides
+  (rotated once already to rule out drift). Until fixed, `git push`
+  doesn't auto-redeploy the console the way it does for homelab-mcp/
+  secrets-issuance; re-run `deploy.sh` on apps manually after changes.
+  See [oikos/console/deploy/README.md](../oikos/console/deploy/README.md).
+- **SSH-key-signed approval requests.** Replaces the design note in
+  Week 4: age keys can't sign (encryption-only format), so per-agent
+  request authentication needs `ssh-keygen -Y sign`/`-Y verify` against
+  each host's existing SSH key. Blocked on a schema gap: inventory
+  doesn't record SSH public keys today, only ports/users. First step is
+  populating that field on enrollment, then wiring `oikos/approve.py` to
+  require and verify a signature over the request payload.
+- **Authentik step-up re-auth** on the Console's `/approvals` POST route
+  — needs a live Authentik `PromptStage`/reauth flow scoped to that path;
+  not configurable without a running instance to test against.
+- **Prometheus provisioning** (see
+  [plans/2026-07-05-oikos-prometheus-lxc.md](../plans/2026-07-05-oikos-prometheus-lxc.md))
+  — unblocks trend signals (disk-full prediction, temp creep) and real
+  sparklines in the Console; investigate the undocumented `pve_id 131`
+  on hubris first.
+- **CPU/NVMe temperature probing** in the scheduler — needs a confirmed
+  sensor path on hubris and strong (lm-sensors vs vendor tool) before a
+  real check can be written; guessing one risks a probe that silently
+  never fires.
+- **DNS-vs-inventory drift check** — compare Technitium zone records
+  against `services.*.url`/`public_host`; not implemented (`oikos/drift.py`
+  has no Technitium API wiring yet).
+- **Generic tracked-config-cleanliness drift check** — today only caddy's
+  `/etc/caddy` git-checkout path is hardcoded in `oikos/drift.py`; every
+  other service with a `config_repo` needs its local checkout path
+  recorded (a `mutation_path`-style field, same gap Week 1's service
+  contract flagged but didn't backfill) before this generalizes.
+- **Per-service policy overrides** (`oikos/policy.yaml`
+  `service_overrides`) — schema is ready (caddy/dns already use it);
+  populate more as specific services turn out to need non-default risk
+  classes.
+- **Incident timeline generator** — stitch ledger + signal history into
+  a single narrative for `knowledge/sources/investigations/` entries instead of writing
+  them by hand.
+- **Secret access audit** — who-can-decrypt-what report from
+  `.sops.yaml` + inventory `age_pubkey`s, extending what
+  `oikos/drift.py`'s SOPS check already partially does.
+- **Restore drills** — exercise `backs-up-to` (once populated) by
+  actually restoring from a backup target on a schedule, not just
+  checking freshness.
+- **Multi-agent delegation model** — more than one agent acting
+  concurrently; needs the ledger's `agent` field to carry real identity
+  (age pubkey, not just hostname) consistently, which it mostly does
+  already but hasn't been stress-tested with concurrent writers.
+- **Grafana** — only if the Console's own Prometheus-backed sparklines
+  turn out to be insufficient once Prometheus ships.
+- **"Generalize later" extraction** — the original decision was personal-
+  first, generalize-later (see Week 1). Once patterns stabilize, extract
+  a config-driven Oikos core with no `hubris.network`/`hubris`/`strong`
+  hardcoding, so it's installable on a different homelab.

.agents/domains/knowledge/schema.md

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# Knowledge domain — schema
+
+The knowledge domain is the durable, authoritative current-state documentation of the homelab: one
+page per node and per cross-cutting system, synthesized from live state and evidence. It answers
+"what exists and how does it work right now."
+
+It follows the [LLM Wiki layer model](../../shared/llm-wiki.md) and the
+[writing-style](../../shared/writing-style.md) and [page-templates](../../shared/page-templates.md)
+rules.
+
+## The narrative / substrate split
+
+The knowledge wiki is **narrative**. It sits alongside a **machine-readable substrate** that it
+describes but never contains. The split is load-bearing: several programs read the substrate at
+fixed paths, so the wiki reorganization never moves it.
+
+| Layer | Location | Consumed by |
+|-------|----------|-------------|
+| Substrate — source of truth | `inventory.yaml` (root) | MCP server, `homelab` CLI, `oikos/` scheduler/drift/relations/gen-topology |
+| Substrate — generated host records | `hosts/*.yaml` (root) | `mcp/server.py` (`HOSTS_DIR`), `bin/homelab`; written by `mcp/build_host_files.py` |
+| Substrate — kernel + context cards | `oikos/` (code, `oikos/cards/`, `oikos/state.json`) | MCP `explain`, scheduler |
+| Narrative — synthesized wiki | `knowledge/wiki/{hosts,containers,vms,infrastructure}/` | humans, agents via MCP `get_page` / `search_docs` |
+| Evidence — immutable sources | `knowledge/sources/` (references + investigations) | synthesis into wiki pages |
+
+## Wiki pages
+
+- **Node pages** (`knowledge/wiki/containers/<id>-<name>.md`, `.../vms/<id>-<name>.md`,
+  `.../hosts/<name>.md`) follow the container/host template in
+  [page-templates.md](../../shared/page-templates.md): opening definition, `## At a glance`,
+  `## Role`, service/port map, storage, auto-deploy, `## Related`, `## Changelog`.
+- **Cross-cutting pages** (`knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/<topic>.md`) follow the cross-cutting
+  template: `## Why`, `## Components`, `## How to apply`, `## Gotchas`, `## Related`, `## Changelog`.
+- Each `inventory.yaml` host entry carries a `doc_page:` field pointing at its narrative page.
+  Changing where a page lives means updating that field (read by `bin/homelab`).
+
+## The two logs
+
+- The per-page **`## Changelog`** records infrastructure changes and is machine-parsed
+  (`get_changelog`, the Oikos ledger). Keep the `### YYYY-MM-DD — title` shape.
+- **`knowledge/log.md`** is append-only and records *documentation-maintenance* operations only
+  (restructures, source ingests, lint sweeps): `## [YYYY-MM-DD] <op> | <summary>`. It never
+  duplicates the Oikos change ledger (`oikos/ledger.py`).
+
+## Same-session update rule
+
+A change to a node updates every page that references it in the same session — the node page, the
+section `README.md` table, the root `README.md`, the Caddy/DNS/ingress pages, the host page, and
+`inventory.yaml`. See [page-templates.md](../../shared/page-templates.md#same-session-update-rule).

.agents/domains/operations/schema.md

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# Operations domain — schema
+
+The operations domain holds the procedural and time-stamped documentation: runbooks (repeatable
+procedures), investigations (incident evidence), and plans (design docs for non-trivial work). It
+follows [writing-style](../../shared/writing-style.md); runbooks and plans use the imperative voice
+exception.
+
+Where each kind lives: runbooks are skills under [`.agents/skills/`](../../skills/); operator
+reference (command cheatsheet, enrollment, Hermes agent) lives in
+[`.agents/operations/`](../../operations/); investigations are sources under
+`knowledge/sources/investigations/`; plans stay in the repo-root `plans/` folder (below).
+
+## Plans always live in `plans/`
+
+**Any plan or design doc for the Homelab is written into the repo `plans/` folder as
+`plans/YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md` — never a scratch path, an agent-private plan location, or a chat
+message.** An agent drafting a plan:
+
+1. Writes the file under `plans/` using the plan template in [page-templates.md](../../shared/page-templates.md).
+2. Lists it in `plans/index.md`.
+3. On completion, moves it to `plans/done/` and updates the index status.
+
+This is the single source for homelab design intent; keeping it in-repo means the plan is
+versioned, reviewable, and reachable by MCP `get_page`/`search_docs` like any other doc.
+
+## Runbooks
+
+Repeatable procedures are skills — one folder per skill at `.agents/skills/<name>/SKILL.md`, with
+YAML front-matter that the Oikos policy and lifecycle machinery reads:
+
+```yaml
+---
+name: <name>
+risk_class: read_only | reversible_low | config_mutation | destructive
+inputs: [<param>, ...]
+verification: "<shell expression that proves success>"
+docs_update_checklist: [<doc artifacts to update>]
+transition: "<from> -> <to>"   # only for lifecycle runbooks
+---
+```
+
+`risk_class` values and the lifecycle `transition` states must match
+[`oikos/policy.yaml`](../../../oikos/policy.yaml) and [`oikos/ontology.yaml`](../../../oikos/ontology.yaml).
+
+## Investigations
+
+Incident records live in `knowledge/sources/investigations/YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md` and are **evidence sources** — written
+once at incident time, then linked from the changelogs of the nodes they implicate. Sections:
+`## Summary`, `## Timeline`, `## Root cause`, `## Mitigations applied`, `## Open questions`. Resolved
+incidents move to `knowledge/sources/investigations/archive/`.
+
+## The operations log
+
+`plans/log.md` and `knowledge/log.md` are append-only records of documentation operations on
+those areas (`## [YYYY-MM-DD] <op> | <summary>`), distinct from the Oikos change ledger.

.agents/operations/agent-enrollment.md

@@ -0,0 +1,368 @@
+# Agent enrollment — bootstrap a client into the homelab context system
+
+This walks through enrolling a new machine (workstation, LXC, or VM) so it
+joins the cross-client context system: a `/opt/homelab-context/` clone of
+this repo that auto-syncs every 5 min, a per-client age key for SOPS
+decryption, the `homelab` CLI, and an MCP endpoint in Claude Code's config.
+
+> Onboarding a Nous-Hermes-powered Goose agent on top of standard enrollment?
+> See [hermes-agent.md](hermes-agent.md). It uses the same `bootstrap.sh`
+> with an additional `--with-hermes` flag.
+
+Architecture in [project_homelab_context_plan](https://… memory link); the
+operational reference is here.
+
+## Prerequisites the client must satisfy
+
+| Requirement | Why | How to check |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Hostname matches an entry in `inventory.yaml` | The bootstrap looks up `hosts/$(hostname).yaml`. | `hostname` (Linux) / `scutil --get LocalHostName` (macOS) |
+| OS is Linux or macOS | bootstrap detects via `uname -s` | `uname -s` |
+| On the mesh (Netbird or Tailscale) **or** on the LAN | issuance is gated to mesh + LAN subnets. **For Netbird: use a setup-key, not interactive auth** — see "Getting onto Netbird" below. | `netbird status` / `tailscale status` |
+| `git`, `python3`, `python3-yaml`, `age`, `sops` | bootstrap preflight; `homelab` CLI imports yaml | See per-OS commands below |
+| Can resolve `*.hubris.network` | bootstrap calls `https://secrets.hubris.network/issue` and writes `https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp` | `dig +short mcp.hubris.network` (should return `192.168.8.175`) |
+
+### Hostname mismatch is the most common bootstrap failure
+
+If the bootstrap exits with `no hosts/<name>.yaml in the repo`, the
+hostname doesn't match any inventory entry. Two fixes:
+
+- **Rename the host**: `sudo hostnamectl set-hostname <inventory-name>`
+  (Linux) or System Preferences → Sharing (macOS), then re-run.
+- **Rename the inventory entry**: edit `inventory.yaml` on hubris,
+  regenerate `hosts/*.yaml`, push. The next sync (≤5 min) propagates.
+
+### Getting onto Netbird
+
+Bootstrap auto-installs netbird and drives `netbird up` if the mesh isn't already connected (since commit `<bootstrap-tier1>`). Both paths below produce the same end state: `netbird status` shows `Management: Connected`, peer IP `100.122.x.x/16`.
+
+**Path B — interactive OIDC (default; recommended):**
+
+The new client runs bootstrap straight from a fresh OS. Bootstrap installs netbird (apt/dnf/brew based on the OS), then runs `netbird up --management-url https://netbird.hubris.network --ssh-jwt-cache-ttl 86400`. A device-code URL prints inline. The operator opens it (in a browser logged into Authentik), goes through identification → password → consent, and the CLI returns `Connected`. Bootstrap then proceeds with the rest of preflight.
+
+Pre-condition: the operator must be a registered user in Authentik (typically the lab owner). The first user-login against a netbird account with existing peers is added as `pending_approval=1` and needs an sqlite promotion to `owner` — see [124-authentik.md First-time owner promotion gotcha](../../knowledge/wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md). Only needed once per account.
+
+**Path A — setup-key (headless/scripted onboarding):**
+
+Useful for headless servers (no browser at all) or unattended cloud-init bootstraps.
+
+1. From an already-enrolled machine, log into the dashboard at `https://netbird.hubris.network/`.
+2. **Setup Keys** → Create → set reusable + expiry → copy.
+3. On the new client (after installing netbird, OR let bootstrap install it and skip its `netbird up` driver):
+   ```bash
+   sudo netbird up --setup-key <KEY> \
+                   --management-url https://netbird.hubris.network \
+                   --ssh-jwt-cache-ttl 86400
+   ```
+
+**Why we can't OIDC-login from the public internet (still open as a follow-up):**
+
+`auth.hubris.network` resolves publicly to the VPS (`82.165.190.79`), but Traefik on the VPS doesn't currently route that hostname — only `netbird.hubris.network` is exposed. A brand-new client *off the mesh* hitting `auth.hubris.network` directly gets a Traefik default 404. In practice, Path B works fine because the operator's BROWSER (which clicks the device-code URL) is usually on a network that can reach Authentik through the public IONOS IP via some path. But "fresh laptop in a coffee shop with no prior session anywhere" still gets stuck. Future-session fix: add a Traefik route on the VPS forwarding `auth.hubris.network` via the netbird-routed `192.168.8.0/24` to LXC 124.
+
+### DNS prerequisite
+
+`*.hubris.network` resolves via the split-horizon dnsmasq on LXC 124
+([dns.md](../../knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/dns.md)) for LAN clients, **but only if the
+client uses 192.168.8.180 as its resolver**. Most LXCs and roaming
+workstations don't by default. Options:
+
+- **LAN client**: set DNS to 192.168.8.180 (per-interface or
+  `/etc/resolv.conf`).
+- **Off-LAN workstation on Netbird**: configure Netbird DNS forwarder to
+  point `*.hubris.network` at LXC 124.
+- **Hack-fix anywhere**: append to `/etc/hosts`:
+  ```
+  192.168.8.175  mcp.hubris.network secrets.hubris.network
+  192.168.8.175  git.hubris.network
+  ```
+  (192.168.8.175 = caddy on LXC 121, terminates all `*.hubris.network`.)
+
+If DNS isn't an option at all, override the URLs at bootstrap time:
+
+```bash
+sudo HOMELAB_GITEA_TOKEN=... \
+     HOMELAB_REPO_URL=http://192.168.8.121:3000/dtoro/Homelab-Docs.git \
+     HOMELAB_ISSUANCE_NETBIRD=http://192.168.8.205:9820/issue \
+     HOMELAB_MCP_URL=http://192.168.8.205:9810/mcp \
+     bash /tmp/bootstrap.sh --with-mcp
+```
+
+## Install dependencies
+
+Bootstrap auto-installs missing prerequisites (`git`, `python3` + PyYAML, `age`, `sops`, `netbird`) on Fedora/RHEL/Debian/Ubuntu/macOS — no manual `apt`/`dnf`/`brew` needed before running it. The only thing you must have on hand BEFORE the `curl ... | sudo bash` line is `curl` itself (used to pipe the script).
+
+Manual install is still possible (e.g. for air-gapped or unusual platforms); the per-OS recipes are below for reference but optional.
+
+<details>
+<summary>Manual recipes (Fedora / Debian / macOS)</summary>
+
+```bash
+# Fedora / RHEL / Nobara
+sudo dnf install -y git python3-pyyaml age curl
+SOPS_VERSION=v3.9.4
+sudo curl -fsSL https://github.com/getsops/sops/releases/download/$SOPS_VERSION/sops-$SOPS_VERSION.linux.amd64 \
+  -o /usr/local/bin/sops && sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/sops
+
+# Debian / Ubuntu
+sudo apt update && sudo apt install -y git python3-yaml age curl
+SOPS_VERSION=v3.9.4
+sudo curl -fsSL https://github.com/getsops/sops/releases/download/$SOPS_VERSION/sops-$SOPS_VERSION.linux.amd64 \
+  -o /usr/local/bin/sops && sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/sops
+
+# macOS
+brew install git age sops
+pip3 install pyyaml   # if `python3 -c "import yaml"` fails
+```
+
+</details>
+
+## Run the bootstrap
+
+You need a Gitea read-only personal access token for the initial clone
+(the in-cluster shared PAT is encrypted at `secrets/gitea-readonly-pat.yaml`
+but a new client can't decrypt it before bootstrap — chicken-and-egg).
+Ask the operator (or generate in Gitea: Settings → Applications → Generate
+New Token → scope `read:repository`).
+
+```bash
+TOKEN=...   # your Gitea PAT, scope read:repository
+
+# Fetch bootstrap.sh from gitea (HTTPS uses split-DNS → caddy).
+curl -fsSL -u "dtoro:$TOKEN" \
+  https://git.hubris.network/dtoro/Homelab-Docs/raw/branch/main/bootstrap.sh \
+  -o /tmp/bootstrap.sh
+
+# Run it.
+sudo HOMELAB_GITEA_TOKEN=$TOKEN bash /tmp/bootstrap.sh --with-mcp
+```
+
+Flags:
+
+| Flag | Effect |
+| --- | --- |
+| `--with-mcp` | Merges the homelab MCP server into `~/.claude/.mcp.json` of the invoking user |
+| `--no-secrets` | Skips age-key issuance (use when bringing up the first hosts before secrets-issuance exists) |
+| `--dry-run` | Prints actions without executing |
+
+The bootstrap is idempotent: re-running on an enrolled client just
+verifies state, re-issues the age key only if it doesn't match the
+inventory pubkey, and refreshes the sync timer + symlinks.
+
+## Verify
+
+```bash
+homelab whoami                    # prints hosts/$(hostname).yaml
+homelab list                      # shows the full topology
+homelab status                    # ping + HTTP-check across hosts/services
+homelab secret hello              # decrypt the bootstrap-test secret
+systemctl list-timers homelab-context-sync.timer
+                                  # next run within ≤5 min
+```
+
+For Claude Code: start a new session — the `homelab` MCP server appears
+in `~/.claude/.mcp.json` and registers 14 tools (8 context, 5 management,
+1 secrets-metadata).
+
+## Post-bootstrap: SSH reachability
+
+A new workstation must be reachable from other workstations and must be
+able to reach every host by short hostname. Run these steps after the
+bootstrap verify passes:
+
+### 1. Enable SSH server
+
+```bash
+# macOS:
+sudo launchctl load -w /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ssh.plist
+
+# Linux:
+sudo systemctl enable --now sshd
+```
+
+### 2. Generate SSH key (if missing)
+
+```bash
+ls ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub 2>/dev/null || ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -a 100
+```
+
+### 3. Publish pubkey to the repo
+
+```bash
+cp ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub /opt/homelab-context/ssh/authorized_keys/$(hostname -s).pub
+cd /opt/homelab-context && git add ssh/authorized_keys/ && git commit -m 'ssh: add $(hostname -s) pubkey' && git push
+```
+
+### 4. Deploy keys to all hosts
+
+From any existing enrolled machine (hubris or another workstation):
+
+```bash
+ssh root@192.168.8.77 "cd /opt/homelab-context && git pull --ff-only && bash ssh/deploy-keys.sh"
+```
+
+This adds the new workstation's pubkey to hubris and every running LXC.
+
+### 5. Generate SSH config
+
+```bash
+homelab ssh-config --install
+```
+
+Verify:
+
+```bash
+ssh hubris hostname     # should return "hubris" without password
+ssh gitea hostname      # should return "gitea" without password
+ssh mac-mini hostname   # should return "mac-mini" without password (workstation-to-workstation)
+```
+
+### 6. Add LAN IP to inventory (if on LAN)
+
+If the workstation has a static or reserved LAN IP, add it to
+`inventory.yaml`:
+
+```yaml
+hosts:
+  your-hostname:
+    lan_ip: 192.168.8.xxx
+```
+
+This gives it a primary LAN entry in the generated SSH config (faster
+than the Netbird fallback). Commit + push, then:
+
+```bash
+cd /opt/homelab-context && git pull --ff-only && homelab ssh-config --install
+```
+
+## Claude Code permissions for fleet ops
+
+By default Claude Code's auto-mode classifier asks for confirmation on every
+ssh into the mesh. The bootstrap already installs the ssh ControlMaster block
+so subsequent in-session sshes multiplex, but the *first* ssh of each session
+still gets classifier-evaluated. Pre-authorize the common fleet ssh patterns
+by adding to `~/.claude/settings.json`:
+
+```json
+{
+  "permissions": {
+    "defaultMode": "auto",
+    "allow": [
+      "Bash(ssh -p 22022 *)",
+      "Bash(homelab *)"
+    ]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+The first rule covers any ssh to a mesh peer on the homelab netbird port; the
+second covers all `homelab` CLI invocations. Both are scoped tight enough that
+the classifier doesn't gate them but loose enough to handle the variety of
+arguments.
+
+If you also want the netbird `--ssh-jwt-cache-ttl` flag rationale to be
+visible to the classifier (it's not actually durable in 0.71.2, but the
+ControlMaster block is — see [runbook-dpkg-interrupted](../skills/runbook-dpkg-interrupted/SKILL.md)
+for context), drop a free-text rule into `autoMode.allow` describing the
+authorization. Optional.
+
+## Adding a new client to inventory
+
+If the hostname you want isn't yet in inventory, enrollment is a two-step
+ceremony driven from an existing enrolled client (e.g. hubris). The
+`homelab` CLI handles steps 1 + 4; you provide steps 2 + 3.
+
+```bash
+# 1. On hubris (or any existing client): add the inventory entry.
+homelab client add my-new-machine
+# Prompts for kind, os, netbird FQDN, role. Commits + pushes.
+
+# 2. Join the new machine to Netbird (out-of-band, Netbird console / setup key).
+
+# 3. On the new machine: install deps + run bootstrap (above).
+#    Bootstrap calls /issue, receives a fresh age keypair, and prints the
+#    public key for the operator to commit back to inventory.
+
+# 4. On hubris: finalize the age public key.
+homelab client add my-new-machine --finalize-pubkey age1...
+# Updates inventory.yaml hosts.my-new-machine.age_pubkey, regenerates
+# hosts/*.yaml, commits + pushes. The 5-min sync propagates.
+```
+
+## Granting a secret to a new client
+
+Adding a client doesn't grant them every secret. Recipients are explicit
+per file via `.sops.yaml` glob rules. To grant a client access to (say)
+`secrets/hello.yaml`:
+
+1. Edit `.sops.yaml` at the repo root, add the client's `age_pubkey` to
+   the matching `creation_rules` block.
+2. Re-key the existing ciphertext for the new recipient list:
+   ```bash
+   sops updatekeys -y secrets/hello.yaml
+   ```
+3. Commit + push. On the next sync (≤5 min), the client can decrypt.
+
+## Removing a client
+
+```bash
+# From any existing client:
+homelab client remove my-old-machine
+```
+
+This:
+1. Removes the inventory entry and `hosts/my-old-machine.yaml`.
+2. Runs `sops updatekeys -y` against every file in `secrets/` (operator
+   must first remove the pubkey from `.sops.yaml` rules).
+3. Calls `secrets-issuance` `/revoke` (admin-token-gated, on LXC 105) to
+   shred the key file and add the hostname to the denylist.
+4. Commits + pushes.
+
+The CLI prints a follow-up checklist that the operator must do manually:
+
+- Revoke the peer in the Netbird console (denies future mesh access).
+- **Rotate any credentials whose ciphertext the removed client already
+  has on disk.** The age key revocation only protects *future*
+  ciphertext; what's already been pulled is still decryptable until the
+  underlying credential changes.
+- Optional: `homelab nuke my-old-machine` SSHes in, shreds
+  `/etc/age/key.txt`, removes `/opt/homelab-context`, disables sync.
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+| Symptom | Cause | Fix |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `no hosts/<hostname>.yaml in the repo` | Hostname doesn't match inventory entry | Rename either side (see above) |
+| `fatal: could not read Username for 'http://192.168.8.121:3000'` | bootstrap.sh's credentials file has wrong scheme | Fixed in commit `de6f8be`; pull latest `bootstrap.sh` |
+| `gnutls_handshake() failed: TLS connection was non-properly terminated` cloning `git.hubris.network` | Client DNS resolves `*.hubris.network` to the public VPS IP | Configure split-DNS (LXC 180 / Netbird forwarder) or `/etc/hosts` override; or use `HOMELAB_REPO_URL=http://192.168.8.121:3000/dtoro/Homelab-Docs.git` |
+| `TLS/SSL connection has been closed (EOF)` connecting MCP | Same — `mcp.hubris.network` resolves to public VPS without this vhost | Same DNS fix |
+| `Invalid Host header` from MCP server | FastMCP's DNS-rebinding protection (default whitelist is 127.0.0.1 only) | Fixed in commit `6848640`; pull latest `mcp/server.py` and redeploy |
+| `python3-yaml` install fails on Fedora | Wrong package name | Use `python3-pyyaml` (Fedora) instead of `python3-yaml` (Debian) |
+| `address already in use` for FastMCP | FastMCP defaults to 127.0.0.1:8000 | Fixed: server now sets `mcp.settings.host/port` from env (default `0.0.0.0:9810`) |
+| `homelab: no age key at /etc/age/key.txt` even after bootstrap | `/etc/age` is 0700 root, so non-root users couldn't even stat the key file; existence check returned False under regular users | Fixed in commit `df6aca8`: the CLI re-execs `sops -d` via sudo when invoked as a non-root user. On older deployments, re-link the CLI with `sudo ln -sfn /opt/homelab-context/bin/homelab /usr/local/bin/homelab` after the 5-min sync. |
+| `homelab` CLI doesn't pick up repo updates | Pre-`02db…` bootstrap copied the binary instead of symlinking | One-time migration: `sudo ln -sfn /opt/homelab-context/bin/homelab /usr/local/bin/homelab`. New bootstraps use the symlink, which auto-tracks the synced repo. |
+| `homelab-context-sync.service` journal shows `fatal: could not read Username for 'https://git.hubris.network'` | Pre-fix bootstrap set the gitea credential helper via `git config --global`, which writes to `/root/.gitconfig` — invisible to the systemd timer's git process (no HOME set). | One-time migration: `sudo git config --system credential.helper "store --file=/etc/homelab-context/git-credentials"`. New bootstraps store the helper in `/etc/gitconfig` instead. |
+| Chat-mode `!` shell can't `sudo` (`a terminal is required to read the password`) | Claude Code's `!` invocation doesn't allocate a tty, and standard `sudo` won't read its password from stdin or a non-tty pipe. | Run the sudo'd command in a real terminal outside chat. For commands the agent issues repeatedly, configure passwordless sudo for the narrow set (e.g. `/etc/sudoers.d/homelab-self` with `<user> ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/dnf upgrade -y, /usr/bin/apt-get *`). |
+| `netbird status -d` reports `192.168.8.180:53 ... is Unavailable` but DNS actually works | netbird's UDP-53 probe times out over the relay latency (~90ms), but actual queries still flow through systemd-resolved. Cosmetic. | Ignore unless `dig @192.168.8.180 git.hubris.network` also fails — then check dnsmasq on [LXC 124](../../knowledge/wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md). |
+| `netbird ssh` rejected with `JWT authentication failed: validate token (expected issuer=https://netbird.hubris.network/oauth2 ...)` | Peer's SSH JWT validator cached the OLD embedded-Dex issuer from before the 2026-05-21 Authentik migration. `systemctl restart netbird` and `netbird down/up` don't clear it — `client/internal/engine_ssh.go` bails out of `updateSSH()` if the SSH server is already running. | Full daemon bounce: `sudo systemctl stop netbird; sleep 3; sudo systemctl start netbird`. Verify with `grep -iE "issuer\|audience" /var/log/netbird/client.log \| tail`. Apply once per peer post-migration. |
+| `netbird ssh` JWT passes but session closes with `user privilege check failed: user dtoro not found: unknown user dtoro` | netbird-ssh defaults the remote username to the LOCAL one (operator's laptop user). Hubris and LXCs only have `root`. | Always use explicit `root@` prefix manually: `netbird ssh -p 22022 root@proxmox-server.netbird.selfhosted`. `homelab ssh <host>` does this automatically via `inventory.yaml`'s per-host `ssh.user` field (defaults to `root`). |
+| `homelab ssh hubris` (or any host on the LAN) fails with `Connection refused` or hangs, despite mesh routing being up | Off-LAN networks (operator on a VPN / coffee shop / symmetric NAT) sometimes can't reach the LAN IP even with the netbird subnet route. | Newer homelab CLIs probe the LAN with a 1.5s TCP connect and transparently fall back to the netbird FQDN. If your `/usr/local/bin/homelab` is a symlink to `/opt/homelab-context/bin/homelab` it'll pick up the fix on the next 5-min context sync. Otherwise pull the latest from gitea. |
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-06-02 — SSH reachability post-bootstrap steps
+Added a new "Post-bootstrap: SSH reachability" section covering SSH key
+generation, pubkey publication, deployment to hosts, SSH config generation,
+and LAN IP registration. New workstations enrolled via this doc will
+automatically join the universal SSH mesh.
+
+### 2026-05-31 — cross-link to hermes-agent.md
+Added a sibling page covering Nous-Hermes-on-Goose enrollment ([hermes-agent.md](hermes-agent.md)) and noted it at the top of this page. The Hermes flow extends `bootstrap.sh` with `--with-hermes` and `homelab client add` with the same flag; it does not change the underlying enrollment steps documented here.
+
+### 2026-05-21 — netbird-ssh JWT issuer + username + LAN-fallback troubleshooting rows
+Added three rows to the troubleshooting table covering issues surfaced during the netbird vanilla migration: (1) post-migration SSH JWT validator cache stuck on old Dex issuer (full `systemctl stop/start` required, not `restart`), (2) `user not found` from netbird-ssh's local-username default (use explicit `root@`), and (3) homelab CLI's LAN→netbird-FQDN fallback for off-LAN operators. Companion code change: per-host `ssh.user` field in `inventory.yaml` + `homelab` CLI's `ssh_target()` helper.
+
+### 2026-05-20 — initial page
+Captures the enrollment flow validated during Phase 2 of the homelab
+context distribution rollout. hubris + LXC 105 (apps) enrolled; first
+workstation (republic-laptop) blocked on hostname mismatch, documented
+the resolution.

.agents/operations/commands.md

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+# Operations cheatsheet
+
+Run from the [hubris host](../../knowledge/wiki/hosts/hubris.md) as root. When working from `/root` on Linux you're already on hubris — don't `ssh hubris` / `ping hubris`.
+
+## Proxmox CLI
+
+| Command | Use |
+| --- | --- |
+| `pct list` / `qm list` | List LXC containers / VMs |
+| `pct config <id>` / `qm config <id>` | Container / VM config |
+| `pct exec <id> -- <cmd>` | Run command inside an LXC without entering it (no initgroups — see [media permissions](../../knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/media-permissions.md)) |
+| `pct enter <id>` | Shell into a container |
+| `pct start <id>` / `pct stop <id>` | Boot / halt a container |
+| `pvesm status` | Storage pools status |
+| `pvesh get /nodes --output-format json` | Node summary as JSON |
+| `pvesh get /nodes/hubris/lxc/<id>/status/current` | Live container status |
+| `pvesh get /cluster/resources --type vm --output-format json` | Bulk per-LXC CPU/mem/disk (used by the `homelab-health-watchdog` Hermes cron — see [monitoring](../../knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/monitoring.md); the old `claudio-monitor` this once fed is deprecated) |
+| `pveversion` | PVE version |
+| `journalctl -u pve-cluster -n 100` | PVE service logs |
+
+## Storage
+
+- Shared mount: `/mnt/library` (ext4 on lvmthin `library`).
+- Bind into a container: `pct set <id> -mp<N> /mnt/library/<sub>,mp=/data`
+- For the standard whole-tree mount: `pct set <id> -mp0 /mnt/library,mp=/mnt/library`. See [media permissions](../../knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/media-permissions.md) for the GID-10000 onboarding recipe.
+
+## Reverse proxy
+
+- Caddyfile: `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` on [LXC 121](../../knowledge/wiki/containers/121-caddy.md).
+- **CRITICAL:** This file is tracked in `dtoro/caddy-conf` (https://git.hubris.network/dtoro/caddy-conf). Never edit it directly on the LXC — commit + push to the repo instead. Caddy auto-deploys on push (see [auto-deploy](../../knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)). If you edit directly, the change will be lost on the next pull and agents won't know about it.
+- Hot reload: `pct exec 121 -- systemctl reload caddy`.
+- Validate: `pct exec 121 -- caddy validate --config /etc/caddy/Caddyfile`.
+- Git workflow shortcut: `pct exec 121 -- "cd /etc/caddy && git add Caddyfile && git commit -m '...' && git push"`.
+
+## DNS
+
+- Split-horizon authority: [Technitium DNS](https://technitium.com) on [dns (107)](../../knowledge/wiki/containers/107-dns.md) at `192.168.8.2:53`. Web UI at `http://192.168.8.2`. (Formerly dnsmasq on the now-destroyed LXC 124 — decommissioned 2026-06-04.)
+- Add/edit records in the Technitium UI; the NetBird managed zone sync (`scripts/dns-sync.py` cron on 107) picks changes up within ~10 minutes.
+- Verify: `dig @192.168.8.2 +short <host>.hubris.network`.
+- See [DNS](../../knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/dns.md).
+
+## Web access
+
+- `https://proxmox.hubris.network` or `https://192.168.8.77:8006` — Proxmox UI
+
+## Telemetry quick checks
+
+- `ras-mc-ctl --summary` — summary of any RAS events (memory / PCIe AER / thermal) since boot
+- `ras-mc-ctl --errors` — full event log
+- `cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq/energy_performance_preference` — should be `balance_power`
+- `cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq/scaling_governor` — should be `powersave`
+- `ls /sys/fs/pstore/ /var/lib/systemd/pstore/` — panic traces from a previous crash (empty for pure hardware hangs — see [investigation](../../knowledge/sources/investigations/archive/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md))
+
+## Fleet apt operations
+
+Two `homelab` subcommands wrap the common patterns; both fan out to hubris + every LXC.
+
+| Command | What it does |
+| --- | --- |
+| `homelab apt-audit [--target HOST]` | Per-host table: dpkg-interrupted state, holds, upgradable count, non-apt binaries in system paths, DNS health. Exits nonzero if any host has dpkg-interrupted state. |
+| `homelab apt-upgrade --target HOST` | Launch `apt update && apt upgrade` inside a transient `systemd-run --collect` unit on the target. Survives ssh teardown. Apt configured with `Acquire::Retries=3` + `ForceIPv4=true`. |
+| `homelab apt-upgrade --all` | Same, fanned out across the standard targets. |
+| `homelab apt-upgrade ... --status` | Show running unit + tail `/var/log/homelab-apt-upgrade.log` on each target. |
+| `homelab apt-upgrade ... --safe` | Take a pre-upgrade snapshot per LXC first (`pct snapshot` → `vzdump` fallback for bind-mounted LXCs). Refuses if any snapshot fails unless `--force`. |
+| `homelab apt-upgrade ... --force` | Skip both the dpkg-audit gate and snapshot-failure refusal. |
+
+PVE/kernel deferral on hubris: `homelab apt-upgrade --target hubris` will try every upgrade, including kernel + `pve-*`. To skip those, `apt-mark hold` the relevant packages on hubris first; `homelab apt-audit` shows held packages so you can confirm.
+
+## Oikos (agent OS layer)
+
+See [OIKOS.md](../OIKOS.md) for the operating model. Quick reference:
+
+| Command | What it does |
+| --- | --- |
+| `homelab service <name> explain\|health\|docs\|log\|actions\|history` | Service Console v0 — context card, cached health (`--live` to force a probe), docs, logs, safe actions + risk class, ledger history |
+| `homelab node <name> relations` | Ontology blast-radius query: what this host/service impacts, is affected by, and its full transitive blast radius |
+| `homelab change preflight <service>` | Dry-run report before mutating: risk class, current health, config repo, verification command |
+| `homelab decide <action> <entity>` | Decision classifier: risk × blast radius × confidence → auto-act or escalate |
+| `homelab signal list\|raise\|ack\|resolve\|mute` | The attention layer — pending updates, thresholds, drift, anything needing attention |
+| `homelab approval request\|list\|reply\|check` | Escalate-route grants (Matrix-delivered via Hermes, or the Oikos Console's `/approvals` page) |
+| `homelab restart <service> [--approval-id <id>]` | `--approval-id` is required whenever the service's risk class needs approval (e.g. `caddy`, `dns`) — refuses mechanically without a valid grant |
+
+Oikos Console (read-mostly dashboard): `oikos.hubris.network` once deployed — see [oikos/console/deploy/README.md](../../oikos/console/deploy/README.md).
+
+## Related
+- [Hubris host](../../knowledge/wiki/hosts/hubris.md)
+- [Containers index](../../knowledge/wiki/containers/index.md)
+- [DNS](../../knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/dns.md)
+- [Monitoring](../../knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/monitoring.md)
+- [Auto-deploy](../../knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)
+- [Runbook: dpkg-interrupted recovery](../skills/runbook-dpkg-interrupted/SKILL.md) — what to do when apt got killed mid-transaction

.agents/operations/hermes-agent.md

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+# Hermes agent — Nous-Hermes-powered Goose sessions on a homelab client
+
+Onboards [Nous Research's Hermes](https://nousresearch.com/) (a fine-tuned
+Llama variant) as a working terminal agent on a homelab client. Builds on top
+of standard client enrollment (see [agent-enrollment.md](agent-enrollment.md))
+— this page covers only the Hermes-specific additions.
+
+The agent runs as a [Goose](https://goose-docs.ai/) session. Goose provides:
+
+- The chat loop, multi-turn history, and streaming
+- The OpenRouter provider that routes to Nous Hermes
+- The built-in `developer` extension (shell + file editor — same surface Claude
+  Code has)
+- A remote MCP extension pointed at `mcp.hubris.network` for read-only
+  homelab context (`list_lxcs`, `tail_log`, `search_docs`, etc.)
+
+The persona is `/opt/homelab-context/HERMES.md`, symlinked as Goose's global
+`.goosehints` so it's injected into the system prompt on every session.
+
+## Prerequisites
+
+| Requirement | How |
+| --- | --- |
+| Standard enrollment complete (`homelab whoami` works) | [agent-enrollment.md](agent-enrollment.md) |
+| `secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml` exists with a real `sk-or-...` value | See "Seeding the OpenRouter key" below |
+| The host's `age_pubkey` is on the openrouter-api-key.yaml sops rule | `homelab client add <host> --finalize-pubkey <age1...> --with-hermes` |
+
+## Onboarding flow
+
+```bash
+# 1. On hubris (or any enrolled client): reserve the inventory entry.
+homelab client add new-machine
+
+# 2. Join new-machine to Netbird (setup-key or OIDC).
+
+# 3. On new-machine: bootstrap with --with-hermes.
+TOKEN=...   # gitea PAT, read:repository
+curl -fsSL -u "dtoro:$TOKEN" \
+  https://git.hubris.network/dtoro/Homelab-Docs/raw/branch/main/bootstrap.sh \
+  -o /tmp/bootstrap.sh
+sudo HOMELAB_GITEA_TOKEN=$TOKEN bash /tmp/bootstrap.sh --with-mcp --with-hermes
+
+# 4. Back on hubris: finalize the age pubkey AND grant the Hermes secret.
+homelab client add new-machine \
+  --finalize-pubkey age1... \
+  --with-hermes
+
+# 5. Wait ≤5 min for sync, then on new-machine:
+hermes "what LXCs are running?"
+```
+
+The bootstrap `--with-hermes` flag does five things, all idempotent:
+
+1. Downloads the latest Goose binary into the operator's `~/.local/bin/goose`
+   (upstream installer) and symlinks `/usr/local/bin/goose` to it.
+2. Symlinks `/opt/homelab-context/bin/hermes` → `/usr/local/bin/hermes`.
+3. Symlinks `/opt/homelab-context/HERMES.md` → `/root/HERMES.md` (Linux) or
+   `/etc/HERMES.md` (macOS) for `cat`-as-operator convenience.
+4. Drops `~/.config/goose/config.yaml` pinning the provider, model, and
+   extensions (preserves any keys the operator added by hand).
+5. Symlinks `~/.config/goose/.goosehints` → HERMES.md, so the persona is
+   injected as the system prompt on every session.
+
+## Seeding the OpenRouter key
+
+The first time anyone enrolls with `--with-hermes`, the encrypted file
+`secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml` contains a placeholder. On hubris (or any
+existing recipient):
+
+```bash
+sops secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml
+# editor opens; replace api_key value with the real sk-or-... key, save, close.
+git -C /opt/homelab-context add secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml
+git -C /opt/homelab-context commit -m 'openrouter-api-key: seed real key'
+git -C /opt/homelab-context push
+```
+
+Until this step happens, `hermes …` exits with `openrouter-api-key.yaml still
+contains the placeholder`. Subsequent enrollees get the real key automatically
+via `--with-hermes` (which adds them as a sops recipient on
+`secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml`).
+
+## Granting the OpenRouter key to an already-enrolled host
+
+If a host was enrolled without `--with-hermes` and you want to add it later:
+
+```bash
+# On hubris:
+PUBKEY=$(homelab whoami --hostname <host> | grep age_pubkey | awk '{print $2}')
+homelab client add <host> --finalize-pubkey "$PUBKEY" --with-hermes
+```
+
+`--finalize-pubkey` is required by the existing flow even when the pubkey is
+unchanged — it's also the trigger that runs the sops grant.
+
+After ≤5 min sync the host can decrypt the key. Bootstrap doesn't need to
+re-run; only the secret recipient list changed.
+
+## Verifying
+
+```bash
+homelab whoami                                # standard enrollment OK
+homelab secret openrouter-api-key | head -c 8 # decrypts (prints `api_key:`)
+which goose && which hermes                   # binaries present
+goose info -v                                  # provider/model wiring sane
+hermes "what LXCs are running?"                # interactive Goose session
+
+# Non-interactive smoke test:
+echo "List the homelab MCP tools you have available" | hermes
+```
+
+## Configuration
+
+The bootstrap-managed keys in `~/.config/goose/config.yaml`:
+
+```yaml
+GOOSE_PROVIDER: openrouter
+GOOSE_MODEL: deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash
+GOOSE_MODE: smart_approve         # asks before destructive tool calls
+extensions:
+  developer:
+    type: builtin
+    bundled: true
+    enabled: true
+    name: developer
+    timeout: 300
+  homelab:
+    type: streamable_http
+    enabled: true
+    name: homelab
+    uri: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+    timeout: 60
+```
+
+Override via env on a single bootstrap run:
+
+```bash
+HOMELAB_HERMES_MODEL=nousresearch/hermes-3-llama-3.1-405b \
+HOMELAB_HERMES_MCP_URI=https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp \
+  sudo bash /tmp/bootstrap.sh --with-hermes
+```
+
+Any keys you add by hand (e.g. `GOOSE_TEMPERATURE`, extra `extensions.*`) are
+preserved across re-bootstraps — the merge only overwrites the keys it manages.
+
+## Tool permissions
+
+`GOOSE_MODE: smart_approve` is the bootstrap default: Goose runs read-only
+shell commands without prompting and asks for confirmation before destructive
+ones. To make the agent fully unattended (e.g. for scheduled jobs), set
+`GOOSE_MODE: auto` in `~/.config/goose/config.yaml`. To require confirmation on
+every tool call, use `approve`. See
+[goose-permissions](https://goose-docs.ai/docs/guides/managing-tools/goose-permissions/).
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+| Symptom | Cause | Fix |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `hermes: could not decrypt secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml` | Host isn't a recipient on the sops rule | `homelab client add <host> --finalize-pubkey <age1...> --with-hermes` from hubris |
+| `hermes: openrouter-api-key.yaml still contains the placeholder` | No real key has been seeded yet | See "Seeding the OpenRouter key" above |
+| Goose hangs on first `hermes` invocation with no output | Goose's interactive `configure` ran on first launch and is awaiting input | Re-run; the installer is supposed to skip it (CONFIGURE=false). If it persists, run `goose configure` once manually in a real terminal to commit the config. |
+| `homelab` extension fails to connect / no MCP tools listed | MCP server still runs SSE-only; Goose requires `streamable_http`. See follow-up #1 below. | Either: (a) migrate the FastMCP server to streamable_http (one-line change in `mcp/server.py` — `mcp.run(transport="streamable_http")` — then redeploy), or (b) accept that the agent works via the developer extension alone (shell + `homelab` CLI cover everything MCP would). |
+| `goose: command not found` after bootstrap | Upstream installer dropped binary in `~/.local/bin/` but `/usr/local/bin/goose` symlink didn't land | Re-run bootstrap with `--with-hermes`; the symlink step is at the end of the install block. If still missing, `ln -sfn ~/.local/bin/goose /usr/local/bin/goose` manually. |
+| Tool calls hit OpenRouter rate limits | One shared key across many hosts | Future: per-host keys; for now, see the rate-limits guide referenced in `goose info -v`. |
+
+## Cross-references
+
+- [agent-enrollment.md](agent-enrollment.md) — base client onboarding the
+  Hermes flow assumes is done.
+- [`HERMES.md`](../HERMES.md) — the persona the Hermes agent reads on every
+  session start (via `~/.config/goose/.goosehints`).
+- [`bin/hermes`](../../bin/hermes) — the wrapper that decrypts the OpenRouter key
+  and execs `goose session`.
+- [`bootstrap.sh`](../../bootstrap.sh) — the `--with-hermes` flag's install block.
+
+## Follow-ups
+
+1. **Migrate the MCP server to streamable_http.** Goose 1.x deprecated SSE
+   (`"SSE transport is no longer supported - kept only for config file
+   compatibility"` in `crates/goose/src/agents/extension.rs`). Our FastMCP
+   server at `mcp/server.py:336` still calls `mcp.run(transport="sse")`. Until
+   that's changed, the `homelab` MCP extension in Goose will fail to connect.
+   The developer extension (shell + edit) covers most ops without it; this is
+   a polish item, not a blocker.
+2. **Per-host OpenRouter keys** for billing attribution. Today all Hermes
+   hosts share one key.
+3. **Pin the model version** rather than tracking `nousresearch/hermes-4-405b`
+   directly — OpenRouter periodically rotates the underlying weights.
+4. **Local-inference fallback** (ollama / vllm) once the homelab has a GPU
+   node. The wrapper, persona, and MCP wiring stay unchanged; only
+   `GOOSE_PROVIDER`/`GOOSE_MODEL` change.
+
+7. **Caveman auto-setup via post-pull hook.** The sync timer now calls
+   `tools/post-pull.sh`, which runs any `tools/*.setup.sh` after git pull.
+   Currently this auto-installs the Caveman npm package, wrapper scripts, and
+   compact output templates on all agent hosts (*token efficiency*).
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-06-01 — caveman + post-pull auto-setup
+Added `tools/post-pull.sh` sync hook that auto-runs `tools/*.setup.sh`
+after every git pull. First user: `tools/setup-caveman.sh` installed Caveman
+templating + `~/bin/caveman_wrapper.sh` + `~/templates/*.txt` for token-
+efficient CLI output. Replaces raw `git pull` in launchd/systemd timers.
+Also created `tools/caveman/` with the wrapper script, JS renderer, and
+templates — the canonical source for all agent hosts.
+Captures the Hermes-on-Goose onboarding flow added in the same commit as
+`bootstrap.sh --with-hermes`, `bin/hermes`, the sops rule for
+`secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml`, and the `homelab client add --with-hermes`
+extension. MCP streamable_http migration is queued as follow-up #1.

.agents/shared/caveman.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# CAVEMAN.md — communication mode for homelab agents
+
+Respond terse like smart caveman. All technical substance stay. Only fluff die.
+
+## Rules
+
+Drop: articles (a/an/the), filler (just/really/basically/actually/simply), pleasantries (sure/certainly/of course/happy to), hedging. Fragments OK. Short synonyms (big not extensive, fix not "implement a solution for"). Technical terms exact. Code blocks unchanged. Errors quoted exact.
+
+Pattern: `[thing] [action] [reason]. [next step].`
+
+Not: "Sure! I'd be happy to help you with that. The issue you're experiencing is likely caused by..."
+Yes: "Bug in auth middleware. Token expiry check use `<` not `<=`. Fix:"
+
+## Levels
+
+- **lite** — no filler/hedging. Keep articles + full sentences. Professional but tight.
+- **full** (default) — drop articles, fragments OK, short synonyms. Classic caveman.
+- **ultra** — abbreviate prose words (DB/auth/config/req/res), strip conjunctions, arrows (X → Y). Code symbols/API names/errors: never abbreviate.
+
+Switch: `/caveman lite|full|ultra`. Stop: "normal mode".
+
+## Auto-Clarity
+
+Drop caveman for: security warnings, irreversible actions, multi-step sequences where fragments risk misread, user confused/repeating. Resume after clear part done.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+Code/commits/PRs: write normal. "stop caveman" or "normal mode": revert. Level persist until changed or session end.
+
+---
+
+Source: https://github.com/JuliusBrussee/caveman
+Copy to `~/.hermes/skills/` for Hermes Agent, or `~/.claude/projects/<name>/SKILL.md` for Claude Code.

.agents/shared/llm-wiki.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# LLM Wiki — the documentation contract
+
+How the narrative documentation in this repo is organized. The pattern is borrowed from the
+`sources / wiki / index / log` model: a durable synthesized layer (`knowledge/wiki/`) built on top
+of immutable evidence (`knowledge/sources/`, incident records), with pure-listing indexes and an
+append-only operations log.
+
+This contract governs the **narrative layer only**. The machine-readable substrate — `inventory.yaml`,
+generated `hosts/*.yaml`, `oikos/`, `mcp/`, `secrets/`, `bin/` — is not part of the wiki and never
+moves under it. See [the knowledge schema](../domains/knowledge/schema.md) for the split.
+
+## Layers
+
+- **Sources** are immutable raw material: incident records (`knowledge/sources/investigations/`), external reference
+  docs (`knowledge/sources/references/`), and the live system itself (`pct config`, `docker inspect`).
+  Read them; do not rewrite them into other sources.
+- **Wiki** (`knowledge/wiki/`) is the synthesized, authoritative current-state layer: one page per
+  node (`containers/`, `vms/`, host narratives) and per cross-cutting system (`infrastructure/`). A
+  reader understands the topic from the wiki page without reading the sources.
+- **Index** (`index.md` / folder `README.md`) is a pure listing — every page in scope with a
+  one-line summary, and nothing else. Anything the section wants to say up front goes into a page
+  the index lists, not into the index.
+- **Log** (`log.md`) is append-only, recording *doc-maintenance operations* (restructures, source
+  ingests, lint sweeps) in single-line format: `## [YYYY-MM-DD] <op> | <summary>`.
+
+## Two logs, kept distinct
+
+- **`## Changelog`** on each node/topic page records *infrastructure* changes to that node. It is
+  machine-parsed (`get_changelog`, the Oikos ledger) — keep the `### YYYY-MM-DD — title` shape.
+- **`log.md`** per area records *documentation* operations only. It never duplicates the Oikos
+  change ledger (`oikos/ledger.py`), which stays authoritative for infra changes with
+  who/what/risk/approval/verification.
+
+## Rules
+
+- Wiki pages stay short and focused. A page past ~300 lines splits.
+- Pages stay flat under `wiki/<section>/` until there are enough to warrant a sub-group.
+- Every page follows [writing-style.md](writing-style.md).
+- Plans and design docs always live in the repo `plans/` folder (`plans/YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md`),
+  listed in `plans/index.md`, moved to `plans/done/` on completion — never a scratch path or a chat
+  message. See [the operations schema](../domains/operations/schema.md).

.agents/shared/page-templates.md

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+# Page templates for the Homelab Wiki
+
+The structural templates for each page type. Prose voice, vocabulary, and cross-reference rules live
+in [writing-style.md](writing-style.md); the layer model (sources / wiki / index / log) lives in
+[llm-wiki.md](llm-wiki.md).
+
+## File naming
+
+**Foundational / entry-point files:** ALL-CAPS
+
+- **Root level:** `AGENTS.md`, `README.md` — discovery paths for agents and humans.
+- **Agent instruction** (under `.agents/`): `OIKOS.md`, `HERMES.md` — foundational docs agents read before acting.
+- **Reference docs:** `GLOSSARY.md` — lookup reference (like classic repo conventions: LICENSE, CHANGELOG, GLOSSARY).
+
+**Content / narrative pages:** lowercase-with-dashes, date-prefixed as needed
+
+- **Container pages:** `<id>-<name>.md` (e.g. `101-jellyfin.md`, `132-rclone.md`). The `<id>` is the LXC/VM ordinal from `inventory.yaml`.
+- **Infrastructure / cross-cutting pages:** `<topic>.md` (e.g. `dns.md`, `auto-deploy.md`, `mesh.md`). Describes a system, not a specific node.
+- **Plans / investigations:** `YYYY-MM-DD-<slug>.md` (e.g. `2026-07-05-oikos-prometheus-lxc.md`). Date-sorted; slug is lowercase.
+- **Section indices:** `README.md` (lowercase, conventional). Prefer in folders; `index.md` only if both intro prose and listing coexist.
+
+**Skills / runbooks:** special case
+
+- **Folder structure:** `<name>/SKILL.md` where `<name>` is lowercase-with-dashes (e.g. `client-enrollment/SKILL.md`).
+- **The filename SKILL.md is always uppercase** — it acts as a signpost so tools and humans instantly recognize it as a skill.
+
+**General rules:** All paths use lowercase letters, numbers, and hyphens (no underscores). Uppercase is reserved for foundational docs (entry points + instruction) and filenames that signify document type (SKILL.md, GLOSSARY.md, etc.).
+
+## Voice
+
+Concise, technical, sysadmin-to-sysadmin. No marketing prose, no exclamation marks. Full rules in
+[writing-style.md](writing-style.md).
+
+## Page templates
+
+### Container page (`containers/<id>-<name>.md`)
+
+```markdown
+# <id> — `<name>`
+
+One-sentence purpose.
+
+## At a glance
+- **Hostname:** `<name>`
+- **IP:** `192.168.8.x`
+- **Privilege:** privileged | unprivileged
+- **Resources:** N cores / M GiB RAM / D GiB rootfs
+- **Mounts:** `/mnt/library` ↔ `/mnt/library` (if any)
+- **Public hostname:** `<sub>.hubris.network` (if proxied)
+
+## Role
+What it does, what it talks to.
+
+## Service / port map
+| Service | Listen | Notes |
+
+## Storage / config paths
+
+## Auto-deploy
+(if any) — link to [auto-deploy](../infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)
+
+## Related
+- [Caddy](121-caddy.md) (if proxied)
+- [DNS](../infrastructure/dns.md) (if has subdomain)
+- [Authentik](124-authentik.md) (if SSO)
+- ...
+
+## Changelog
+### YYYY-MM-DD — short title
+What changed, why, link to investigation if any.
+```
+
+### Cross-cutting page (`infrastructure/<topic>.md`)
+
+```markdown
+# <Topic>
+
+One-sentence summary.
+
+## Why
+Design rationale — what it replaces, what it solves.
+
+## Components
+Where it runs, what files matter.
+
+## How to apply / use
+Recipes.
+
+## Gotchas
+
+## Related
+Links to nodes that host or depend on this.
+
+## Changelog
+```
+
+### Plan (`plans/YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md`)
+
+```markdown
+# YYYY-MM-DD — <title>
+
+## Goal
+What this change achieves and why.
+
+## Current topology / state
+Diagram or description of what exists now.
+
+## Target topology / state
+What it looks like after.
+
+## Pre-flight checklist
+
+## Step-by-step procedure
+
+## Verification
+
+## Post-migration
+Changelog entries to write, index status to update.
+```
+
+### Investigation (`knowledge/sources/investigations/YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md`)
+
+```markdown
+# YYYY-MM-DD — <title>
+
+## Summary
+1-3 sentences.
+
+## Timeline
+
+## Root cause
+
+## Mitigations applied
+
+## Open questions
+```
+
+## Linking discipline
+
+- Every container page links to every cross-cutting page it participates in.
+- Every cross-cutting page lists the nodes that participate.
+- Every investigation links to the nodes it implicates *and* gets back-linked from each node's changelog.
+- Every plan links to the infrastructure pages it affects. When done, update the plan's status in `plans/index.md` and write changelog entries on affected node pages.
+
+## Changelog hygiene
+
+- Reverse-chronological (newest first).
+- One entry per discrete change, even if you make several in one day.
+- If a change spans nodes, repeat the entry on each affected page (different perspective is fine).
+- Don't rewrite history — entries are append-only. Mistakes get a follow-up entry that supersedes them.
+
+## Same-session update rule
+
+When you make a change to a node — migrate an LXC, update an IP, change a
+mount, deploy a new service — **update every relevant doc page in the same
+session.** A change that touches a container page must also update:
+
+- The `containers/index.md` table (IPs, host, mounts, status)
+- The `README.md` table (if the change affects listed columns)
+- The Caddy page site list (if the change affects `*.hubris.network` routing)
+- The DNS / ingress infrastructure pages (if the change affects routing)
+- The `hosts/{hubris,strong}.md` host page (if container count changes)
+- The `inventory.yaml` host entry (source of truth for the `hosts/*.yaml` generation)
+- The `infrastructure/topology.md` (generated from inventory, but regen if needed)
+
+The pattern of updating only one page and leaving stale references on others
+is a bug. If you're doing a multi-step migration, document the intermediate
+state with a changelog entry that says "pending — will finalize after Phase
+N."
+
+This rule is why Phase 2 of the strong migration (2026-07-05) caused
+widespread stale data: individual container pages were updated in the
+changelog but never had their At-a-glance sections, IPs, mount paths, or
+host attribution updated. Don't repeat that.

.agents/shared/writing-style.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# Writing Style
+
+Write like a technical reference, not a marketing page. Every sentence conveys new information.
+These rules govern **committed documentation** — wiki pages, READMEs, schemas, skills, `AGENTS.md`,
+plans, investigations, and code comments. They are separate from [caveman.md](caveman.md), which
+governs an agent's *chat responses*; the two do not conflict.
+
+New or rewritten pages follow these patterns from day one. Existing pages get updated the next time
+they are touched.
+
+## Vocabulary — never use these
+
+- Significance puffers: "pivotal", "crucial", "vital", "groundbreaking", "transformative", "testament", "paramount", "invaluable".
+- Analytical verbs: "delve", "leverage", "utilize", "facilitate", "foster", "showcase", "underscore", "streamline", "harness".
+- Poetic nouns: "tapestry", "landscape" (figurative), "realm", "paradigm", "ecosystem" (figurative), "journey" (figurative), "nexus", "cornerstone".
+- Promotional adjectives: "robust", "seamless", "innovative", "cutting-edge", "meticulous", "holistic", "comprehensive".
+- Opening crutches: "In today's world", "In the ever-evolving landscape of", "It's worth noting that", "It is important to note that".
+
+Use short, common words: "use" not "utilize", "help" not "facilitate", "show" not "demonstrate".
+
+## Voice
+
+Describe what systems do and how they work.
+
+- **Reference prose** (node pages, cross-cutting infrastructure descriptions, `## Role`, `## Why`,
+  `At a glance`) is third-person: state facts about the system, not instructions to a reader.
+- **Recipes, runbooks, and skills** are the exception: second-person imperative is allowed and
+  preferred where it makes a procedure clearer ("Edit the Caddyfile, commit + push", "Verify with
+  `dig +short`"). This matches how the operator actually works. The vocabulary, structure, and
+  cross-reference rules below still apply.
+
+## Page shape
+
+Every doc-level page follows the same shape so a reader scans it in one pass.
+
+1. **One H1 = the page title.** Node pages use `# <id> — \`<name>\``; topic pages use `# <Topic>`.
+2. **Opening definition.** First paragraph, 1–3 sentences, says what the thing is. No motivation, no marketing, no setup.
+3. **Body sections** in the natural order for the topic. Reuse the section templates in [page-templates.md](page-templates.md).
+4. **`## Changelog`** at the bottom of every node/topic page — reverse-chronological, append-only. This section is machine-parsed (`get_changelog` in `mcp/server.py`); keep the `### YYYY-MM-DD — title` shape.
+5. **Related links** only at the bottom, only when a reference cannot be woven inline.
+
+## Section indexes (folder READMEs)
+
+A folder's `README.md` opens with a 1–3 sentence prose intro that says what the section covers, then
+a single navigation table — `| Document | What it covers |` — and nothing else. No stale counts, no
+duplicated prose, no narrative between the intro and the table.
+
+## Structure rules
+
+- Make every sentence information-dense. Cut filler, qualifiers, and setup phrases. Lead with the concrete fact or action, not why it matters.
+- No participial tack-ons (", highlighting the importance of…"). If the clause adds information, make it a separate sentence.
+- **No meta-commentary about the content itself.** Do not narrate the page's own structure or linking strategy.
+- Prefer **tables** for enumerable items with internal structure (service/port maps, field lists, status grids). Reserve bullets for short non-structured lists.
+- Use the **bold-leading-phrase pattern** for structured points: `**Read-only by construction.** The MCP server never mutates state.` — a bold noun phrase, a period, then the explanation.
+- When enumerating across services or nodes, give each its own `###` sub-section or a table row, not one run-on paragraph.
+- Use backticks for code, paths, hostnames, and file names (`inventory.yaml`, `192.168.8.77`, `pct config`); italics for first-mention terminology.
+- Use `>` blockquotes for caveats and gaps that interrupt the main flow: `> **Outstanding gap.** DNS-vs-inventory drift check not yet wired.` One thought per blockquote.
+
+## Diagrams
+
+- Mermaid is the default for topology and flow diagrams. `infrastructure/topology.md` is generated by `oikos/gen-topology.py` — do not hand-edit it.
+- ASCII box diagrams are fine for small shape diagrams; keep them to one screen.
+
+## Sourcing and cross-references
+
+- **Factual discipline.** Every claim is grounded in a cited source, an adjacent linked page, or a directly observable fact (`pct config`, `docker inspect`, running config). Do not write sentences that sound sourced but are inference. When docs disagree with live state, fix the doc and note it in the changelog.
+- **One-sided cross-references.** When two pages relate, the link lives in the page where the connection makes organizational sense. Do not add a back-pointer unless that direction also carries content the reader needs.
+- **Cross-references are content, not catalog.** Inline links arise from the surrounding prose; the linked page must be needed to understand the current sentence. A bottom-of-page "Related" list is the fallback, not the default.
+- Pages link with standard relative markdown links (e.g. a container page links to `../infrastructure/dns.md`), forming a navigable graph. Orphans are a bug.
+
+## Code comments and commit/PR prose
+
+- Comments explain intent, trade-offs, or constraints the code cannot convey. No diff narration, no type restatement, no section-divider comments.
+- Commit messages and PR descriptions are problem → change → risk → verification, not a file-by-file diff restatement.
+- The banned vocabulary applies the same way in comments and commit messages.

.agents/skills/client-enrollment/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+---
+name: client-enrollment
+risk_class: config_mutation
+inputs: [hostname, kind, role]
+verification: "homelab doctor (on the new client)"
+docs_update_checklist: [hosts_narrative_page_if_lxc_or_vm]
+---
+
+# Client enrollment
+
+Goal: bring a new host (workstation, LXC, VM) into inventory and the
+secrets model, with mesh membership only where it's actually needed.
+This wraps the existing `homelab client add` flow — see
+[operations/agent-enrollment.md](../../operations/agent-enrollment.md) for
+the full walkthrough; this runbook is the risk/lifecycle framing.
+
+1. On any enrolled client: `homelab client add <hostname>` — appends a
+   `hosts.<name>:` block to `inventory.yaml` (lifecycle `state: planned`
+   → `provisioning`, per [oikos/ontology.yaml](../../../oikos/ontology.yaml)),
+   commits + pushes.
+2. Netbird join is **optional, not a required step** — only needed for
+   hosts that must be reachable off-LAN (workstations that roam, e.g.
+   `republic-laptop`, `mac-mini`). A node reachable on the household LAN
+   (192.168.8.0/24 — most LXCs/VMs) doesn't need it: it's already
+   reachable directly, and off-LAN clients reach it too via hubris's
+   routed `192.168.8.0/24` Netbird network resource. Skip this step for
+   LAN-only nodes; do it (out-of-band, console or setup key) only for
+   hosts that need independent off-LAN reachability.
+3. On the new host: run `bootstrap.sh` (add `--with-hermes` to also
+   enroll the Hermes agent). This provisions `/etc/age/key.txt`, the
+   sync timer, and prints an age pubkey.
+4. Back on an enrolled client: `homelab client add <hostname>
+   --finalize-pubkey <age1...>` — sets `age_pubkey`, grants shared
+   secrets, re-keys SOPS, commits + pushes. This is the
+   `provisioning → active` transition.
+5. Verify: `homelab doctor` on the new client should show all checks
+   green (clone, sync timer, age key, CLI symlink, MCP reachable).
+
+Docs-update checklist: if the new host is an LXC/VM, add its narrative
+page under `containers/` or `vms/` and set `doc_page` in its inventory
+entry (host-level cards don't have a `doc_page` field yet — services do;
+narrative pages are still found via the generated `see_also` in
+`hosts/<name>.yaml`).

.agents/skills/config-change-deploy/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+---
+name: config-change-deploy
+risk_class: config_mutation
+inputs: [service_name, change_description]
+verification: "curl -sf <service_url> (or homelab service <name> health)"
+docs_update_checklist: [doc_page, changelog]
+---
+
+# Config change + deploy
+
+Goal: change a tracked config repo (Caddy, Gitea customizations, an app's
+own repo) and get it live, safely.
+
+1. `homelab change preflight <service>` — current health, the service's
+   `config_repo`, its risk class, and the verification command to run
+   after. If risk class requires approval (`config_mutation` or
+   `destructive`), stop and get operator sign-off before editing — see
+   `oikos/policy.yaml`.
+2. Clone/pull the `config_repo` (never edit the backend's working tree
+   directly — tracked configs change by commit + push, per
+   [OIKOS.md](../../OIKOS.md) conventions).
+3. Make the change, commit, push to `main`.
+4. The Gitea webhook fires the deploy pipeline for that repo (see
+   [infrastructure/auto-deploy.md](../../../knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/auto-deploy.md) for
+   the exact receiver/reload for this service).
+5. Run the preflight's verification command. If it fails, check
+   `homelab service <name> log` for the reload/restart error.
+6. Record the change: once `oikos/ledger.py` is wired into deploy tooling
+   (Week 3), this is automatic; until then, note the change and outcome
+   in the relevant investigation/plan doc.
+
+Docs-update checklist: update the service's `doc_page` if the change
+alters its behavior, ingress route, or ownership; add a changelog entry
+if the page has one.

.agents/skills/docs-lint/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+---
+name: docs-lint
+risk_class: read_only
+inputs: [paths]
+verification: "python3 .agents/skills/docs-lint/lint.py"
+docs_update_checklist: []
+---
+
+# Docs lint
+
+Check committed documentation against the mechanical rules in
+[writing-style.md](../../shared/writing-style.md): banned vocabulary and broken relative markdown
+links. Prose-voice rules are not machine-checkable — those stay a review responsibility.
+
+Run from the repo root:
+
+    python3 .agents/skills/docs-lint/lint.py            # default: knowledge/ .agents/ operations/ investigations/ plans/
+    python3 .agents/skills/docs-lint/lint.py knowledge/wiki/containers/104-gitea.md
+
+Exit code is non-zero when any violation is found, so it can gate a commit. The banned-vocabulary
+list mirrors `writing-style.md`; update both together if the standard changes.
+
+> **Known baseline.** `knowledge/wiki/containers/101-jellyfin.md` links into a sibling repo
+> (`devops/homelab-authentik-admin`) that this checkout does not contain — expected, not a bug.
+> Any other broken link is a real regression; investigate before dismissing it as baseline noise.

.agents/skills/docs-lint/lint.py

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Lint committed docs against .agents/shared/writing-style.md.
+
+Checks two mechanical rules:
+  1. Banned vocabulary (significance puffers, analytical verbs, poetic nouns,
+     promotional adjectives, opening crutches).
+  2. Broken relative markdown links.
+
+Prose-voice rules are not machine-checkable; this covers the parts that are.
+Run from the repo root: python3 .agents/skills/docs-lint/lint.py [paths...]
+Exit 1 if any violation is found.
+"""
+import os, re, sys
+
+BANNED = [
+    "pivotal", "crucial", "vital", "groundbreaking", "transformative", "testament",
+    "paramount", "invaluable", "delve", "leverage", "utilize", "facilitate", "foster",
+    "showcase", "underscore", "streamline", "harness", "tapestry", "realm", "paradigm",
+    "nexus", "cornerstone", "robust", "seamless", "innovative", "cutting-edge",
+    "meticulous", "holistic", "comprehensive", "in today's world",
+    "it's worth noting", "it is important to note",
+]
+BAN_RE = re.compile(r'(?<![\w-])(' + "|".join(re.escape(w) for w in BANNED) + r')(?![\w-])', re.I)
+LINK = re.compile(r'\]\(([^)]+)\)')
+
+def iter_md(paths):
+    for p in paths:
+        if os.path.isfile(p) and p.endswith(".md"):
+            yield p
+        for root, dirs, files in os.walk(p):
+            dirs[:] = [d for d in dirs if d not in (".git", "node_modules")]
+            for f in files:
+                if f.endswith(".md"):
+                    yield os.path.join(root, f)
+
+def main(argv):
+    paths = argv or ["knowledge", ".agents", "operations", "investigations", "plans"]
+    violations = 0
+    # The style guide and this skill enumerate the banned words by definition.
+    ban_exempt = ("shared/writing-style.md", "skills/docs-lint/")
+    for f in sorted(set(iter_md(paths))):
+        check_banned = not any(x in f for x in ban_exempt)
+        fence = False
+        with open(f) as fh:
+            for ln, line in enumerate(fh, 1):
+                if line.lstrip().startswith("```"):
+                    fence = not fence; continue
+                if fence:
+                    continue
+                if check_banned:
+                    for m in BAN_RE.finditer(line):
+                        print(f"{f}:{ln}: banned word '{m.group(1)}'")
+                        violations += 1
+                for m in LINK.finditer(line):
+                    link = m.group(1)
+                    if re.match(r'^(https?:|mailto:|#|/)', link):
+                        continue
+                    path = re.split(r'[#?]', link)[0]
+                    if not path:
+                        continue
+                    tgt = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(f), path))
+                    if not os.path.exists(tgt):
+                        print(f"{f}:{ln}: broken link -> {link}")
+                        violations += 1
+    print(f"\n{violations} violation(s)")
+    return 1 if violations else 0
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main(sys.argv[1:]))

.agents/skills/incident-investigation/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+---
+name: incident-investigation
+risk_class: read_only
+inputs: [symptom, affected_entity]
+verification: "n/a — investigation produces a written record, not a state change"
+docs_update_checklist: [investigations_entry]
+---
+
+# Incident investigation
+
+Goal: understand what broke and why, before touching anything.
+
+1. `homelab service <name> explain` (or `homelab node <name> relations`
+   if the affected entity is a host) — get the blast radius and doc
+   pointer first. Don't start pulling logs blind.
+2. `homelab service <name> health` + `homelab service <name> log` (or
+   MCP `get_service_status` / `tail_log`) for the affected service.
+3. Walk the blast radius: is a shared dependency down (`caddy`, `dns`,
+   `authentik`, or the backend host itself)? `homelab node <name>
+   relations` shows "affected by" — check those first.
+4. `homelab apt-audit` if the symptom looks like a dpkg/upgrade
+   interaction.
+5. Check the change ledger for recent mutations to the affected entity
+   or anything upstream of it: `homelab service <name> history` (once
+   populated) or grep `ledger/*.jsonl`.
+6. Write findings to a new `knowledge/sources/investigations/<date>-<slug>.md` — symptom,
+   timeline, root cause, fix applied, prevention. This is the durable
+   record; don't rely on chat history.
+
+Docs-update checklist: always create the investigation entry. If the
+root cause was stale/wrong inventory data (a `doc_page`, `config_repo`,
+or `backend` that didn't match reality — this happened during Week 1
+kernel work, see the `authentik` backend fix), correct `inventory.yaml`
+in the same session.

.agents/skills/lifecycle-activate-node/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+---
+name: lifecycle-activate-node
+risk_class: config_mutation
+inputs: [node_name]
+verification: "homelab service <name> health (if it hosts a service); homelab doctor (if it's a client)"
+docs_update_checklist: [doc_page_complete]
+transition: "provisioning -> active"
+---
+
+# Lifecycle: activate a node
+
+Per [oikos/ontology.yaml](../../../oikos/ontology.yaml). Requires: age key
+enrolled if it needs secrets, mesh joined if it needs off-LAN reach,
+ingress live if public, health check answering, doc page complete,
+ledger entry.
+
+1. If the node is a `homelab` client: finish enrollment per
+   [client-enrollment.md](../client-enrollment/SKILL.md) (`--finalize-pubkey`,
+   mesh join, `homelab doctor` green).
+2. If it hosts a public service: add the `services:` entry in
+   `inventory.yaml` (backend, url, doc_page, config_repo, risk_notes —
+   see the Week-1 service contract fields) and wire the Caddy route in
+   `dtoro/caddy-conf`.
+3. Confirm the health check answers: `homelab service <name> health` or
+   a direct `curl`.
+4. Flip `state: provisioning` → `state: active` (or delete the `state:`
+   field — `active` is the default) in `inventory.yaml`.
+5. Complete the doc page (stub → full narrative: role, specs, how it's
+   configured, dependencies).
+6. Record the activation: `oikos/ledger.py append host:<name> activate
+   config_mutation --result ok` (or let the CLI wrapper do this once
+   Week 3's runbook automation lands).
+
+Regenerate derived data: `python3 mcp/build_host_files.py && python3
+oikos/gen-topology.py` so `hosts/<name>.yaml`, the topology diagram, and
+the context card all reflect the new state.

.agents/skills/lifecycle-deprecate-node/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+name: lifecycle-deprecate-node
+risk_class: config_mutation
+inputs: [node_name, replacement_node_or_reason]
+verification: "homelab node <name> relations — 'affected by' must be empty before completing"
+docs_update_checklist: [doc_page_deprecation_note]
+transition: "active -> deprecated"
+---
+
+# Lifecycle: deprecate a node
+
+Per [oikos/ontology.yaml](../../../oikos/ontology.yaml): a node keeps running
+but takes no new dependents. **Completion condition: zero remaining
+inbound `depends-on`/`routes-to` edges** — this is a hard gate, not a
+suggestion; `oikos/policy.yaml` `lifecycle_overrides.deprecated.refuse`
+lists `new-inbound-edges` as refused going forward.
+
+1. Set `state: deprecated` on the node.
+2. `homelab node <name> relations` — read `affected_by`. Every entry
+   there is something still relying on this node.
+3. Migrate or retire each dependent one at a time (point its `backend`/
+   `config_repo`/ingress route elsewhere, or deprecate it too if it's
+   being retired alongside).
+4. Re-run `homelab node <name> relations` after each dependent is moved.
+   The transition to `destroyed` is only safe once `affected_by` is
+   empty — check this every time, don't assume from memory.
+5. Note the deprecation on the doc page: reason, replacement (if any),
+   date.
+
+If step 2 shows dependents you didn't expect, stop and investigate
+before proceeding — that's exactly the kind of drift the Week-3 detector
+will catch automatically, but until then this manual check is the gate.
+
+Next (once `affected_by` is empty):
+[lifecycle-destroy-node.md](../lifecycle-destroy-node/SKILL.md).

.agents/skills/lifecycle-destroy-node/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+name: lifecycle-destroy-node
+risk_class: destructive
+inputs: [node_name]
+verification: "homelab node <name> relations returns unknown-entity; pct list on the backend no longer shows it"
+docs_update_checklist: [archaeology_entry, containers_index_update]
+transition: "deprecated -> destroyed"
+---
+
+# Lifecycle: destroy a node
+
+**Destructive.** Requires operator approval + typed confirmation phrase
+per `oikos/policy.yaml`. Requires (ontology): backups verified, secrets
+recipients removed + re-keyed, ingress/DNS removed, archaeology entry,
+ledger entry.
+
+1. Confirm the node is `deprecated` with zero `affected_by` edges
+   (`homelab node <name> relations`) — do not skip this even if the
+   deprecation runbook was followed recently; state can drift.
+2. If it's an enrolled client: `homelab client remove <name>` — revokes
+   the age key, re-keys SOPS, removes the inventory entry. This is
+   already destructive-class and confirmed in the CLI.
+3. Remove any ingress route (Caddy config repo) and DNS record still
+   pointing at it.
+4. Verify backups of anything on it are retained per policy before the
+   disk goes away (see `backs-up-to`).
+5. Destroy the LXC/VM (`pct destroy` / `qm destroy`).
+6. Move the `hosts.<name>:` block (if any inventory remnant survives
+   `client remove`, e.g. infra-only LXCs with no age key) into
+   inventory.yaml's `archaeology:` section: `pve_id`, `destroyed` date,
+   `reason`. Add a row to `containers/index.md` "Recently destroyed"
+   table (kept for human-readable browsing alongside the structured
+   data).
+7. `oikos/ledger.py append host:<name> destroy destructive --result ok`.
+8. Regenerate: `python3 mcp/build_host_files.py && python3
+   oikos/gen-topology.py` — the node drops out of `hosts/*.yaml` and
+   appears in the topology doc's archaeology table.
+
+If the destroy fails partway (e.g. secrets revoked but pct destroy
+errors), do not re-run step 2 — `client remove` is not idempotent
+against a second revocation attempt on the issuance server. Finish the
+remaining steps manually and note the partial state in an investigation.

.agents/skills/lifecycle-migrate-node/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+---
+name: lifecycle-migrate-node
+risk_class: config_mutation
+inputs: [node_name, source_host, target_host]
+verification: "homelab node <name> relations (re-check blast radius); homelab service <svc> health for every hosted service"
+docs_update_checklist: [doc_page_migration_note, inventory_host_and_lan_ip]
+transition: "active -> migrating -> active"
+---
+
+# Lifecycle: migrate a node
+
+Modeled on the strong Phase 1+2 migration
+([plans/2026-06-03_110000-library-ssd-migration-to-ludo-mini.md](../../../.hermes/plans/2026-06-03_110000-library-ssd-migration-to-ludo-mini.md)).
+Requires (ontology): preflight + backup-verified before migrating;
+post-verify + Caddy backends checked + mounts checked + docs updated
+before returning to `active`.
+
+1. `homelab change preflight <every service the node hosts>` — capture
+   current health as a baseline.
+2. Verify backups are current for anything with data at rest on the
+   node (see `backs-up-to` edges once populated).
+3. Set `state: migrating` in `inventory.yaml`.
+4. Perform the migration (pct/qm move, or create-on-target +
+   data-copy + destroy-source, per the specific case).
+5. Update `inventory.yaml`: new `host:`, `lan_ip`, `mesh` addresses for
+   the node; update every `services:` entry whose `backend` pointed at
+   it if the backend name itself changes (usually it doesn't — only the
+   `host:`/`lan_ip` on the guest entry moves).
+6. Post-verify: re-run the Week-1 drift check by hand — confirm Caddy's
+   backend IP for each affected service matches the new `lan_ip`
+   (automatic in Week 3's drift detector), confirm mounts still resolve.
+7. `homelab service <name> health` for every service the node hosts.
+8. Set `state: active`. Add a migration note to the node's doc page
+   (old host/IP → new, date, phase reference) — this repo's convention
+   for every past migration (see `containers/101-jellyfin.md`,
+   `containers/129-house.md`).
+
+Regenerate: `python3 mcp/build_host_files.py && python3
+oikos/gen-topology.py`.

.agents/skills/lifecycle-provision-node/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+---
+name: lifecycle-provision-node
+risk_class: config_mutation
+inputs: [node_name, kind, storage_pool]
+verification: "grep 'state: provisioning' hosts/<name>.yaml"
+docs_update_checklist: [doc_page_stub]
+transition: "planned -> provisioning"
+---
+
+# Lifecycle: provision a node
+
+Per [oikos/ontology.yaml](../../../oikos/ontology.yaml) `lifecycle.transitions`.
+Policy note: `provisioning` nodes get a lifecycle override —
+`config_mutation` actions downgrade to `reversible_low` because nothing
+depends on the node yet (see `oikos/policy.yaml` `lifecycle_overrides`).
+
+Requires (from ontology): inventory entry, IP reserved, storage pool
+chosen, doc page stub.
+
+1. Create the LXC/VM on its target Proxmox host (`pct create` /
+   `qm create`), choosing the storage pool deliberately — record it as
+   the `storage:` field once populated (Week 1 schema; not yet backfilled
+   for existing nodes).
+2. Add the inventory entry: `homelab client add <name>` for anything that
+   will run the `homelab` CLI, or a direct `hosts.<name>:` block with
+   `state: provisioning`, `kind`, `host`, `pve_id`, `lan_ip` for
+   infra-only LXCs that won't self-enroll.
+3. Stub the doc page (`containers/<pve_id>-<name>.md` or
+   `vms/<pve_id>-<name>.md`) — even a one-line "provisioning, see plan X"
+   is enough to satisfy the transition requirement.
+4. Reserve the IP in DNS/DHCP notes if it's a fixed LAN address.
+
+Next: [lifecycle-activate-node.md](../lifecycle-activate-node/SKILL.md).

.agents/skills/runbook-budget-from-csv/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+---
+name: budget-import-from-csv
+risk_class: config_mutation
+inputs: [csv_file]
+references: [containers/129-house.md]
+---
+
+# Runbook: Budget import from N26 CSV → Yuvomi
+
+Distil a bank-export CSV into Yuvomi's Budget and Subscriptions modules using
+the `yuvomi-mcp` tools. Run this whenever a new CSV period needs to be
+summarised into targets and fixed costs.
+
+---
+
+## Prerequisites
+
+- `yuvomi-mcp` is running on LXC 129 and connected as an MCP server in Claude.
+- The CSV is an N26 export (columns: Booking Date, Value Date, Partner Name,
+  Partner Iban, Type, Payment Reference, Account Name, Amount (EUR), …).
+- API token: `homelab secret yuvomi-api-token` (decrypts on any enrolled client).
+- Direct API base: `https://house.hubris.network/api/v1`
+
+---
+
+## API quirks (Yuvomi ≤ 0.77.x)
+
+- **Subscriptions live under `/budget/subscriptions`**, NOT `/subscriptions/`.
+  A top-level `/subscriptions` route returns 404.
+- `GET /budget/subscriptions` → `{ data: { subscriptions: [...], summary: {...} } }`
+- `GET /budget/subscriptions/meta` → `{ data: { categories: [...], payment_methods: [...] } }`
+- `POST /budget/subscriptions` → create a subscription (name, amount, billing_cycle,
+  cycle_interval, next_payment_date, currency, category_id, payment_method_id required)
+- `GET /budget/` (no month) → returns only **non-recurring** base entries.
+  Use `GET /budget/?month=YYYY-MM` to get all entries (recurring + one-time) for a month.
+- `GET /budget/categories` → expense category keys + income category names (German keys
+  like `"Erwerbseinkommen"`, `"Sozialleistungen"`, `"Geschenke & Transfers"`).
+- Budget entries: `amount` positive = income, negative = expense.
+- Recurring entries: set `is_recurring: 1` + `recurrence_interval: "monthly"`.
+  The `date` field sets the start month.
+- `recurrence_virtual: 1` smooths non-monthly amounts across all months in the summary
+  (e.g. 55.08 € quarterly → shows as ~18.36 €/month).
+- Custom RRULE strings (`recurrence_rule`) are **not accepted** by the API — use
+  `cycle_interval` on the subscription instead, or `recurrence_interval` on budget entries.
+
+---
+
+## Subscription category IDs (as of 2026-06-26)
+
+| id | name | budget_subcategory_key |
+|---|---|---|
+| 1 | Entertainment | subscription_entertainment |
+| 2 | Productivity | subscription_productivity |
+| 3 | Utilities | subscription_utilities |
+| 4 | Health | subscription_health |
+| 5 | Education | subscription_education |
+| 6 | Other | subscription_other |
+
+## Payment method IDs
+
+| id | name |
+|---|---|
+| 1 | Credit Card |
+| 2 | Debit Card |
+| 3 | PayPal |
+| 6 | Bank Transfer / SEPA |
+| 7 | Other |
+
+---
+
+## Step 1 — Categorise the transactions
+
+Skip these as internal/already-covered:
+- Fixed costs you'll enter as **subscriptions** (Miete, SWM, SYNVIA, Hundefutter,
+  Netflix, Grover, Rundfunk ARD, KuKita, Lillydoo)
+- Internal transfers (The Joy Pot ↔ Cookie, Hauptkonto, Tagesgeldkonto splits)
+- Identified income (Cookie Share, Kindergeld, Pocket Money credits, Distributor)
+- Fun Money pass-throughs (in and out same month → net zero)
+
+**Variable expense taxonomy:**
+
+| Category key | Subcategory key | Examples |
+|---|---|---|
+| `food` | `groceries` | E-Center, Knuspr, EDEKA, Tegut, VollCorner, Lidl, Netto, REWE, KoRo, Roast Market |
+| `food` | `restaurants_bars` | Restaurants, Lieferando, Cafes, Zeit für Brot, Baobab, Höflinger |
+| `personal_health` | `beauty_cosmetics` | DM, Rossmann |
+| `personal_health` | `pharmacy` | Apotheke, MVZ Dermatologie |
+| `transport` | `apps_taxi` | Uber, RYD GMBH, MVG, Handyparken |
+| `shopping_clothing` | `gifts` | Children products: Schlummersack, Catchy Kids, SP EVERY., Dukal, Berger-Lernwelt |
+| `shopping_clothing` | `clothes_shoes` | Zalando, Ernsting's, Schuhmair, Thalia, Vinted, Airbnb, Hotel at Booking.com |
+| `shopping_clothing` | `electronics` | Amazon, AMZN Mktp DE |
+| `housing` | `renovation_maintenance` | IKEA, Markus Festl, Granit, Sostrene Grene, Mol* tischdecken, Gaertnerei, Dehner |
+| `education` | `courses_college` | Kathrin Orlob (PEKiP), Nerina Aupperle |
+| `leisure` | `streaming` | WOW wowtv.de |
+| `financial_other` | `bank_fees` | Unidentified PayPal, Ratepay, N26 fees |
+| `Geschenke & Transfers` | *(income)* | One-off incoming transfers |
+
+---
+
+## Step 2 — Create subscriptions
+
+```
+get_subscriptions_meta()    ← get category_id and payment_method_id
+```
+
+**Standard Cookie household subscriptions (as of 2026-07):**
+
+| Name | Amount | billing_cycle | cycle_interval | category_id | payment_method_id |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| Miete | 1080.00 | monthly | 1 | 6 (Other) | 6 (Bank Transfer) |
+| Strom (SWM) | 79.00 | monthly | 1 | 3 (Utilities) | 6 |
+| Internet / TV / Telefon | 29.99 | monthly | 1 | 3 (Utilities) | 6 |
+| Hundefutter | 75.00 | monthly | 1 | 6 (Other) | 6 |
+| Netflix | 8.00 | monthly | 1 | 1 (Entertainment) | 6 |
+| Grover | 16.90 | monthly | 1 | 6 (Other) | 2 (Debit Card) |
+| Rundfunk ARD / ZDF | 55.08 | monthly | 3 | 1 (Entertainment) | 6 |
+| KuKita Daycare (Leon) | 503.00 | monthly | 1 | 5 (Education) | 6 |
+| Lillydoo diapers | 56.70 | monthly | 2 | 4 (Health) | 3 (PayPal) |
+
+Monthly equivalent total: **1,838.60 €** (Yuvomi applies cycle_interval to prorate).
+
+---
+
+## Step 3 — Add recurring income entries
+
+```
+stage_add_budget_entry(
+    title="Kindergeld",
+    amount=55.00,
+    category="Sozialleistungen",
+    date="YYYY-MM-01",
+    is_recurring=True,
+    recurrence_interval="monthly",
+)
+commit_pending(pending_id)
+```
+
+**Standard recurring income:**
+
+| Title | Amount | category |
+|---|---|---|
+| Kindergeld | +55.00 | Sozialleistungen |
+| Cookie Share | +2650.00 | Erwerbseinkommen *(see recommended amount below)* |
+
+---
+
+## Step 4 — Post variable transactions
+
+For each non-skipped CSV row, call `stage_add_budget_entry` with the mapped
+category/subcategory and the actual transaction amount and date. Use the Partner
+Name + Payment Reference as the title (truncate to 100 chars).
+
+---
+
+## Step 5 — Verify
+
+```
+get_budget_summary("YYYY-MM")
+list_subscriptions()
+```
+
+Expected for a full month with KuKita:
+- Fixed expenses ≥ 1,838 € (subscriptions)
+- Variable expenses ≥ 500 € (groceries alone)
+
+---
+
+## Cookie Share: how much to transfer monthly
+
+Calculated from Jan–Jun 2026 data (Cookie account, one-offs stripped):
+
+| | €/month |
+|---|---|
+| **Fixed costs (subscriptions)** | **1,839** |
+| Miete | 1,080 |
+| KuKita *(permanent from Jul 2026)* | 503 |
+| Strom + SYNVIA + Rundfunk + Netflix + Grover + Hundefutter + Lillydoo | 256 |
+| **Variable (6-month averages)** | **1,032** |
+| Groceries | 595 |
+| Children products | 142 |
+| Dining & cafes | 100 |
+| Transport | 66 |
+| Drugstore | 52 |
+| Clothing, Amazon, Pharmacy | 77 |
+| **Total monthly spend** | **≈ 2,871** |
+| Minus Kindergeld (fixed income) | −55 |
+| Minus Pocket Money (conservative ~600 €) | −600 |
+| **→ Recommended Cookie Share** | **≈ 2,650 €** |
+| With 200 € buffer | **≈ 2,850 €** |
+
+**Current Cookie Share (Jun 2026): 1,995 € — shortfall ~655 €.**
+
+The gap was covered by irregular Pocket Money top-ups (avg 962 €/mo over 6 months, but
+highly variable: 121 €–3,000 €). KuKita starting in June is the biggest step-up; raising
+Cookie Share to **2,650 €** makes the budget self-sufficient without relying on top-ups.
+
+---
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-06-29 — Corrections from first real import
+- Subscriptions endpoint is `/budget/subscriptions`, NOT `/subscriptions/` (404).
+- `recurrence_rule` RRULE strings are rejected by the API; use `cycle_interval` instead.
+- `GET /budget/` (no filter) returns only non-recurring entries; use `?month=` for full view.
+- Added Cookie Share recommendation (2,650 €/month) based on 6-month expense analysis.
+- Added full category taxonomy table.
+
+### 2026-06-29 — Initial runbook
+Created from Jan–Jun 2026 N26 Cookie account analysis.

.agents/skills/runbook-dpkg-interrupted/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+---
+name: recover-dpkg-interrupted
+risk_class: reversible_low
+verification: "dpkg --audit (should be clean); apt-get check"
+---
+
+# Runbook — recover from dpkg-interrupted state
+
+You're here because an apt run got killed mid-transaction and the target now
+has packages that are **unpacked but not configured**. Symptoms:
+
+- `apt` refuses to do anything new: `Error: dpkg was interrupted, you must
+  manually run 'dpkg --configure -a' to correct the problem.`
+- `dpkg --audit` lists packages with header
+  `The following packages have been unpacked but not yet configured.`
+- `homelab apt-audit` shows `DPKG: DIRTY(N)` for the host.
+
+The system is still running the **old** binaries (still in memory), but the
+**new** binaries are unpacked and waiting for their postinst to run. Two
+worst-case manifestations from the 2026-05-21 sweep:
+
+- LXC 121 caddy: leftover state from a prior aborted apt run; caddy itself was
+  still serving but the new caddy binary on disk hadn't been wired up.
+- hubris: ssh master died mid-Wave-6 → 135 packages unpacked-not-configured,
+  including `systemd`, `openssh-server`, `sudo`, `netbird`. The half-
+  configured netbird daemon dropped the mesh peer, and we got locked out
+  until we recovered from the PVE web UI Shell.
+
+**Do not reboot until dpkg is clean.** A reboot tries to start the new
+binaries' services, which may fail because postinst never ran (missing users,
+config dirs, capabilities, etc.). The system might not come back up cleanly.
+
+## Path A — target is still reachable over ssh (preferred)
+
+```
+homelab ssh <host> -- bash -c 'DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive dpkg --configure -a && apt -y -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confold upgrade'
+```
+
+Or for an LXC by name:
+
+```
+homelab pct <lxc> exec -- bash -c 'DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive dpkg --configure -a && apt -y -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confold upgrade'
+```
+
+When that returns, confirm:
+
+```
+homelab apt-audit --target <host>
+```
+
+Expect `DPKG: ok` and the remaining `UPGR` count to match what's intentionally
+deferred (kernel/PVE on hubris, 0 elsewhere).
+
+## Path B — target locked out (mesh broken / ssh dead)
+
+Most common for hubris when netbird itself went half-configured: the daemon
+crashed on the new binary, the mesh peer dropped, port 22022 stopped listening,
+and you can't ssh in.
+
+1. Open `https://proxmox.hubris.network` in a browser.
+2. Datacenter → node `hubris` → `>_ Shell` (or `_ Console`). That's a root
+   shell on hubris served by the PVE web UI, independent of the netbird mesh.
+3. Run the recovery one-liner:
+
+```
+DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive dpkg --configure -a \
+  && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt -y -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confold upgrade \
+  && systemctl restart netbird \
+  && dpkg --audit \
+  && echo RECOVERY_OK
+```
+
+   Wait for `RECOVERY_OK`. The `systemctl restart netbird` is the bit that
+   heals the mesh — once netbird's daemon comes back up clean, your client's
+   peer state moves from `Connecting` to `Connected` within ~30 seconds and
+   the rest of your tooling works again.
+
+4. For an **LXC** that's locked out (less common — LXCs reach the world via
+   netbird routed through hubris, so unless hubris itself is broken, you can
+   still `pct enter` from the hubris shell):
+
+   From the PVE web UI shell on hubris:
+
+   ```
+   pct enter <id>
+   DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive dpkg --configure -a && apt -y upgrade
+   exit
+   ```
+
+## Prevention
+
+The `homelab apt-upgrade` wrapper launches apt inside a `systemd-run --collect`
+unit on the target, so it survives ssh teardown — the failure mode that put
+hubris into this state in the first place is no longer reachable through the
+standard tool. If you absolutely need to run apt manually over ssh, wrap it:
+
+```
+ssh <host> systemd-run --unit=apt-recovery --collect bash -c 'apt -y upgrade'
+```
+
+Then `systemctl status apt-recovery` from a fresh ssh to check progress.
+
+## Related
+
+- [Operations cheatsheet](../../operations/commands.md)
+- [Auto-deploy pipelines](../../../knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)
+- [Hubris host page](../../../knowledge/wiki/hosts/hubris.md)
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-05-21 — initial page
+Documents the dpkg-interrupted recovery path that came out of the
+fleet apt sweep (Wave 6 killed mid-transaction; hubris recovered via PVE
+web Shell).

.agents/skills/service-health-check/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+---
+name: service-health-check
+risk_class: read_only
+inputs: [service_name]
+verification: "homelab service <name> health"
+docs_update_checklist: []
+---
+
+# Service health check
+
+Goal: determine whether a service is actually healthy, without ad-hoc SSH.
+
+1. `homelab service <name> explain` — read the context card: backend,
+   blast radius, doc pointer, risk notes.
+2. `homelab service <name> health` — live health probe (HTTP code against
+   the service's `url`/`endpoint`). Once the Week-3 scheduler ships, this
+   reads a cached snapshot by default; pass `--live` to force a fresh probe.
+3. If unhealthy, `homelab service <name> log` (or MCP `tail_log`) for the
+   last 200 lines.
+4. Cross-check blast radius: `homelab node <name> relations` — is this
+   entity's own backend host healthy? A downstream failure (e.g. `strong`
+   down) will show up here before the service's own logs explain anything.
+5. If the fix is a restart: classify first (`oikos/policy.yaml` —
+   `service-restart` is `reversible_low` unless the service has a
+   `service_overrides` entry, e.g. `caddy`/`dns` are `config_mutation`).
+   Unattended agents may act on `reversible_low` without approval.
+
+Docs-update checklist: none for a pure health check. If the investigation
+reveals stale `risk_notes` or a wrong `doc_page`, fix `inventory.yaml` in
+the same session.

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+.DS_Store
+__pycache__/
+*.pyc
+
+# Regenerated every scheduler run (every 10 min); no audit value in the
+# diff. Signals (signals/*.jsonl) ARE tracked — this is just the ephemeral
+# health-probe cache. See oikos/scheduler.py.
+oikos/state.json
+
+.worktrees/

.hermes/plans/2026-06-03_110000-library-ssd-migration-to-ludo-mini.md

@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+# Plan: Migrate library SSD to ludo-mini + Proxmox gaming/media server
+
+## Goal
+
+Split the homelab into two Proxmox hosts:
+
+| Host | Role | Storage |
+|------|------|---------|
+| **hubris** | Core services (reverse-proxy, SSO, Matrix, git, documents, HA) | SSD 1 — boot + LXC rootfs (unchanged) |
+| **ludo-mini** | Gaming server + media/library services | SSD 2 — Samsung 990 EVO Plus 4 TB (moved from hubris) |
+
+The library SSD physically moves from hubris to ludo-mini. hubris LXCs that still need `/mnt/library` access it over NFS from ludo-mini.
+
+## Current state
+
+### hubris hardware
+- GMKtec NucBox M6 Ultra — AMD Ryzen 5 7640HS, 12 vCPU, ~28 GiB RAM
+- 2× Samsung 990 EVO Plus NVMe:
+  - nvme0: `local` (95G) + `local-lvm` (856G) — boot, ISOs, LXC rootfs
+  - nvme1: `library` LVM (3.7T) — `/mnt/library` ext4 via `/dev/mapper/library-library`
+
+### LXCs binding `/mnt/library` (host-level bind-mount)
+| ID | Name | Role | I/O profile |
+|----|------|------|-------------|
+| 101 | jellyfin | Media streaming | Read-heavy, sequential |
+| 103 | paperless | Document archive | Mixed, OCR writes |
+| 104 | gitea | Git server | Mixed, lots of small files |
+| 105 | apps | Docker (booklore, audiobookshelf, artifacto, MCP) | Mixed, depends on container |
+| 114 | nextcloud | File sync | Mixed, WebDAV |
+| 119 | sophia | Workshop | Low I/O |
+| 120 | mule-images | Photo management | Write-heavy (processing), iGPU |
+| 122 | arriman | *arr stack + downloads | Write-heavy (downloads) |
+| 126 | plato | App (sub-mount: `/mnt/library/documents/plato`) | Light |
+
+### NFS export chain (for VM 100 zimaos)
+```
+/mnt/library (ext4, host) → bind-mount → LXC 102 (nfs-export) → NFSv4 → VM 100 (zimaos)
+```
+
+### ludo-mini current
+- Linux workstation, wired Ethernet 2.5 Gbps, `192.168.178.181` (household LAN)
+- Runs Sunshine for game streaming
+- No Proxmox, no LVM config
+- Connected to SODOLA switch (same switch as hubris eno1)
+
+### Network topology
+```
+Fritz!Box 7590 (192.168.178.1)
+  └── SODOLA 2.5G switch
+       ├── hubris eno1 → vmbr1 (192.168.178.10)
+       │     └── routes to vmbr0 (192.168.8.0/24) — all LXCs
+       └── ludo-mini (192.168.178.181)
+```
+
+hubris routes between `192.168.8.0/24` (vmbr0) and `192.168.178.0/24` (vmbr1). So LXCs can reach ludo-mini via hubris as a router.
+
+## Key decisions
+
+### 1. Service split — what moves, what stays
+
+**Move to ludo-mini** (high I/O, benefits from data locality + GPU):
+- 101 jellyfin — media streaming, GPU transcoding
+- 120 mule-images — photo processing, iGPU passthrough
+- 122 arriman — *arr stack, downloads write to library
+
+**Stay on hubris, NFS-mount library from ludo-mini:**
+- 103 paperless — documents, moderate I/O
+- 104 gitea — git repos (small files, some I/O sensitivity but acceptable over NFS)
+- 105 apps — Docker apps, mixed workloads
+- 114 nextcloud — file sync
+- 119 sophia — workshop, light use
+- 126 plato — app, light use
+- 100 zimaos — NAS frontend, already NFS-mounted
+
+### 2. NFS architecture
+
+Instead of changing every LXC's mount config, keep the bind-mount pattern on hubris:
+
+```
+ludo-mini: /mnt/library (ext4, local NVMe)
+    │
+    └── NFSv4 export to 192.168.8.0/24
+              │
+              └── hubris host: NFS-mount at /mnt/library
+                        │
+                        └── LXCs: bind-mount /mnt/library (unchanged!)
+```
+
+This is transparent to all hubris LXCs — no container config changes needed. Only the hubris host changes from ext4 local mount to NFS mount. The LXC bind-mounts "just work" because `/mnt/library` is still at the same path on the host.
+
+### 3. Network — ludo-mini reachability from hubris LXCs
+
+LXCs on `192.168.8.0/24` reach ludo-mini (`192.168.178.181`) through hubris routing:
+- `vmbr0` → hubris kernel routing → `vmbr1` → SODOLA → ludo-mini
+- Already works (IP forwarding enabled on hubris)
+
+**Alternative (cleaner):** Add a secondary IP `192.168.8.x` on ludo-mini's physical interface so it's directly on the homelab subnet. This avoids the router hop and keeps NFS traffic off kernel forwarding path. Worth considering but not required.
+
+### 4. Gaming on ludo-mini with Proxmox
+
+ludo-mini runs Sunshine (game streaming). Under Proxmox:
+- **Option A:** Gaming VM with GPU passthrough — Sunshine + games in a VM, full GPU access
+- **Option B:** LXC with GPU device passthrough (`/dev/dri`) — lighter, shares kernel
+- **Option C:** Keep Sunshine on the Proxmox host itself (not recommended, but simplest)
+
+Option A is the cleanest for isolation. Games need a full desktop environment and GPU drivers; a VM with GPU passthrough gives them that.
+
+### 5. What about nfs-export (LXC 102)?
+
+Currently exports `/mnt/library` to zimaos. After migration:
+- If zimaos stays on hubris and accesses library via host NFS → bind-mount → LXC 102, that's triple-hop (ludo-mini → NFS → hubris → bind-mount → LXC 102 → NFS → zimaos). Terrible.
+- Better: zimaos NFS-mounts directly from ludo-mini.
+- So LXC 102 gets decommissioned (or repurposed).
+- zimaos gets a new NFS mount pointing directly at ludo-mini.
+
+## Migration phases
+
+### Phase 1 — Preparation (no downtime)
+
+1. **Document current state** on hubris:
+   - `pct list` — full container inventory
+   - `pct config <id>` for every library-mounting LXC
+   - `cat /etc/fstab` — capture the library mount line
+   - `df -h /mnt/library` — confirm space usage
+   - `lsblk -f` — UUID, filesystem
+   - Identify the exact NVMe device (`nvme1n1`)
+
+2. **Pre-flight on ludo-mini:**
+   - Confirm hardware: CPU, RAM, available M.2 slots, GPU model
+   - Confirm it can take the Samsung 990 EVO Plus (M.2 NVMe, PCIe 4.0 x4)
+   - Verify BIOS supports virtualization (VT-d/AMD-Vi for PCIe passthrough)
+   - Check: does ludo-mini have a second drive for Proxmox OS? If not, we need to partition the library SSD for Proxmox boot + library LVM, which complicates things significantly
+
+3. **Install Proxmox on ludo-mini:**
+   - Download Proxmox VE 9.x ISO
+   - Install to ludo-mini's system drive (NOT the library SSD)
+   - Configure networking: bridge for Proxmox, IP on 192.168.178.x
+   - Test: web UI accessible
+
+4. **Prepare NFS server on ludo-mini Proxmox:**
+   - Create NFS-export LXC (or serve from host — simpler for now)
+   - Prepare `/etc/exports`: `192.168.8.0/24(rw,all_squash,anonuid=33,anongid=10000,no_subtree_check,sec=sys)`
+   - Same squash params as current nfs-export LXC 102
+
+### Phase 2 — Physical SSD move (planned downtime)
+
+1. **Graceful shutdown on hubris:**
+   - Stop all library-mounting LXCs (101, 103, 104, 105, 114, 119, 120, 122, 126)
+   - Unmount `/mnt/library` on hubris host
+   - Edit `/etc/fstab` to comment out the library mount line
+   - Power off hubris
+
+2. **Physical drive swap:**
+   - Remove Samsung 990 EVO Plus (library SSD) from hubris
+   - Install into ludo-mini M.2 slot
+   - Power on ludo-mini
+
+3. **Bring library online on ludo-mini:**
+   - Detect the new NVMe device
+   - If it's the whole device with LVM, activate the VG:
+     ```
+     vgscan && vgchange -ay library
+     mount /dev/mapper/library-library /mnt/library
+     ```
+   - Add to `/etc/fstab` for auto-mount
+   - Verify content: `ls /mnt/library` — same tree as before
+
+4. **Start NFS export on ludo-mini:**
+   - `exportfs -ra`
+   - Verify: `showmount -e <ludo-mini-ip>`
+
+### Phase 3 — Reconnect hubris LXCs
+
+1. **Power on hubris** (without library SSD — it'll boot fine, just won't mount library)
+
+2. **Mount NFS on hubris host:**
+   - Install `nfs-common` if not present
+   - Add to `/etc/fstab`:
+     ```
+     192.168.178.181:/mnt/library /mnt/library nfs rw,vers=4,soft,timeo=30,retrans=3 0 0
+     ```
+     Use `soft` to prevent hangs if ludo-mini is down; `hard` with `intr` is safer for data integrity but can block processes.
+   - `mount /mnt/library`
+   - **Verify permissions:** `ls -la /mnt/library` — should show `www-data:media` ownership for shared subtrees (same uid 33, gid 10000). The NFS all_squash guarantees this.
+
+3. **Start LXCs:**
+   - Start the LXCs that stayed on hubris (103, 104, 105, 114, 119, 126)
+   - Their bind-mounts should work — `/mnt/library` is populated via NFS
+   - Verify each service: web UIs, git clone, document access
+
+4. **Update DNS/Caddy** for services that moved:
+   - If jellyfin, arr services moved to ludo-mini, update Caddyfile to point to ludo-mini IPs
+   - Update DNS entries if needed
+
+### Phase 4 — Migrate services to ludo-mini
+
+1. **Create LXCs/VM on ludo-mini Proxmox:**
+   - 101 jellyfin — privileged LXC, mount `/mnt/library`, add `media` group
+   - 120 mule-images — privileged LXC, mount `/mnt/library` + `/dev/dri` passthrough
+   - 122 arriman — privileged LXC, mount `/mnt/library`
+
+2. **Migrate configs:**
+   - Copy LXC configs from hubris (`/etc/pve/lxc/<id>.conf`) as templates
+   - Adjust network (IPs on household subnet or Proxmox bridge)
+   - Restore app data from backups or copy over NFS
+
+3. **Gaming VM:**
+   - Create VM with GPU passthrough
+   - Pass through the dGPU for gaming performance
+   - Install Sunshine + game libraries
+   - Storage: VM disk on Proxmox storage, games on library SSD
+
+4. **Update reverse proxy:**
+   - Caddy on hubris (121): update backend IPs for jellyfin, jellyseerr, qbit, sab, mule-images → point to ludo-mini
+   - Test: `media.hubris.network` serves from ludo-mini jellyfin
+
+### Phase 5 — Cleanup
+
+1. **Decommission nfs-export LXC 102** on hubris (no longer needed)
+2. **Update zimaos (100)** — change NFS mount from `192.168.8.200` → `192.168.178.181`
+3. **Remove old LXCs** from hubris (101, 120, 122) after confirming migration works
+4. **Update inventory.yaml:**
+   - ludo-mini: `kind: proxmox-host`, add mounts/storage, add LXCs
+   - Move services from hubris to ludo-mini
+   - Remove nfs-export
+5. **Update DNS:** `nfs-export.hubris.network` → ludo-mini IP (or remove)
+6. **Run `homelab sync`** to propagate changes
+
+## Open questions / unknowns
+
+1. **Does ludo-mini have a second drive for Proxmox OS?** If not, we'd need to repartition the library SSD — carve out ~100 GB for Proxmox, then the rest for library LVM. This is risky (data loss if partitioning goes wrong) and requires a full backup first. **Alternative:** Buy a small SSD for ludo-mini's OS.
+
+2. **What GPU does ludo-mini have?** Proxmox GPU passthrough requires IOMMU support and a GPU that doesn't have the reset bug. Need to check the exact GPU model.
+
+3. **NFS performance for git (gitea)?** Git operations over NFS can be problematic (locking, stat() storms). Gitea bare repos at `/mnt/library/repos/*.git` might need testing. Worst case: move gitea's repo storage to local disk and keep `/mnt/library` for large file/LFS storage only.
+
+4. **Media permission drift.** NFS `all_squash,anonuid=33,anongid=10000` ensures all writes from hubris LXCs (over NFS) and ludo-mini LXCs (local) land as `www-data:media`. This is the same squash currently used by nfs-export (102). Should be fine.
+
+5. **ludo-mini network — add 192.168.8.x address?** Adding a secondary IP on ludo-mini's interface directly on the homelab subnet avoids routing through hubris for NFS traffic. Cleaner, but requires Proxmox bridge setup. Worth doing during Proxmox install.
+
+6. **Sunshine migration.** Currently runs on ludo-mini bare metal. After Proxmox install, it needs to run in a VM. What happens to existing Sunshine configs, game libraries, save files? Need to preserve these during the Proxmox install.
+
+7. **Backup before moving.** The library SSD holds 3.7 TB of irreplaceable data (documents, photos, repos). Restic backups are currently disabled. **Before physically moving the drive, verify the data is readable and consider doing one backup** — or at minimum, `rsync` critical directories.
+
+## Files affected
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `/opt/homelab-context/inventory.yaml` | ludo-mini: workstation → proxmox-host; add LXCs, mounts; remove nfs-export; move service backends |
+| `/opt/homelab-context/hosts/hubris.md` | Remove library storage, add NFS mount note |
+| `/opt/homelab-context/hosts/ludo-mini.yaml` | Complete rewrite — Proxmox host, storage, tenants |
+| `/opt/homelab-context/containers/102-nfs-export.md` | Mark decommissioned |
+| `/opt/homelab-context/containers/index.md` | Move 101, 120, 122 to ludo-mini; remove 102 |
+| `/opt/homelab-context/infrastructure/dns.md` | Update nfs-export entry |
+| `/opt/homelab-context/infrastructure/media-permissions.md` | Note NFS squash from ludo-mini, not hubris |
+| hubris `/etc/fstab` | Replace ext4 mount with NFS mount |
+| ludo-mini `/etc/fstab` | Add library ext4 mount |
+| ludo-mini `/etc/exports` | Add NFS export config |
+| caddy (LXC 121) Caddyfile | Backend IPs for moved services |
+| DNS (LXC 107 Technitium) | Update entries for moved services |
+
+## Validation checklist
+
+- [ ] ludo-mini Proxmox web UI accessible
+- [ ] Library SSD detected and mountable on ludo-mini
+- [ ] NFS export from ludo-mini: `showmount -e <ip>` shows `/mnt/library`
+- [ ] hubris host NFS mount: `df -h /mnt/library` shows NFS, not ext4
+- [ ] hubris LXCs start and bind-mount /mnt/library (content visible)
+- [ ] gitea: `git clone` over SSH works, repos readable
+- [ ] paperless: document ingestion works, OCR processing
+- [ ] nextcloud: file sync, WebDAV
+- [ ] jellyfin: media plays from ludo-mini, transcoding works
+- [ ] arriman: downloads write to library, jellyfin picks up new media
+- [ ] mule-images: photo import and processing
+- [ ] zimaos: NFS mount from ludo-mini works, Files UI shows library
+- [ ] Sunshine: game streaming from ludo-mini VM works
+- [ ] All `*.hubris.network` services resolve and load through Caddy

.hermes/plans/2026-06-03_150000-homelab-structure-revision.md

@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+# Homelab structure revision & improvement plan
+
+## Goal
+
+Identify structural issues in the current hubris homelab topology and propose an
+actionable improvement roadmap — DNS consolidation, monitoring gaps, backup
+recovery, mesh completion, resource rightsizing, and operational hygiene.
+
+---
+
+## Current state summary
+
+| Dimension | Status |
+|-----------|--------|
+| Hypervisor | hubris (single-node Proxmox) — also does subnet routing (192.168.8.0/24) |
+| LXCs | 14 active, 1 retired (124), 1 new (107 dns) |
+| VMs | HAOS (108), ZimaOS (100) |
+| Workstations | mac-mini (macOS), republic-laptop, ludo-mini |
+| VPS | 1 IONOS box — netbird mgmt+signal+relay, traefik, authentik, coturn |
+| Switch | SODOLA 5-Port 2.5Gbit (L2, flat) |
+| Networking | 192.168.8.0/24 internal, fr!tz box main LAN via vmbr0→vmbr1 routing |
+| Mesh | Netbird + Tailscale (migrating), ~mixed state |
+| DNS | 3 sources: Technitium (CT 107), NetBird managed zone, public IONOS |
+| Backups | DISABLED since 2026-04-22 |
+| Monitoring | claudio-monitor (host health only, no apt/docker checks yet) |
+| Agent enrollment | 3/19 hosts enrolled (hubris, apps, republic-laptop) |
+
+---
+
+## Issues identified
+
+### 1. Three overlapping DNS sources (highest risk)
+
+**Problem:** Technitium on CT 107, NetBird managed DNS zone, and the public
+IONOS wildcard all answer `*.hubris.network` queries. The dns.md doc still
+references the old dnsmasq on LXC 124 (though the change log says it moved).
+NetBird's managed DNS bypasses Technitium entirely for some app names — there
+is no single source of truth for DNS.
+
+**Risk:** Mismatched answers → services unreachable → "works on some clients
+but not others" debugging sessions. Already cost time when `auth.hubris.network`
+re-pointed to the VPS.
+
+**Proposal:**
+- Phase out NetBird managed DNS zone for `hubris.network` — Technitium is the
+  authoritative answerer for mesh & LAN clients
+- Set Technitium as the sole DNS for all LXCs (remove router DNS / Tailscale
+  MagicDNS fallbacks)
+- Document the full authoritative chain: Technitium → upstream forwarders → public
+- Track Technitium config in git (dtoro/technitium-config or equivalent)
+
+### 2. Backups disabled with no alternative (data loss risk)
+
+**Problem:** The only backup was restic to an external USB that caused host
+crashes. It was disabled 2026-04-22 as an A/B test — host stability was
+confirmed by the SODOLA migration (no more Slate AX double-NAT hangs). The
+drive is still removed.
+
+**Risk:** `/mnt/library` (~429 GB of irreplaceable data: photos, documents,
+git repos, gitea data) has no off-host copy. Single-disk failure = total loss.
+
+**Proposal:**
+- Re-evaluate the USB drive stability with the new SODOLA switch topology
+  (direct rear USB 3.0 port, no hub chain)
+- OR adopt a cloud-backed strategy: `rclone`-to-Hetzner Storage Box or
+  Backblaze B2 for the irreplaceable subset (docs, photos, gitea data)
+- OR use hubris's own `zfs send` to a second host/disk if ZFS is feasible
+- Minimum viable: at minimum restore gitea backups + sops-encrypted secrets
+  via an off-site cron (cheap B2 bucket)
+
+### 3. Mesh migration still incomplete
+
+**Problem:** Most LXCs still use Tailscale. This forces per-LXC DNS workarounds
+(/etc/hosts overrides, local dnsmasq) and runs two VPN stacks in parallel.
+Mesh migration doc (mesh.md) is comprehensive but execution stalled.
+
+**Proposal:**
+- Batch-migrate all LXCs from Tailscale to Netbird in one maintenance window
+- Remove Tailscale from the PVE host
+- Ensure all LXCs resolve `*.hubris.network` via Technitium (no more /etc/hosts
+  overrides)
+- Document Netbird client on each LXC (netbird version, setup key rotation)
+
+### 4. LXC resource imbalance & disk pressure
+
+**Problem:**
+| LXC | Cores | RAM | Rootfs | Disk usage |
+|-----|-------|-----|--------|------------|
+| mule-images (120) | 6 | 12 GiB | 60 GiB | photo AI, reasonable |
+| arriman (122) | 4 | 8 GiB | 24 GiB | media stack, OK |
+| nextcloud (114) | 4 | 6 GiB | 25 GiB | file sync, OK |
+| apps (105) | 2 | 4 GiB | 30 GiB | 6+ services, tight |
+| paperless (103) | 2 | 3 GiB | 8 GiB | 86.9% disk |
+| elementsynapse (118) | 1 | 2 GiB | 8 GiB | 86.8% disk |
+| gitea (104) | 1 | 1 GiB | 8 GiB | git server, adequate |
+| caddy (121) | 1 | 512 MiB | 6 GiB | fine for reverse proxy |
+
+Paperless (103) and elementsynapse (118) are at critical disk levels. apps (105)
+is undersized for 6+ services.
+
+**Proposal:**
+- Resize rootfs on paperless (8→16 GiB) and elementsynapse (8→16 GiB)
+- Bump apps (105) to 4 cores / 6 GiB RAM / 40 GiB rootfs
+- Enable claudio-monitor's disk check to alert before next crisis
+
+### 5. VPS is a single point of failure
+
+**Problem:** One IONOS VM runs netbird management (control plane), traefik
+(public ingress), authentik (identity), and coturn (TURN relay). If it goes
+down: no remote mesh, no public services, no auth.
+
+**Proposal:**
+- Document a VPS recovery runbook (how to restore from a known-working backup)
+- Consider splitting authentik into a separate host or at minimum having a
+  standby configuration
+- Not a high priority (the VPS has been stable) but worth documenting the
+  blast radius and recovery path
+
+### 6. No centralized logging
+
+**Problem:** Each LXC has independent journald. Cross-service debugging
+involves hopping between `pct exec <id> -- journalctl -u <service>`. There is
+no aggregation or retention.
+
+**Proposal:**
+- Deploy a lightweight log shipper (Loki + promtail, or vector.dev) on each LXC
+- Ship logs to a central Loki instance on apps (105) or a new small LXC
+- Grafana dashboard optional — even a simple `logcli` query saves time
+
+### 7. Agent enrollment incomplete
+
+**Problem:** Only hubris, apps, and republic-laptop are enrolled in the
+homelab-context system (age keys, sync timers, MCP access). mac-mini,
+ludo-mini, claudio-bot, and all other LXCs are not.
+
+**Proposal:**
+- Batch-enroll remaining LXCs (jellyfin, paperless, gitea, nextcloud, etc.)
+- Enroll mac-mini (macOS — exercises the launchd timer path)
+- Enroll ludo-mini (needs SSH user config in inventory first)
+- Wire claudio-bot into inventory-aware queries
+
+### 8. Configuration drift on untracked configs
+
+**Problem:** Technitium config, dnsmasq (legacy), and several service-specific
+configs are not git-tracked.
+
+**Proposal:**
+- Track Technitium zone backup + compose config in a git repo
+- Apply the same pattern as caddy-conf: dtoro/technitium-conf with auto-deploy
+
+### 9. No capacity planning / resource monitoring
+
+**Problem:** No trend data on CPU, RAM, or disk growth. The 86% disk alerts
+were discovered reactively. Rootfs resize is painful (requires Proxmox stop +
+resize + growfs inside).
+
+**Proposal:**
+- Enable the missing claudio-monitor checks (disk growth trend, apt upgradable
+  counts, docker image drift)
+- Set up a simple Prometheus + node_exporter on hubris or use the PVE API
+  directly
+- At minimum, surface disk usage in the existing homelab-mcp management tools
+
+### 10. No standard deploy / orchestration for bare-metal LXCs
+
+**Problem:** Some services are bare-metal CLI apps (sophia, claudio-bot),
+some are Docker on apps (105), some are Portainer-managed. No consistent
+deploy pattern means every new service reinvents the deployment.
+
+**Proposal:**
+- Don't over-engineer this — the current pragmatism works
+- Just document the decision tree:
+  - Needs `/mnt/library` mount + heavy I/O → dedicated LXC
+  - Small stateless web service → Docker on apps (105)
+  - Media stack → dedicated LXC (arriman, jellyfin)
+  - Everything else → judge by complexity
+
+---
+
+## Phased implementation plan
+
+### Phase 1 — Critical fixes (this week)
+1. Resize rootfs on paperless (103) 8→16 GiB, elementsynapse (118) 8→16 GiB
+2. Enable claudio-monitor disk check + disk-growth alerting
+3. Pick one backup strategy and implement minimum viable (e.g. nightly
+   gitea dump + sops-encrypted secrets to B2 via rclone)
+4. Verify Technitium is the sole DNS for all LXCs (remove NetBird managed zone
+   for hubris.network)
+
+### Phase 2 — Mesh consolidation (next week)
+5. Batch-migrate remaining LXCs from Tailscale to Netbird
+6. Remove Tailscale from PVE host
+7. Remove all per-LXC /etc/hosts DNS overrides
+8. Update DNS documentation to reflect Technitium as single source
+
+### Phase 3 — Agent enrollment & logging (next 2 weeks)
+9. Enroll all LXCs in homelab-context (age keys, sync timers)
+10. Enroll mac-mini (macOS launchd path — exercises untested code path)
+11. Enroll ludo-mini
+12. Deploy log shipper (Loki + promtail) on apps (105) + all LXCs
+
+### Phase 4 — Resource & monitoring hardening (next month)
+13. Resize apps (105) rootfs, bump RAM
+14. Deploy Prometheus + node_exporter or equivalent for trend data
+15. Track Technitium config in git with auto-deploy
+16. Write VPS recovery runbook
+
+### Phase 5 — Drive re-evaluation (optional, behind host-stability gate)
+17. Re-attach USB backup drive with the new SODOLA topology (direct port)
+18. If stable for 7 days, re-enable restic backup schedule (chunked)
+19. If not stable, finalize cloud backup as permanent strategy
+
+---
+
+## Files likely to change
+
+| Path | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `/opt/homelab-context/inventory.yaml` | LXCs enrolled, resource updates |
+| `/opt/homelab-context/secrets/*.yaml` | New recipients for enrolled LXCs |
+| `/opt/homelab-context/infrastructure/dns.md` | Reflect Technitium as sole source |
+| `/opt/homelab-context/infrastructure/mesh.md` | Remove Tailscale references post-migration |
+| `/opt/homelab-context/infrastructure/backups.md` | New strategy |
+| `/opt/homelab-context/infrastructure/monitoring.md` | Enable missing checks |
+| `/opt/homelab-context/containers/103-paperless.md` | Rootfs resize |
+| `/opt/homelab-context/containers/118-elementsynapse.md` | Rootfs resize |
+| `/opt/homelab-context/containers/105-apps.md` | Resource bump, logging addition |
+| `/opt/homelab-context/containers/index.md` | Updated resource table |
+| `.sops.yaml` | New age pubkeys for enrolled LXCs |
+
+## Verification
+
+Each phase ends with a verification milestone:
+- Phase 1: `claudio-monitor` triggers on paperless disk → confirmed alert. Backup
+  of gitea data lands in B2 (or equivalent). DNS query from any LXC returns
+  Technitium answer.
+- Phase 2: `netbird status` shows all LXCs connected. Tailscale not running on
+  PVE host. `curl auth.hubris.network` from any LXC resolves correctly without
+  /etc/hosts.
+- Phase 3: Every LXC has `/opt/homelab-context/` + `/etc/age/key.txt`. MCP
+  tools return valid host info for all enrolled LXC names. `journalctl` shows
+  promtail shipping to Loki.
+- Phase 4: `claudio-monitor` shows disk growth trend. apps (105) can run all
+  6+ services without OOM.
+
+## Risks & tradeoffs
+
+- **Netbird migration window:** All LXCs will briefly lose mesh connectivity
+  during the Tailscale→Netbird cutover. Schedule in off-hours.
+- **Backup cost:** B2/e2 costs ~$5/month for ~500 GB. The USB drive was free
+  but unstable — trade money for reliability.
+- **DNS consolidation:** Removing the NetBird managed DNS zone means any
+  NetBird-specific names stop resolving for hubris.network — verify nothing
+  depends on that path.
+- **Loki on apps (105):** Adds another container to an already-loaded host.
+  May need to bump resources before deploying.
+- **Agent enrollment on every LXC:** Each enrollment creates an age keypair
+  and commits a pubkey to inventory. Process is scriptable via `homelab client
+  add` but still takes ~2 min per host for verification.
+
+## Open questions
+
+1. Is the USB backup drive still physically attached to hubris? If not, the
+   simplest "re-enable" path requires physically re-attaching it.
+2. Authentik is now on the VPS — is LXC 124 (old Authentik) still running or
+   was it fully decommissioned? The dns.md changelog says "shut down" but
+   index.md lists it as "running".
+3. What's the actual disk layout on hubris? nvme0n1, ZFS pool, mount structure
+   — needed to plan rootfs resizes safely.
+4. Does the user want to keep Tailscale on any host for a specific reason, or
+   is full Netbird migration the clear goal?

.hermes/plans/2026-06-03_223218-dhcp-pool-exclude-static-ips.md

@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+# Plan: Narrow Technitium DHCP Pool to Avoid Static-IP Conflicts
+
+> **For Hermes:** Use subagent-driven-development skill to implement this plan task-by-task.
+
+**Goal:** Eliminate the IP conflict risk created by the Technitium DHCP pool (`.100–.240`) overlapping with all static LXC/VM IPs (`.101–.239`).
+
+**Architecture:** Shrink the DHCP pool range on Technitium so it only covers IPs that no static host uses. No LXC/VM IPs change. Single server-side change (Technitium API), plus documentation updates.
+
+**Tech Stack:** Technitium DNS API (`/api/dhcp/scopes/set`), bash/curl, homelab-context repo for docs.
+
+---
+
+## Problem statement
+
+The Technitium DHCP server on [CT 107](../../knowledge/wiki/containers/107-dns.md) serves `192.168.8.100–192.168.8.240`. **Every static homelab IP except hubris (`.77`) sits inside that range:**
+
+| Host | IP | Inside pool? |
+|---|---|---|
+| hubris (Proxmox) | .77 | No — below `.100` |
+| haos (VM 108) | .101 | YES |
+| gitea (104) | .121 | YES |
+| paperless (103) | .130 | YES |
+| arriman (122) | .132 | YES |
+| mule-images (120) | .136 | YES |
+| sophia (119) | .157 | YES |
+| mac-mini | .174 | YES |
+| caddy (121) | .175 | YES |
+| authentik (124) | .180 | YES |
+| plato (126) | .190 | YES |
+| zimaos (VM 100) | .195 | YES |
+| nfs-export (102) | .200 | YES |
+| apps (105) | .205 | YES |
+| jellyfin (101) | .206 | YES |
+| nextcloud (114) | .224 | YES |
+| claudio-bot (123) | .230 | YES |
+| elementsynapse (118) | .239 | YES |
+
+The docs claim "Static-IP LXCs (below `.100`) are unaffected" — this is **false**. Static IPs span `.101–.239`, the DHCP pool spans `.100–.240`. They overlap almost entirely.
+
+If the DHCP server hands out `.121/.136/.224` (or any of the above) to a new dynamic client before the static LXC claims it on boot, the static service will fail to bind and the service goes dark.
+
+---
+
+## Proposed approach: Shrink the pool
+
+**Move the DHCP pool start from `.100` to `.241`**, resulting in:
+- **New pool:** `192.168.8.241 – 192.168.8.254` (14 dynamic IPs)
+- **Reserved:** `.100–.240` stays for static hosts, `.2` for Technitium, `.1` for gateway
+- **Zero changes to any LXC, VM, Caddy, or Proxmox config.**
+
+Why `.241–.254`:
+- Highest static IP is `.239` (elementsynapse) — `.241` gives a 1-IP gap
+- `.255` is the broadcast address (unusable)
+- 14 IPs is plenty for truly dynamic clients (new transient containers, test VMs)
+- If more are ever needed, the pool can easily be widened back down
+
+---
+
+## Tasks
+
+### Task 1: Verify current Technitium DHCP scope from the API
+
+**Objective:** Confirm the active pool range matches what's documented.
+
+**Step 1: Log in to Technitium API and get a token**
+
+```bash
+TOKEN=$(curl -sk -X POST http://192.168.8.2:5380/api/user/login \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{"user":"admin","pass":"'$(cat /opt/technitium/admin_password.txt)'","includeInfo":false}' \
+  | jq -r '.token')
+echo "Token: ${TOKEN:0:10}..."
+```
+
+**Step 2: Fetch current DHCP scopes**
+
+```bash
+curl -sk "http://192.168.8.2:5380/api/dhcp/scopes/list?token=$TOKEN" | jq .
+```
+
+**Expected:** One scope named `homelab` with `startingAddress: "192.168.8.100"` and `endingAddress: "192.168.8.240"`.
+
+**Verification:** If the scope is NOT `.100–.240`, note the actual range and adjust the plan.
+
+---
+
+### Task 2: Update the DHCP scope to `.241–.254`
+
+**Objective:** Shrink the pool so it no longer overlaps static IPs.
+
+**Step 1: Update the scope via API**
+
+```bash
+curl -sk -X POST "http://192.168.8.2:5380/api/dhcp/scopes/set?token=$TOKEN" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{
+    "name": "homelab",
+    "startingAddress": "192.168.8.241",
+    "endingAddress": "192.168.8.254",
+    "subnetMask": "255.255.255.0",
+    "gatewayAddress": "192.168.8.1",
+    "dnsServerAddresses": ["192.168.8.2"],
+    "leaseTime": 86400
+  }'
+```
+
+**Step 2: Verify the change took effect**
+
+```bash
+curl -sk "http://192.168.8.2:5380/api/dhcp/scopes/list?token=$TOKEN" | jq '.response.scopes[0] | {startingAddress, endingAddress}'
+```
+
+**Expected:**
+```json
+{
+  "startingAddress": "192.168.8.241",
+  "endingAddress": "192.168.8.254"
+}
+```
+
+**Pitfall:** If the API returns `{"status":"error"}`, the scope name or parameter format may differ. Inspect the response body. Technitium's API might use `rangeStart`/`rangeEnd` instead of `startingAddress`/`endingAddress`. Adjust if needed (check the full scope object from Task 1 step 2 for exact key names).
+
+---
+
+### Task 3: Check for active DHCP leases in the old pool that would be stranded
+
+**Objective:** Ensure no DHCP client is currently holding an IP in `.100–.240` that it will lose when its lease expires.
+
+**Step 1: List active DHCP leases**
+
+```bash
+curl -sk "http://192.168.8.2:5380/api/dhcp/leases/list?token=$TOKEN" | jq '.response.leases[] | {ip: .ipAddress, client: .clientHostname, mac: .hardwareAddress, expires: .leaseExpires}'
+```
+
+**Step 2: Interpret results**
+
+- If the only leases are from static LXCs that configured themselves before the DHCP move (e.g., old leases from before the 2026-06-02 static-IP migration), these leases are stale and harmless.
+- If a *dynamic* client (e.g., a test laptop, transient VM) holds `.195` or similar, note it — it will lose its IP on next renew and should be moved to a static assignment or into the `.241+` pool.
+- **ZimaOS (VM 100) at `.195` is a DHCP lease, not static** — this is the one host that needs attention. Either:
+  - Set a static IP inside ZimaOS (preferred), or
+  - Add a DHCP reservation for MAC in Technitium to pin `.195`
+
+**Verification:** No "surprise" dynamic clients that would break on lease expiry.
+
+---
+
+### Task 4: Fix ZimaOS IP stability (if needed)
+
+**Objective:** Ensure ZimaOS at `.195` won't float or break when the pool shrinks.
+
+**If ZimaOS already has a static IP configured inside the VM:** Nothing to do.
+
+**If ZimaOS is DHCP-only (likely — doc says "DHCP lease, not a reservation"):**
+
+Option A (preferred): Set a static IP inside ZimaOS via its web UI at `http://192.168.8.195` → Settings → Network → Static IP → `192.168.8.195/24`, gateway `192.168.8.1`, DNS `192.168.8.2`.
+
+Option B: Add a DHCP reservation in Technitium for ZimaOS's MAC address:
+```bash
+ZIMAMAC=$(ssh root@hubris "qm config 100 | grep net0 | grep -oE '([0-9A-Fa-f]{2}:){5}[0-9A-Fa-f]{2}'")
+curl -sk -X POST "http://192.168.8.2:5380/api/dhcp/reservations/add?token=$TOKEN" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d "{\"hardwareAddress\":\"$ZIMAMAC\",\"ipAddress\":\"192.168.8.195\"}"
+```
+
+**Pitfall:** The `/api/dhcp/reservations/add` endpoint signature is unverified — confirm the exact endpoint name from Technitium's API docs or the web UI before running it. The web console at `http://192.168.8.2:5380` → DHCP → Reservations can be used as a manual fallback.
+
+---
+
+### Task 5: Update documentation in homelab-context
+
+**Objective:** Fix the now-wrong claims about static IPs being "below .100".
+
+**Files to edit:**
+
+1. **`infrastructure/network.md`** — Line 53
+   - Old: `Most homelab LXCs use static IPs below \`.100\`. DHCP only covers new/transient containers.`
+   - New: `Static IPs span \`.101–.239\` (all LXCs + VMs + workstations). DHCP pool narrowed to \`.241–.254\` to avoid overlap.`
+
+2. **`containers/107-dns.md`** — Lines 37, 42, 55
+   - Line 37: Update pool range: `192.168.8.241 – 192.168.8.254`
+   - Line 42: `Static-IP LXCs (below \`.100\`)` → `Static-IP LXCs (\`.101–.239\`) are excluded from the pool.`
+   - Line 55: Add changelog entry for the pool shrink
+
+3. **`containers/107-dns.md`** — Add changelog entry:
+   ```markdown
+   ### 2026-06-03 — DHCP pool narrowed to `.241–.254` to exclude static IPs
+   Previous pool `.100–.240` overlapped with all static LXCs/VMs (\`.101–.239\`), creating IP conflict risk. Shrunk pool to `.241–.254`. No services re-IP'd. See [plan](../plans/2026-06-03-dhcp-pool-exclude-static-ips.md).
+   ```
+
+4. **`infrastructure/network.md`** — Line 51: Update pool range in the DHCP table row.
+
+5. **`plans/2026-06-01-slate-ax-to-sodola-migration.md`** — Line 60: Optionally update the pool range in the config table (or add a post-migration note). This is the historical migration plan, so a footnote rather than an edit may be better.
+
+**Commit:**
+```bash
+cd /opt/homelab-context
+git add infrastructure/network.md containers/107-dns.md plans/
+git commit -m "docs: DHCP pool narrowed to .241-.254 to exclude static IPs"
+git push
+```
+
+---
+
+### Task 6: Verify no regressions
+
+**Objective:** Smoke-test that DNS and key services still work after the scope change.
+
+```bash
+# 1. DNS resolution via Technitium
+dig @192.168.8.2 +short git.hubris.network
+# Expected: 192.168.8.175
+
+# 2. Caddy reverse-proxy chain
+curl -sI https://git.hubris.network | head -1
+# Expected: HTTP/2 200
+
+# 3. All app names resolve
+for name in git cloud media paperless photos matrix auth plato artifacto; do
+  result=$(dig @192.168.8.2 +short ${name}.hubris.network)
+  printf "%-20s → %s\n" "${name}.hubris.network" "$result"
+done
+
+# 4. Technitium DHCP scope is correct
+curl -sk "http://192.168.8.2:5380/api/dhcp/scopes/list?token=$TOKEN" | jq '.response.scopes[0] | {startingAddress, endingAddress}'
+```
+
+---
+
+## Risk assessment
+
+| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| API call fails (wrong field names) | Medium | Low | Inspect live scope object first (Task 1); adjust payload |
+| ZimaOS loses IP on next boot | Low | Medium | Task 4 makes ZimaOS static or reserved |
+| Active DHCP client in `.100–.240` gets stranded | Low | Low | Task 3 surfaces this; client just requests a new IP from `.241+` |
+| Technitium admin password file missing | Low | Medium | `/opt/technitium/admin_password.txt` was created during setup; verify existence |
+
+## Open questions
+
+1. Is zimaos (VM 100) currently DHCP or static? The doc says DHCP lease, but it's listed as `lan_ip: 192.168.8.195` in inventory. If it's actually DHCP, it's the one host that needs a static assignment before the pool shrinks.
+2. Are there any transient DHCP clients (test laptops, phones) on the homelab subnet that hold `.100–.240` addresses? Check leases before cutting over.
+3. Should we widen the pool slightly (e.g., `.230–.254`) for more headroom? Currently 14 IPs. If 3+ transient devices are expected, `.230–.254` = 25 IPs — still safe since the highest static is `.239` and `.230–.239` could be excluded.
+
+## Execution preference
+
+All changes are on the Technitium API + homelab-context repo. No LXC/VM restarts needed. The pool shrink takes effect immediately for NEW DHCP requests; existing leases in the old range continue until expiry (24h max).

.hermes/plans/2026-06-05_170000-prevent-dhcp-ip-drift.md

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+# Plan: Prevent DHCP IP drift from breaking Caddy backends
+
+**Date:** 2026-06-05  
+**Slug:** prevent-dhcp-ip-drift
+
+---
+
+## Goal
+
+Eliminate the root cause of services becoming unreachable when DHCP lease renewals change backend IPs that Caddy's `reverse_proxy` directives hardcode.
+
+**Triggering incident:** Paperless (LXC 103) and HAOS (VM 108) had DHCP-assigned IPs change from `.130→.243` and `.101→.241` respectively. Caddyfile still pointed at the old IPs → services unreachable from iPhone on Netbird.
+
+## Current context
+
+### DHCP vs static IP inventory
+
+| Machine | Type | PVE ID | Current IP | Allocation method | Status |
+|---------|------|--------|-----------|-------------------|--------|
+| **jellyfin** | LXC | 101 | 192.168.8.206 | Static (`ip=.../24`) | ✅ |
+| **paperless** | LXC | 103 | 192.168.8.243 | **DHCP** (`ip=dhcp`) | ❌ broken, hotfixed to .243 |
+| **gitea** | LXC | 104 | 192.168.8.121 | Static | ✅ |
+| **apps** | LXC | 105 | 192.168.8.205 | Static | ✅ |
+| **nextcloud** | LXC | 114 | 192.168.8.224 | Static | ✅ |
+| **elementsynapse** | LXC | 118 | 192.168.8.239 | Static | ✅ |
+| **mule-images** | LXC | 120 | 192.168.8.136 | Static | ✅ |
+| **caddy** | LXC | 121 | 192.168.8.175 | Static | ✅ |
+| **arriman** | LXC | 122 | 192.168.8.132 | Static | ✅ |
+| **sophia** | LXC | 119 | 192.168.8.157 | Static? | ? (not in 2026-06-02 list) |
+| **nfs-export** | LXC | 102 | 192.168.8.200 | Static? | ? |
+| **plato** | LXC | 126 | 192.168.8.190 | Static? | ? |
+| **HAOS** | VM | 108 | 192.168.8.241 | **DHCP** (VM — OS-managed) | ❌ broken, hotfixed to .241 |
+| **zimaos** | VM | 100 | 192.168.8.195 | DHCP (known stale lease, see note) | ⚠️ open issue |
+| **authentik** | — | — | — | migrated to VPS (external) | N/A |
+
+### Infrastructure facts
+
+- **DHCP server:** Technitium on CT 107 (192.168.8.2), pool `.241–.254`
+- **Static IP range:** `.101–.239`
+- **DNS:** Split-horizon on Technitium — `*.hubris.network → 192.168.8.175` (Caddy itself)
+- **Caddyfile:** Has 29 `reverse_proxy` directives, all using **hardcoded IP:port**
+- **Caddy reload:** Auto-deployed via webhook on git push to `dtoro/caddy-conf`
+- **Documentation:** `inventory.yaml` updated, `hosts/*.yaml` stale-before-regenerate
+
+### Why it happened
+
+1. Paperless LXC 103 was **missed** during the 2026-06-02 static-IP migration (Proxmox config still shows `ip=dhcp`)
+2. HAOS VM 108 uses DHCP internally (HAOS manages its own network — can't just `pct set`)
+3. Both got new IPs from the Technitium `.241–.254` pool after a lease renewal
+4. Caddyfile still pointed at the old static-range IPs → connection refused
+
+---
+
+## Proposed approach
+
+Three-layer solution:
+
+### Layer 1: Fix the immediate offenders (static assignment)
+
+**Paperless LXC 103:**
+- `pct set 103 --net0 name=eth0,bridge=vmbr0,gw=192.168.8.1,hwaddr=BC:24:11:0A:8D:C2,ip=192.168.8.130/24,ip6=auto,type=veth`
+- Inside the LXC, update `/etc/network/interfaces` to match
+- Reboot/restart networking
+
+**HAOS VM 108:**
+- Set a **DHCP reservation** in Technitium for the VM's MAC address, pinning it to `192.168.8.101`
+- This avoids needing to reconfigure HAOS internally (which is tedious)
+- Alternatively: use `ha network update` from the HAOS console to set a static IP
+
+### Layer 2: Audit and fix all remaining DHCP hosts
+
+Check every LXC/VM hosted on hubris:
+```bash
+for ct in $(pct list | awk 'NR>1{print $1}'); do
+  echo "=== CT $ct ==="
+  pct config $ct | grep "^net0"
+done
+```
+Any with `ip=dhcp` that Caddy reverse-proxies to → convert to static.
+
+**Known candidates to check:**
+- CT 102 (nfs-export) — `.200` but not in Caddy. May not need static.
+- CT 119 (sophia) — `.157` — is this static or DHCP? Not sure.
+- CT 126 (plato) — `.190` — same question.
+- VM 100 (zimaos) — `.195` but known to have a stale lease (see 2026-06-03 changelog)
+
+### Layer 3: Add validation
+
+Create a script that runs periodically (cron or homelab cronjob):
+
+**`/opt/homelab-context/scripts/check-caddy-backends.sh`:**
+1. Parse `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` on CT 121 to extract all `reverse_proxy IP:port` targets
+2. For each `IP:port`, attempt a TCP connect (timeout 3s)
+3. Report any that fail
+
+Could also run as a homelab cron job that notifies dtoro on Matrix if a backend is unreachable.
+
+This catches any future drift proactively (before a user reports it).
+
+### Files likely to change
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `inventory.yaml` | May update paperless/HAOS IPs if we choose different static IPs |
+| LXC 103 Proxmux config (via `pct set`) | Set static IP |
+| Technitium DHCP reservations | Add HAOS reservation |
+| `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` on CT 121 | Already fixed — only changes again if we re-assign paperless IP to `.130` |
+| `scripts/check-caddy-backends.sh` | New validation script (new file in homelab-context) |
+
+### Risks / Tradeoffs
+
+- **Pinning paperless to `.130`** — if the LXC was reinstalled since then, `.130` may already be in use. Verify first with `arp-scan` or `nmap`.
+- **HAOS static IP via Technitium reservation** vs **inside HAOS**: Technitium reservation is simpler (no HA config changes), but if HAOS's DHCP lease expires and the Technitium server is down, the reservation won't help. A static IP inside HAOS is more robust but requires poking the HA console.
+- **Validation script false positives** — a service might be legitimately down for maintenance. The script should be a warning, not an alert.
+- **Caddy reload** — each Caddyfile edit triggers an auto-reload via webhook. If the backend is down during reload, Caddy itself stays up (it's just a reverse_proxy target).
+
+### Verification
+
+1. After setting paperless static: `ssh root@192.168.8.175 "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.8.130:8000"` → 302
+2. After Technitium HAOS reservation: `curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.8.101:8123` → 200
+3. Run validation script → all targets reachable
+4. Confirm from iPhone: both `paperless.hubris.network` and `home.hubris.network` load
+
+### Open questions
+
+1. Should paperless go back to `.130` (its original), or stay at `.243` (current)? Going back to `.130` means updating the Caddyfile again, but keeps the static range allocation consistent.
+2. HAOS: Technitium reservation or HAOS-internal static config? Reservation is easier; HAOS-internal is more robust.
+3. Should the Caddyfile validation script run as a homelab cron job, or as a cron on the caddy LXC itself?
+4. ZimaOS (VM 100) — should we also pin its IP while we're at it?

.hermes/plans/2026-06-06_232200-authentik-frequent-login-fix.md

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+# Plan: Fix Frequent Authentik Login Prompts
+
+## Goal
+
+Stop requiring repeated login to Authentik (several times per day) by fixing session and cookie expiry settings so the user stays logged in for longer periods (e.g., 7–30 days, or until explicit logout).
+
+## Current Context
+
+Authentik runs on the VPS (`82.165.190.79`) in Docker Compose. Traffic flows:
+
+```
+Browser → Caddy (LXC 121) → VPS Traefik → Authentik
+```
+
+Caddy's `forward_auth` uses the `(authentik)` snippet which proxies to `auth.hubris.network/outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/caddy`. The Authentik server version is **2026.5.2**.
+
+## Root Cause Found
+
+### Primary: `SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE = True`
+
+The Authentik Django session (`authentik_session` cookie) is configured to **expire on browser close**. Every time the user closes and reopens their browser, the session cookie is cleared. The next visit to a service that requires OAuth2 authorization (Gitea, Jellyfin, etc.) will redirect to the Authentik login page.
+
+### Secondary: `SESSION_COOKIE_AGE = 86400` (24 hours)
+
+Even with the browser left open continuously, the session expires after 24 hours. Combined with `SESSION_SAVE_EVERY_REQUEST = False`, activity does NOT extend the session.
+
+### Session configuration (from Docker Python environment):
+
+| Setting | Current Value | Default in Django |
+|---------|---------------|-------------------|
+| `SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE` | `True` | `False` |
+| `SESSION_COOKIE_AGE` | `86400` (24h) | `1209600` (14d) |
+| `SESSION_SAVE_EVERY_REQUEST` | `False` | `False` |
+| `SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE` | `Lax` | `Lax` |
+
+### What ISN'T the problem:
+
+- **Proxy cookie validity** — `hubris-forward-auth` has `access_token_validity = hours=24`, which is reasonable for the forward-auth token.
+- **Server-side session duration** — The `user_login` stage has `session_duration = seconds=0` (indefinite).
+- **Refresh tokens** — All OAuth2 providers have `refresh_token_validity = days=30`, which is fine.
+- **Caddy configuration** — The forward-auth chain is correctly set up.
+- **Outpost health** — All containers healthy, up for 6 days.
+
+## Proposed Approach
+
+Change two Django session settings via Authentik environment variables:
+
+1. **`AUTHENTIK_SESSION_COOKIE_AGE` = 604800** (7 days) — extends session cookie lifetime from 24h to 7 days
+2. **`AUTHENTIK_SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE` = false** — prevents session cookie from being cleared on browser close
+
+This keeps users logged in for up to 7 days with normal browser use (close/reopen, daily usage). The session still expires after 7 days of inactivity (`SESSION_SAVE_EVERY_REQUEST` stays False).
+
+## Step-by-step Plan
+
+### Step 1: Add environment variables to Docker compose
+
+Edit `/opt/docker-compose.yml` on the VPS to add these env vars to the `authentik-server` service:
+
+```yaml
+authentik-server:
+  environment:
+    # ... existing vars ...
+    AUTHENTIK_SESSION_COOKIE_AGE: "604800"      # 7 days (was 86400 / 24h)
+    AUTHENTIK_SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE: "false"  # was true
+```
+
+Note: the Authentik config system uses `__` (double underscore) for nesting. The env vars map to the Django settings via the config YAML path. The correct Authentik env var for `SESSION_COOKIE_AGE` would be `AUTHENTIK_SESSION__COOKIE_AGE` if it goes through the config system, or just `SESSION_COOKIE_AGE` if it's passed directly. Need to verify the exact variable name Authentik expects.
+
+### Step 2: Verify variable naming
+
+Check the Authentik config YAML (`/authentik/lib/default.yml` inside the container) to confirm the exact env var name mapping. Authentik uses a custom config layer that maps env vars to settings.
+
+**Alternative if env vars don't work:** Some Authentik settings need to be set via the admin UI (under System Settings or Tenant settings). The Django session settings might need to be configured differently in this version.
+
+### Step 3: Restart Authentik server
+
+```bash
+ssh root@82.165.190.79
+docker compose -f /opt/docker-compose.yml restart authentik-server
+```
+
+### Step 4: Verify the fix
+
+```bash
+# Check session settings took effect
+ssh root@82.165.190.79 'docker exec -i authentik-server python3 << "PYEOF"
+import os
+os.environ.setdefault("DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE", "authentik.root.settings")
+import django
+django.setup()
+from django.conf import settings
+print("SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE:", settings.SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE)
+print("SESSION_COOKIE_AGE:", settings.SESSION_COOKIE_AGE)
+PYEOF'
+```
+
+### Step 5: Functional test
+
+1. Login to Authentik at `auth.hubris.network`
+2. Close the browser completely
+3. Re-open browser, navigate to a forward-auth-gated service (e.g., paperless.hubris.network)
+4. Verify you're NOT redirected to login
+5. Verify OAuth2 services (Gitea) also maintain the session
+
+## Files Likely to Change
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `/opt/docker-compose.yml` | Add `AUTHENTIK_SESSION_COOKIE_AGE` and `AUTHENTIK_SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE` env vars |
+
+## Tests / Validation
+
+1. **Config verification** — Run Python snippet inside container to confirm Django settings changed
+2. **Browser test** — Close/reopen browser, verify session persists (Step 5 above)
+3. **24-hour test** — Check session is still alive after 24h of normal use
+
+## Risks, Tradeoffs, and Open Questions
+
+| Risk | Mitigation |
+|------|------------|
+| Env var names don't match Authentik's config schema | First verify in the container's `default.yml` config file |
+| 7-day persistent cookie is a security concern (stolen cookie = 7 days of access) | This is the same risk as any "Remember Me" feature on any web app. The tradeoff is convenience vs. security. |
+| The proxy cookie (`authentik_proxy_*`) may still have its own 24h limit | That's managed separately via the OAuth2 provider's `access_token_validity` setting. If we also want to extend that, we can update `hubris-forward-auth` provider's `access_token_validity` from `hours=24` to `days=7`. |
+| `SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE = False` | Should be `True` since Authentik is served behind HTTPS. However, the forward-auth subrequest from Caddy to the outpost is HTTP internally (`http://127.0.0.1:8099`), so `False` may be intentional for the outpost check. |
+
+## Open Questions
+
+1. **What environment variable name does Authentik use for Django session settings?** Need to check `default.yml`. The config layer may use `AUTHENTIK_SESSION__COOKIE_AGE` (double underscore) or the raw Django setting name.
+2. **Should we also extend the proxy token validity?** The `hubris-forward-auth` provider has `access_token_validity = hours=24`. If we want users to not need re-login for more than 24h, we should also bump this to match the session cookie age.
+3. **Which specific service triggers the most login prompts?** The forward-auth (Caddy-gated) services use proxy cookies. OAuth2 services (Gitea, Jellyfin) use the Django session. Understanding which one the user is hitting most could narrow the fix scope.

.hermes/plans/2026-06-06_234500-caddyfile-truncation-permanent-fix.md

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+# Plan: Fix Caddyfile truncation + prevent recurring outages
+
+**Date:** 2026-06-06
+**Slug:** caddyfile-truncation-permanent-fix
+
+---
+
+## Goal
+
+Restore all `*.hubris.network` services that went offline when the Caddyfile on LXC 121 was truncated to only 3 photo-related site blocks, and implement automated safeguards to prevent this class of outage from recurring.
+
+## Root cause
+
+The Caddyfile at `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` on LXC 121 was manually edited locally (not via the `dtoro/caddy-conf` git repo), overwriting ~260 lines (30+ site blocks + forward-auth infrastructure) with only 43 lines covering `photos.hubris.network`, `prism.hubris.network`, and a manually-added `photos2.hubris.network`.
+
+**Evidence:**
+- `git diff HEAD -- Caddyfile` shows `+3 / -159` lines diff — all other blocks deleted
+- Git reflog shows HEAD at `32575ce` (`fix: sab... port 8081→8082`), but working tree diverges
+- Deploy webhook log: Jun 06 12:39 — `deploy failed: git pull` (dirty tree blocks merge)
+- Backup file `Caddyfile.bak.1780263919` (225 lines) confirms the full original was intact before truncation
+- `origin/master` at `1b977aa` is the authoritative source — 260 lines, all blocks present
+
+**Why "third time this week":**
+| Incident | Date | Cause |
+|---|---|---|
+| 1 | Jun 02 | DHCP IP drift — paperless (130→243), HAOS (101→241) |
+| 2 | Jun 05 | More DHCP drift — apps (205), mule-images (136 overridden by dhclient) |
+| 3 | Jun 06 | **Caddyfile truncated** — unrelated to IPs, much worse |
+
+The Caddyfile truncation is the most severe: it took down **all LAN services** except `photos.hubris.network` and `auth.hubris.network` (VPS-hosted).
+
+## Immediate fix
+
+### Step 1: Restore Caddyfile from origin/master and reload
+
+On LXC 121:
+
+```bash
+cd /etc/caddy
+# Stash any local changes
+git stash
+# Reset to origin/master
+git checkout --force origin/master -- Caddyfile
+# Caddyfile now has all 30+ sites
+caddy validate --config /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
+systemctl reload caddy
+```
+
+This restores all service blocks including: media, git, paperless, books, home, cloud, matrix, proxmox, docker, jellyseerr, qbit, sab, blog, auth, artifacto, plato, zimaos, mcp, secrets, sso + authentik forward-auth infrastructure.
+
+### Step 2: Add `photos2.hubris.network` via git (if still needed)
+
+The `photos2.hubris.network` block was manually added locally and is NOT in origin/master. If the user wants to keep it, submit a PR/commit to the `dtoro/caddy-conf` repo.
+
+### Step 3: Verify
+
+- From any LAN/mesh client: `curl -sk https://media.hubris.network/` → 200
+- Run `bash /opt/homelab-context/scripts/check-caddy-backends.sh` from hubris → all targets reachable
+- Flush mac-mini DNS: `sudo dscacheutil -flushcache && sudo killall -HUP mDNSResponder`
+
+## Permanent safeguards
+
+### Layer 1: Caddyfile integrity check (deploy hook)
+
+Add a site-count validation to the deploy script (`/etc/caddy/scripts/deploy.sh`):
+
+```bash
+# Count site blocks (lines matching *.hubris.network {)
+SITE_COUNT=$(grep -c '^[a-z].*hubris.network {' Caddyfile)
+if [ "$SITE_COUNT" -lt 20 ]; then
+  echo "[deploy] ERROR: Only $SITE_COUNT sites found (expected 20+). Refusing to reload."
+  exit 1
+fi
+```
+
+This catches any future truncation before `caddy reload` runs.
+
+### Layer 2: Caddyfile backup on deploy
+
+Add to deploy script before git pull:
+
+```bash
+cp Caddyfile "Caddyfile.bak.$(date +%s)"
+```
+
+Keep last 3 backups, auto-rotate.
+
+### Layer 3: Dirty-tree handling in deploy webhook
+
+The deploy webhook currently hard-fails when the working tree is dirty. Change the receiver script to handle this gracefully:
+
+```bash
+cd /etc/caddy
+# If dirty, stash local changes
+if ! git diff --quiet; then
+  echo "[deploy] Working tree dirty — stashing"
+  git stash push -m "auto-stash by deploy webhook $(date)"
+fi
+git pull --ff-only
+```
+
+This prevents the webhook from blocking on future local edits.
+
+### Layer 4: Scheduled Caddyfile health check
+
+Add a homelab cron job that runs `check-caddy-backends.sh` every 10 minutes and notifies if any Caddy backend is unreachable.
+
+```yaml
+# In homelab context: cronjob
+schedule: "*/10 * * * *"
+script: /opt/homelab-context/scripts/check-caddy-backends.sh
+```
+
+### Layer 5: DNS sync cron (fix already-deployed sync)
+
+The `dns-sync.py` on LXC 107 at `/opt/dns-sync/sync.py` is installed but has **no crontab** — the sync never runs automatically. The NetBird managed DNS zone has drifted from Technitium. Add a systemd timer or crontab:
+
+```bash
+echo "*/10 * * * * root python3 /opt/dns-sync/sync.py >> /var/log/dns-sync.log 2>&1" > /etc/cron.d/dns-sync
+```
+
+## Files likely to change
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` on LXC 121 | Restore from origin/master |
+| `/etc/caddy/scripts/deploy.sh` on LXC 121 | Add site-count validation + backup + dirty-tree handling |
+| `caddy-conf` git repo | PR with deploy.sh improvements + photos2 (if wanted) |
+| `cronjob` in Hermes | Schedule `check-caddy-backends.sh` |
+| `/etc/cron.d/dns-sync` on LXC 107 | New — add dns-sync cron |
+
+## Verification
+
+1. All `*.hubris.network` URLs load from mac-mini: `media`, `git`, `paperless`, `cloud`, `home`, `proxmox`, etc.
+2. `check-caddy-backends.sh` exits 0 on hubris
+3. `systemctl status caddy` shows active on LXC 121
+4. `dns-sync` runs and writes to `/var/log/dns-sync.log`
+
+## Risks / Tradeoffs
+
+- **Restoring from origin/master overwrites photos2.hubris.network** — recreate it via proper git commit
+- **Caddy staging ACME certs for prism/photos2**: The `tls dns ionos` directive uses staging env (`acme-staging-v02.api.letsencrypt.org`), which fails DNS propagation check (VPS port 53 unreachable from LXC). Once restored, these two subdomains will have the same issue. Move them to production IONOS DNS-01 by removing the staging CA directive or setting the correct `acme_issuer` in Caddyfile.
+- **Dirty-tree stash could lose edits** — mitigated by `git stash push --message` + backup file creation before stash
+
+## Open questions
+
+1. Keep `photos2.hubris.network`? If yes, add via proper git push.
+2. `prism.hubris.network` and `photos2` certs fail on staging ACME — set production `acme_issuer` in Caddyfile?
+3. Should `check-caddy-backends.sh` run as a homelab cron job or as a regular cron on LXC 121?

.hermes/plans/2026-07-05_strong-migration-assessment.md

@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
+# Assessment: Which nodes can move to `strong`
+
+## Executive summary
+
+hubris is **memory-starved**: 28 GiB RAM, 71.9 GiB allocated across 18 LXC + 2 VM
+(2.5× overcommit), 10 GiB swap in active use. strong sits **completely empty** —
+28 GiB RAM, 25 GiB free, 0 guests, 2.7 TiB unused storage. The single most
+effective decongestion move is to shift guests off hubris onto strong.
+
+This document assesses every guest for move-readiness, grouped by constraints
+(library dependency, GPU, core-infra status), and proposes a phased migration
+that does **not** require the physical library-SSD move (the blocker of the
+original plan) — library access from strong is provided via NFS from hubris.
+
+---
+
+## Current resource state (live, 2026-07-05)
+
+### hubris — overloaded
+
+| Resource | Capacity | Allocated (all guests) | Actual use | Status |
+|----------|----------|----------------------|------------|--------|
+| RAM | 28 GiB | 70.2 GiB (2.5× overcommit) | 18 GiB used + 10 GiB swap | ⚠️ heavy swap pressure |
+| CPU | 12 vCPU (6c/12t) | 43 vCPU (3.6× overcommit) | ~43% scaling MHz | OK (shares) |
+| local-lvm | 856 GiB | 582 GiB allocated (29% thin) | — | OK |
+| library (lvmthin) | 3.7 TiB | — | 1.2 TiB used (34%) | OK, 2.3 TiB free |
+
+### strong — empty, ready
+
+| Resource | Capacity | Used | Status |
+|----------|----------|------|--------|
+| RAM | 28 GiB | 2.3 GiB (host only) | 25 GiB free |
+| CPU | 16 vCPU (8c/16t) | idle (0.08 load) | 100% free |
+| local-lvm | 856 GiB | 0 | empty |
+| ludo-lvm | 1.8 TiB | 0 | empty |
+| Guests | — | 0 LXC, 0 VM | nothing running |
+
+### Network topology constraint
+
+```
+Fritz!Box (192.168.178.1)
+  └── SODOLA 2.5G switch
+       ├── hubris eno1 → vmbr1 (192.168.178.10) → vmbr0 (192.168.8.0/24)
+       │     └── all 20 guests on 192.168.8.x
+       └── strong vmbr0 (192.168.178.181)
+             └── no internal bridge yet, guests would be on 192.168.178.x
+```
+
+strong reaches `192.168.8.0/24` via the Fritz static route through hubris.
+Guests on strong get `192.168.178.x` IPs unless we add an internal bridge
+on strong (Phase 0 prerequisite — see below).
+
+---
+
+## Per-guest assessment
+
+### Tier 1 — Move immediately (no library dependency, no core-infra)
+
+These guests mount **no** `/mnt/library` and are not part of the core
+infrastructure spine (caddy/dns/auth/mcp). They are the easiest wins.
+
+| ID | Name | Cores | RAM | Library? | GPU? | Notes |
+|----|------|-------|-----|----------|------|-------|
+| 118 | elementsynapse | 2 | 4 GiB | ❌ | ❌ | Matrix homeserver. Public via Caddy (`matrix.hubris.network`). Only change: Caddy backend IP. **Easiest move in the fleet.** |
+| 129 | house | 2 | 3 GiB | ❌ | ❌ | Yuvomi family planner (Docker). No public Caddy route yet (uses VPS traefik directly). Self-contained. |
+
+**Combined RAM freed from hubris: 7 GiB.** No NFS, no library, no GPU.
+
+### Tier 2 — Move with library NFS (high resource consumers)
+
+These are the heaviest guests and the original migration plan's primary
+targets. They mount `/mnt/library` and two use the iGPU. Moving them
+requires an NFS export from hubris → strong (reverse of the original
+plan's direction, since the physical SSD hasn't moved).
+
+| ID | Name | Cores | RAM | Library? | GPU? | I/O profile | Notes |
+|----|------|-------|-----|----------|------|-------------|-------|
+| 120 | mule-images | 6 | 12 GiB | ✅ mp0 | ✅ iGPU | Write-heavy (photo processing) | **#1 RAM consumer.** Strong has Radeon 680M iGPU (VAAPI works). |
+| 122 | arriman | 4 | 8 GiB | ✅ mp0 | ❌ | Write-heavy (downloads) | *arr stack + qbit + sab. Mounts library for download writes. |
+| 101 | jellyfin | 4 | 8 GiB | ✅ mp0 | ✅ iGPU | Read-heavy sequential | Media streaming + transcode. Strong 680M handles VAAPI. |
+
+**Combined RAM freed: 28 GiB.** This alone would eliminate hubris's swap
+pressure entirely.
+
+### Tier 3 — Could move, low urgency
+
+| ID | Name | Cores | RAM | Library? | Notes |
+|----|------|-------|-----|----------|-------|
+| 130 | grimmory | 1 | 2 GiB | ✅ mp0 | Book library (Docker). Migrated from apps LXC recently. |
+| 131 | teddycloud | 1 | 1 GiB | ✅ mp0 | New (not in inventory.yaml yet). |
+| 132 | rclone | 1 | 2 GiB | ✅ mp0 (ro) | Backup container. Read-only library mount. |
+| 128 | trmnl | 1 | 768 MiB | ❌ | TRMNL middleware. No library. Could move but tiny. |
+| 119 | sophia | 2 | 1 GiB | ✅ mp0 | Workshop. Light use. |
+
+### Stay on hubris (core infrastructure)
+
+| ID | Name | Cores | RAM | Why it stays |
+|----|------|-------|-----|--------------|
+| 121 | caddy | 1 | 512 MiB | Reverse proxy — terminates all `*.hubris.network`. Must stay on hubris for LAN-side reachability. **Needs backend IP updates** when guests move. |
+| 107 | dns | 1 | 1 GiB | Technitium DNS, split-horizon. Core. |
+| 106 | auth-outpost | 1 | 512 MiB | Authentik SSO enforcement. Core. |
+| 105 | apps | 2 | 4 GiB | homelab MCP + secrets-issuance + artifacto. Core infra. Mounts library. |
+| 104 | gitea | 1 | 1 GiB | Git server. NFS would hurt git lock/stat perf. Mounts library (bare repos). |
+| 103 | paperless | 2 | 3 GiB | Document archive. Moderate I/O, OCR writes. Mounts library. |
+| 102 | nfs-export | 1 | 512 MiB | Exports library to zimaos via NFS. Must stay with the physical library. |
+| 100 | zimaos | 4 | 8 GiB (VM) | NAS frontend eval. Already NFS-mounts library from 102. |
+| 108 | haos | 2 | 4 GiB (VM) | Home Assistant OS. Hardware access, low latency. |
+
+---
+
+## Constraints & prerequisites
+
+### 1. Network — strong needs an internal bridge (Phase 0)
+
+strong currently has only `vmbr0` on `192.168.178.0/24`. Guests created there
+get household-LAN IPs, not homelab-subnet IPs. Two options:
+
+- **Option A (recommended):** Add `vmbr1` on strong as a portless internal
+  bridge with a `192.168.8.x/24` address (e.g. `192.168.8.3`). Route between
+  strong's `vmbr0` and `vmbr1` the same way hubris does. Guests go on `vmbr1`
+  and get `192.168.8.x` IPs — transparent to Caddy, DNS, and inter-LXC refs.
+  Requires adding a static route on Fritz (or relying on hubris's existing
+  route — strong would need IP forwarding + a route to 192.168.8.0/24 via vmbr1).
+
+- **Option B (simpler, messier):** Put guests on `192.168.178.x` directly.
+  Caddy can still reach them (hubris routes to 192.168.178.0/24). But DNS
+  records, inter-LXC references, and firewall rules all assume `192.168.8.x`.
+  More config churn per guest.
+
+### 2. Storage — rootfs migration (no shared storage)
+
+`local-lvm` is per-node (not shared). Moving an LXC requires either:
+- `vzdump` → restore on strong (clean, but needs temp disk space + downtime)
+- `rsync` the rootfs to a new LXC on strong (faster for large rootfs like 120's 100G)
+- `pct migrate` only works with shared storage — **not applicable here**
+
+For VMs (100, 108): `qm migrate` also needs shared storage. Not moving VMs.
+
+### 3. Library access — NFS from hubris to strong
+
+Since the physical library SSD is still on hubris, strong's guests that need
+`/mnt/library` must NFS-mount it from hubris. Options:
+
+- **Export from hubris host directly** (simplest): add `/mnt/library` to
+  `/etc/exports` on hubris with the same squash params as LXC 102
+  (`rw,all_squash,anonuid=33,anongid=10000,no_subtree_check`). Mount on strong
+  at `/mnt/library`. Strong's guests bind-mount it just like hubris's guests do.
+
+- **Use existing nfs-export LXC 102**: strong NFS-mounts from `192.168.8.200`
+  (LXC 102). This already has the right squash config. Less host-level change.
+  **This is the path of least resistance.**
+
+### 4. GPU — iGPU passthrough on strong
+
+strong has a Ryzen 7 PRO 6850U with Radeon 680M iGPU. For jellyfin (VAAPI
+transcoding) and mule-images (photo processing), we need:
+- `/dev/dri/renderD128` passed to the LXC (`lxc.cgroup2.devices.allow` +
+  `lxc.mount.entry` or Proxmox's `dev0:` passthrough)
+- `video` / `render` group membership inside the container
+- Confirm `amdgpu` driver loads on strong's host kernel (it should — same APU family)
+
+### 5. Quorum — 2-node cluster, no QDevice
+
+Moving guests to strong does NOT fix the quorum issue but **reduces blast
+radius**: if hubris reboots (its known thermal instability), the guests on
+strong keep running independently. Consider adding a QDevice as a separate
+follow-up — it's orthogonal to this migration.
+
+---
+
+## Revised migration phases
+
+The original plan's NFS-over-LAN approach has been superseded. Instead,
+**media library data moves to ludo-lvm** on strong so migrated guests access
+it as a local ext4 mount. Data is split by origin:
+
+```
+hubris (stays):   library SSD (3.7T, 1.2T used)
+                     └── /mnt/library/{documents,images,cloud,homecloud,notes,repos,sophia}
+                         ↑ user-generated content (docs, photos, cloud sync, notes, repos, workshop)
+
+strong (moves):   ludo-lvm (1.8T, 0 used at start)
+                     └── /mnt/media_local ← 1.5T thin volume
+                            └── {downloads,movies,music,tv,anime,books}
+                            ↑ non-user-generated content (media arr stack, book library)
+```
+
+| Category | Stays on hubris | Moves to strong |
+|----------|----------------|-----------------|
+| Media | — | downloads (25G), movies (51G), music (29G), tv (30G), anime (206G) |
+| Books | — | books (2.6G) |
+| Docs/Photos | documents (249M), images (4K) | — |
+| Cloud sync | cloud (287G), homecloud (367G) | — |
+| Personal | notes (6.7M), repos (84M), sophia (151G) | — |
+| **Total** | **~805G** | **~344G** |
+
+ludo-lvm (1.8T) fits all media + books with ~1.15T headroom for growth.
+hubris library SSD (3.7T, 1.2T used) retains the user-generated content.
+Both sides keep their data local — no cross-node NFS needed for daily I/O.
+
+---
+
+### Phase 2a — Prepare ludo-lvm on strong
+
+1. Create a ext4 filesystem on ludo-lvm for media:
+   ```bash
+   lvcreate -n media -L 1.5T ludo-lvm
+   mkfs.ext4 /dev/ludo-lvm/media
+   ```
+2. Mount at `/mnt/media_local` on strong, add to `/etc/fstab`
+3. rsync media directories from hubris → strong:
+   ```bash
+   rsync -av --progress /mnt/library/{movies,tv,anime,downloads,music,books} strong:/mnt/media_local/
+   ```
+
+### Phase 2b — Migrate arriman (122) to strong
+
+1. Stop arriman on hubris, dump rootfs (24G)
+2. Restore on strong with IP `192.168.8.245/28` on vmbr1
+3. Mount `/mnt/media_local` → `/mnt/library` via mp0 (downloads land locally)
+4. Update Caddy: jellyseerr/qbit/sab backends → new IP
+5. Update inventory.yaml
+
+### Phase 2c — Migrate jellyfin (101) to strong
+
+1. Stop jellyfin on hubris, dump rootfs (16G)
+2. Restore on strong with IP `192.168.8.246/28` on vmbr1
+3. Pass `/dev/dri/renderD128` + `/dev/dri/card0` (Radeon 680M + RX 7600)
+4. Mount `/mnt/media_local` → `/mnt/library` via mp0 (media reads locally)
+5. Update Caddy: `media.hubris.network` → new IP
+6. Reinstall `sso-inject.js` in web dir (lost on every apt upgrade)
+7. Test VAAPI transcoding, SSO login, media playback
+
+### Phase 2d — Migrate grimmory (130) to strong
+
+1. Stop grimmory on hubris, dump rootfs (16G)
+2. Restore on strong with IP `192.168.8.247/28` on vmbr1
+3. Mount `/mnt/media_local` → `/mnt/library` via mp0 (books read locally)
+4. Update Caddy: `books.hubris.network` → new IP
+5. Update inventory.yaml
+6. Test: book browsing, calibre-web access
+
+### No NFS export needed
+
+With the data split by origin, hubris guests that only need user-generated
+content (documents, images, cloud, repos, sophia) still access them from the
+original library SSD — no cross-node NFS required. The two sides are
+independent.
+
+**Result after Phase 2: hubris frees 26 GiB RAM (4 migrated guests) + 344G of
+library I/O burden. Strong becomes the media/books powerhouse.**
+
+---
+
+### Phase 3 — Migrate mule-images (120) to strong
+
+Move photo management (12 GiB RAM, 6 cores, iGPU) last because it needs:
+- `/mnt/library` access (now NFS from strong — already set up in Phase 2d)
+- `/dev/dri/renderD128` (Radeon 680M — confirm VAAPI compatibility first)
+
+Steps:
+1. Stop mule-images on hubris, rsync the 100G rootfs to strong (faster than vzdump)
+2. Restore on strong with IP on vmbr1
+3. Pass Radeon 680M iGPU
+4. Reconfigure library paths → `/mnt/media_local` (or keep NFS mount)
+5. Update Caddy: `photos.hubris.network` → new IP
+6. Test photo import + processing pipeline
+
+---
+
+### Phase 4 — Tier 3 moves (optional)
+
+Migrate grimmory (130), teddycloud (131), rclone (132), trmnl (128), sophia (119)
+as needed — each frees 1–2 GiB. Not urgent; do when convenient.
+
+---
+
+### Phase 5 — Follow-up
+
+- **QDevice**: add a tiebreaker for 2-node quorum
+- **Gaming VM**: strong's 6850U has enough cores alongside migrated LXCs
+- **Hubris library cleanup**: after all guests are confirmed working, decide
+  whether to keep the original library SSD as backup or repurpose it
+
+---
+
+## Resource math after Phase 3 (all Tier 1 + 2 moved)
+
+| | hubris | strong |
+|---|--------|--------|
+| Guests | 11 LXC + 2 VM | 5 LXC |
+| RAM allocated | ~25 GiB | ~45 GiB |
+| RAM capacity | 28 GiB | 28 GiB |
+| Overcommit | 0.9× (under-committed) | 1.6× (manageable) |
+| Library disk | Local ext4 (3.7T) → NFS client | Local ext4 on ludo-lvm (1.8T) |
+| GPU | Radeon 760M (idle) | Radeon 680M (jellyfin + mule-images) |
+
+strong becomes the media/library powerhouse. hubris becomes a lean core-infra
+node (DNS, auth, git, docs, caddy, HA).
+
+---
+
+---
+
+## Risk register
+
+| Risk | Impact | Mitigation |
+|------|--------|------------|
+| NFS latency for library reads (jellyfin, arriman) | Media playback stutter, slow downloads | Test iperf between strong↔hubris first. If 2.5G link, NFS throughput is fine (~1 Gbit/s). |
+| GPU passthrough on strong (680M vs 760M) | Transcode quality/compat differences | Both are AMD VAAPI — same driver stack. Test `vainfo` inside LXC before going live. |
+| Caddy backend IP churn | Service outage if IP wrong | Update Caddyfile in git repo (caddy-conf), test each route before destroying old LXC. |
+| vzdump/restore downtime | Service unavailable during migration | Schedule off-hours. Use rsync for large rootfs (120's 100G) to minimize freeze window. |
+| 2-node quorum still fragile | If hubris goes down, strong /etc/pve goes read-only | Guests keep running. Add QDevice as follow-up. |
+| Library data integrity during NFS transition | Permission drift | NFS `all_squash,anonuid=33,anongid=10000` matches existing LXC 102 config. Verify with `ls -la /mnt/library` after mount. |
+
+---
+
+## Open questions for operator
+
+1. **Internal bridge on strong**: proceed with `vmbr1` on `192.168.8.3/24`
+   (Option A), or use `192.168.178.x` guest IPs (Option B)?
+2. **Migration method**: `vzdump`/restore (clean, downtime) vs `rsync` rootfs
+   (faster for large disks, needs manual config copy)?
+3. **Phase 1 priority**: move elementsynapse + house first (quick wins), or
+   go straight to Phase 2 (mule-images/jellyfin/arriman) for maximum relief?
+4. **Should we add a QDevice now** before moving anything, to protect
+   management plane during the migration?
+
+---
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-07-05 — Phase 2d complete (grimmory migrated; media NFS to zimaos)
+grimmory (130) → 192.168.8.247 on strong. Rsync'd /books (2.6G) to ludo-lvm.
+LXC 102 (nfs-export) now mounts strong's NFS at /mnt/media and exports it as
+a second share alongside /mnt/library. Zimaos mounts both: /media/library
+(hubris user-generated) and /media/media (strong media+books).
+See hosts/strong.md changelog.
+
+### 2026-07-05 — Phase 2 complete (arriman + jellyfin migrated; library on ludo-lvm)
+arriman (122) → 192.168.8.245, jellyfin (101) → 192.168.8.246. Created 1.5T
+thin volume on ludo-lvm, rsync'd 363G of media data. Both containers use local
+ext4 mount — no NFS. Jellyfin has 680M + RX 7600 GPU passthrough.
+Caddy backends updated. See hosts/strong.md changelog.
+
+### 2026-07-05 — Phase 1 complete (elementsynapse + house migrated to strong)
+Both Tier 1 guests moved: elementsynapse (118) → 192.168.8.242, house (129) → 192.168.8.244.
+Strong now has vmbr1 at 192.168.8.241/28. Hubris has proxy ARP + /32 routes for strong
+guest range. DHCP scope narrowed to 192.168.8.100-239 to avoid conflicts.
+Teddycloud (LXC 131) given static IP 192.168.8.150 due to IP conflict with
+previous DHCP allocation at 192.168.8.243.
+See hosts/strong.md changelog for full steps.
+
+### 2026-07-05 — assessment created
+Built from live `pct config` + `pvesm status` + `free -h` data pulled from
+both nodes. Supersedes the storage-migration framing of the original
+library-SSD plan — this assessment treats the SSD move as optional and
+focuses on guest relocation via NFS.

.sops.yaml

@@ -18,19 +18,119 @@
 creation_rules:
   - path_regex: ^secrets/hello\.yaml$
     # The "hello" secret is encrypted to every enrolled client so the bootstrap
-    # decrypt test works for everyone. Populated by the operator with the
-    # age_pubkey from each hosts/<name>.yaml after Phase 3a generates keys.
+    # decrypt test works for everyone. Add each new client's age_pubkey when
+    # they enrol; re-key with `sops updatekeys -y secrets/hello.yaml`.
     age: >-
-      # placeholder — operator fills in after first issuance run.
-      # comma-separated age public keys, e.g.:
-      #   age1xxx,age1yyy,age1zzz
+      age1xkklkvnk5z0fsnh6cfgv70hy9ksfy8rdprwerzw4yk3p4p7cxcqs2yvpz6,
+      age1duyl8mkpgu80uv934dy8q7enqjms6yvdz264hme8uryuxmvvqesq6rusq0,
+      age1vf8h7s8mqsn2q5eadgpdupsj4mwn8zguc77d85ws3xj40sl9rgksx2rxw6,
+      age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs,
+      age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h,
+      age1rtwvdct6avjkr3cyxv3vue3vqx4d524fjfr3vk7xrnvyrylnry5sm54sn4,
+      age1pwtdws2thdh7vzp2dzttl3zxgcs2tgpcsjsqgw3q04nyml4kvuqq467u4x
+
+  - path_regex: ^secrets/gitea-pat\.yaml$
+    # Write-scoped Gitea PAT (dtoro user). Same recipient list as hello.yaml
+    # since every enrolled client should be able to push (homelab client
+    # add/remove, wiki edits, etc.).
+    age: >-
+      age1xkklkvnk5z0fsnh6cfgv70hy9ksfy8rdprwerzw4yk3p4p7cxcqs2yvpz6,
+      age1duyl8mkpgu80uv934dy8q7enqjms6yvdz264hme8uryuxmvvqesq6rusq0,
+      age1vf8h7s8mqsn2q5eadgpdupsj4mwn8zguc77d85ws3xj40sl9rgksx2rxw6,
+      age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs,
+      age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h,
+      age1rtwvdct6avjkr3cyxv3vue3vqx4d524fjfr3vk7xrnvyrylnry5sm54sn4,
+      age1pwtdws2thdh7vzp2dzttl3zxgcs2tgpcsjsqgw3q04nyml4kvuqq467u4x
 
   - path_regex: ^secrets/gitea-tokens\.yaml$
     # Workstations only.
     age: >-
-      # placeholder — fill with age_pubkey of: republic-laptop, mac-mini, ludo-mini, hubris
+      # placeholder — fill with age_pubkey of: republic-laptop, mac-mini, strong, hubris
 
   - path_regex: ^secrets/webhook-hmacs\.yaml$
     # LXCs that run a webhook receiver.
     age: >-
-      # placeholder — fill with age_pubkey of: apps, caddy, claudio-bot, claudio-monitor host
+      # placeholder — fill with age_pubkey of: apps, caddy
+
+  - path_regex: ^secrets/turn-shared-secret\.yaml$
+    # coturn TURN long-term-credential password. Consumed by hubris (which
+    # renders /etc/turnserver.conf + /opt/management.json on the VPS via
+    # `homelab render-vps-configs`). Other recipients are convenience for
+    # operator debugging — only hubris's pubkey is strictly required.
+    age: >-
+      age1xkklkvnk5z0fsnh6cfgv70hy9ksfy8rdprwerzw4yk3p4p7cxcqs2yvpz6,
+      age1duyl8mkpgu80uv934dy8q7enqjms6yvdz264hme8uryuxmvvqesq6rusq0,
+      age1vf8h7s8mqsn2q5eadgpdupsj4mwn8zguc77d85ws3xj40sl9rgksx2rxw6,
+      age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs,
+      age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h,
+      age1pwtdws2thdh7vzp2dzttl3zxgcs2tgpcsjsqgw3q04nyml4kvuqq467u4x
+
+  - path_regex: ^secrets/netbird-authentik-oidc\.yaml$
+    # Authentik OIDC client secret for the netbird-dashboard provider.
+    # Consumed by hubris to render /opt/management.json on the VPS
+    # (PKCEAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.ClientSecret).
+    age: >-
+      age1xkklkvnk5z0fsnh6cfgv70hy9ksfy8rdprwerzw4yk3p4p7cxcqs2yvpz6,
+      age1duyl8mkpgu80uv934dy8q7enqjms6yvdz264hme8uryuxmvvqesq6rusq0,
+      age1vf8h7s8mqsn2q5eadgpdupsj4mwn8zguc77d85ws3xj40sl9rgksx2rxw6,
+      age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs,
+      age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h,
+      age1pwtdws2thdh7vzp2dzttl3zxgcs2tgpcsjsqgw3q04nyml4kvuqq467u4x
+
+  - path_regex: ^secrets/netbird-pat\.yaml$
+    # NetBird API Personal Access Token. Consumed by the dns-sync job on the
+    # `dns` LXC (107) to reconcile Technitium -> NetBird managed DNS zone.
+    # (When 107 is enrolled, add its age_pubkey here and updatekeys.)
+    age: >-
+      age1xkklkvnk5z0fsnh6cfgv70hy9ksfy8rdprwerzw4yk3p4p7cxcqs2yvpz6,
+      age1duyl8mkpgu80uv934dy8q7enqjms6yvdz264hme8uryuxmvvqesq6rusq0,
+      age1vf8h7s8mqsn2q5eadgpdupsj4mwn8zguc77d85ws3xj40sl9rgksx2rxw6,
+      age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs
+
+  - path_regex: ^secrets/openrouter-api-key\.yaml$
+    # OpenRouter API key consumed by the `hermes` wrapper (bin/hermes) when
+    # spawning a Goose session. Recipients are any host that should run a
+    # Nous-Hermes agent. Add a host's age_pubkey here, then
+    # `sops updatekeys -y secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml`.
+    # See operations/hermes-agent.md.
+    age: >-
+      age1xkklkvnk5z0fsnh6cfgv70hy9ksfy8rdprwerzw4yk3p4p7cxcqs2yvpz6,
+      age1vf8h7s8mqsn2q5eadgpdupsj4mwn8zguc77d85ws3xj40sl9rgksx2rxw6,
+      age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs,
+      age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h
+
+  - path_regex: ^secrets/yuvomi-api-token\.yaml$
+    # Named Bearer token for the Yuvomi REST API, consumed by yuvomi-mcp on
+    # LXC 129 (house).
+    age: >-
+      age1xkklkvnk5z0fsnh6cfgv70hy9ksfy8rdprwerzw4yk3p4p7cxcqs2yvpz6,
+      age1vf8h7s8mqsn2q5eadgpdupsj4mwn8zguc77d85ws3xj40sl9rgksx2rxw6,
+      age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs,
+      age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h
+
+  - path_regex: ^secrets/hermes-house-users\.yaml$
+    # Signal number → Yuvomi user_id mapping (PII). Consumed by hermesd on LXC 129.
+    age: >-
+      age1xkklkvnk5z0fsnh6cfgv70hy9ksfy8rdprwerzw4yk3p4p7cxcqs2yvpz6,
+      age1vf8h7s8mqsn2q5eadgpdupsj4mwn8zguc77d85ws3xj40sl9rgksx2rxw6,
+      age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs,
+      age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h
+
+  - path_regex: ^secrets/oikos-approval-hmac\.yaml$
+    # HMAC signing key for Oikos approval-grant tokens (oikos/approve.py).
+    # Recipients: apps (105, runs the approval engine alongside homelab-mcp)
+    # and hubris (admin/debug decrypt). See OIKOS.md "Approval engine".
+    age: >-
+      age1xkklkvnk5z0fsnh6cfgv70hy9ksfy8rdprwerzw4yk3p4p7cxcqs2yvpz6,
+      age1duyl8mkpgu80uv934dy8q7enqjms6yvdz264hme8uryuxmvvqesq6rusq0
+
+  - path_regex: ^secrets/oikos-console-deploy-secret\.yaml$
+    # Shared HMAC secret for the Gitea deploy webhook (id 14) ->
+    # oikos-console-deploy.service on apps (105). Generated + registered
+    # with Gitea before the apps-side install ran (see
+    # oikos/console/deploy/README.md "Status") — write this exact value
+    # into /etc/oikos-console-deploy/secret rather than letting
+    # webhook/install.sh generate a fresh one.
+    age: >-
+      age1duyl8mkpgu80uv934dy8q7enqjms6yvdz264hme8uryuxmvvqesq6rusq0
+# webhook noop 2026-05-20T18:16:57+02:00

AGENTS.md

@@ -4,6 +4,20 @@ You are running on a machine that is part of the **hubris** homelab. The full
 context is in this checkout at `/opt/homelab-context/`. This file is the entry
 point. Read it once at start, then keep working.
 
+The operating model — OODA loop, risk classes, approval rules, the ontology,
+and node lifecycle — is defined in [OIKOS.md](.agents/OIKOS.md). Before any mutation,
+classify the action against `oikos/policy.yaml`; when the class requires
+approval, stop and ask the operator.
+
+Agent-facing instruction is separated from human content under `.agents/`:
+`.agents/shared/` holds the conventions every agent applies
+([writing-style](.agents/shared/writing-style.md), [caveman](.agents/shared/caveman.md),
+[page-templates](.agents/shared/page-templates.md), [llm-wiki](.agents/shared/llm-wiki.md)), and
+`.agents/domains/` holds the per-domain schemas
+([knowledge](.agents/domains/knowledge/schema.md), [operations](.agents/domains/operations/schema.md)).
+The narrative wiki lives under `knowledge/wiki/`; the machine-readable substrate
+(`inventory.yaml`, `hosts/*.yaml`, `oikos/`) stays at the repo root.
+
 ## 1. Who you are
 
 Run `hostname` (Linux) or `scutil --get LocalHostName` (macOS), then read:
@@ -19,13 +33,14 @@ the operator to run `homelab client add <hostname>` from an existing client.
 - `/opt/homelab-context/inventory.yaml` — every host, LXC, VM, and workstation
   with their mesh addresses, roles, and service mappings. Treat this file as
   authoritative; anything you read in narrative pages should agree with it.
-- `/opt/homelab-context/infrastructure/mesh.md` — Tailscale → Netbird state.
+- `/opt/homelab-context/knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/mesh.md` — Tailscale → Netbird state.
   Both meshes are accepted today; Netbird is preferred for new traffic.
-- `/opt/homelab-context/infrastructure/dns.md` — split-horizon DNS via
-  dnsmasq on LXC 124. `*.hubris.network` resolves to 192.168.x.x on the LAN
-  and to mesh addresses off-LAN.
-- `/opt/homelab-context/operations/commands.md` — the operator's cheatsheet
-  for pct, caddy, dnsmasq. Use these verbs when you take actions.
+- `/opt/homelab-context/knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/dns.md` — split-horizon DNS via
+  Technitium on [dns (107)](knowledge/wiki/containers/107-dns.md). `*.hubris.network`
+  resolves to 192.168.x.x on the LAN and to mesh addresses off-LAN.
+- `/opt/homelab-context/.agents/operations/commands.md` — the operator's cheatsheet
+  for pct, caddy, DNS, and the Oikos command surface. Use these verbs when
+  you take actions.
 
 ## 3. The MCP server
 
@@ -44,8 +59,15 @@ Available tools:
     get_service_status(service), tail_log(service, lines=200),
     list_lxcs(), get_lxc_state(lxc), ping_service(service)
 
+  Oikos (read-only; see OIKOS.md):
+    explain(service) — compact context card, cheaper than search_docs+get_page
+    preflight(service) — risk class, approval requirement, verification command
+    get_relations(entity) — ontology blast-radius query (host: or service: id)
+    get_change_history(entity, limit=20) — change-ledger entries
+    get_state_snapshot() — last scheduler Observe-pass (health, disk, drift count)
+
 Mutations are **not** exposed via MCP. Use the `homelab` CLI for those, with
-operator confirmation.
+operator confirmation — see OIKOS.md's risk classes and approval flow.
 
 **When to prefer MCP over grepping the clone:** any time you need to resolve a
 name to an address, look up service status, or search the wiki by content.
@@ -53,17 +75,25 @@ Grep is fine for browsing or when MCP is unreachable.
 
 ## 4. Wiki conventions
 
-- Pages live under `containers/`, `hosts/`, `vms/`, `infrastructure/`,
-  `investigations/`, `operations/`. Cross-link liberally; orphans are bugs.
-- Every page ends with a `## Changelog` section, entries in reverse-chrono
-  order:
+See [page-templates.md](.agents/shared/page-templates.md) for file naming, page
+structure, and the tone standard. Quick reference:
+
+- **File naming:** Foundational docs are ALL-CAPS (AGENTS.md, OIKOS.md, GLOSSARY.md);
+  containers use `<id>-<name>.md`; infrastructure uses lowercase-with-dashes; plans
+  and investigations use `YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md`; skills are `<name>/SKILL.md`.
+- **Where pages live:** Narrative under `knowledge/wiki/{containers,hosts,vms,infrastructure}/`;
+  incident records under `knowledge/sources/investigations/`; runbook procedures under
+  `.agents/skills/<name>/SKILL.md`; operator reference under `.agents/operations/`;
+  design docs under `plans/`. Cross-link liberally; orphans are bugs.
+- **Changelog format:** Every page ends with a `## Changelog` section, entries in
+  reverse-chronological order:
 
       ### YYYY-MM-DD — short title
       one or two lines describing what changed and why.
 
-- Investigation files are dated and slugged: `YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md`.
-- Live state takes precedence over docs. If you observe a discrepancy, update
-  the docs *in the same session* (per the same-session update rule).
+- **Live state precedence.** If you observe a discrepancy between the docs and
+  running state, update the docs *in the same session* (per the same-session update
+  rule in [page-templates.md](.agents/shared/page-templates.md#same-session-update-rule)).
 
 ## 5. Acting on the homelab
 
@@ -76,14 +106,44 @@ Grep is fine for browsing or when MCP is unreachable.
   demand using the per-client age key at `/etc/age/key.txt`. Secrets ARE
   available in this system — `list_my_secrets()` (MCP) shows what you can
   decrypt.
-- **Mutations** (restart, edit configs, etc.): the `homelab` CLI's mutating
-  subcommands ask for confirmation. For ad-hoc work, SSH and edit directly —
-  but commit changes that touch tracked configs (caddy, gitea custom,
-  artifacto, mule-image, etc.; see `infrastructure/auto-deploy.md`).
+- **Mutations** (restart, edit configs, etc.): classify against
+  `oikos/policy.yaml` first (`homelab decide <action> <entity>`).
+  `reversible_low` actions just need the interactive confirmation prompt;
+  `config_mutation`/`destructive` actions are mechanically refused without
+  a valid `--approval-id` from `homelab approval request` — see OIKOS.md.
+  For ad-hoc work, SSH and edit directly — but commit changes that touch
+  tracked configs (caddy, gitea custom, artifacto, mule-image, etc.; see
+  `knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/auto-deploy.md`).
 - **Wiki updates**: same-session rule applies to any meaningful state change
   this client makes.
 
-## 6. When in doubt
+## 6. Communication mode
+
+Read and apply `/opt/homelab-context/.agents/shared/caveman.md` (if present). It defines the lab's
+terse-communication standard — drop filler, keep substance, use fragments.
+
+## 7. Auto-setup mechanism
+
+The homelab-context repo ships tooling that gets automatically installed
+on every client after `git pull`. This is handled by `tools/post-pull.sh`
+(replaces the raw git pull in the sync timer) which runs any script matching
+`tools/*.setup.sh` after pull.
+
+Currently auto-setup:
+- **Caveman + templates** (`tools/setup-caveman.sh`): Installs Caveman npm
+  package, wrapper scripts, and compact output templates for token-efficient
+  CLI output. Wrapper at `~/bin/caveman_wrapper.sh`.
+- **Hermes agent persona** (`tools/setup-hermes-soul.sh`): Provisions
+  `~/.hermes/SOUL.md` from `HERMES.md` on Hermes agents. This ensures every
+  Hermes agent follows the canonical homelab persona (token efficiency, source
+  of truth hierarchy). No-op on non-Hermes agents.
+
+To add a new auto-setup, create `tools/<name>.setup.sh` in the repo,
+commit and push. All enrolled clients pick it up within 5 minutes.
+
+To trigger sync manually: `sudo homelab sync` or wait for the 5-min timer.
+
+## 8. When in doubt
 
 Run `homelab mcp search_docs <query>` or `homelab mcp get_host <name>`.
 The clone is the fallback; MCP is the index.

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-# Contributing to the Homelab Wiki
-
-## Voice
-
-Concise, technical, sysadmin-to-sysadmin. No marketing prose, no exclamation marks.
-
-## Page templates
-
-### Container page (`containers/<id>-<name>.md`)
-
-```markdown
-# <id> — `<name>`
-
-One-sentence purpose.
-
-## At a glance
-- **Hostname:** `<name>`
-- **IP:** `192.168.8.x`
-- **Privilege:** privileged | unprivileged
-- **Resources:** N cores / M GiB RAM / D GiB rootfs
-- **Mounts:** `/mnt/library` ↔ `/mnt/library` (if any)
-- **Public hostname:** `<sub>.hubris.network` (if proxied)
-
-## Role
-What it does, what it talks to.
-
-## Service / port map
-| Service | Listen | Notes |
-
-## Storage / config paths
-
-## Auto-deploy
-(if any) — link to [auto-deploy](../infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)
-
-## Related
-- [Caddy](121-caddy.md) (if proxied)
-- [DNS](../infrastructure/dns.md) (if has subdomain)
-- [Authentik](124-authentik.md) (if SSO)
-- ...
-
-## Changelog
-### YYYY-MM-DD — short title
-What changed, why, link to investigation if any.
-```
-
-### Cross-cutting page (`infrastructure/<topic>.md`)
-
-```markdown
-# <Topic>
-
-One-sentence summary.
-
-## Why
-Design rationale — what it replaces, what it solves.
-
-## Components
-Where it runs, what files matter.
-
-## How to apply / use
-Recipes.
-
-## Gotchas
-
-## Related
-Links to nodes that host or depend on this.
-
-## Changelog
-```
-
-### Investigation (`investigations/YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md`)
-
-```markdown
-# YYYY-MM-DD — <title>
-
-## Summary
-1-3 sentences.
-
-## Timeline
-
-## Root cause
-
-## Mitigations applied
-
-## Open questions
-```
-
-## Linking discipline
-
-- Every container page links to every cross-cutting page it participates in.
-- Every cross-cutting page lists the nodes that participate.
-- Every investigation links to the nodes it implicates *and* gets back-linked from each node's changelog.
-
-## Changelog hygiene
-
-- Reverse-chronological (newest first).
-- One entry per discrete change, even if you make several in one day.
-- If a change spans nodes, repeat the entry on each affected page (different perspective is fine).
-- Don't rewrite history — entries are append-only. Mistakes get a follow-up entry that supersedes them.

README.md

@@ -2,56 +2,69 @@
 
 Living documentation for the **hubris** Proxmox homelab. Every node, every cross-cutting system, and every meaningful incident is its own page; pages are linked so you can start anywhere and walk the graph.
 
-> Last refreshed against live state: **2026-04-28**.
+> Last refreshed against live state: **2026-07-06**.
+
+## Quick navigation
+
+- [Proxmox hosts](#proxmox-hosts) — hubris (primary) + strong (cluster member)
+- [VMs](#vms) — ZimaOS, Home Assistant
+- [LXC containers](#lxc-containers) — service fleet (17 containers)
+- [Cross-cutting infrastructure](#cross-cutting-infrastructure) — DNS, ingress, mesh, storage, auth
+- [Investigations](#investigations) — incident timelines
+- [Operations](#operations) — cheatsheet, enrollment, runbooks
+- [Glossary](knowledge/GLOSSARY.md) — term definitions
+- [Conventions](#conventions) — wiki style, changelog hygiene, same-session update rule
 
 ## Map
 
-### Hosts
-- [`hubris`](hosts/hubris.md) — single Proxmox VE node, GMKtec NucBox M6 Ultra, `192.168.8.77`
+### Proxmox hosts
+- [`hubris`](knowledge/wiki/hosts/hubris.md) — PVE node, GMKtec NucBox M6 Ultra, `192.168.8.77` — primary host, runs [8 LXCs](knowledge/wiki/containers/index.md) + 2 VMs
+- [`strong`](knowledge/wiki/hosts/strong.md) — PVE node (cluster hostname `strong`), `192.168.178.181` — 2nd member of `Homelab` cluster. Hosts [7 LXCs](knowledge/wiki/containers/index.md) migrated from hubris (Phase 1+2, 2026-07-05)
 
 ### VMs
-- [100 — `zimaos`](vms/100-zimaos.md) — ZimaOS 1.6.1, NAS frontend (evaluation)
-- [108 — `haos-16.3`](vms/108-haos.md) — Home Assistant OS
+- [100 — `zimaos`](knowledge/wiki/vms/100-zimaos.md) — ZimaOS 1.6.1, NAS frontend (evaluation)
+- [108 — `haos-16.3`](knowledge/wiki/vms/108-haos.md) — Home Assistant OS
+- See [vms/index.md](knowledge/wiki/vms/index.md) for the full table
 
 ### LXC containers
-See the full table in [`containers/index.md`](containers/index.md). Quick links:
+See the full table with IPs, hosts, mounts, and status in
+[`containers/index.md`](knowledge/wiki/containers/index.md). Quick summary:
 
-| ID  | Name             | IP              | Role                                          |
-| --- | ---------------- | --------------- | --------------------------------------------- |
-| 101 | [jellyfin](containers/101-jellyfin.md)             | 192.168.8.206 | Media server                                  |
-| 102 | [nfs-export](containers/102-nfs-export.md)         | 192.168.8.200 | NFSv4 re-export of /mnt/library for ZimaOS    |
-| 103 | [paperless](containers/103-paperless.md)           | 192.168.8.130 | Document mgmt                                 |
-| 104 | [gitea](containers/104-gitea.md)                   | 192.168.8.121 | Git server                                    |
-| 105 | [apps](containers/105-apps.md)                     | 192.168.8.205 | Docker host (Artifacto / Booklore / PlantUML / Portainer / WriteFreely) |
-| 114 | [nextcloud](containers/114-nextcloud.md)           | 192.168.8.224 | Personal cloud                                |
-| 118 | [elementsynapse](containers/118-elementsynapse.md) | 192.168.8.239 | Matrix Synapse                                |
-| 119 | [sophia](containers/119-sophia.md)                 | 192.168.8.157 | Sophia                                        |
-| 120 | [mule-images](containers/120-mule-images.md)       | 192.168.8.136 | Mule-image / mulita photos                    |
-| 121 | [caddy](containers/121-caddy.md)                   | 192.168.8.175 | Reverse proxy                                 |
-| 122 | [arriman](containers/122-arriman.md)               | 192.168.8.132 | Docker host (\*arr stack)                     |
-| 123 | [claudio-bot](containers/123-claudio-bot.md)       | 192.168.8.230 | Matrix control plane                          |
-| 124 | [authentik](containers/124-authentik.md)           | 192.168.8.180 | SSO + split-horizon DNS                       |
-| 126 | [plato](containers/126-plato.md)                   | 192.168.8.190 | Plato (notes/discovery workspace)             |
+- **hubris** (10 active): 102 nfs-export, 103 paperless, 104 gitea, 105 apps,
+  114 nextcloud, 119 sophia, 120 mule-images, 121 caddy, 124 authentik (outpost),
+  128 trmnl, 132 rclone
+- **strong** (7 active): 101 jellyfin, 118 elementsynapse, 122 arriman,
+  129 house, 130 grimmory, 133 seanime, 134 romm
+- **Destroyed (archaeology)**: 100 arr, 106 flaresolverr, 107 marimo,
+  109 syncthing, 110 photoprism, 111 karakeep, 112 immich, 115 reticulum,
+  123 claudio-bot, 125 seafile, 126 plato, 127 mule-photos-new — see
+  [containers/index.md](knowledge/wiki/containers/index.md#recently-destroyed-kept-for-archaeology)
 
 ### Cross-cutting infrastructure
-- [DNS — split-horizon](infrastructure/dns.md)
-- [Ingress — Caddy + VPS traefik](infrastructure/ingress.md)
-- [Mesh — Tailscale → Netbird migration](infrastructure/mesh.md)
-- [Monitoring — claudio-monitor](infrastructure/monitoring.md)
-- [Media permissions — `media` GID 10000](infrastructure/media-permissions.md)
-- [SSH access](infrastructure/ssh-access.md)
-- [Backups — restic on external drive (disabled)](infrastructure/backups.md)
-- [Auto-deploy — gitea-webhook pipelines](infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)
-- [VPS hardening — IONOS / netbird control plane](infrastructure/vps-hardening.md)
+- [Infrastructure index](knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/index.md) — map of every cross-cutting system
+- [Glossary](knowledge/GLOSSARY.md) — term definitions
+- [DNS — split-horizon](knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/dns.md)
+- [Ingress — Caddy + VPS traefik](knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/ingress.md)
+- [Mesh — Tailscale → Netbird migration](knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/mesh.md)
+- [Monitoring — Hermes health watchdog](knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/monitoring.md)
+- [Media permissions — `media` GID 10000](knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/media-permissions.md)
+- [SSH access](knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/ssh-access.md)
+- [Backups — rclone → Proton Drive (LXC 132); restic-on-USB deprecated](knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/backups.md)
+- [Auto-deploy — gitea-webhook pipelines](knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)
+- [VPS hardening — IONOS / netbird control plane](knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/vps-hardening.md)
+- [Homelab context distribution](knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/homelab-context.md) — cross-client `/opt/homelab-context` + MCP + secrets-issuance
 
 ### Investigations
-Time-stamped incident notes / experiments in [`investigations/`](investigations/index.md).
+Time-stamped incident notes / experiments in [`investigations/index.md`](knowledge/sources/investigations/index.md).
+Resolved cases move to [`investigations/archive/`](knowledge/sources/investigations/archive/).
 
 ### Operations
-- [Command cheatsheet](operations/commands.md)
+- [Command cheatsheet](.agents/operations/commands.md)
+- [Agent enrollment](.agents/operations/agent-enrollment.md) — bootstrap a new client (workstation, LXC, VM) into the homelab context system
 
 ## Conventions
 
+- **File naming.** Foundational docs (entry-points, agent instruction, references) are ALL-CAPS (`AGENTS.md`, `OIKOS.md`, `GLOSSARY.md`); containers use `<id>-<name>.md`; infrastructure pages use lowercase-with-dashes; plans and incidents use `YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md`; skills are `<name>/SKILL.md`. See [page-templates.md](.agents/shared/page-templates.md) for the full rules.
 - **Each node page** ends with a `## Changelog` section. Reverse-chronological. Entry format:
   ```
   ### YYYY-MM-DD — short title
@@ -59,7 +72,7 @@ Time-stamped incident notes / experiments in [`investigations/`](investigations/
   ```
 - **Cross-linking is mandatory.** If a page references another node or system, link to it. Treat orphans as a bug.
 - **Live state wins.** When something here disagrees with `pct config` / `docker inspect` / running config, fix the wiki *and* note the change in the relevant changelog.
-- **Tracked configs.** A node whose config lives in a Gitea repo (Caddy, Gitea customizations, Artifacto, mule-image, claudio-bot) is auto-deployed via webhook — see [auto-deploy](infrastructure/auto-deploy.md). Edits there must be pushed, not left local.
+- **Tracked configs.** A node whose config lives in a Gitea repo (Caddy, Gitea customizations, Artifacto, mule-image) is auto-deployed via webhook — see [auto-deploy](knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/auto-deploy.md). Edits there must be pushed, not left local.
 - **No secrets.** This is a private repo on `git.hubris.network`, but still: paths to secret files are fine, secret values are not.
 
 ## Maintaining this wiki
@@ -68,8 +81,9 @@ When you change a node:
 1. Update the relevant page (config snapshot, ports, mounts).
 2. Add a changelog entry at the bottom of that page.
 3. If the change touches a cross-cutting system (DNS, Caddy, Authentik, mesh), update *that* page too and link it from the changelog entry.
-4. If it's an incident, add an entry to [`investigations/`](investigations/index.md).
+4. If it's an incident, add an entry to [`investigations/`](knowledge/sources/investigations/index.md).
 
 ## See also
 
-- [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md) — page templates and tone
+- [`.agents/shared/page-templates.md`](.agents/shared/page-templates.md) — page templates and tone
+- [`.agents/shared/writing-style.md`](.agents/shared/writing-style.md) — prose style, banned vocabulary

bin/hermes

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# hermes — launch a Goose session pre-wired with the homelab persona,
+# OpenRouter (Nous Hermes) provider, and the homelab MCP server.
+#
+# See operations/hermes-agent.md for the full onboarding flow.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+die() { echo "hermes: $*" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+command -v goose >/dev/null \
+    || die "goose binary not found — re-run bootstrap.sh with --with-hermes"
+command -v homelab >/dev/null \
+    || die "homelab CLI not found — is this client bootstrapped?"
+
+# Decrypt OpenRouter API key.
+# `homelab secret` re-execs via sudo for non-root users (age key is 0600 root).
+SECRET_YAML=$(homelab secret openrouter-api-key 2>&1) || \
+    die "could not decrypt secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml — this host probably
+isn't a recipient yet. See operations/hermes-agent.md ('Granting the OpenRouter
+key to a new host'). sops output:
+${SECRET_YAML}"
+
+API_KEY=$(printf '%s' "$SECRET_YAML" | python3 -c \
+    'import sys, yaml; print(yaml.safe_load(sys.stdin)["api_key"])')
+
+case "$API_KEY" in
+    PLACEHOLDER_*|"")
+        die "openrouter-api-key.yaml still contains the placeholder; operator
+must run \`sops secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml\` on hubris to insert a real
+\`sk-or-...\` key and push the change." ;;
+esac
+
+export OPENROUTER_API_KEY="$API_KEY"
+exec goose session "$@"

bootstrap.sh

@@ -5,8 +5,13 @@
 #   curl -fsSL https://git.hubris.network/dtoro/Homelab-Docs/raw/main/bootstrap.sh \
 #     | sudo bash
 #   curl ... | sudo bash -s -- --with-mcp           # also wire Claude's .mcp.json
+#   curl ... | sudo bash -s -- --with-hermes        # also install Goose + Hermes wrapper
 #   curl ... | sudo bash -s -- --dry-run            # show what would happen
-#   curl ... | sudo bash -s -- --no-secrets         # skip age-key issuance
+#   curl ... | sudo bash -s -- --no-secrets         # skip age-key issuance entirely
+#   curl ... | sudo bash -s -- --no-mesh            # get secrets over LAN only, skip
+#                                                    # installing/connecting Netbird
+#                                                    # (host must be on 192.168.8.0/24
+#                                                    # or otherwise reach secrets.hubris.network)
 #
 # Prerequisites the script verifies:
 #   - running as root
@@ -20,20 +25,30 @@ set -euo pipefail
 # -------- defaults --------
 REPO_HTTPS="${HOMELAB_REPO_URL:-https://git.hubris.network/dtoro/Homelab-Docs.git}"
 CLONE_DIR="${HOMELAB_CONTEXT_DIR:-/opt/homelab-context}"
-ISSUANCE_URL_NETBIRD="${HOMELAB_ISSUANCE_NETBIRD:-http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue}"
-ISSUANCE_URL_TAILSCALE="${HOMELAB_ISSUANCE_TAILSCALE:-http://apps.ts:9820/issue}"
-MCP_URL="${HOMELAB_MCP_URL:-http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse}"
+ISSUANCE_URL_NETBIRD="${HOMELAB_ISSUANCE_NETBIRD:-https://secrets.hubris.network/issue}"
+ISSUANCE_URL_TAILSCALE="${HOMELAB_ISSUANCE_TAILSCALE:-https://secrets.hubris.network/issue}"
+MCP_URL="${HOMELAB_MCP_URL:-https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp}"
+HERMES_MCP_URI="${HOMELAB_HERMES_MCP_URI:-https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp}"
+HERMES_MODEL="${HOMELAB_HERMES_MODEL:-nousresearch/hermes-4-405b}"
 
 WITH_MCP=0
+WITH_HERMES=0
 DRY_RUN=0
 NO_SECRETS=0
+NO_MESH=0
+GITEA_TOKEN="${HOMELAB_GITEA_TOKEN:-}"
+GITEA_USER="${HOMELAB_GITEA_USER:-dtoro}"
 
 # -------- flag parsing --------
 while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
     case "$1" in
         --with-mcp)    WITH_MCP=1; shift ;;
+        --with-hermes) WITH_HERMES=1; shift ;;
         --dry-run)     DRY_RUN=1; shift ;;
         --no-secrets)  NO_SECRETS=1; shift ;;
+        --no-mesh)     NO_MESH=1; shift ;;
+        --gitea-token) GITEA_TOKEN="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+        --gitea-user)  GITEA_USER="$2"; shift 2 ;;
         --help|-h)
             sed -n '2,11p' "$0" | sed 's/^# *//'
             exit 0
@@ -43,6 +58,29 @@ while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
     esac
 done
 
+# If a gitea token is provided, write it to the standard credential store
+# BEFORE the clone happens. The HTTPS REPO_HTTPS will then pick it up via
+# git's credential helper.
+configure_gitea_creds() {
+    if [ -z "$GITEA_TOKEN" ]; then return 0; fi
+    local creds_dir=/etc/homelab-context
+    local creds_file=$creds_dir/git-credentials
+    mkdir -p "$creds_dir"
+    chmod 700 "$creds_dir"
+    # Format the credential URL: <scheme>://user:token@host (scheme must match
+    # the actual REPO_HTTPS — git's credential helper does exact prefix match).
+    local proto host
+    proto=$(echo "$REPO_HTTPS" | sed -E 's|^(https?)://.*|\1|')
+    host=$(echo "$REPO_HTTPS" | sed -E 's|^https?://([^/]+).*|\1|')
+    printf '%s://%s:%s@%s\n' "$proto" "$GITEA_USER" "$GITEA_TOKEN" "$host" > "$creds_file"
+    chmod 600 "$creds_file"
+    # Point git at this store system-wide (/etc/gitconfig) so the systemd
+    # sync timer's git — which runs as root without HOME set — finds it.
+    # --global writes to /root/.gitconfig which the timer doesn't read.
+    git config --system credential.helper "store --file=$creds_file"
+    echo "[bootstrap] wrote gitea credentials to $creds_file"
+}
+
 run() {
     if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
         printf '+ %s\n' "$*"
@@ -51,6 +89,21 @@ run() {
     fi
 }
 
+# Run a command as the enrolling human user when one exists (i.e. this
+# script was invoked via `sudo bash bootstrap.sh` from a real login), and
+# directly otherwise. Minimal Linux images (bare Proxmox/Debian installs
+# reached via `ssh root@host`) often don't even have a `sudo` binary
+# installed — calling `sudo -u root ...` on those unconditionally fails
+# with "sudo: command not found" even though we're already root and don't
+# need to switch users at all.
+run_as() {
+    if [ -n "${SUDO_USER:-}" ] && [ "$SUDO_USER" != "root" ]; then
+        sudo -u "$SUDO_USER" -- "$@"
+    else
+        "$@"
+    fi
+}
+
 # -------- preflight --------
 if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
     echo "bootstrap.sh must run as root (use sudo)." >&2
@@ -78,34 +131,173 @@ echo "[bootstrap] hostname: $HNAME"
 
 # Check dependencies.
 missing=()
-for cmd in git; do command -v "$cmd" >/dev/null || missing+=("$cmd"); done
+for cmd in git python3; do command -v "$cmd" >/dev/null || missing+=("$cmd"); done
+# The homelab CLI needs PyYAML.
+if ! python3 -c "import yaml" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    missing+=("python3-yaml")
+fi
 if [ "$NO_SECRETS" -eq 0 ]; then
     for cmd in age sops; do command -v "$cmd" >/dev/null || missing+=("$cmd"); done
 fi
+# sops isn't a real Debian/Fedora package (there is no apt/dnf "sops"), so it
+# always needs the direct-binary-download path, on both distros. Only Darwin
+# (brew) can install it via a package manager.
+install_sops_binary() {
+    local sops_version=v3.9.4
+    local arch
+    arch="$(uname -m)"
+    case "$arch" in
+        x86_64|amd64) arch=amd64 ;;
+        aarch64|arm64) arch=arm64 ;;
+        *) echo "[bootstrap] unsupported arch for sops binary download: $arch" >&2; return 1 ;;
+    esac
+    curl -fsSL "https://github.com/getsops/sops/releases/download/${sops_version}/sops-${sops_version}.linux.${arch}" \
+        -o /usr/local/bin/sops && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/sops
+}
+
 if [ "${#missing[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
-    echo "missing required tools: ${missing[*]}" >&2
-    if [ "$OS" = "Darwin" ]; then
-        echo "  brew install ${missing[*]}"
+    if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
+        echo "+ would install missing tools: ${missing[*]}"
     else
-        echo "  apt install -y ${missing[*]}  (or platform equivalent)"
+        echo "[bootstrap] installing missing tools: ${missing[*]}"
+        if [ "$OS" = "Darwin" ]; then
+            brew_list=()
+            for m in "${missing[@]}"; do
+                case "$m" in
+                    python3-yaml) python3 -m pip install --break-system-packages pyyaml >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+                                  || python3 -m pip install pyyaml ;;
+                    *) brew_list+=("$m") ;;
+                esac
+            done
+            [ "${#brew_list[@]}" -gt 0 ] && brew install "${brew_list[@]}"
+        elif command -v dnf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            dnf_list=()
+            for m in "${missing[@]}"; do
+                case "$m" in
+                    python3-yaml) dnf_list+=("python3-pyyaml") ;;
+                    sops)         install_sops_binary ;;
+                    *)            dnf_list+=("$m") ;;
+                esac
+            done
+            [ "${#dnf_list[@]}" -gt 0 ] && dnf install -y "${dnf_list[@]}"
+        elif command -v apt-get >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            apt_list=()
+            for m in "${missing[@]}"; do
+                case "$m" in
+                    sops) install_sops_binary ;;
+                    *)    apt_list+=("$m") ;;
+                esac
+            done
+            if [ "${#apt_list[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
+                DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get update
+                DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y "${apt_list[@]}"
+            fi
+        else
+            echo "[bootstrap] no supported package manager for: ${missing[*]}" >&2
+            echo "[bootstrap] install with your package manager + re-run" >&2
+            exit 1
+        fi
+        # Re-verify (especially python yaml — the rename is the most common gotcha).
+        for cmd in git python3; do
+            command -v "$cmd" >/dev/null || { echo "[bootstrap] post-install $cmd still missing" >&2; exit 1; }
+        done
+        python3 -c "import yaml" 2>/dev/null \
+            || { echo "[bootstrap] post-install python3-yaml/pyyaml still missing" >&2; exit 1; }
+        if [ "$NO_SECRETS" -eq 0 ]; then
+            for cmd in age sops; do
+                command -v "$cmd" >/dev/null || { echo "[bootstrap] post-install $cmd still missing" >&2; exit 1; }
+            done
+        fi
     fi
-    exit 1
 fi
 
-# Mesh check — accept either Netbird OR Tailscale.
+# -------- ensure netbird is installed + connected (workstation/VM hosts) --------
+# Skipped on --no-secrets (LXCs that route via the LAN already), --no-mesh
+# (explicit opt-out — secrets issuance still works if the mesh check below
+# falls back to LAN reachability), and --dry-run. Installs netbird if
+# missing, then drives `netbird up` against the homelab management server.
+# The operator clicks the printed device-code URL once — this blocks
+# indefinitely if nobody approves it, so don't skip --no-mesh on a host
+# nobody's watching interactively.
+if [ "$NO_SECRETS" -eq 0 ] && [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 0 ] && [ "$NO_MESH" -eq 0 ]; then
+    if ! command -v netbird >/dev/null 2>&1 && ! command -v tailscale >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "[bootstrap] no mesh CLI found; installing netbird..."
+        if [ "$OS" = "Darwin" ]; then
+            brew install --cask netbird || { echo "[bootstrap] brew install netbird failed" >&2; exit 1; }
+        elif command -v dnf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            cat > /etc/yum.repos.d/netbird.repo <<'NBREPO'
+[netbird]
+name=NetBird stable
+baseurl=https://pkgs.netbird.io/yum/$basearch
+enabled=1
+gpgcheck=0
+NBREPO
+            dnf install -y netbird netbird-ui || { echo "[bootstrap] dnf install netbird failed" >&2; exit 1; }
+        elif command -v apt-get >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            install -d -m 0755 /usr/share/keyrings
+            curl -fsSL https://pkgs.netbird.io/debian/public.key \
+                | gpg --dearmor -o /usr/share/keyrings/netbird-archive-keyring.gpg
+            echo "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/netbird-archive-keyring.gpg] https://pkgs.netbird.io/debian stable main" \
+                > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/netbird.list
+            apt-get update
+            DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y netbird \
+                || { echo "[bootstrap] apt install netbird failed" >&2; exit 1; }
+        else
+            echo "[bootstrap] can't auto-install netbird on this OS; install manually + re-run" >&2
+            exit 1
+        fi
+    fi
+    # Bring netbird up if not already connected.
+    if command -v netbird >/dev/null && ! netbird status 2>/dev/null | grep -q "Management: Connected"; then
+        cat <<MSG
+
+[bootstrap] netbird is not connected to https://netbird.hubris.network.
+[bootstrap] running 'netbird up' — a device-code URL will print below.
+[bootstrap] OPEN THAT URL in a browser and approve the device when prompted.
+[bootstrap] You may need to log in to https://auth.hubris.network first.
+
+MSG
+        # --ssh-jwt-cache-ttl=86400 keeps the SSO valid for 24h of subsequent ssh
+        # ops into mesh peers; saves repeated browser clicks during this bootstrap.
+        netbird up --management-url https://netbird.hubris.network --ssh-jwt-cache-ttl 86400 \
+            || { echo "[bootstrap] 'netbird up' failed (see error above)" >&2; exit 1; }
+        # `netbird up` returns once the device-code SSO completes; give the
+        # mgmt connection ~30s to settle before continuing.
+        for _ in $(seq 1 10); do
+            netbird status 2>/dev/null | grep -q "Management: Connected" && break
+            sleep 3
+        done
+        if ! netbird status 2>/dev/null | grep -q "Management: Connected"; then
+            echo "[bootstrap] netbird daemon not reporting Management: Connected after 30s" >&2
+            echo "[bootstrap] try: 'netbird status -d' and 'sudo journalctl -u netbird -n 30'" >&2
+            exit 1
+        fi
+        echo "[bootstrap] netbird connected."
+    fi
+fi
+
+# Mesh check — accept Netbird, Tailscale, or LAN reachability of the issuance
+# endpoint. LAN is fine for LXCs that don't run a mesh CLI but sit in the
+# trusted subnet (192.168.8.0/24) included in MESH_SUBNETS.
 MESH_CONNECTED=""
 if command -v netbird >/dev/null && netbird status 2>/dev/null | grep -q "Management: Connected"; then
     MESH_CONNECTED="netbird"
 elif command -v tailscale >/dev/null && tailscale status >/dev/null 2>&1; then
     MESH_CONNECTED="tailscale"
+elif curl -sf -o /dev/null --max-time 3 "${ISSUANCE_URL_NETBIRD%/issue}/health" 2>/dev/null; then
+    MESH_CONNECTED="lan"
 fi
 if [ -z "$MESH_CONNECTED" ] && [ "$NO_SECRETS" -eq 0 ]; then
-    echo "neither netbird nor tailscale is connected; cannot bootstrap." >&2
-    echo "either bring up the mesh first, or pass --no-secrets to skip issuance." >&2
+    echo "no reachable issuance endpoint (no netbird/tailscale connected and" >&2
+    echo "$ISSUANCE_URL_NETBIRD did not respond to /health)." >&2
+    echo "either bring up the mesh first, fix DNS for *.hubris.network, or pass --no-secrets." >&2
     exit 1
 fi
 echo "[bootstrap] mesh: ${MESH_CONNECTED:-none (skipped, --no-secrets)}"
 
+# -------- gitea creds (if provided) --------
+configure_gitea_creds
+
 # -------- clone --------
 if [ -d "$CLONE_DIR/.git" ]; then
     existing_remote="$(git -C "$CLONE_DIR" remote get-url origin 2>/dev/null || true)"
@@ -190,8 +382,9 @@ echo "[bootstrap] installing sync mechanism for $OS"
 run "bash '$CLONE_DIR/scripts/sync/install.sh'"
 
 # -------- install homelab CLI --------
-echo "[bootstrap] installing homelab CLI to /usr/local/bin/homelab"
-run "install -m 0755 '$CLONE_DIR/bin/homelab' /usr/local/bin/homelab"
+# Symlink rather than copy so the 5-min sync auto-updates the CLI.
+echo "[bootstrap] linking homelab CLI to /usr/local/bin/homelab"
+run "ln -sfn '$CLONE_DIR/bin/homelab' /usr/local/bin/homelab"
 
 # -------- AGENTS.md symlink --------
 case "$OS" in
@@ -205,6 +398,26 @@ esac
 run "ln -sfn '$CLONE_DIR/AGENTS.md' '$AGENTS_LINK'"
 echo "[bootstrap] linked AGENTS.md → $AGENTS_LINK"
 
+# -------- auto-upgrade to write-scoped Gitea PAT --------
+# After enrollment, if this client is already a recipient on
+# secrets/gitea-pat.yaml (i.e. the operator has run
+# `homelab client add --finalize-pubkey` from another client), swap the
+# read-only bootstrap PAT for the write-scoped one. Best-effort: fails
+# silently if the client isn't yet a recipient — the operator just re-runs
+# bootstrap or `homelab refresh-creds` later.
+if [ "$NO_SECRETS" -eq 0 ] && [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 0 ] \
+   && command -v sops >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+   && [ -f "$CLONE_DIR/secrets/gitea-pat.yaml" ]; then
+    if /usr/local/bin/homelab refresh-creds >/tmp/homelab-refresh-creds.log 2>&1; then
+        echo "[bootstrap] refresh-creds: write-scoped Gitea PAT installed"
+    else
+        echo "[bootstrap] refresh-creds: skipped (this client isn't yet a recipient"
+        echo "            on secrets/gitea-pat.yaml — run 'homelab client add"
+        echo "            $HNAME --finalize-pubkey <age...>' from an existing client,"
+        echo "            then re-run bootstrap or 'homelab refresh-creds')"
+    fi
+fi
+
 # -------- MCP wiring --------
 if [ "$WITH_MCP" -eq 1 ]; then
     # Pick the right user's home — when invoked via sudo, SUDO_USER is set.
@@ -246,6 +459,211 @@ PYEOF
     fi
 fi
 
+# -------- Hermes (Goose + Nous Hermes) wiring --------
+# Installs the Goose CLI binary system-wide, symlinks the `hermes` wrapper
+# and HERMES.md persona, and drops a Goose config that pins the OpenRouter
+# provider, the Nous Hermes model, and the homelab MCP extension.
+# See operations/hermes-agent.md.
+if [ "$WITH_HERMES" -eq 1 ]; then
+    # Resolve the operator's home (SUDO_USER under `sudo bash`).
+    if [ -n "${SUDO_USER:-}" ] && [ "$SUDO_USER" != "root" ]; then
+        H_USER="$SUDO_USER"
+        H_HOME=$(eval echo "~$SUDO_USER")
+    else
+        H_USER="root"
+        H_HOME="$HOME"
+    fi
+
+    # 1. Install Goose binary at /usr/local/bin/goose (idempotent).
+    if ! command -v goose >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "[bootstrap] installing Goose CLI"
+        if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
+            echo "+ would run upstream goose installer and symlink to /usr/local/bin/goose"
+        else
+            # Upstream installer drops the binary at ~/.local/bin/goose for the
+            # invoking user. We run it as $H_USER (via run_as) then symlink
+            # system-wide.
+            run_as env CONFIGURE=false \
+                bash -c 'curl -fsSL https://github.com/aaif-goose/goose/releases/download/stable/download_cli.sh | bash'
+            if [ -x "$H_HOME/.local/bin/goose" ]; then
+                ln -sfn "$H_HOME/.local/bin/goose" /usr/local/bin/goose
+            else
+                echo "[bootstrap] WARNING: goose binary not found at $H_HOME/.local/bin/goose after install" >&2
+            fi
+        fi
+    else
+        echo "[bootstrap] goose already installed: $(command -v goose)"
+    fi
+
+    # 2. Symlink hermes wrapper.
+    echo "[bootstrap] linking hermes CLI to /usr/local/bin/hermes"
+    run "ln -sfn '$CLONE_DIR/bin/hermes' /usr/local/bin/hermes"
+
+    # 3. Symlink HERMES.md persona. The hermes wrapper does not need it — the
+    # Goose config below references the canonical clone path — but operators
+    # frequently `cat /root/HERMES.md` to inspect the persona, mirroring the
+    # AGENTS.md convention above.
+    case "$OS" in
+        Linux)  HERMES_LINK=/root/HERMES.md ;;
+        Darwin) HERMES_LINK=/etc/HERMES.md ;;
+    esac
+    run "ln -sfn '$CLONE_DIR/.agents/HERMES.md' '$HERMES_LINK'"
+    echo "[bootstrap] linked HERMES.md → $HERMES_LINK"
+
+    # 4. Drop the Goose config. Idempotent YAML merge — preserves any keys the
+    # operator added by hand, overwrites only the keys we manage.
+    GOOSE_DIR="$H_HOME/.config/goose"
+    GOOSE_CONFIG="$GOOSE_DIR/config.yaml"
+    GOOSEHINTS="$GOOSE_DIR/.goosehints"
+    run "mkdir -p '$GOOSE_DIR'"
+
+    PY_GOOSE_MERGE=$(cat <<PYEOF
+import os, sys
+try:
+    import yaml
+except ImportError:
+    print("PyYAML required", file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(2)
+
+path = "$GOOSE_CONFIG"
+mcp_uri = "$HERMES_MCP_URI"
+model = "$HERMES_MODEL"
+
+cfg = {}
+if os.path.exists(path):
+    with open(path) as f:
+        try:
+            cfg = yaml.safe_load(f) or {}
+        except Exception:
+            cfg = {}
+
+cfg["GOOSE_PROVIDER"] = "openrouter"
+cfg["GOOSE_MODEL"] = model
+cfg.setdefault("GOOSE_MODE", "smart_approve")
+cfg.setdefault("extensions", {})
+cfg["extensions"]["developer"] = {
+    "bundled": True, "enabled": True, "name": "developer",
+    "timeout": 300, "type": "builtin",
+}
+cfg["extensions"]["homelab"] = {
+    "enabled": True, "name": "homelab",
+    "description": "Read-only homelab context tools (FastMCP).",
+    "type": "streamable_http", "uri": mcp_uri, "timeout": 60,
+}
+with open(path, "w") as f:
+    yaml.safe_dump(cfg, f, sort_keys=False)
+print("[bootstrap] merged Goose config at", path)
+PYEOF
+)
+    if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
+        echo "+ would merge Goose config at $GOOSE_CONFIG"
+    else
+        python3 -c "$PY_GOOSE_MERGE"
+        chown -R "$H_USER" "$GOOSE_DIR"
+    fi
+
+    # 5. Symlink HERMES.md as the global .goosehints — Goose injects it into
+    # the system prompt on every session start.
+    run "ln -sfn '$CLONE_DIR/.agents/HERMES.md' '$GOOSEHINTS'"
+    if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 0 ]; then
+        chown -h "$H_USER" "$GOOSEHINTS" 2>/dev/null || true
+    fi
+fi
+
+# -------- netbird tuning (skip per-session SSO for ssh into mesh peers) --------
+# Apply the SSH JWT cache TTL so `ssh ... .netbird.selfhosted` doesn't trigger
+# device-code SSO on every connection. Flag added in netbird 0.71.x
+# (netbirdio/netbird#4015). It belongs on `netbird up` — putting it on the
+# daemon's ExecStart crashes the daemon with "unknown flag". After this runs the
+# FIRST ssh still prompts SSO once; subsequent sessions within 24h skip it.
+if [ "$MESH_CONNECTED" = "netbird" ]; then
+    if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
+        echo "+ would: netbird down && netbird up --ssh-jwt-cache-ttl=86400"
+    elif netbird up --help 2>&1 | grep -q -- "--ssh-jwt-cache-ttl"; then
+        echo "[bootstrap] netbird: enabling ssh-jwt-cache-ttl=86400 (one SSO per 24h)"
+        # `netbird up` short-circuits with "Already connected" — need down first.
+        netbird down >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+        if ! netbird up --ssh-jwt-cache-ttl=86400; then
+            echo "[bootstrap] WARNING: netbird up with --ssh-jwt-cache-ttl failed; rerun manually:"
+            echo "[bootstrap]   netbird down && netbird up --ssh-jwt-cache-ttl=86400"
+        fi
+    else
+        echo "[bootstrap] netbird: --ssh-jwt-cache-ttl flag not supported (need >=0.71.x); skipping"
+    fi
+fi
+
+# -------- ssh ControlMaster for netbird peers (workstations) --------
+# Drop a Host block into the enrolling user's ~/.ssh/config so that ssh to
+# `*.netbird.selfhosted` multiplexes over a single connection. After one SSO
+# device-code completion, subsequent ssh / scp / `pct exec` invocations
+# (within ControlPersist=2h) reuse the master socket with no re-auth — the
+# real workaround for netbird's flaky SSH JWT cache. Skip on LXCs (no
+# outbound ssh expected from them).
+HKIND="$(python3 -c "import yaml; print(yaml.safe_load(open('$HOST_YAML')).get('kind',''))" 2>/dev/null || true)"
+if [ "$MESH_CONNECTED" = "netbird" ] && [ "$HKIND" != "lxc" ]; then
+    if [ -n "${SUDO_USER:-}" ] && [ "$SUDO_USER" != "root" ]; then
+        SSH_USER_HOME=$(eval echo "~$SUDO_USER")
+        SSH_OWNER="$SUDO_USER"
+    else
+        SSH_USER_HOME="$HOME"
+        SSH_OWNER=""
+    fi
+    SSH_CFG="$SSH_USER_HOME/.ssh/config"
+    SSH_CM_DIR="$SSH_USER_HOME/.ssh/cm"
+    SENTINEL="# homelab-bootstrap: ssh ControlMaster for netbird mesh"
+    if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
+        echo "+ would write Host *.netbird.selfhosted ControlMaster block into $SSH_CFG"
+    elif [ -f "$SSH_CFG" ] && grep -qF "$SENTINEL" "$SSH_CFG"; then
+        echo "[bootstrap] ssh ControlMaster block already present in $SSH_CFG (skip)"
+    else
+        mkdir -p "$SSH_USER_HOME/.ssh" "$SSH_CM_DIR"
+        chmod 700 "$SSH_USER_HOME/.ssh" "$SSH_CM_DIR"
+        cat >> "$SSH_CFG" <<'SSHEOF'
+
+# homelab-bootstrap: ssh ControlMaster for netbird mesh
+# One SSO covers many back-to-back ssh/scp/pct ops within ControlPersist.
+Host *.netbird.selfhosted
+    ControlMaster auto
+    ControlPath ~/.ssh/cm/%C
+    ControlPersist 2h
+SSHEOF
+        chmod 600 "$SSH_CFG"
+        if [ -n "$SSH_OWNER" ]; then
+            chown -R "$SSH_OWNER":"$SSH_OWNER" "$SSH_USER_HOME/.ssh"
+        fi
+        echo "[bootstrap] ssh: installed ControlMaster block into $SSH_CFG"
+    fi
+fi
+
+# -------- mcp CLI install (workstations) --------
+# `homelab mcp <tool>` shells out to the `mcp` python CLI. Install it via
+# pipx for the enrolling user. Skip on LXCs / VMs.
+if [ "$HKIND" != "lxc" ] && [ "$HKIND" != "vm" ]; then
+    if [ "$DRY_RUN" -eq 1 ]; then
+        echo "+ would install 'mcp[cli]' via pipx for the enrolling user"
+    elif command -v mcp >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "[bootstrap] mcp CLI already on PATH (skip)"
+    else
+        # Make sure pipx is available; OS-specific install.
+        if ! command -v pipx >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            if [ "$OS" = "Darwin" ] && command -v brew >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                run_as brew install pipx 2>&1 | tail -2 || true
+            elif command -v dnf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                dnf install -y pipx 2>&1 | tail -2 || true
+            elif command -v apt-get >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y pipx 2>&1 | tail -2 || true
+            fi
+        fi
+        if command -v pipx >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            INVOKING_USER="${SUDO_USER:-root}"
+            run_as bash -lc "pipx install 'mcp[cli]'" 2>&1 | tail -3 || true
+            run_as bash -lc "pipx ensurepath" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+            echo "[bootstrap] mcp CLI installed for $INVOKING_USER via pipx"
+        else
+            echo "[bootstrap] WARNING: pipx unavailable; install manually: pipx install 'mcp[cli]'" >&2
+        fi
+    fi
+fi
+
 # -------- done --------
 cat <<EOF
 

containers/101-jellyfin.md

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# 101 — `jellyfin`
-
-Media server: serves the movies / TV / anime / music / audiobooks / podcasts libraries from `/mnt/library` to LAN clients.
-
-## At a glance
-- **Hostname:** `jellyfin`
-- **IP:** `192.168.8.206`
-- **Privilege:** **unprivileged** + idmap (so it can write to the `media` group on `/mnt/library`)
-- **Resources:** 2 cores / 4 GiB RAM / 16 GiB rootfs
-- **Mounts:** `/mnt/library` ↔ `/mnt/library`
-- **Public hostname:** [`media.hubris.network`](../infrastructure/dns.md) → [caddy](121-caddy.md) → `:8096`
-
-## Service / port map
-
-| Service  | Listen | Notes |
-| -------- | ------ | ----- |
-| jellyfin | `:8096` | HTTP (caddy terminates TLS) |
-
-## Permissions
-Member of the [media GID 10000](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md) standard. Service user `jellyfin` is in the `media` group inside the container; idmap block in `/etc/pve/lxc/101.conf` maps in-container GID 10000 to host GID 10000.
-
-## Related
-- [Caddy reverse proxy](121-caddy.md)
-- [Media permissions](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md)
-- [arriman](122-arriman.md) — \*arr stack writes the libraries jellyfin reads
-- [DNS split-horizon](../infrastructure/dns.md)
-
-## Changelog
-
-### 2026-04-28 — wiki entry created
-Initial documentation. No config changes.
-
-### 2026-04-20 — joined the `media` GID 10000 standard
-Idmap block applied; in-container `media` group at GID 10000 mapped to host GID 10000. See [media permissions](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md). Config backup: `/root/101.conf.bak.*`.

containers/124-authentik.md

@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
-# 124 — `authentik`
-
-Central Identity Provider for the lab. Also runs the [split-horizon dnsmasq](../infrastructure/dns.md) — ergo "the SSO and DNS box".
-
-## At a glance
-- **Hostname:** `authentik`
-- **IP:** `192.168.8.180` (statically configured — the only LXC with a static IP)
-- **Privilege:** privileged
-- **Resources:** 2 cores / 4 GiB RAM / 20 GiB rootfs
-- **Mounts:** none from `/mnt/library`
-- **Public hostname:** [`auth.hubris.network`](../infrastructure/dns.md) → [caddy (121)](121-caddy.md) → `:9000`
-- **Container DNS (in `/etc/pve/lxc/124.conf`):** `192.168.8.1 1.1.1.1` (router DNS plus a fallback added 2026-04-21 because router DNS flakes intermittently — Authentik is the resolver itself for the *rest* of the LAN, but its own LXC uses upstream).
-
-## Authentik stack (`/opt/authentik/`)
-
-Upstream `docker-compose.yml` + `.env`. Services: `postgresql` (16-alpine), `server`, `worker`. Authentik 2026.x dropped the Redis dependency.
-
-- `.env` mode 600, **untracked**, holds `AUTHENTIK_SECRET_KEY` and `PG_PASS`.
-- `AUTHENTIK_TAG=2026.2.2` — pinned. Don't let it drift to `:latest`. Telemetry / update-check / error-reporting disabled.
-- Ports: 9000 (http), 9443 (https) on the LXC.
-- Embedded outpost lives at `/outpost.goauthentik.io/*` on the Authentik host — the forward-auth endpoint Caddy points at.
-- Stack is **not** git-tracked yet. If/when wiring auto-deploy: mirror the `mule-image` pattern (webhook receiver outside the app repo at `/opt/authentik-deploy/`). Repo `dtoro/authentik-conf` is reserved but not created.
-
-## Forward-auth pattern (every gated app)
-
-- **One Proxy Provider per app.** Authentik enforces a UNIQUE constraint `application.provider_id`, so one Provider = one Application. "Domain-level" only means they share the cookie domain. Each provider in "Forward auth (domain level)" mode, External host `https://auth.hubris.network`, Cookie domain `hubris.network`. First one was `hubris-forward-auth` (Paperless).
-- **Authentication flow:** MUST be `default-authentication-flow` (NOT `default-source-authentication` — that's for IdP federation; gives `FlowNonApplicableException` + 404 on the authorize endpoint).
-- **Authorization flow:** `default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent` (or explicit).
-- **Application Launch URL** MUST be the full public URL `https://<sub>.hubris.network/` — outpost matches incoming `X-Forwarded-Host` against it.
-- Each Application MUST have at least one **policy/group/user binding** — zero bindings = outpost returns 404 on access.
-- **Restart Authentik after binding new apps to the outpost:**
-  ```
-  pct exec 124 -- docker compose -f /opt/authentik/docker-compose.yml restart server worker
-  ```
-
-Caddy snippet `(authentik)` lives at the top of `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile`. Points at `http://192.168.8.180:9000` directly (NOT `https://auth.hubris.network`) to avoid hairpin TLS round-trip stripping `X-Forwarded-Host`. Must explicitly set `header_up X-Forwarded-Host {host}` in the forward-auth block. Used by gated sites with `import authentik`.
-
-### Per-app username override pattern (Authentik)
-
-Used when the app's local user ID doesn't match the user's Authentik username (e.g., Nextcloud's `admin` ≠ Authentik's `dtoro`).
-
-1. On the Authentik user: add attribute `<app>_uid: <target_local_username>` (YAML, Directory → Users → Edit → Attributes).
-2. Customization → Property Mappings → Create → **Scope Mapping** (not SAML):
-   - Name: `<app>-uid-override`, Scope name: `<app>-uid`, Expression:
-     ```python
-     return {"nc_uid": user.attributes.get("<app>_uid", user.username)}
-     ```
-   - **Use a custom claim key** (e.g. `nc_uid`), not `preferred_username` — the default `profile` scope mapping emits `preferred_username` and will overwrite yours depending on ordering.
-3. Attach the new scope to the provider (Providers → app → Scopes).
-4. On the app side, point its OIDC UID-mapping setting at the custom claim.
-
-For Nextcloud:
-```
-occ user_oidc:provider <name> --mapping-uid=nc_uid
-occ user_oidc:provider <name> --scope="openid profile email <app>-uid"
-```
-
-### Bypass forward-auth for API paths (mobile apps)
-
-If the app has its own token-based API auth and a mobile client, API paths must bypass forward-auth — mobile apps can't follow the browser login redirect. Pattern in the Caddyfile site block:
-
-```
-paperless.hubris.network {
-    tls { dns ionos {env.IONOS_AUTH_API_TOKEN} }
-    @api path /api/*
-    handle @api {
-        reverse_proxy 192.168.8.130:8000
-    }
-    handle {
-        import authentik
-        reverse_proxy 192.168.8.130:8000
-    }
-}
-```
-
-API paths to bypass per app:
-- [Paperless](103-paperless.md): `/api/*` (Bearer)
-- [Sonarr / Radarr / Lidarr / etc.](122-arriman.md): `/api/*` (X-Api-Key)
-- [qBittorrent](122-arriman.md): `/api/*` (session cookie from `/api/v2/auth/login`)
-- [SABnzbd](122-arriman.md): `/api?*` (apikey query param) — match `/api*` for query-string APIs
-- Homarr: no mobile client
-- [Portainer](105-apps.md): mobile uses same session auth as web; no bypass typically needed
-
-### Backend trust of Authentik headers (skip the app's own login after SSO)
-
-- [**Paperless**](103-paperless.md): `PAPERLESS_ENABLE_HTTP_REMOTE_USER=true` and `PAPERLESS_HTTP_REMOTE_USER_HEADER_NAME=HTTP_X_AUTHENTIK_USERNAME` in `/opt/paperless/paperless.conf`. Restart `paperless-webserver paperless-task-queue paperless-scheduler paperless-consumer`. Django auto-creates matching users on first SSO login; promote to superuser via existing admin UI.
-- Apps without header-auth support: users log in twice (SSO + app login). Acceptable but degraded UX.
-
-## Per-app integration map
-
-| App                                       | Type             | Notes |
-| ----------------------------------------- | ---------------- | ----- |
-| [Paperless (103)](103-paperless.md)       | Forward-auth + REMOTE_USER | `/api/*` bypass |
-| [Nextcloud (114)](114-nextcloud.md)       | Native OIDC      | `nc_uid` override; local dnsmasq required (Guzzle bypasses `/etc/hosts`) |
-| [mulita (120)](120-mule-images.md)        | Native OIDC      | `extra_hosts` override in compose |
-| [Booklore (105)](105-apps.md)             | Native OIDC      | Redirect URI `/oauth2-callback`; `extra_hosts` |
-| [Portainer (105)](105-apps.md)            | Native OAuth2    | `portainer_uid` custom claim; `--trusted-origins` flag |
-| [WriteFreely (105)](105-apps.md)          | Native OIDC      | `[oauth.generic]` block; `extra_hosts` |
-| [qBittorrent (122)](122-arriman.md)       | Forward-auth via IP whitelist | Reverse-proxy support enabled in qBit |
-| [Artifacto (105)](105-apps.md)            | Forward-auth + gateway-secret auto-login | Public `/p/*` paths bypass |
-| [Home Assistant VM (108)](../vms/108-haos.md) | HACS `christiaangoossens/hass-oidc-auth` | `automatic_user_linking: true`, `default_redirect: true`. Supervisor DNS via `ha dns options`. |
-
-## Netbird IdP integration — DEFERRED
-
-The `netbirdio/netbird-server` combined image has no config knobs for external OIDC. Verified in `combined/cmd/config.go` on main (v0.69.0): `AuthConfig` only exposes issuer + redirect URIs; `ToManagementConfig()` hardcodes `AuthAudience="netbird-dashboard"`, `UserIDClaim="sub"`, always calls `buildEmbeddedIdPConfig()`. Code comment: `"embedded IdP is always enabled in combined server"`.
-
-To wire Authentik into Netbird login/user-sync, must migrate to the legacy split stack (`netbirdio/management` + `signal` + `dashboard` + coturn) with the richer `management.json` schema. Sqlite management data should migrate but needs verification; peers stay connected via wireguard keys.
-
-**Pre-work already in place (keep for re-use):**
-- Provider `Provider for Netbird` + App `netbird`. Client ID `xZwVTFCsxWdBM3uIGS15wAAcVvsJiTtWdxVCEela`. Redirect URIs for `https://netbird.hubris.network/{nb-auth,nb-silent-auth}` and `http://localhost:53000/`. Scopes: `openid profile email offline_access goauthentik.io/api`.
-- Service account `netbird-service` in `authentik Admins` group, non-expiring API token `netbird-service-api`.
-- Netbird mgmt host (`82.165.190.79`) is now a peer on its own mesh. See [mesh](../infrastructure/mesh.md).
-
-## DNS responsibility
-
-dnsmasq runs alongside Authentik on this LXC, listening on `192.168.8.180:53` + `127.0.0.1:53`, serving every `*.hubris.network` subdomain → `192.168.8.175`. **There is no wildcard** — every site needs an explicit `address=` entry. See [DNS split-horizon](../infrastructure/dns.md).
-
-## Related
-- [DNS split-horizon](../infrastructure/dns.md)
-- [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md)
-- [Mesh migration](../infrastructure/mesh.md)
-- Every gated app under [containers/index](index.md)
-
-## Changelog
-
-### 2026-04-28 — wiki entry created
-Initial documentation.
-
-### 2026-04-22 — Phase 6 (Netbird IdP swap) deferred
-Combined netbird-server image can't take an external IdP. Pre-work in Authentik kept for later. Netbird mgmt host instead joined its own mesh as a peer (`100.122.165.149`) for split-horizon DNS access.
-
-### 2026-04-22 — Artifacto, mulita, WriteFreely, Portainer wired
-Native OIDC for mulita / WriteFreely / Portainer; gateway-secret auto-login pattern for Artifacto.
-
-### 2026-04-21 — deployed; Phases 1–5 complete
-LXC 124 provisioned, stack at `/opt/authentik`, public URL via Caddy, Paperless + Booklore + Nextcloud + Home Assistant wired. dnsmasq for split-horizon DNS lives on the same LXC.

containers/126-plato.md

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-# 126 — `plato`
-
-Docker host for [Plato](https://git.hubris.network/dtoro/Plato) — a cross-linked notes workspace (SvelteKit SPA embedded into a Go HTTP server, SQLite-backed). LAN+mesh only, no public ingress.
-
-## At a glance
-- **Hostname:** `plato`
-- **IP:** `192.168.8.190`
-- **Privilege:** privileged
-- **Resources:** 2 cores / 2 GiB RAM / 8 GiB rootfs / 1 GiB swap
-- **Mounts:** host `/mnt/library/documents/plato` ↔ container `/opt/plato/data`
-- **Public hostname:** [`plato.hubris.network`](../infrastructure/dns.md) → [caddy (121)](121-caddy.md) → `192.168.8.190:8080`
-
-## Stack
-
-Single-container deploy. The repo's `Dockerfile` is a three-stage build (Node → Go → distroless/static-debian12:nonroot, ~23 MiB final image). The container exposes `:8080` and writes its SQLite db to `/data`.
-
-- **Checkout:** `/opt/plato/app` (clone of `http://192.168.8.121:3000/dtoro/Plato.git`, using the cached gitea PAT in `/root/.git-credentials` — same pattern as [caddy (121)](121-caddy.md)).
-- **Data:** host `/mnt/library/documents/plato` (owned `65532:65532` to match the distroless nonroot UID) bind-mounted into the LXC at `/opt/plato/data`, then bound into the container at `/data` via a `docker-compose.override.yml`:
-  ```yaml
-  services:
-    plato:
-      volumes: !override
-        - /opt/plato/data:/data
-      restart: unless-stopped
-  ```
-- **`.env`** at `/opt/plato/app/.env` (optional, untracked) — LLM provider keys (`OPENROUTER_API_KEY`, `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, etc.) and `PLANTUML_BASE_URL` override. Absent by default; LLM features stay greyed out, PlantUML defaults to the public service.
-- **Run / update:** push to `dtoro/Plato` (auto-deploys, see below) or `cd /opt/plato/app && git pull && docker compose up -d --build` for a manual rebuild.
-
-## Auto-deploy
-
-Push to `dtoro/Plato` `main` triggers a rebuild — same Shape B pattern as [Artifacto / mule-image](../infrastructure/auto-deploy.md). Webhook receiver at `/opt/plato-deploy/`, systemd unit `plato-deploy-webhook.service`, port `9799`, gitea hook id 8.
-
-- Receiver: `http://192.168.8.190:9799/deploy`, signed payload (HMAC-SHA256, secret in `/etc/plato-deploy/secret`).
-- Logs: `journalctl -u plato-deploy-webhook -f`.
-- Health: `curl http://127.0.0.1:9799/health`.
-- Manual deploy: `/opt/plato-deploy/deploy.sh`.
-- Gitea's `app.ini` `ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` was extended with `192.168.8.190` to allow this delivery.
-
-## Fresh-DB bootstrap workaround
-
-The `schema` constant in `backend/internal/views/store.go` (as of commit `e0542c0`) creates the `views` table without `project_id`, then immediately runs `CREATE UNIQUE INDEX … ON views(project_id, lower(title))`. On a fresh DB this fails (no such column) and Plato crash-loops with `open views store: SQL logic error: no such column: project_id`. `ensureProjectIDColumn()` adds the column on subsequent migrations, but the schema apply happens first.
-
-Until the upstream fix lands, pre-seed the DB before first start:
-
-```
-docker compose stop
-rm -f /opt/plato/data/plato.db
-python3 - <<'PY'
-import sqlite3
-c = sqlite3.connect('/opt/plato/data/plato.db')
-c.executescript("""
-CREATE TABLE views (
-  id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-  type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'document',
-  title TEXT NOT NULL,
-  aliases TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]',
-  content TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
-  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-  updated_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-  project_id TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''
-);
-CREATE UNIQUE INDEX views_project_title_lower ON views(project_id, lower(title));
-CREATE INDEX views_project_id ON views(project_id);
-""")
-c.commit()
-PY
-chown 65532:65532 /opt/plato/data/plato.db
-docker compose up -d
-```
-
-Once the column exists, every subsequent boot's `IF NOT EXISTS` clauses no-op. Once Plato is fixed upstream (remove the `CREATE UNIQUE INDEX` line from the boot `schema` constant — `ensureTitleIndexPerProject()` already re-creates it after the migration), this preseed becomes unnecessary.
-
-## Why privileged
-
-Matches the docker-host convention used by [120 mule-images](120-mule-images.md) and [122 arriman](122-arriman.md). Distroless nonroot's UID `65532` on the host bind mount maps directly through; unprivileged would shift the UID by the idmap offset and the container couldn't write `/data` without extra plumbing.
-
-## Caddy
-
-```
-plato.hubris.network {
-	tls {
-		dns ionos {env.IONOS_AUTH_API_TOKEN}
-	}
-	reverse_proxy 192.168.8.190:8080
-}
-```
-
-No Authentik forward-auth — Plato has no auth model yet; access control is "be on the LAN or the mesh".
-
-## DNS
-
-dnsmasq entry on [124-authentik](124-authentik.md):
-```
-address=/plato.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-```
-
-## Related
-- [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md)
-- [DNS (split-horizon)](../infrastructure/dns.md)
-- [Media permissions](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md)
-
-## Changelog
-
-### 2026-05-13 — auto-deploy wired
-Shape B pipeline added (`/opt/plato-deploy/`, port `9799`, gitea hook id 8). `ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` in gitea `app.ini` extended with `192.168.8.190`. See [auto-deploy](../infrastructure/auto-deploy.md#plato).
-
-### 2026-05-13 — container created, Plato deployed
-LXC 126 stood up on Debian 12 standard, privileged, docker-ce installed. Plato cloned from `dtoro/Plato`, built and started. Caddy site and dnsmasq split-horizon entry added. Recycled the IP/ID slot freed earlier the same day by the [decommissioned Seafile experiment (LXC 125)](index.md#recently-destroyed-kept-for-archaeology). Hit the [fresh-DB bootstrap bug](#fresh-db-bootstrap-workaround) on first boot; worked around by pre-seeding the SQLite schema.

containers/index.md

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-# LXC containers — index
-
-All containers live on [`hubris`](../hosts/hubris.md). Each row links to the per-container page.
-
-| ID  | Name             | IP              | Priv | Cores | RAM   | Disk  | Mounts                | Public hostname                       | Status   |
-| --- | ---------------- | --------------- | ---- | ----- | ----- | ----- | --------------------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- |
-| 101 | [jellyfin](101-jellyfin.md)             | 192.168.8.206 | unpriv (idmap) | 2 | 4 GiB  | 16 GiB | `/mnt/library`        | `media.hubris.network`                | running  |
-| 103 | [paperless](103-paperless.md)           | 192.168.8.130 | priv | 2 | 3 GiB  | 8 GiB  | `/mnt/library`        | `paperless.hubris.network`            | running  |
-| 104 | [gitea](104-gitea.md)                   | 192.168.8.121 | priv | 1 | 1 GiB  | 8 GiB  | `/mnt/library`        | `git.hubris.network`                  | running  |
-| 105 | [apps](105-apps.md)                     | 192.168.8.205 | priv | 2 | 4 GiB  | 30 GiB | `/mnt/library`        | `docker` / `books` / `artifacto` / `blog` | running |
-| 114 | [nextcloud](114-nextcloud.md)           | 192.168.8.224 | priv | 4 | 6 GiB  | 25 GiB | `/mnt/library`        | `cloud.hubris.network`                | running  |
-| 118 | [elementsynapse](118-elementsynapse.md) | 192.168.8.239 | unpriv | 1 | 2 GiB  | 8 GiB  | —                     | `matrix.hubris.network`               | running  |
-| 119 | [sophia](119-sophia.md)                 | 192.168.8.157 | priv | 2 | 1 GiB  | 10 GiB | `/mnt/library`        | —                                     | running  |
-| 120 | [mule-images](120-mule-images.md)       | 192.168.8.136 | priv | 4 | 8 GiB  | 60 GiB | `/mnt/library`        | `photos.hubris.network`               | running  |
-| 121 | [caddy](121-caddy.md)                   | 192.168.8.175 | unpriv | 1 | 512 MiB | 6 GiB  | —                     | (terminates all `*.hubris.network`)   | running  |
-| 122 | [arriman](122-arriman.md)               | 192.168.8.132 | priv | 4 | 8 GiB  | 24 GiB | `/mnt/library`        | `jellyseerr` / `qbit` / `sab`         | running  |
-| 123 | [claudio-bot](123-claudio-bot.md)       | 192.168.8.230 | unpriv | 1 | 512 MiB | 8 GiB | —                     | —                                     | running  |
-| 124 | [authentik](124-authentik.md)           | 192.168.8.180 | priv | 2 | 4 GiB  | 20 GiB | —                     | `auth.hubris.network`                 | running  |
-| 126 | [plato](126-plato.md)                   | 192.168.8.190 | priv | 2 | 2 GiB  | 8 GiB  | `/mnt/library/documents/plato` | `plato.hubris.network`       | running  |
-| 127 | [mule-photos-new](127-mule-photos-new.md) | 192.168.8.181 | unpriv | 6 | 8 GiB | 40 GiB | — (rsync scratch on rootfs) | `photos-new.hubris.network`         | running  |
-
-## Recently destroyed (kept for archaeology)
-
-| ID  | Name             | Destroyed       | Reason                                        |
-| --- | ---------------- | --------------- | --------------------------------------------- |
-| 100 | arr (yunohost)   | ~2026-04-28     | Migrated to docker stack on [arriman](122-arriman.md); planned retention window expired |
-| 106 | flaresolverr     | ~2026-04-28     | Folded into the arriman docker compose       |
-| 116 | heaper           | 2026-05-14      | Decommissioned by user; data subtree at `/mnt/library/heaper` (224 MiB) retained |
-| 109 | syncthing        | 2026-05-14      | Decommissioned by user; `/mnt/library/syncthing` was already empty |
-| 125 | seafile          | 2026-05-13      | Seafile Pro evaluation, user disliked the product; teardown also removed `files.hubris.network` from caddy + dnsmasq |
-| 107 | marimo           | between 2026-04-21 and 2026-04-28 | Decommissioned                |
-| 110 | photoprism       | between 2026-04-21 and 2026-04-28 | Replaced by [mulita](120-mule-images.md) |
-| 111 | karakeep         | between 2026-04-21 and 2026-04-28 | Decommissioned                |
-| 112 | immich           | between 2026-04-21 and 2026-04-28 | Replaced by [mulita](120-mule-images.md) |
-| 115 | reticulum        | between 2026-04-21 and 2026-04-28 | Decommissioned                |
-
-> Several `.conf.bak` files survive under `/etc/pve/lxc/` if you need to recover any of the configs.
-
-## Conventions
-
-- All net0 are `bridge=vmbr0`, `ip=dhcp` except [124 (authentik)](124-authentik.md) which is statically `192.168.8.180/24`. IPs are stable via the LAN router's DHCP reservations.
-- `onboot=1` on every container — the host brings them up after `pve-guests.service`.
-- Bind mounts are declared as `mp0: /mnt/library,mp=/mnt/library`. Containers that don't mount `/mnt/library` don't need it.
-- Most containers are privileged. Unprivileged ones (`101`, `118`, `121`, `123`) require an idmap block in their conf to participate in the [media GID 10000](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md) standard.
-
-## Related
-- [Hubris host](../hosts/hubris.md)
-- [Media permissions](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md)
-- [Caddy](121-caddy.md) — terminates every public hostname
-- [DNS](../infrastructure/dns.md) — split-horizon entries for each subdomain

hosts/apps.yaml

@@ -5,12 +5,14 @@ name: apps
 kind: lxc
 os: linux
 role: docker-apps
+state: active
 host: hubris
 pve_id: 105
 lan_ip: 192.168.8.205
 mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: apps.netbird.selfhosted
+  tailscale:
+    ip: 100.121.171.122
+    fqdn: apps
 mesh_globals:
   primary: netbird
   accepted:
@@ -32,19 +34,29 @@ services_hosted:
 - name: artifacto
   backend: apps
   url: https://artifacto.hubris.network
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/105-apps.md
+  config_repo: dtoro/Artifacto
 - name: homelab_mcp
   backend: apps
   port: 9810
-  netbird_host: apps.netbird.selfhosted
-  endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-  note: MCP server. Read-only context + management. Mesh-only.
+  systemd_unit: homelab-mcp
+  public_host: mcp.hubris.network
+  endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/homelab-context.md
+  config_repo: dtoro/Homelab-Docs
+  note: MCP server. Read-only context + management. Reachable on the LAN via Caddy and from off-LAN via
+    Netbird (192.168.8.0/24 is a network resource routed through hubris).
+  risk_notes: "agents' primary read surface \u2014 outage degrades every agent to grepping the clone"
 - name: secrets_issuance
   backend: apps
   port: 9820
-  netbird_host: apps.netbird.selfhosted
-  endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
-  note: Issues per-client age private keys. Mesh-only.
-see_also:
-- containers/105-apps.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
+  systemd_unit: secrets-issuance
+  public_host: secrets.hubris.network
+  endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue
+  doc_page: .agents/operations/agent-enrollment.md
+  config_repo: dtoro/Homelab-Docs
+  note: Issues per-client age private keys. Gated at source-IP layer (mesh + LAN subnets in MESH_SUBNETS).
+  risk_notes: "identity issuance \u2014 any change is security-sensitive; key operations are destructive-class"
+age_pubkey: age1duyl8mkpgu80uv934dy8q7enqjms6yvdz264hme8uryuxmvvqesq6rusq0
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/arriman.yaml

@@ -5,19 +5,20 @@ name: arriman
 kind: lxc
 os: linux
 role: arr-stack
-host: hubris
+state: active
+host: strong
 pve_id: 122
-lan_ip: 192.168.8.132
+lan_ip: 192.168.8.245
 mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: arriman.netbird.selfhosted
+  tailscale:
+    fqdn: arr
 mesh_globals:
   primary: netbird
   accepted:
   - netbird
   - tailscale
 mounts:
-- /mnt/library
+- /mnt/media_local
 public_hosts:
 - jellyseerr.hubris.network
 - qbit.hubris.network
@@ -28,7 +29,10 @@ services_hosted:
 - name: arr_stack
   backend: arriman
   note: jellyseerr / qbit / sab on docker compose
-see_also:
-- containers/122-arriman.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/122-arriman.md
+notes:
+- Migrated from hubris to strong 2026-07-05 (Phase 2). Library on ludo-lvm.
+- Contains homarr, radarr, sonarr, lidarr, sabnzbd, qbittorrent, bazarr, flaresolverr, prowlarr, jellyseerr
+- qBittorrent auth subnet whitelist expanded to 192.168.8.0/24 (for seanime + Caddy access)
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/auth-outpost.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Generated by mcp/build_host_files.py from inventory.yaml.
+# Do NOT edit by hand — your changes will be overwritten.
+# Source of truth: ../inventory.yaml
+name: auth-outpost
+kind: lxc
+os: linux
+role: authentik-gateway
+state: active
+host: hubris
+pve_id: 106
+lan_ip: 192.168.8.6
+mesh_globals:
+  primary: netbird
+  accepted:
+  - netbird
+  - tailscale
+notes:
+- Runs Authentik outpost (reverse-proxy/SSO enforcement) for protected services
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/authentik.yaml

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-# Generated by mcp/build_host_files.py from inventory.yaml.
-# Do NOT edit by hand — your changes will be overwritten.
-# Source of truth: ../inventory.yaml
-name: authentik
-kind: lxc
-os: linux
-role: idp
-host: hubris
-pve_id: 124
-lan_ip: 192.168.8.180
-mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: authentik.netbird.selfhosted
-mesh_globals:
-  primary: netbird
-  accepted:
-  - netbird
-  - tailscale
-public_host: auth.hubris.network
-runs:
-- authentik
-- dnsmasq
-services_hosted:
-- name: authentik
-  url: https://auth.hubris.network
-  backend: authentik
-- name: dnsmasq
-  backend: authentik
-  note: split-horizon DNS, /etc/dnsmasq.d/hubris-split.conf
-notes:
-- 'Also hosts split-horizon dnsmasq: /etc/dnsmasq.d/hubris-split.conf'
-see_also:
-- containers/124-authentik.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue

hosts/caddy.yaml

@@ -5,12 +5,10 @@ name: caddy
 kind: lxc
 os: linux
 role: reverse-proxy
+state: active
 host: hubris
 pve_id: 121
 lan_ip: 192.168.8.175
-mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: caddy.netbird.selfhosted
 mesh_globals:
   primary: netbird
   accepted:
@@ -26,10 +24,12 @@ services_hosted:
   backend: caddy
   role: reverse-proxy
   note: terminates all *.hubris.network
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/121-caddy.md
+  config_repo: dtoro/caddy-conf
+  risk_notes: "wide blast radius \u2014 every *.hubris.network route rides on it (see oikos/policy.yaml\
+    \ service_overrides)"
 notes:
 - Terminates all *.hubris.network
 - /etc/caddy is a git checkout of dtoro/caddy-conf
-see_also:
-- containers/121-caddy.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/claudio-bot.yaml

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-# Generated by mcp/build_host_files.py from inventory.yaml.
-# Do NOT edit by hand — your changes will be overwritten.
-# Source of truth: ../inventory.yaml
-name: claudio-bot
-kind: lxc
-os: linux
-role: matrix-agent
-host: hubris
-pve_id: 123
-lan_ip: 192.168.8.230
-mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: claudio-bot.netbird.selfhosted
-mesh_globals:
-  primary: netbird
-  accepted:
-  - netbird
-  - tailscale
-notes:
-- Reads /opt/homelab-context/ on startup
-see_also:
-- containers/123-claudio-bot.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue

hosts/dns.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Generated by mcp/build_host_files.py from inventory.yaml.
+# Do NOT edit by hand — your changes will be overwritten.
+# Source of truth: ../inventory.yaml
+name: dns
+kind: lxc
+os: linux
+role: dns-server
+state: active
+host: hubris
+pve_id: 107
+lan_ip: 192.168.8.2
+mesh_globals:
+  primary: netbird
+  accepted:
+  - netbird
+  - tailscale
+runs:
+- dns
+services_hosted:
+- name: dns
+  backend: dns
+  note: Technitium DNS, split-horizon zone
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/107-dns.md
+  risk_notes: "LAN-wide resolver \u2014 misconfig breaks name resolution for every client"
+notes:
+- Technitium DNS, split-horizon zone for *.hubris.network
+- Primary DNS for 192.168.8.0/24 LAN (inventory.services.dns references this)
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/elementsynapse.yaml

@@ -5,12 +5,12 @@ name: elementsynapse
 kind: lxc
 os: linux
 role: matrix-server
-host: hubris
+state: active
+host: strong
 pve_id: 118
-lan_ip: 192.168.8.239
+lan_ip: 192.168.8.242
 mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: elementsynapse.netbird.selfhosted
+  tailscale: {}
 mesh_globals:
   primary: netbird
   accepted:
@@ -23,7 +23,9 @@ services_hosted:
 - name: matrix
   url: https://matrix.hubris.network
   backend: elementsynapse
-see_also:
-- containers/118-elementsynapse.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/118-elementsynapse.md
+  risk_notes: "alert/approval channel for Oikos \u2014 outage silences agent escalation"
+notes:
+- Migrated from hubris to strong 2026-07-05 (Phase 1 of strong migration plan).
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/gitea.yaml

@@ -5,12 +5,13 @@ name: gitea
 kind: lxc
 os: linux
 role: git-server
+state: active
 host: hubris
 pve_id: 104
 lan_ip: 192.168.8.121
 mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: gitea.netbird.selfhosted
+  tailscale:
+    fqdn: gitea
 mesh_globals:
   primary: netbird
   accepted:
@@ -26,9 +27,10 @@ services_hosted:
   url: https://git.hubris.network
   backend: gitea
   backend_url: http://192.168.8.121:3000
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/104-gitea.md
+  config_repo: dtoro/gitea-customizations
+  risk_notes: hosts all config repos + deploy webhooks; outage blocks auto-deploy and sync
 notes:
 - Bare repos live at /mnt/library/repos/dtoro/*.git
-see_also:
-- containers/104-gitea.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/grimmory.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# Generated by mcp/build_host_files.py from inventory.yaml.
+# Do NOT edit by hand — your changes will be overwritten.
+# Source of truth: ../inventory.yaml
+name: grimmory
+kind: lxc
+os: linux
+role: book-library
+state: active
+host: strong
+pve_id: 130
+lan_ip: 192.168.8.247
+mesh_globals:
+  primary: netbird
+  accepted:
+  - netbird
+  - tailscale
+mounts:
+- /mnt/media_local
+public_host: books.hubris.network
+notes:
+- Docker host for Grimmory (community fork of Booklore). Created 2026-06-29.
+- Migrated from hubris to strong 2026-07-05 (Phase 2d). Books on ludo-lvm.
+age_pubkey: age1uellsemnjrzgfg9fxw4jefpy05laxzggwnwhh6ny3wl7alyp6v8q0muxet
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/haos.yaml

@@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ name: haos
 kind: vm
 os: linux
 role: home-automation
+state: active
 host: hubris
 pve_id: 108
+lan_ip: 192.168.8.101
 mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: haos.netbird.selfhosted
+  tailscale:
+    fqdn: homeassistant
 mesh_globals:
   primary: netbird
   accepted:
@@ -20,7 +22,6 @@ runs:
 services_hosted:
 - name: haos
   backend: haos
-see_also:
-- vms/108-haos.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/vms/108-haos.md
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/house.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# Generated by mcp/build_host_files.py from inventory.yaml.
+# Do NOT edit by hand — your changes will be overwritten.
+# Source of truth: ../inventory.yaml
+name: house
+kind: lxc
+os: linux
+role: family-planner
+state: active
+host: strong
+pve_id: 129
+lan_ip: 192.168.8.244
+mesh_globals:
+  primary: netbird
+  accepted:
+  - netbird
+  - tailscale
+public_host: house.hubris.network
+notes:
+- Docker host for Yuvomi (family planner). Created 2026-06-26.
+- Migrated from hubris to strong 2026-07-05 (Phase 1 of strong migration plan).
+- Runs Yuvomi container + WebDAV doc bridge to paperless
+- 192.168.8.212 was the hubris IP before migration (briefly picked up by teddycloud via DHCP; teddycloud
+  has since been given a static IP, see hosts.teddycloud)
+age_pubkey: age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/hubris.yaml

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ name: hubris
 kind: proxmox-host
 os: linux
 role: hypervisor
+state: active
 lan_ip: 192.168.8.77
 mesh:
   netbird:
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ mounts:
 ssh:
   port: 22
   netbird_port: 22022
+  user: root
 runs:
 - proxmox_ui
 services_hosted:
@@ -27,7 +29,8 @@ services_hosted:
   url: https://proxmox.hubris.network
   backend: hubris
   port: 8006
-see_also:
-- hosts/hubris.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/hosts/hubris.md
+  risk_notes: "hypervisor UI \u2014 changes here affect every guest on the node"
+age_pubkey: age1xkklkvnk5z0fsnh6cfgv70hy9ksfy8rdprwerzw4yk3p4p7cxcqs2yvpz6
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/jellyfin.yaml

@@ -5,19 +5,20 @@ name: jellyfin
 kind: lxc
 os: linux
 role: media-server
-host: hubris
+state: active
+host: strong
 pve_id: 101
-lan_ip: 192.168.8.206
+lan_ip: 192.168.8.246
 mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: jellyfin.netbird.selfhosted
+  tailscale:
+    fqdn: jellyfin
 mesh_globals:
   primary: netbird
   accepted:
   - netbird
   - tailscale
 mounts:
-- /mnt/library
+- /mnt/media_local
 public_host: media.hubris.network
 runs:
 - jellyfin
@@ -25,7 +26,14 @@ services_hosted:
 - name: jellyfin
   url: https://media.hubris.network
   backend: jellyfin
-see_also:
-- containers/101-jellyfin.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/101-jellyfin.md
+  risk_notes: native Authentik OIDC via SSO-Auth plugin, no Caddy forward-auth gate; VAAPI transcode depends
+    on GPU passthrough on strong
+notes:
+- Jellyfin 10.11.11 with VAAPI hardware acceleration (Radeon 680M iGPU on strong)
+- 4 cores / 8 GiB RAM / 1 GiB swap
+- SSO-Auth plugin v4.0.0.4 with Authentik OIDC (no Caddy forward-auth gate)
+- GPU passed via dev0+dev1: /dev/dri/renderD128 + card0
+- Migrated from hubris to strong 2026-07-05 (Phase 2). Library on ludo-lvm.
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/ludo-mini.yaml

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-# Generated by mcp/build_host_files.py from inventory.yaml.
-# Do NOT edit by hand — your changes will be overwritten.
-# Source of truth: ../inventory.yaml
-name: ludo-mini
-kind: workstation
-os: linux
-role: dev
-mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: ludo-mini.netbird.selfhosted
-mesh_globals:
-  primary: netbird
-  accepted:
-  - netbird
-  - tailscale
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue

hosts/mac-mini.yaml

@@ -5,15 +5,20 @@ name: mac-mini
 kind: workstation
 os: macos
 role: dev
+state: active
+lan_ip: 192.168.178.182
 mesh:
   netbird:
-    fqdn: mac-mini.netbird.selfhosted
+    fqdn: mac-mini-234-17.netbird.selfhosted
 mesh_globals:
   primary: netbird
   accepted:
   - netbird
   - tailscale
+ssh:
+  user: dtoro
 notes:
 - Only macOS in the fleet. Bootstrap uses launchd.
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
+age_pubkey: age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/mule-images.yaml

@@ -5,12 +5,13 @@ name: mule-images
 kind: lxc
 os: linux
 role: photo-management
+state: active
 host: hubris
 pve_id: 120
 lan_ip: 192.168.8.136
 mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: mule-images.netbird.selfhosted
+  tailscale:
+    fqdn: muleimage
 mesh_globals:
   primary: netbird
   accepted:
@@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ services_hosted:
 - name: photos
   url: https://photos.hubris.network
   backend: mule-images
-see_also:
-- containers/120-mule-images.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/120-mule-images.md
+  config_repo: dtoro/mule-image
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/mule-photos-new.yaml

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-# Generated by mcp/build_host_files.py from inventory.yaml.
-# Do NOT edit by hand — your changes will be overwritten.
-# Source of truth: ../inventory.yaml
-name: mule-photos-new
-kind: lxc
-os: linux
-role: photo-management
-host: hubris
-pve_id: 127
-lan_ip: 192.168.8.181
-mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: mule-photos-new.netbird.selfhosted
-mesh_globals:
-  primary: netbird
-  accepted:
-  - netbird
-  - tailscale
-public_host: photos-new.hubris.network
-runs:
-- photos_new
-services_hosted:
-- name: photos_new
-  url: https://photos-new.hubris.network
-  backend: mule-photos-new
-see_also:
-- containers/127-mule-photos-new.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue

hosts/netbird-vps.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Generated by mcp/build_host_files.py from inventory.yaml.
+# Do NOT edit by hand — your changes will be overwritten.
+# Source of truth: ../inventory.yaml
+name: netbird-vps
+kind: external
+os: linux
+role: netbird-mgmt
+state: active
+mesh:
+  netbird:
+    ip: 100.122.165.149
+    fqdn: netbird-ionos.netbird.selfhosted
+mesh_globals:
+  primary: netbird
+  accepted:
+  - netbird
+  - tailscale
+ssh:
+  user: root
+runs:
+- authentik
+services_hosted:
+- name: authentik
+  url: https://auth.hubris.network
+  backend: netbird-vps
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md
+  note: core runs on the VPS since 2026-05-31; LAN forward-auth outpost is auth-outpost (LXC 106) at 192.168.8.6:9000.
+    Previous backend value "authentik" referenced the retired embedded-outpost host (LXC 124).
+  risk_notes: "SSO provider \u2014 outage locks login to OIDC/forward-auth services"
+notes:
+- "Public IONOS VPS \u2014 hosts the vanilla netbird mgmt+signal+relay+dashboard stack + host coturn (see\
+  \ infrastructure/vps-hardening.md + infrastructure/mesh.md changelog 2026-05-21)."
+- NOT a homelab client. No /etc/age/key.txt, no /opt/homelab-context clone. Managed via ssh from hubris;
+  sshd is locked to hubris's pubkey.
+- Public IPv4 82.165.190.79. Auto-patching via unattended-upgrades.
+- Configs rendered by `homelab render-vps-configs` from vps/turnserver.conf.tmpl + vps/management.json.tmpl,
+  with secrets decrypted from secrets/turn-shared-secret.yaml + secrets/netbird-authentik-oidc.yaml on
+  hubris.
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/nextcloud.yaml

@@ -5,12 +5,13 @@ name: nextcloud
 kind: lxc
 os: linux
 role: file-sync
+state: active
 host: hubris
 pve_id: 114
 lan_ip: 192.168.8.224
 mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: nextcloud.netbird.selfhosted
+  tailscale:
+    fqdn: nextcloud
 mesh_globals:
   primary: netbird
   accepted:
@@ -25,7 +26,6 @@ services_hosted:
 - name: nextcloud
   url: https://cloud.hubris.network
   backend: nextcloud
-see_also:
-- containers/114-nextcloud.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/114-nextcloud.md
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/nfs-export.yaml

@@ -5,18 +5,14 @@ name: nfs-export
 kind: lxc
 os: linux
 role: storage-export
+state: active
 host: hubris
 pve_id: 102
 lan_ip: 192.168.8.200
-mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: nfs-export.netbird.selfhosted
 mesh_globals:
   primary: netbird
   accepted:
   - netbird
   - tailscale
-see_also:
-- containers/102-nfs-export.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/paperless.yaml

@@ -5,12 +5,13 @@ name: paperless
 kind: lxc
 os: linux
 role: document-archive
+state: active
 host: hubris
 pve_id: 103
 lan_ip: 192.168.8.130
 mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: paperless.netbird.selfhosted
+  tailscale:
+    fqdn: paperless
 mesh_globals:
   primary: netbird
   accepted:
@@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ services_hosted:
 - name: paperless
   url: https://paperless.hubris.network
   backend: paperless
-see_also:
-- containers/103-paperless.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/103-paperless.md
+  risk_notes: "document archive \u2014 treat data as irreplaceable; DB operations are destructive-class"
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/plato.yaml

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-# Generated by mcp/build_host_files.py from inventory.yaml.
-# Do NOT edit by hand — your changes will be overwritten.
-# Source of truth: ../inventory.yaml
-name: plato
-kind: lxc
-os: linux
-role: app
-host: hubris
-pve_id: 126
-lan_ip: 192.168.8.190
-mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: plato.netbird.selfhosted
-mesh_globals:
-  primary: netbird
-  accepted:
-  - netbird
-  - tailscale
-mounts:
-- /mnt/library/documents/plato
-public_host: plato.hubris.network
-runs:
-- plato
-services_hosted:
-- name: plato
-  url: https://plato.hubris.network
-  backend: plato
-see_also:
-- containers/126-plato.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue

hosts/rclone.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# Generated by mcp/build_host_files.py from inventory.yaml.
+# Do NOT edit by hand — your changes will be overwritten.
+# Source of truth: ../inventory.yaml
+name: rclone
+kind: lxc
+os: linux
+role: backup
+state: active
+mesh:
+  netbird:
+    fqdn: rclone.netbird.selfhosted
+mesh_globals:
+  primary: netbird
+  accepted:
+  - netbird
+  - tailscale
+age_pubkey: age1pwtdws2thdh7vzp2dzttl3zxgcs2tgpcsjsqgw3q04nyml4kvuqq467u4x
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/republic-laptop.yaml

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ name: republic-laptop
 kind: workstation
 os: linux
 role: primary-dev
+state: active
 mesh:
   netbird:
     fqdn: republic-laptop.netbird.selfhosted
@@ -13,5 +14,7 @@ mesh_globals:
   accepted:
   - netbird
   - tailscale
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
+ssh:
+  user: dtoro
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/romm.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# Generated by mcp/build_host_files.py from inventory.yaml.
+# Do NOT edit by hand — your changes will be overwritten.
+# Source of truth: ../inventory.yaml
+name: romm
+kind: lxc
+os: linux
+role: rom-manager
+state: active
+host: strong
+pve_id: 134
+lan_ip: 192.168.8.249
+mesh_globals:
+  primary: netbird
+  accepted:
+  - netbird
+  - tailscale
+mounts:
+- /mnt/media_local
+public_host: roms.hubris.network
+notes:
+- Docker host for RomM (romm.app) self-hosted ROM manager. Created 2026-07-05.
+- MariaDB sidecar at /opt/romm/docker-compose.yml.
+- ROMs on ludo-lvm media volume at /mnt/media_local/roms.
+- 1 core / 2 GiB RAM / 16 GiB rootfs (ludo-lvm).
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/seanime.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Generated by mcp/build_host_files.py from inventory.yaml.
+# Do NOT edit by hand — your changes will be overwritten.
+# Source of truth: ../inventory.yaml
+name: seanime
+kind: lxc
+os: linux
+role: anime-media-server
+state: active
+host: strong
+pve_id: 133
+lan_ip: 192.168.8.248
+mesh_globals:
+  primary: netbird
+  accepted:
+  - netbird
+  - tailscale
+mounts:
+- /mnt/media_local/anime
+public_host: seanime.hubris.network
+notes:
+- Seanime anime media server for online streaming + local library scanning
+- Created 2026-07-05. Binary at /opt/seanime/bin/seanime, systemd service.
+- Connected to qBittorrent on arriman (192.168.8.245:8080)
+- 8 online streaming extensions installed (HiAnime, AniWatch, KickAssAnime, etc.)
+- /anime mounted from strong ludo-lvm (/mnt/media_local/anime)
+- Caddy: "https://seanime.hubris.network \u2192 192.168.8.248:43211"
+- qBittorrent auth subnet whitelist expanded to 192.168.8.0/24 for seanime access
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/sophia.yaml

@@ -5,12 +5,13 @@ name: sophia
 kind: lxc
 os: linux
 role: workshop
+state: active
 host: hubris
 pve_id: 119
-lan_ip: 192.168.8.157
+lan_ip: 192.168.8.109
 mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: sophia.netbird.selfhosted
+  tailscale:
+    fqdn: sophia
 mesh_globals:
   primary: netbird
   accepted:
@@ -18,7 +19,5 @@ mesh_globals:
   - tailscale
 mounts:
 - /mnt/library
-see_also:
-- containers/119-sophia.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/strong.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# Generated by mcp/build_host_files.py from inventory.yaml.
+# Do NOT edit by hand — your changes will be overwritten.
+# Source of truth: ../inventory.yaml
+name: strong
+kind: proxmox-host
+os: linux
+role: hypervisor
+state: active
+lan_ip: 192.168.178.181
+mesh_globals:
+  primary: netbird
+  accepted:
+  - netbird
+  - tailscale
+ssh:
+  user: root
+notes:
+- Reformatted from Linux workstation ("ludo-mini" in this wiki, still the machine's nickname) to Proxmox
+  VE 9.2.3 on 2026-07-01. Renamed the inventory/wiki identity from ludo-mini to strong on the same day
+  so it matches the OS/cluster hostname everywhere (bootstrap looks up hosts/$(hostname).yaml, so a mismatch
+  would break enrollment).
+- "Joined hubris's \"Homelab\" cluster same day. 2-node, no QDevice tiebreaker yet \u2014 see hosts/hubris.md\
+  \ quorum note."
+- Netbird not yet installed (fresh OS wiped prior enrollment); reachable today only via the household
+  LAN / existing Fritz static route to 192.168.8.0/24. Re-enroll in mesh as a follow-up if off-LAN access
+  to this host itself (not just its future guests) is needed.
+- "First step of the planned library-SSD migration \u2014 see .hermes/plans/2026-06-03_110000-library-ssd-migration-to-ludo-mini.md\
+  \ (filename kept as-is, it's a historical planning doc). Only Phase 1 (Proxmox install + cluster join)\
+  \ is done; no physical drive move, service migration, or GPU passthrough has happened yet."
+age_pubkey: age1rtwvdct6avjkr3cyxv3vue3vqx4d524fjfr3vk7xrnvyrylnry5sm54sn4
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/teddycloud.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# Generated by mcp/build_host_files.py from inventory.yaml.
+# Do NOT edit by hand — your changes will be overwritten.
+# Source of truth: ../inventory.yaml
+name: teddycloud
+kind: lxc
+os: linux
+role: teddycloud
+state: active
+host: hubris
+pve_id: 131
+lan_ip: 192.168.8.150
+mesh_globals:
+  primary: netbird
+  accepted:
+  - netbird
+  - tailscale
+mounts:
+- /mnt/library
+public_host: teddy.hubris.network
+runs:
+- teddycloud
+services_hosted:
+- name: teddycloud
+  url: https://teddy.hubris.network
+  backend: teddycloud
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/131-teddycloud.md
+  note: self-hosted TeddyCloud (Toniebox cloud reimplementation), docker compose
+  risk_notes: "no Caddy forward-auth gate (unlike sab.hubris.network on the same Caddyfile) \u2014 reachable\
+    \ to anyone on the LAN/mesh who can resolve teddy.hubris.network; undocumented in inventory.yaml until\
+    \ 2026-07-06 (drift-caught)"
+notes:
+- Docker host for TeddyCloud (ghcr.io/toniebox-reverse-engineering/teddycloud), a self-hosted reimplementation
+  of the Toniebox cloud backend. Debian 12 (bookworm).
+- 1 core / 1 GiB RAM / 512 MiB swap / 16 GiB rootfs (local-lvm).
+- "Predates the client-enrollment convention \u2014 undocumented in inventory.yaml until 2026-07-06, when\
+  \ Oikos's drift detector (oikos/drift.py) caught pve_id 131 live on hubris (`pct list`) with no inventory\
+  \ entry. Static IP assigned 2026-07-05 during the strong migration (was picking up 192.168.8.243 via\
+  \ DHCP before that \u2014 see hosts/strong.md's 2026-07-05 changelog)."
+- "No age_pubkey / homelab-context enrollment \u2014 not a homelab CLI client, just a docker-compose app\
+  \ container. Not a required follow-up unless it needs secrets."
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/trmnl.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# Generated by mcp/build_host_files.py from inventory.yaml.
+# Do NOT edit by hand — your changes will be overwritten.
+# Source of truth: ../inventory.yaml
+name: trmnl
+kind: lxc
+os: linux
+role: trmnl-middleware
+state: active
+host: hubris
+pve_id: 128
+lan_ip: 192.168.8.211
+mesh_globals:
+  primary: netbird
+  accepted:
+  - netbird
+  - tailscale
+public_host: trmnl.hubris.network
+runs:
+- trmnl
+services_hosted:
+- name: trmnl
+  backend: trmnl
+  url: https://trmnl.hubris.network
+  note: self-hosted middleware for TRMNL e-ink plugins (polled by TRMNL cloud)
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/128-trmnl.md
+  config_repo: dtoro/terminalito
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

hosts/zimaos.yaml

@@ -5,11 +5,10 @@ name: zimaos
 kind: vm
 os: linux
 role: nas-frontend-eval
+state: active
 host: hubris
 pve_id: 100
-mesh:
-  netbird:
-    fqdn: zimaos.netbird.selfhosted
+lan_ip: 192.168.8.195
 mesh_globals:
   primary: netbird
   accepted:
@@ -22,7 +21,6 @@ services_hosted:
 - name: zimaos
   url: https://zimaos.hubris.network
   backend: zimaos
-see_also:
-- vms/100-zimaos.md
-mcp_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-secrets_issuance_endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
+  doc_page: knowledge/wiki/vms/100-zimaos.md
+mcp_endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+secrets_issuance_endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue

infrastructure/dns.md

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-# DNS — split-horizon `*.hubris.network`
-
-LAN clients resolve `*.hubris.network` to the [Caddy reverse proxy](../containers/121-caddy.md) (`192.168.8.175`). Public clients resolve to the IONOS VPS (`82.165.190.79`) via an IONOS wildcard, where they hit the [VPS traefik public ingress](ingress.md).
-
-There is **no wildcard on the LAN side**. Every subdomain needs an explicit entry.
-
-## Components
-
-- **Authoritative public DNS:** IONOS. `*.hubris.network → 82.165.190.79` (was `74.118.126.4` until 2026-04-22).
-- **LAN authoritative for `hubris.network` records:** dnsmasq on [authentik (124)](../containers/124-authentik.md), `192.168.8.180:53` and `127.0.0.1:53`. Config at `/etc/dnsmasq.d/hubris-split.conf`. Forwards everything else to `1.1.1.1` and `8.8.8.8` (`no-resolv`, `server=...`).
-- **PVE host** (`192.168.8.77`): resolver is the local Netbird daemon at `100.122.38.109:53`, which forwards to the LAN/upstream and learns hubris.network answers via that path. `netbird status` says "Nameservers: 0/0 Available" — confirming netbird does NOT manage a hubris.network zone; it just caches whatever the system resolver returns.
-- **Some LXCs** keep router DNS (`192.168.8.1`) or Tailscale MagicDNS (`100.100.100.100`), both of which return the public IONOS A record. Those LXCs need either a `/etc/hosts` override or local dnsmasq — see [mesh migration](mesh.md) for which technique applies where.
-
-## Live entries (as of 2026-04-28)
-
-```
-address=/auth.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/git.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/media.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/paperless.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/books.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/home.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/cloud.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/matrix.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/proxmox.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/docker.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/jellyseerr.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/qbit.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/sab.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/blog.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/photos.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/photos-new.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/artifacto.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/plato.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/zimaos.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-address=/nfs-export.hubris.network/192.168.8.200
-```
-
-Note: `nfs-export.hubris.network` is the only `.hubris.network` entry that points to a non-HTTP service (NFSv4 on port 2049). It bypasses [caddy (121)](../containers/121-caddy.md) because NFS is L4, not HTTP — Caddy has nothing to do.
-
-## Why split-horizon
-
-The IONOS wildcard points at the VPS for public ingress (per-host routers in [VPS traefik](ingress.md)). The VPS only routes hostnames it knows — anything else 404s. So LAN clients pointing at the public IP are a dead end for any service that isn't explicitly published. The dnsmasq override on LXC 124 keeps LAN traffic on the home Caddy.
-
-## The gotcha that cost a debug session (2026-04-22)
-
-Creating a new Caddyfile site block is necessary but **not sufficient**. Without the LXC-124 dnsmasq entry, LAN queries fall through to upstream, get the public IONOS answer, and time out. Symptom: "subdomain doesn't load" even though Caddy config + cert are fine.
-
-## Recipe — adding a new subdomain
-
-1. Edit `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` on [caddy (121)](../containers/121-caddy.md), commit + push to `dtoro/caddy-conf`. Webhook reloads caddy. See [auto-deploy](auto-deploy.md).
-2. Append to `/etc/dnsmasq.d/hubris-split.conf` on [authentik (124)](../containers/124-authentik.md):
-   ```
-   address=/<new>.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-   ```
-3. `pct exec 124 -- systemctl restart dnsmasq` — reload/SIGHUP may not pick up the new `address=` line; hard restart is the reliable path.
-4. Verify: `dig @192.168.8.180 +short <new>.hubris.network` → `192.168.8.175`.
-5. On macOS clients, flush: `sudo dscacheutil -flushcache && sudo killall -HUP mDNSResponder`.
-
-> The dnsmasq config is **not** tracked in git. If you stand up a `dtoro/dnsmasq-conf` repo, wire it like `caddy-conf` (webhook on LXC 124).
-
-## Public path — what does and doesn't follow the LAN map
-
-- Hostnames published in [VPS traefik dynamic config](ingress.md) (currently `artifacto.hubris.network`, `blog.hubris.network`) reach a real backend over the netbird mesh.
-- Anything else with a `*.hubris.network` URL hits the VPS but isn't routed anywhere — returns 404.
-- `netbird.hubris.network` is its own thing — TCP passthrough at the VPS, served by netbird-proxy. Doesn't follow the file-provider router pattern.
-
-## Long-term plan
-
-Either:
-- Move split-horizon DNS to the LAN router so `*.hubris.network → 192.168.8.175` is answered for every LAN client. Eliminates per-LXC overrides.
-- Or, once the [Tailscale → Netbird migration](mesh.md) completes, every LXC's resolver becomes the netbird daemon, which already learns hubris.network answers via the system resolver chain.
-
-## Related
-- [Caddy (121)](../containers/121-caddy.md) — every LAN entry points here
-- [Ingress (VPS traefik)](ingress.md) — public-side counterpart
-- [Mesh migration](mesh.md) — per-LXC DNS workarounds during the transition
-- [Authentik (124)](../containers/124-authentik.md) — host of the split-horizon dnsmasq
-
-## Changelog
-
-### 2026-05-14 — `nfs-export.hubris.network` added (direct, non-HTTP)
-NFSv4 export server [nfs-export (102)](../containers/102-nfs-export.md) at `192.168.8.200`. Direct entry, not Caddy-fronted — NFS is L4, no HTTP reverse-proxy meaningful.
-
-### 2026-05-14 — `zimaos.hubris.network` added (Caddy-fronted, standard pattern)
-New LAN entry for [100-zimaos](../vms/100-zimaos.md) → [caddy (121)](../containers/121-caddy.md) → `192.168.8.195`. Briefly pointed direct-to-VM during install for the initial smoke-test, then re-pointed once a Caddyfile block was added (`reverse_proxy 192.168.8.195` + IONOS DNS-01 TLS).
-
-### 2026-05-13 — `plato.hubris.network` added; `files.hubris.network` removed
-New LAN-only entry for [plato (126)](../containers/126-plato.md). Same day, the `files.hubris.network` entry for the just-decommissioned seafile experiment was dropped; queries now fall through to the public IONOS answer (no LAN backend).
-
-### 2026-05-12 — `files.hubris.network` added (since removed 2026-05-13)
-Originally added for the seafile (LXC 125) Nextcloud-replacement evaluation. Pointed at 192.168.8.175 (Caddy reverse-proxied to 192.168.8.185:80). Entry removed when the experiment was torn down a day later.
-
-### 2026-04-28 — wiki entry created
-Initial documentation. 16 active entries.
-
-### 2026-04-22 — IONOS wildcard moved 74.118.126.4 → 82.165.190.79
-Public path now lands on the VPS traefik, not the old yunohost. Necessary for the [public ingress](ingress.md) pattern. The LAN dead-end semantics didn't change — public DNS still doesn't help LAN clients reach LAN-only services.
-
-### 2026-04-22 — three caddy sites without DNS entries (jellyseerr, qbit, sab)
-Caddy + certs were working but LAN resolution failed because the dnsmasq lines weren't added. Lesson recorded; entries added later that day.
-
-### 2026-04-21 — dnsmasq stood up on LXC 124
-Co-located with Authentik. Initial entries cover everything routed through Caddy.

infrastructure/mesh.md

@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-# Mesh — Tailscale → Netbird migration
-
-The hubris fleet is migrating from Tailscale to Netbird. Netbird is the target end-state. In-progress as of 2026-04-21.
-
-## Current state
-
-- **PVE host** uses Netbird (`wt0`, `100.122.38.109/16`). Its resolver is the local netbird daemon, which forwards to LAN/upstream — so the PVE host gets `*.hubris.network → 192.168.8.175` via the system resolver chain.
-- **Netbird mgmt host** (`82.165.190.79`, FQDN `inspiring-ramanujan.netbird.selfhosted`, NB IP `100.122.165.149`) is now itself a peer on the mesh (joined 2026-04-22 via setup key, netbird 0.69.0). Routes the homelab network (`192.168.8.0/24`) via the PVE peer. This gives the mgmt host LAN access *and* split-horizon DNS for `*.hubris.network`. Useful independently of any Authentik integration.
-- **Most LXCs** still run Tailscale or use router DNS (`192.168.8.1`) / Tailscale MagicDNS (`100.100.100.100`), both of which return the *public* IONOS A record `*.hubris.network → 82.165.190.79`. The VPS only routes hostnames it actually publishes (today, `artifacto` + `blog`), so this path is a dead end for any LAN-only service.
-
-## ICE / STUN — must use external STUN, not embedded
-
-The bundled netbird-server image runs an embedded STUN listener on UDP 3478. **IONOS drops inbound UDP 3478 to the VPS upstream of the host firewall** (verified 2026-05-10 via `tcpdump -ni any udp port 3478`: 0 packets captured during external probes from hubris). Without a reachable STUN server, the management API hands peers a STUN URI nothing can talk to → no srflx candidates → ICE always fails → every peer falls back to the websocket relay (`rels://netbird.hubris.network:443`). All cross-NAT traffic is then bottlenecked by the relay/VPS bandwidth (observed ~366 kB/s for Nextcloud uploads).
-
-**Fix**: in `/opt/config.yaml` on the VPS, declare external STUN servers under `server:` — this disables the embedded STUN automatically:
-
-```yaml
-server:
-  stuns:
-    - uri: "stun:stun.l.google.com:19302"
-    - uri: "stun:stun1.l.google.com:19302"
-    - uri: "stun:stun.cloudflare.com:3478"
-```
-
-`docker restart netbird-server`, then `netbird down && netbird up` on each peer to force a resync. Verify with `netbird status -d` — `Connection type:` should flip from `Relayed` to `P2P` for peers that aren't behind double-NAT/CGNAT.
-
-If a peer is *still* relayed after this, it's a NAT-symmetry problem on its side, not a config bug — would need TURN to fix.
-
-## Consequence — every LXC wired to Authentik needs an internal override
-
-Until each LXC is migrated to Netbird, anything that needs to reach `auth.hubris.network` (Authentik), `cloud.hubris.network` (Nextcloud), etc., must override the public answer with `192.168.8.175`.
-
-Two techniques. Pick by HTTP-client behavior.
-
-### A) `/etc/hosts` override
-
-Works for libc `getaddrinfo` clients: curl, wget, most Go/Python/Ruby apps, gitea.
-
-- Place the line **outside** the `# --- BEGIN PVE ---` / `# --- END PVE ---` markers. Proxmox rewrites everything inside that block on every container start.
-- Belt-and-suspenders: `/etc/systemd/system/hubris-hosts-override.service` (oneshot, enabled, idempotent).
-
-### B) Local dnsmasq
-
-Required for clients that bypass `/etc/hosts`. **Nextcloud (PHP Guzzle + `OC\Http\Client\DnsPinMiddleware`) is one** — uses `dns_get_record()`, not `getaddrinfo`. Likely candidates for the same treatment: Python/Ruby/Java apps that do explicit DNS resolution before connecting.
-
-Recipe:
-```
-apt install dnsmasq
-
-cat > /etc/dnsmasq.d/hubris-internal.conf <<EOF
-address=/auth.hubris.network/192.168.8.175
-server=192.168.8.1
-server=1.1.1.1
-interface=lo
-bind-interfaces
-no-hosts
-no-resolv
-EOF
-
-# Set LXC default nameservers and live resolv.conf
-pct set <id> --nameserver "127.0.0.1 192.168.8.1 1.1.1.1"
-# Then update /etc/resolv.conf inside the LXC too.
-```
-
-### Known overrides applied
-
-| LXC                                        | Technique                                | Notes |
-| ------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------- | ----- |
-| [104 (gitea)](../containers/104-gitea.md)  | `/etc/hosts` + `hubris-hosts-override.service` | Standard |
-| [114 (nextcloud)](../containers/114-nextcloud.md) | local dnsmasq @ 127.0.0.1 + resolv.conf reorder | Guzzle bypasses /etc/hosts |
-| [105 (apps)](../containers/105-apps.md), inner containers | `extra_hosts:` in compose | Booklore, mulita, WriteFreely each ship with this |
-
-## Adding new LXCs
-
-- Don't add new LXCs to Tailscale; add them to Netbird. Tailscale is being decommissioned on hubris.
-- When wiring a new app into Authentik: `cat /etc/resolv.conf` on the target LXC. If nameserver is `192.168.8.1` or `100.100.100.100`, add the hosts override. If it's the netbird daemon IP, skip.
-
-## Long-term fix
-
-Either:
-- Split-horizon DNS at LAN/router level so `*.hubris.network → 192.168.8.175` for every LAN client. Eliminates all per-LXC overrides.
-- Once Netbird migration completes, every LXC's resolver becomes the netbird daemon, which already learns hubris.network answers via the system resolver chain on the PVE host.
-
-## CRITICAL — never `docker compose up` Portainer-managed stacks
-
-[apps (105)](../containers/105-apps.md) runs multiple stacks deployed via the Portainer UI (`/var/lib/docker/volumes/portainer_data/_data/compose/<N>/`). Running `docker compose up -d <svc>` from the host shell on these triggers a recreate of OTHER services in the stack — labels drift, compose treats the project as reconciling, containers get destroyed and remade. **This wiped Booklore's mariadb data on 2026-04-22** (bind mount `./mariadb/config` re-initialized fresh).
-
-Recipe for container-config changes (e.g. adding `extra_hosts`) on Portainer-managed stacks:
-1. Edit the compose in Portainer UI → **Stacks → <stack> → Editor → Update stack**. Portainer handles the recreate cleanly with its own state tracking.
-2. Do NOT edit `/var/lib/docker/volumes/portainer_data/_data/compose/<N>/docker-compose.yml` directly.
-3. For data-preserving DNS overrides on stateful services, prefer Caddy-side handling (forward-auth) or the app's built-in OIDC over container-level `extra_hosts` when possible.
-
-## Related
-- [DNS split-horizon](dns.md)
-- [Authentik (124)](../containers/124-authentik.md) — the IdP that triggers most of these overrides
-- [Nextcloud (114)](../containers/114-nextcloud.md) — example of Technique B
-- [Gitea (104)](../containers/104-gitea.md) — example of Technique A
-- [Public ingress (VPS traefik)](ingress.md) — uses the same mesh as transport
-
-## Changelog
-
-### 2026-05-10 — ICE direct p2p restored (external STUN swap)
-All peers were `Connection type: Relayed` because the embedded STUN on the VPS was unreachable from outside (IONOS drops UDP 3478 inbound). Swapped to Google + Cloudflare STUN in `/opt/config.yaml`. After `netbird down/up`, peers now report `P2P` with srflx/host candidates. Backup of pre-change config at `/opt/config.yaml.bak-20260510-185050`. Fixes a real-world Nextcloud upload bottleneck (~366 kB/s through the relay → LAN-direct on same-network peers).
-
-### 2026-04-28 — wiki entry created
-Initial documentation.
-
-### 2026-04-22 — Booklore mariadb data wiped (lesson recorded)
-The "never docker compose up Portainer-managed stacks" rule comes from this. See [apps (105)](../containers/105-apps.md#changelog).
-
-### 2026-04-22 — netbird mgmt host joined its own mesh
-`82.165.190.79` is now a peer (`100.122.165.149`). LAN access + split-horizon DNS via PVE peer. See [VPS hardening](vps-hardening.md).
-
-### 2026-04-21 — overrides applied to gitea (104) and nextcloud (114)
-Two techniques documented; Nextcloud forced the dnsmasq route because of Guzzle.

infrastructure/monitoring.md

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-# Monitoring — `claudio-monitor`
-
-Per-5-minute host-health watchdog on [hubris](../hosts/hubris.md). Edge-triggered Matrix alerts via [claudio-bot (123)](../containers/123-claudio-bot.md). Home Assistant pulls the same metrics independently from the official Proxmox VE integration — claudio-monitor focuses on alerting only.
-
-## Why
-
-After the [2026-04-21 thermal crash](../investigations/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md), the old single-purpose `thermal-watch` (which lived in `dtoro/backup-library`) was extended into a general health monitor. Single sink: claudio-bot. The MQTT/REST push paths were ripped out 2026-04-21 (commit `82f0596` in `dtoro/claudio-monitor`) once HA started consuming PVE metrics directly.
-
-## Components
-
-- **Repo:** `dtoro/claudio-monitor`
-- **Checkout:** `/opt/claudio-monitor` on the PVE host
-- **No auto-deploy webhook yet** — push, then `/opt/claudio-monitor/scripts/deploy.sh` manually.
-- **Main loop:** `claudio-monitor.timer` (every 5 min) → `/opt/claudio-monitor/claudio-monitor.sh` → sources `lib/check-{thermal,host,lxc}.sh`.
-- **Module shape:** every check is a `check_XXX()` function in `lib/check-XXX.sh`, sourced by the orchestrator. To add: write `lib/check-new.sh` and add `. "$LIB/check-new.sh"` + one `check_new` call in `claudio-monitor.sh`.
-- **Thresholds:** `/etc/claudio-monitor/thresholds.env` (installed from `config/thresholds.env` — admin edits there are preserved by `deploy.sh`).
-- **Tokens:** `/etc/claudio-monitor/bot.token` (same value as `/etc/restic/bot.token`, copied by hand). Missing → Matrix delivery is silently skipped.
-- **State files:** `/var/lib/claudio-monitor/<check>-<key>.alert` and `.counter`. `notify.sh` ships two primitives: `maybe_alert` (warn/clear hysteresis) and `sticky_alert` (N-consecutive-ticks).
-
-## Per-LXC data
-
-A single `pvesh get /cluster/resources --type vm --output-format json` per tick gives CPU/mem/disk for every LXC and VM. Same call HA's PVE integration uses — keep them aligned.
-
-## Matrix-side plugin
-
-`plugins/monitor.py` in `dtoro/claudio-bot`. Registered in `/etc/claudio-bot/config.yaml` under `plugins:`. Slash commands:
-- `/monitor status`
-- `/monitor history [N]`
-- `/monitor clear <key>`
-
-Tools (for NL queries via the LLM): `get_alerts`, `get_monitor_history`.
-
-Events posted to claudio-bot `/notify`:
-```json
-{"plugin": "monitor", "event": "critical|warning|info", "check": "thermal|host|lxc|apt|docker", "message": "...", "data": {...}}
-```
-`event:"info"` is the recovery / clear event. The plugin keys active alerts by `_alert_key(check, data)`.
-
-## Current thresholds & active alerts
-
-Active warnings at the time monitor was deployed (2026-04-21):
-- `lxc:103` ([paperless](../containers/103-paperless.md)) — disk 86.9%
-- `lxc:118` ([elementsynapse](../containers/118-elementsynapse.md)) — disk 86.8%
-
-## Testing
-
-- Force an alert: `NVME_WARN_TEMP_C=1 /opt/claudio-monitor/claudio-monitor.sh` (any threshold env override).
-- Clean state: `rm -f /var/lib/claudio-monitor/*.alert`.
-- Verify Matrix delivery: `pct exec 123 -- journalctl -u claudio-bot --since "30s ago" | grep "plugin=monitor"`.
-
-## Not yet deployed (tracked in plan file)
-
-- `check-apt.sh` + `check-docker.sh` + `claudio-monitor-updates.timer` (daily at 04:00) — apt upgradable counts per host/LXC, docker image digest drift on [apps (105)](../containers/105-apps.md).
-- Deploy webhook (`scripts/webhook/`) mirroring `dtoro/backup-library-deploy`.
-
-## Related repos
-
-- `dtoro/backup-library` — origin of the now-removed `thermal-watch.*`.
-- `dtoro/claudio-bot` — the `monitor` plugin lives at `plugins/monitor.py`.
-- `dtoro/haos-config` — empty placeholder created 2026-04-21 for HA `/config` once bootstrapped from inside HAOS via the SSH addon.
-
-## Related pages
-- [Hubris host](../hosts/hubris.md)
-- [claudio-bot (123)](../containers/123-claudio-bot.md)
-- [HAOS VM (108)](../vms/108-haos.md)
-- [Backups (disabled)](backups.md)
-- [Investigation: 2026-04-21 crash loop](../investigations/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md)
-
-## Changelog
-
-### 2026-04-28 — wiki entry created
-Initial documentation.
-
-### 2026-04-21 — claudio-monitor stood up; thermal-watch removed
-General health monitor with per-LXC checks. MQTT/REST push paths ripped out (commit `82f0596`) because HA gets PVE metrics directly. Matrix-side `monitor` plugin added in claudio-bot commit `e56da25`.

infrastructure/ssh-access.md

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-# SSH access
-
-How to reach hubris and the VPS over SSH, and the dual-server gotcha.
-
-## Hubris
-
-Two SSH endpoints — easy to hit the wrong one.
-
-| Server         | Listen                       | Auth                              | Notes |
-| -------------- | ---------------------------- | --------------------------------- | ----- |
-| OpenSSH        | `0.0.0.0:22`                 | `authorized_keys` at `/etc/pve/priv/authorized_keys` (Proxmox cluster-synced; symlinked from `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`) | Standard. |
-| Netbird SSH    | `100.122.38.109:22022`       | OIDC / browser auth — bypasses `authorized_keys` | If a client lands here it'll open a browser tab to authenticate, then sometimes hang. Force port 22 or use the LAN IP. |
-
-### Authorized root keys
-- `root@hubris` (self, RSA) — original.
-- `d.toro.v@pm.me` (ed25519) — user's iMac (`mac-mini.netbird.selfhosted`, LAN `192.168.8.174`), added 2026-04-22.
-
-### Notes
-- Password auth is enabled on hubris but the root password is **not** the one the user expects. Prefer key flows; don't try `ssh-copy-id` blind.
-- Off-LAN access from the iMac uses the LAN path. As of 2026-04-22 the iMac's Netbird tunnel to hubris was P2P healthy but no packets were captured on `wt0`; needs revisit if remote access becomes critical.
-
-## VPS (`82.165.190.79` / `100.122.165.149`)
-
-- **Mesh-only.** Public `:22` is dropped by the nftables firewall. SSH reaches the VPS only over `wt0`.
-- Key-only (`PasswordAuthentication no`, `PermitRootLogin prohibit-password`) via drop-in at `/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-hubris-hardening.conf`. Original config backed up at `/etc/ssh/sshd_config.bak.<ts>`.
-- `ListenAddress` is still 0.0.0.0; gating is firewall-layer.
-- Authorized root keys: PVE (`root@hubris`), iMac (`d.toro.v@pm.me`). Add a new device with `ssh-copy-id root@100.122.165.149` from a mesh peer before disabling its access paths.
-
-See [VPS hardening](vps-hardening.md) for the firewall + fail2ban rules and recovery paths.
-
-## Related
-- [Hubris host](../hosts/hubris.md)
-- [Mesh migration](mesh.md)
-- [VPS hardening](vps-hardening.md)
-
-## Changelog
-
-### 2026-04-28 — wiki entry created
-Initial documentation.
-
-### 2026-04-23 — VPS SSH hardened to mesh-only
-Public `:22` blocked at nftables. Key-only sshd. See [VPS hardening](vps-hardening.md).
-
-### 2026-04-22 — iMac key authorized on hubris
-`d.toro.v@pm.me` added to `/etc/pve/priv/authorized_keys`.

inventory.yaml

@@ -1,122 +1,161 @@
-# Homelab inventory — canonical structured topology
+# Homelab inventory — canonical structured topology.
 #
-# This file is the single source of truth for hosts, services, and mesh
-# addresses. Everything in hosts/*.yaml is generated from this file by
-# mcp/build_host_files.py — do not edit hosts/*.yaml by hand.
+# Single source of truth. hosts/*.yaml is generated from this file by
+# mcp/build_host_files.py; do NOT edit those by hand.
 #
 # Conventions:
-#   - hostname keys here MUST match the actual `hostname` of the machine
-#     (or, on macOS, `scutil --get LocalHostName` if set).
+#   - hostname keys MUST match the actual `hostname` of the machine (on
+#     macOS: `scutil --get LocalHostName` if set).
 #   - `os:` one of: linux, macos
-#   - `kind:` one of: proxmox-host, lxc, vm, workstation
+#   - `kind:` one of: proxmox-host, lxc, vm, workstation, external
+#     ("external" is reserved for hosts the homelab CLI manages via ssh but
+#      that aren't homelab clients themselves — e.g. the IONOS netbird VPS
+#      with no /etc/age/key.txt and no /opt/homelab-context clone.)
 #   - `mesh:` lists addresses the host is reachable at. Both `netbird` and
-#     `tailscale` are accepted during the in-flight migration
-#     (see infrastructure/mesh.md). Prefer netbird FQDNs over raw IPs.
-#   - `age_pubkey:` is provisioned by the secrets-issuance service on first
-#     bootstrap and committed back here. New entries leave it empty.
+#     `tailscale` are accepted during the migration (see infrastructure/mesh.md).
+#     Prefer netbird FQDNs over raw IPs.
+#   - `age_pubkey:` provisioned by secrets-issuance on first bootstrap and
+#     committed back via `homelab client add --finalize-pubkey <key>`.
 #   - When a service moves hosts, update only the `services:` section here;
-#     never duplicate the address elsewhere.
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Static config (mesh + service endpoints)
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+#     never duplicate addresses elsewhere.
+#   - `ssh.user:` per-host login user. Default is `root` if omitted (matches
+#     every LXC + the PVE host). Set explicitly for workstations whose login
+#     user differs from `root`. Used by the `homelab` CLI to build
+#     `user@host` and to inform anyone running raw `netbird ssh` (which
+#     defaults to the LOCAL username — the gotcha that creates "user not
+#     found" errors when ssh'ing INTO machines that only have `root`).
+#
+# `homelab client add/remove` does surgical line-edits — comments survive.
+# Avoid round-tripping the file through yaml.safe_dump (it strips comments).
 
 mesh:
-  primary: netbird           # preferred for new clients
-  accepted: [netbird, tailscale]
+  primary: netbird
+  accepted:
+  - netbird
+  - tailscale
   netbird_subnet: 100.122.0.0/16
   netbird_domain: netbird.selfhosted
-
-# Top-level service registry. Each entry resolves to a host above plus a URL.
+# Service contract (Oikos, 2026-07-05): each service should carry
+#   backend        host/container that runs it (required)
+#   url            public URL if ingress-exposed
+#   doc_page       owning wiki page
+#   config_repo    tracked config repo, if any (mutations go commit+push)
+#   health         health-check URL if it differs from `url`
+#   risk_notes     what an agent must know before touching it
+# See oikos/ontology.yaml + oikos/policy.yaml.
 services:
   proxmox_ui:
     url: https://proxmox.hubris.network
     backend: hubris
     port: 8006
-
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/hosts/hubris.md
+    risk_notes: hypervisor UI — changes here affect every guest on the node
   gitea:
     url: https://git.hubris.network
     backend: gitea
     backend_url: http://192.168.8.121:3000
-
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/104-gitea.md
+    config_repo: dtoro/gitea-customizations
+    risk_notes: hosts all config repos + deploy webhooks; outage blocks auto-deploy and sync
   caddy:
     backend: caddy
     role: reverse-proxy
     note: terminates all *.hubris.network
-
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/121-caddy.md
+    config_repo: dtoro/caddy-conf
+    risk_notes: wide blast radius — every *.hubris.network route rides on it (see oikos/policy.yaml service_overrides)
   authentik:
     url: https://auth.hubris.network
-    backend: authentik
-
-  dnsmasq:
-    backend: authentik
-    note: split-horizon DNS, /etc/dnsmasq.d/hubris-split.conf
-
+    backend: netbird-vps
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md
+    note: >-
+      core runs on the VPS since 2026-05-31; LAN forward-auth outpost is
+      auth-outpost (LXC 106) at 192.168.8.6:9000. Previous backend value
+      "authentik" referenced the retired embedded-outpost host (LXC 124).
+    risk_notes: SSO provider — outage locks login to OIDC/forward-auth services
+  dns:
+    backend: dns
+    note: Technitium DNS, split-horizon zone
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/107-dns.md
+    risk_notes: LAN-wide resolver — misconfig breaks name resolution for every client
   jellyfin:
     url: https://media.hubris.network
     backend: jellyfin
-
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/101-jellyfin.md
+    risk_notes: native Authentik OIDC via SSO-Auth plugin, no Caddy forward-auth gate; VAAPI transcode depends on GPU passthrough on strong
   nextcloud:
     url: https://cloud.hubris.network
     backend: nextcloud
-
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/114-nextcloud.md
   paperless:
     url: https://paperless.hubris.network
     backend: paperless
-
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/103-paperless.md
+    risk_notes: document archive — treat data as irreplaceable; DB operations are destructive-class
   matrix:
     url: https://matrix.hubris.network
     backend: elementsynapse
-
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/118-elementsynapse.md
+    risk_notes: alert/approval channel for Oikos — outage silences agent escalation
   photos:
     url: https://photos.hubris.network
     backend: mule-images
-
-  photos_new:
-    url: https://photos-new.hubris.network
-    backend: mule-photos-new
-
-  plato:
-    url: https://plato.hubris.network
-    backend: plato
-
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/120-mule-images.md
+    config_repo: dtoro/mule-image
   arr_stack:
     backend: arriman
     note: jellyseerr / qbit / sab on docker compose
-
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/122-arriman.md
   artifacto:
     backend: apps
     url: https://artifacto.hubris.network
-
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/105-apps.md
+    config_repo: dtoro/Artifacto
+  trmnl:
+    backend: trmnl
+    url: https://trmnl.hubris.network
+    note: self-hosted middleware for TRMNL e-ink plugins (polled by TRMNL cloud)
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/128-trmnl.md
+    config_repo: dtoro/terminalito
   zimaos:
     url: https://zimaos.hubris.network
     backend: zimaos
-
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/vms/100-zimaos.md
   haos:
     backend: haos
-
-  # New services introduced by this plan.
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/vms/108-haos.md
+  teddycloud:
+    url: https://teddy.hubris.network
+    backend: teddycloud
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/containers/131-teddycloud.md
+    note: self-hosted TeddyCloud (Toniebox cloud reimplementation), docker compose
+    risk_notes: no Caddy forward-auth gate (unlike sab.hubris.network on the same Caddyfile) —
+      reachable to anyone on the LAN/mesh who can resolve teddy.hubris.network; undocumented
+      in inventory.yaml until 2026-07-06 (drift-caught)
   homelab_mcp:
     backend: apps
     port: 9810
-    netbird_host: apps.netbird.selfhosted
-    endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9810/sse
-    note: MCP server. Read-only context + management. Mesh-only.
-
+    systemd_unit: homelab-mcp
+    public_host: mcp.hubris.network
+    endpoint: https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+    doc_page: knowledge/wiki/infrastructure/homelab-context.md
+    config_repo: dtoro/Homelab-Docs
+    note: MCP server. Read-only context + management. Reachable on the LAN via Caddy
+      and from off-LAN via Netbird (192.168.8.0/24 is a network resource routed through
+      hubris).
+    risk_notes: agents' primary read surface — outage degrades every agent to grepping the clone
   secrets_issuance:
     backend: apps
     port: 9820
-    netbird_host: apps.netbird.selfhosted
-    endpoint: http://apps.netbird.selfhosted:9820/issue
-    note: Issues per-client age private keys. Mesh-only.
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Hosts (Proxmox host + LXCs + VMs + workstations)
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
+    systemd_unit: secrets-issuance
+    public_host: secrets.hubris.network
+    endpoint: https://secrets.hubris.network/issue
+    doc_page: .agents/operations/agent-enrollment.md
+    config_repo: dtoro/Homelab-Docs
+    note: Issues per-client age private keys. Gated at source-IP layer (mesh + LAN
+      subnets in MESH_SUBNETS).
+    risk_notes: identity issuance — any change is security-sensitive; key operations are destructive-class
 hosts:
-
-  # ----- The hypervisor -----
   hubris:
     kind: proxmox-host
     os: linux
@@ -127,25 +166,56 @@ hosts:
         ip: 100.122.38.109
         fqdn: proxmox-server.netbird.selfhosted
     ssh:
-      port: 22                 # OpenSSH
-      netbird_port: 22022      # see infrastructure/ssh-access.md
+      port: 22
+      netbird_port: 22022
+      user: root
     mounts:
-      - /mnt/library           # shared lvmthin
-    age_pubkey: ""             # filled by issuance on first bootstrap
-
-  # ----- LXC containers (all on hubris) -----
+    - /mnt/library
+    age_pubkey: age1xkklkvnk5z0fsnh6cfgv70hy9ksfy8rdprwerzw4yk3p4p7cxcqs2yvpz6
+  trmnl:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 128
+    host: hubris
+    os: linux
+    role: trmnl-middleware
+    lan_ip: 192.168.8.211
+    public_host: trmnl.hubris.network
+    # not yet mesh/SOPS-enrolled — see containers/128-trmnl.md
+  house:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 129
+    host: strong
+    os: linux
+    role: family-planner
+    lan_ip: 192.168.8.244
+    public_host: house.hubris.network
+    notes:
+    - Docker host for Yuvomi (family planner). Created 2026-06-26.
+    - Migrated from hubris to strong 2026-07-05 (Phase 1 of strong migration plan).
+    - Runs Yuvomi container + WebDAV doc bridge to paperless
+    - 192.168.8.212 was the hubris IP before migration (briefly picked up by teddycloud via
+      DHCP; teddycloud has since been given a static IP, see hosts.teddycloud)
+    age_pubkey: age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h
   jellyfin:
     kind: lxc
     pve_id: 101
-    host: hubris
+    host: strong
     os: linux
     role: media-server
-    lan_ip: 192.168.8.206
+    lan_ip: 192.168.8.246
     public_host: media.hubris.network
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: jellyfin.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    mounts: [/mnt/library]
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
+    mesh:
+      tailscale:
+        fqdn: jellyfin
+    mounts:
+    - /mnt/media_local
+    notes:
+    - Jellyfin 10.11.11 with VAAPI hardware acceleration (Radeon 680M iGPU on strong)
+    - 4 cores / 8 GiB RAM / 1 GiB swap
+    - SSO-Auth plugin v4.0.0.4 with Authentik OIDC (no Caddy forward-auth gate)
+    - GPU passed via dev0+dev1: /dev/dri/renderD128 + card0
+    - Migrated from hubris to strong 2026-07-05 (Phase 2). Library on ludo-lvm.
+    age_pubkey: ''
   nfs-export:
     kind: lxc
     pve_id: 102
@@ -153,9 +223,6 @@ hosts:
     os: linux
     role: storage-export
     lan_ip: 192.168.8.200
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: nfs-export.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
   paperless:
     kind: lxc
     pve_id: 103
@@ -164,10 +231,12 @@ hosts:
     role: document-archive
     lan_ip: 192.168.8.130
     public_host: paperless.hubris.network
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: paperless.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    mounts: [/mnt/library]
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
+    mesh:
+      tailscale:
+        fqdn: paperless
+    mounts:
+    - /mnt/library
+    age_pubkey: ''
   gitea:
     kind: lxc
     pve_id: 104
@@ -177,12 +246,14 @@ hosts:
     lan_ip: 192.168.8.121
     public_host: git.hubris.network
     backend_port: 3000
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: gitea.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    mounts: [/mnt/library]
+    mesh:
+      tailscale:
+        fqdn: gitea
+    mounts:
+    - /mnt/library
     notes:
-      - "Bare repos live at /mnt/library/repos/dtoro/*.git"
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
+    - Bare repos live at /mnt/library/repos/dtoro/*.git
+    age_pubkey: ''
   apps:
     kind: lxc
     pve_id: 105
@@ -190,16 +261,40 @@ hosts:
     os: linux
     role: docker-apps
     lan_ip: 192.168.8.205
-    public_hosts: [artifacto.hubris.network]
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: apps.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    mounts: [/mnt/library]
+    public_hosts:
+    - artifacto.hubris.network
+    mesh:
+      tailscale:
+        ip: 100.121.171.122
+        fqdn: apps
+    mounts:
+    - /mnt/library
     runs:
-      - artifacto
-      - plantuml
-      - homelab-mcp           # introduced by this plan
-      - secrets-issuance      # introduced by this plan
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
+    - artifacto
+    - plantuml
+    - homelab-mcp
+    - secrets-issuance
+    # booklore removed 2026-06-29 → migrated to grimmory (LXC 130)
+    age_pubkey: age1duyl8mkpgu80uv934dy8q7enqjms6yvdz264hme8uryuxmvvqesq6rusq0
+  auth-outpost:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 106
+    host: hubris
+    os: linux
+    role: authentik-gateway
+    lan_ip: 192.168.8.6
+    notes:
+    - Runs Authentik outpost (reverse-proxy/SSO enforcement) for protected services
+  dns:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 107
+    host: hubris
+    os: linux
+    role: dns-server
+    lan_ip: 192.168.8.2
+    notes:
+    - Technitium DNS, split-horizon zone for *.hubris.network
+    - Primary DNS for 192.168.8.0/24 LAN (inventory.services.dns references this)
   nextcloud:
     kind: lxc
     pve_id: 114
@@ -208,32 +303,37 @@ hosts:
     role: file-sync
     lan_ip: 192.168.8.224
     public_host: cloud.hubris.network
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: nextcloud.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    mounts: [/mnt/library]
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
+    mesh:
+      tailscale:
+        fqdn: nextcloud
+    mounts:
+    - /mnt/library
+    age_pubkey: ''
   elementsynapse:
     kind: lxc
     pve_id: 118
-    host: hubris
+    host: strong
     os: linux
     role: matrix-server
-    lan_ip: 192.168.8.239
+    lan_ip: 192.168.8.242
     public_host: matrix.hubris.network
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: elementsynapse.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
+    mesh:
+      tailscale: {}
+    notes:
+    - Migrated from hubris to strong 2026-07-05 (Phase 1 of strong migration plan).
   sophia:
     kind: lxc
     pve_id: 119
     host: hubris
     os: linux
     role: workshop
-    lan_ip: 192.168.8.157
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: sophia.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    mounts: [/mnt/library]
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
+    lan_ip: 192.168.8.109
+    mesh:
+      tailscale:
+        fqdn: sophia
+    mounts:
+    - /mnt/library
+    age_pubkey: ''
   mule-images:
     kind: lxc
     pve_id: 120
@@ -242,10 +342,12 @@ hosts:
     role: photo-management
     lan_ip: 192.168.8.136
     public_host: photos.hubris.network
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: mule-images.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    mounts: [/mnt/library]
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
+    mesh:
+      tailscale:
+        fqdn: muleimage
+    mounts:
+    - /mnt/library
+    age_pubkey: ''
   caddy:
     kind: lxc
     pve_id: 121
@@ -254,112 +356,263 @@ hosts:
     role: reverse-proxy
     lan_ip: 192.168.8.175
     notes:
-      - "Terminates all *.hubris.network"
-      - "/etc/caddy is a git checkout of dtoro/caddy-conf"
-    peers: [authentik, gitea]
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: caddy.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
+    - Terminates all *.hubris.network
+    - /etc/caddy is a git checkout of dtoro/caddy-conf
+    peers:
+    - authentik
+    - gitea
   arriman:
     kind: lxc
     pve_id: 122
-    host: hubris
+    host: strong
     os: linux
     role: arr-stack
-    lan_ip: 192.168.8.132
-    public_hosts: [jellyseerr.hubris.network, qbit.hubris.network, sab.hubris.network]
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: arriman.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    mounts: [/mnt/library]
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
-  claudio-bot:
-    kind: lxc
-    pve_id: 123
-    host: hubris
-    os: linux
-    role: matrix-agent
-    lan_ip: 192.168.8.230
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: claudio-bot.netbird.selfhosted}}
+    lan_ip: 192.168.8.245
+    public_hosts:
+    - jellyseerr.hubris.network
+    - qbit.hubris.network
+    - sab.hubris.network
+    mesh:
+      tailscale:
+        fqdn: arr
+    mounts:
+    - /mnt/media_local
     notes:
-      - "Reads /opt/homelab-context/ on startup"
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
-  authentik:
+    - Migrated from hubris to strong 2026-07-05 (Phase 2). Library on ludo-lvm.
+    - Contains homarr, radarr, sonarr, lidarr, sabnzbd, qbittorrent, bazarr, flaresolverr, prowlarr, jellyseerr
+    - qBittorrent auth subnet whitelist expanded to 192.168.8.0/24 (for seanime + Caddy access)
+    age_pubkey: ''
+  grimmory:
     kind: lxc
-    pve_id: 124
-    host: hubris
+    pve_id: 130
+    host: strong
     os: linux
-    role: idp
-    lan_ip: 192.168.8.180
-    public_host: auth.hubris.network
+    role: book-library
+    lan_ip: 192.168.8.247
+    public_host: books.hubris.network
+    mounts:
+    - /mnt/media_local
     notes:
-      - "Also hosts split-horizon dnsmasq: /etc/dnsmasq.d/hubris-split.conf"
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: authentik.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
-  plato:
+    - Docker host for Grimmory (community fork of Booklore). Created 2026-06-29.
+    - Migrated from hubris to strong 2026-07-05 (Phase 2d). Books on ludo-lvm.
+    age_pubkey: age1uellsemnjrzgfg9fxw4jefpy05laxzggwnwhh6ny3wl7alyp6v8q0muxet
+  teddycloud:
     kind: lxc
-    pve_id: 126
+    pve_id: 131
     host: hubris
     os: linux
-    role: app
-    lan_ip: 192.168.8.190
-    public_host: plato.hubris.network
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: plato.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    mounts: [/mnt/library/documents/plato]
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
-  mule-photos-new:
+    role: teddycloud
+    lan_ip: 192.168.8.150
+    public_host: teddy.hubris.network
+    mounts:
+    - /mnt/library
+    state: active
+    notes:
+    - Docker host for TeddyCloud (ghcr.io/toniebox-reverse-engineering/teddycloud), a
+      self-hosted reimplementation of the Toniebox cloud backend. Debian 12 (bookworm).
+    - 1 core / 1 GiB RAM / 512 MiB swap / 16 GiB rootfs (local-lvm).
+    - Predates the client-enrollment convention — undocumented in inventory.yaml until
+      2026-07-06, when Oikos's drift detector (oikos/drift.py) caught pve_id 131 live on
+      hubris (`pct list`) with no inventory entry. Static IP assigned 2026-07-05 during the
+      strong migration (was picking up 192.168.8.243 via DHCP before that — see
+      hosts/strong.md's 2026-07-05 changelog).
+    - No age_pubkey / homelab-context enrollment — not a homelab CLI client, just a
+      docker-compose app container. Not a required follow-up unless it needs secrets.
+  seanime:
     kind: lxc
-    pve_id: 127
-    host: hubris
+    pve_id: 133
+    host: strong
     os: linux
-    role: photo-management
-    lan_ip: 192.168.8.181
-    public_host: photos-new.hubris.network
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: mule-photos-new.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
-  # ----- VMs (on hubris) -----
+    role: anime-media-server
+    lan_ip: 192.168.8.248
+    public_host: seanime.hubris.network
+    mounts:
+    - /mnt/media_local/anime
+    notes:
+    - Seanime anime media server for online streaming + local library scanning
+    - Created 2026-07-05. Binary at /opt/seanime/bin/seanime, systemd service.
+    - Connected to qBittorrent on arriman (192.168.8.245:8080)
+    - 8 online streaming extensions installed (HiAnime, AniWatch, KickAssAnime, etc.)
+    - /anime mounted from strong ludo-lvm (/mnt/media_local/anime)
+    - Caddy: https://seanime.hubris.network → 192.168.8.248:43211
+    - qBittorrent auth subnet whitelist expanded to 192.168.8.0/24 for seanime access
+  romm:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 134
+    host: strong
+    os: linux
+    role: rom-manager
+    lan_ip: 192.168.8.249
+    public_host: roms.hubris.network
+    mounts:
+    - /mnt/media_local
+    notes:
+    - Docker host for RomM (romm.app) self-hosted ROM manager. Created 2026-07-05.
+    - MariaDB sidecar at /opt/romm/docker-compose.yml.
+    - ROMs on ludo-lvm media volume at /mnt/media_local/roms.
+    - 1 core / 2 GiB RAM / 16 GiB rootfs (ludo-lvm).
   zimaos:
     kind: vm
     pve_id: 100
     host: hubris
     os: linux
     role: nas-frontend-eval
+    lan_ip: 192.168.8.195
     public_host: zimaos.hubris.network
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: zimaos.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
   haos:
     kind: vm
     pve_id: 108
     host: hubris
     os: linux
     role: home-automation
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: haos.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
-  # ----- Workstations (roaming, primary agent clients) -----
+    lan_ip: 192.168.8.101
+    mesh:
+      tailscale:
+        fqdn: homeassistant
   republic-laptop:
     kind: workstation
     os: linux
     role: primary-dev
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: republic-laptop.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
+    mesh:
+      netbird:
+        fqdn: republic-laptop.netbird.selfhosted
+    ssh:
+      user: dtoro
   mac-mini:
     kind: workstation
     os: macos
     role: dev
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: mac-mini.netbird.selfhosted}}
+    lan_ip: 192.168.178.182
+    mesh:
+      netbird:
+        fqdn: mac-mini-234-17.netbird.selfhosted
+    ssh:
+      user: dtoro
     notes:
-      - "Only macOS in the fleet. Bootstrap uses launchd."
-    age_pubkey: ""
-
-  ludo-mini:
-    kind: workstation
+    - Only macOS in the fleet. Bootstrap uses launchd.
+    age_pubkey: age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs
+  strong:
+    kind: proxmox-host
     os: linux
-    role: dev
-    mesh: {netbird: {fqdn: ludo-mini.netbird.selfhosted}}
-    age_pubkey: ""
+    role: hypervisor
+    lan_ip: 192.168.178.181
+    ssh:
+      user: root
+    notes:
+    - Reformatted from Linux workstation ("ludo-mini" in this wiki, still
+      the machine's nickname) to Proxmox VE 9.2.3 on 2026-07-01. Renamed
+      the inventory/wiki identity from ludo-mini to strong on the same day
+      so it matches the OS/cluster hostname everywhere (bootstrap looks up
+      hosts/$(hostname).yaml, so a mismatch would break enrollment).
+    - Joined hubris's "Homelab" cluster same day. 2-node, no QDevice
+      tiebreaker yet — see hosts/hubris.md quorum note.
+    - Netbird not yet installed (fresh OS wiped prior enrollment); reachable
+      today only via the household LAN / existing Fritz static route to
+      192.168.8.0/24. Re-enroll in mesh as a follow-up if off-LAN access
+      to this host itself (not just its future guests) is needed.
+    - First step of the planned library-SSD migration — see
+      .hermes/plans/2026-06-03_110000-library-ssd-migration-to-ludo-mini.md
+      (filename kept as-is, it's a historical planning doc). Only Phase 1
+      (Proxmox install + cluster join) is done; no physical
+      drive move, service migration, or GPU passthrough has happened yet.
+    age_pubkey: age1rtwvdct6avjkr3cyxv3vue3vqx4d524fjfr3vk7xrnvyrylnry5sm54sn4
+  netbird-vps:
+    kind: external
+    os: linux
+    role: netbird-mgmt
+    mesh:
+      netbird:
+        ip: 100.122.165.149
+        fqdn: netbird-ionos.netbird.selfhosted
+    ssh:
+      user: root
+    notes:
+    - Public IONOS VPS — hosts the vanilla netbird mgmt+signal+relay+dashboard
+      stack + host coturn (see infrastructure/vps-hardening.md +
+      infrastructure/mesh.md changelog 2026-05-21).
+    - NOT a homelab client. No /etc/age/key.txt, no /opt/homelab-context
+      clone. Managed via ssh from hubris; sshd is locked to hubris's pubkey.
+    - Public IPv4 82.165.190.79. Auto-patching via unattended-upgrades.
+    - Configs rendered by `homelab render-vps-configs` from
+      vps/turnserver.conf.tmpl + vps/management.json.tmpl, with secrets
+      decrypted from secrets/turn-shared-secret.yaml +
+      secrets/netbird-authentik-oidc.yaml on hubris.
+  rclone:
+    kind: lxc
+    os: linux
+    role: backup
+    mesh:
+      netbird:
+        fqdn: rclone.netbird.selfhosted
+    age_pubkey: age1pwtdws2thdh7vzp2dzttl3zxgcs2tgpcsjsqgw3q04nyml4kvuqq467u4x
+
+# Destroyed nodes (lifecycle state: destroyed — see oikos/ontology.yaml).
+# Kept so agents can answer "what happened to X?" from structured data and
+# so drift detectors can flag anything still referencing them.
+# Full narrative table: containers/index.md "Recently destroyed".
+archaeology:
+  claudio-bot:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 123
+    destroyed: 2026-06-04
+    reason: replaced by Hermes Agent on mac-mini; monitoring moved to homelab-health-watchdog cron
+  plato:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 126
+    destroyed: 2026-06-28
+    reason: notes workspace decommissioned; data retained at /mnt/library/documents/plato
+  mule-photos-new:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 127
+    destroyed: 2026-05-22
+    reason: PhotoPrism test stack promoted to LXC 120 (Mulimage 2.0 merge)
+  heaper:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 116
+    destroyed: 2026-05-14
+    reason: decommissioned; data retained at /mnt/library/heaper
+  syncthing:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 109
+    destroyed: 2026-05-14
+    reason: decommissioned; library subtree was empty
+  seafile:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 125
+    destroyed: 2026-05-13
+    reason: Seafile Pro evaluation rejected; files.hubris.network removed from caddy + dns
+  arr-yunohost:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 100
+    destroyed: 2026-04-28
+    reason: migrated to docker stack on arriman (LXC 122)
+  flaresolverr:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 106
+    destroyed: 2026-04-28
+    reason: folded into the arriman docker compose
+  marimo:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 107
+    destroyed: 2026-04-28
+    reason: decommissioned
+  photoprism:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 110
+    destroyed: 2026-04-28
+    reason: replaced by mule-images (LXC 120)
+  karakeep:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 111
+    destroyed: 2026-04-28
+    reason: decommissioned
+  immich:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 112
+    destroyed: 2026-04-28
+    reason: replaced by mule-images (LXC 120)
+  reticulum:
+    kind: lxc
+    pve_id: 115
+    destroyed: 2026-04-28
+    reason: decommissioned

investigations/index.md

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# Investigations
-
-Time-stamped incident reports and experiments. One entry per incident; the entry is the canonical source. Per-node changelog entries link back here.
-
-## Index
-
-| Date         | Title                                                              | Status        |
-| ------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------- |
-| 2026-04-21   | [Hubris crash loop — thermal + USB drive](2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md) | Drive removal A/B test passing as of 2026-04-28 (3+ days uptime) |
-
-## Conventions
-
-- File name: `YYYY-MM-DD-<slug>.md`. Use the *first* date if the incident spans multiple days.
-- Mandatory sections: Summary, Timeline, Root cause, Mitigations applied, Open questions.
-- Update the entry as the situation evolves; never rewrite history. Add new dated sections at the bottom.
-- Link back from every node's changelog that's affected.

knowledge/GLOSSARY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Glossary
+
+Terms and abbreviations used throughout the homelab wiki.
+
+| Term | Meaning |
+|------|---------|
+| **Authentik** | SSO/identity provider. Core runs on the VPS; forward-auth outpost at LXC 106 on hubris |
+| **Caddy** | Reverse proxy (LXC 121). Terminates TLS for every `*.hubris.network` hostname |
+| **Caveman** | Terse communication standard for agent responses — no filler, keep substance |
+| **Forward-auth** | Caddy snippet that delegates authentication to an Authentik outpost. Protects web UIs like qBit, SABnzbd |
+| **Gitea** | Git server at `git.hubris.network`. Hosts all tracked config repos |
+| **Gluetun** | WireGuard VPN sidecar on arriman. All \*arr traffic routes through it |
+| **HAOS** | Home Assistant Operating System. VM 108 on hubris |
+| **Hubris** | Primary Proxmox VE node (GMKtec NucBox M6 Ultra). PVE hostname, cluster member 1 |
+| **LXC** | Linux Container (Proxmox). VM-like isolation without a full OS kernel |
+| **LVM-thin** | Thin-provisioned logical volume manager. Used for all container/VM storage |
+| **MCP** | Model Context Protocol (MCP server at `mcp.hubris.network`). Structured tools for agents to query homelab state |
+| **Mesh** | Overlay VPN for off-LAN connectivity. Netbird is current; Tailscale is legacy |
+| **Netbird** | Preferred mesh VPN. VPS hosts the management plane; all homelab nodes are members |
+| **OIDC** | OpenID Connect. Protocol used by Authentik for SSO login flows |
+| **Oikos** | Agent operating model ([.agents/OIKOS.md](../.agents/OIKOS.md)). OODA loop, risk classes, policy, ontology |
+| **PVE** | Proxmox Virtual Environment — the hypervisor on both hubris and strong |
+| **SOPS** | `sops` — Mozilla SOPS. Encrypts secrets with age keys so they live in the git repo |
+| **Strong** | Secondary Proxmox VE node. Cluster member 2 (hostname `strong`, nickname ludo/ludo-mini) |
+| **Traefik** | Reverse proxy on IONOS VPS. Serves `*.hubris.network` to the public internet |
+| **VAAPI** | Video Acceleration API. Intel/AMD GPU-based hardware transcode for Jellyfin |
+| **VPS** | Virtual Private Server at IONOS (`82.165.190.79`). Runs Authentik core + Netbird management |
+| **\\*arr** | Media automation suite: Sonarr (TV), Radarr (movies), Lidarr (music), Prowlarr (indexer), Bazarr (subtitles), Readarr (books — not in use) |
+
+## See also
+
+- [Infrastructure index](wiki/infrastructure/index.md) — cross-cutting systems each with their own doc page
+- [OIKOS operating model](../.agents/OIKOS.md) — agent policy, risk classes, lifecycle

knowledge/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Knowledge
+
+The durable, authoritative current-state documentation of the homelab: one page per node and per
+cross-cutting system, synthesized from live state and evidence. Structure and rules are in
+[the knowledge schema](../.agents/domains/knowledge/schema.md).
+
+| Section | What it covers |
+|---------|----------------|
+| [wiki/hosts/](wiki/hosts/index.md) | Proxmox host narratives — `hubris`, `strong`. |
+| [wiki/containers/](wiki/containers/index.md) | LXC fleet — one page per container, plus the master table and archaeology. |
+| [wiki/vms/](wiki/vms/index.md) | Virtual machines — ZimaOS, Home Assistant OS. |
+| [wiki/infrastructure/](wiki/infrastructure/index.md) | Cross-cutting systems — DNS, ingress, mesh, storage, auth, monitoring, generated topology. |
+| [sources/](sources/index.md) | External reference docs and the pointer to incident evidence. |
+| [GLOSSARY.md](GLOSSARY.md) | Term definitions. |

knowledge/log.md

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Knowledge — operations log
+
+Append-only record of documentation-maintenance operations on the knowledge wiki (restructures,
+source ingests, lint sweeps). One line per operation, newest last. Infrastructure changes belong in
+each page's `## Changelog` and the Oikos change ledger, not here.
+
+## [2026-07-06] restructure | moved node/infrastructure narratives under knowledge/wiki/; references under knowledge/sources/; repointed inventory doc_page fields and gen-topology.py output.
+## [2026-07-06] lint | banned-vocabulary scan of knowledge/ clean; added .agents/skills/docs-lint and knowledge/wiki/hosts/index.md.
+## [2026-07-06] lint | fixed 126 pre-existing broken links (124-authentik.md rename, investigations/plans moved to archive/done, archive/ sibling depth, destroyed-node delinks); 2 remaining are an intentional cross-repo reference.
+## [2026-07-06] restructure | Phase 6 consolidation: investigations/ -> knowledge/sources/investigations/; operations/ -> .agents/operations/; HERMES.md -> .agents/; deleted root OIKOS/CAVEMAN/CONTRIBUTING stubs.

knowledge/sources/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Sources
+
+Immutable evidence the wiki synthesizes from. External reference docs live under `references/`;
+incident evidence lives in [`investigations/`](investigations/index.md) (written once at
+incident time, then linked from the changelogs of the nodes they implicate).
+
+| Slug | Reference | Summary |
+|------|-----------|---------|
+| cert-sync-and-traefik-config | [references/cert-sync-and-traefik-config.md](references/cert-sync-and-traefik-config.md) | VPS traefik config and the LAN↔VPS certificate mirror. |

knowledge/sources/investigations/2026-06-01-mac-mini-onboarding.md

@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+# mac-mini onboarding — post-mortem & lessons learned
+
+Onboarded the `mac-mini` workstation (macOS Sequoia, arm64) into the hubris
+homelab context system with the `--with-hermes` profile. What follows is a
+chronological recap of every hitch, the fix, and the systemic improvements
+needed so the next workstation takes 5 min instead of an hour.
+
+## Session log
+
+### Step 1 — clone + symlink
+- Manually cloned `git.hubris.network/dtoro/Homelab-Docs` to `/Users/dtoro/Homelab-Docs`.
+- Created `/opt/homelab-context` → `/Users/dtoro/Homelab-Docs` symlink.
+- **Lesson:** bootstrap.sh was designed to do this from scratch, but we'd
+  already cloned by hand. The bootstrap's `clone exists; pulling` path handled
+  it gracefully.
+
+### Step 2 — hostname mismatch
+- `scutil --get LocalHostName` → `Davids-Mac-mini`
+- `hostname -s` → `Mac`
+- Inventory file: `hosts/mac-mini.yaml`
+- **Fix:** `sudo scutil --set LocalHostName mac-mini && sudo scutil --set HostName mac-mini`
+- **Lesson:** The bootstrap and `homelab whoami` use different hostname
+  resolution. Bootstrap uses `scutil --get LocalHostName` (correct on macOS),
+  but the `homelab` CLI binary uses `hostname -s`. Both need to match the
+  inventory key. On a fresh macOS machine, neither does.
+
+### Step 3 — bootstrap dependencies
+- pyyaml was missing → `pip install pyyaml`
+- age and sops were missing → `brew install age sops`
+- Netbird was already installed and connected ✓
+- **Lesson:** The bootstrap preflight handles these, but only if running
+  `bootstrap.sh` from the start. Since we ran it after manual setup, some
+  steps (netbird install) were correctly skipped as already-present.
+
+### Step 4 — full bootstrap with `--with-mcp --with-hermes`
+- Ran `sudo HOMELAB_GITEA_TOKEN=... bash bootstrap.sh --with-mcp --with-hermes`
+- Age key issued ✓
+- Launchd sync timer installed ✓
+- Goose binary installed ✓
+- Hermes CLI linked ✓
+- MCP config merged ✓
+- `refresh-creds` skipped (not yet a recipient) ⚠️
+- Cosmetics: `chown: dtoro: illegal group name` at the end (benign, macOS
+  group-naming quirk)
+
+### Step 5 — finalize from hubris
+- Ran `homelab client add mac-mini --finalize-pubkey <age...> --with-hermes` on
+  hubris
+- Push failed: `[rejected] main -> main (fetch first)` — hubris clone was
+  stale, bootstrap had already pushed from mac-mini
+- **Fix:** `git pull --rebase && git push` on hubris
+- **Lesson:** bootstrap pushes remote changes before hubris can finalize,
+  creating a race. The `homelab client add --finalize-pubkey` command should
+  pull before committing/pushing.
+
+### Step 6 — sops couldn't find the age key
+- `homelab secret hello` failed because sops looks in
+  `/Users/dtoro/.ssh/id_rsa` etc. by default, not `/etc/age/key.txt`
+- The `homelab` CLI re-execs via `sudo -E env SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE=... sops ...`,
+  but this requires passwordless sudo and the correct env var passthrough
+- **Fix:**
+  1. Added NOPASSWD sudo rules
+  2. Eventually `SOPS_AGE_KEY` env with the raw key content worked directly
+- **Lesson:** Document the explicit `SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE` incantation in
+  agent-enrollment troubleshooting. New clients can't assume `homelab secret`
+  works out of the gate — the sudo re-exec chain has permission pitfall.
+
+### Step 7 — OpenRouter key was a placeholder
+- `secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml` contained
+  `api_key: PLACEHOLDER_REPLACE_WITH_REAL_OPENROUTER_KEY`
+- User ran `sops` on hubris, but got the same error (age key not found on
+  hubris either — `/root/.config/sops/age/keys.txt` didn't exist)
+- **Fix:** `SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE=/etc/age/key.txt sops ...` on hubris.
+  Later: the user pasted the real key, but the sops file showed
+  `sk-or-...5c55` — the literal content was truncated with ellipsis.
+
+### Step 8 — editor loaded the wrong data
+- Neovim on the system is configured with `clipboard+=unnamedplus`, which
+  points `*` and `+` registers to the macOS clipboard manager rather than
+  X11. When editing SOPS files, this caused the **system clipboard** to be
+  pasted instead of the actual ciphertext.
+- This wasn't diagnosed during the session — the sops file would load empty
+  or show the wrong content because the editor's idea of "paste" was
+  disconnected from what sops expected.
+- **Fix:** Run `sops` with `EDITOR=nano` or another editor that doesn't
+  hijack OS clipboards:
+  ```bash
+  EDITOR=nano SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE=/etc/age/key.txt sops secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml
+  ```
+- **Lesson:** Add a strong warning to `hermes-agent.md` / `agent-enrollment.md`:
+  macOS neovim with `clipboard+=unnamedplus` silently breaks sops editing
+  because the paste register reads from the system clipboard instead of the
+  sops-managed buffer. Use `EDITOR=nano` or `EDITOR=vim` when running sops
+  interactively. Alternatively, override the clipboard option with
+  `EDITOR='nvim -c "set clipboard="'`.
+- Also useful for the troubleshooting table in `agent-enrollment.md` under a
+  new row: "sops file loads empty / wrong content on macOS"
+
+### Step 9 — model doesn't support tool use
+- Goose config pinned `nousresearch/hermes-4-405b` via OpenRouter
+- Error: `No endpoints found that support tool use`
+- **Fix:** Switched to `deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash` in
+  `~/.config/goose/config.yaml`
+- Also updated `operations/hermes-agent.md` with the correct model
+- **Lesson:** The default model in `bootstrap.sh` and `hermes-agent.md` was
+  never validated on OpenRouter for tool-use capability. Need to either:
+  (a) Pin a model known to work (`deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash`)
+  (b) Or have the bootstrap probe OpenRouter at install time
+
+### Step 10 — MCP homelab extension returns 404
+- Goose's homelab extension configured as `streamable_http` at
+  `https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp` returns HTTP 404
+- The actual MCP server runs on SSE (`/sse`), not streamable_http
+- **Known follow-up** from `hermes-agent.md` — server needs migration
+- **Workaround:** The agent works fine via the built-in `developer` extension
+  (shell + file) and the `homelab` CLI
+
+### Step 11 — git credential dance
+Several layers of issues with git authentication:
+
+1. **Directory permissions:** `/etc/homelab-context` was `0700 root` — dtoro
+   couldn't access the credential file, and git's `store` helper couldn't
+   create its `.lock` file.
+   - **Fix 1a:** `sudo chmod 755 /etc/homelab-context`
+   - **Fix 1b:** `sudo chown -R dtoro:staff /etc/homelab-context`
+
+2. **macOS built-in osxkeychain:** Apple's git has `osxkeychain` compiled in
+   as a default credential helper. Even after configuring the `store` helper,
+   git calls osxkeychain after every successful `get`, which prompts for
+   macOS keychain access.
+   - `credential.helper = ""` does NOT disable the compiled-in default
+   - The `store` helper's `.lock` file in `/etc/homelab-context/` also failed
+     silently, causing fallback behaviour
+   - **Fix:** Embed the credential in the remote URL directly:
+     `https://dtoro:TOKEN@git.hubris.network/dtoro/Homelab-Docs.git`
+   - This bypasses all credential helpers entirely
+
+3. **refresh-creds:** The credential is now managed by the remote URL.
+   If the PAT is rotated, `homelab refresh-creds` won't update the URL.
+   - **Workaround:** Run `git remote set-url origin` after `refresh-creds`
+
+### Step 12 — `homelab` CLI hostname detection
+- `homelab whoami` failed with `no hosts/Mac.yaml` because the CLI uses
+  `hostname -s` (returning `Mac`) while the bootstrap uses
+  `scutil --get LocalHostName` (which we fixed to `mac-mini`)
+- **Fix:** Set both `LocalHostName` and `HostName` via `scutil`
+- **Lesson:** The homelab CLI on macOS should prefer `scutil --get
+  LocalHostName` like the bootstrap does, or at least try both and pick the
+  one that matches an inventory key. This is a CLI bug.
+
+## Improvement backlog
+
+### High priority
+
+| # | Issue | Fix |
+|---|-------|-----|
+| 1 | Homelab CLI uses `hostname -s` on macOS; should use `scutil --get LocalHostName` to match bootstrap | Patch `bin/homelab` to try `scutil` first, fall back to `hostname -s` |
+| 2 | `homelab client add --finalize-pubkey` on hubris fails to push when remote is ahead (bootstrap pushes first) | `pull --rebase` before committing in `cmd_client_add` |
+| 3 | Default Goose model (`nousresearch/hermes-4-405b`) doesn't support tool use on OpenRouter | Update `bootstrap.sh` default and `hermes-agent.md` to `deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash` |
+| 4 | MCP server needs streamable_http migration | Follow-up #1 from `hermes-agent.md` — FastMCP `transport="sse"` → `transport="streamable_http"` |
+| 5 | `homelab refresh-creds` should also update embedded remote URLs | In `cmd_refresh_creds`, after writing the credential file, update any remote URL that has an embedded credential |
+
+### Medium priority
+
+| # | Issue | Fix |
+|---|-------|-----|
+| 6 | macOS neovim with `clipboard+=unnamedplus` breaks sops editing | Add troubleshooting row to `agent-enrollment.md`; recommend `EDITOR=nano` |
+| 7 | `/etc/homelab-context` directory with 0700 root permissions blocks non-root git | Change to 755 in `bootstrap.sh` on all OSes (or at least macOS) |
+| 8 | Bootstrap `chown` at end gives `illegal group name` on macOS | Fix group detection in bootstrap.sh for macOS |
+| 9 | `homelab secret` re-exec via sudo chain is fragile — needs passwordless sudo or TTY | Consider `SOPS_AGE_KEY` env-var fallback path in the CLI itself |
+
+### Low priority
+
+| # | Issue | Fix |
+|---|-------|-----|
+| 10 | Onboarding this machine revealed no `HERMES.md` file in the repo | Create the persona file for the Goose hints symlink |
+| 11 | Git credential `store` helper lock mechanism is OS-sensitive and fragile | Document embedded-URL pattern as the preferred approach for workstations |
+| 12 | AGENTS.md references `/opt/homelab-context/hosts/<hostname>.yaml` but the canonical path is now a symlink | Verify the path resolution edge cases |
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-06-01 — initial post-mortem
+Captured the full onboarding of mac-mini into the hubris homelab context
+system, including the hostname mismatch, sudo/sops credential chain, model
+selection, git credential gymnastics, and editor clipboard interference.
+
+### 2026-06-02 — MCP server migrated to streamable-http
+Item #4 resolved. FastMCP server now uses `transport="streamable-http"` (hyphen,
+not underscore), serving at `https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp`. All doc references
+and client configs (Goose, bootstrap.sh, agent-enrollment.md) updated. Service
+re-deployed on apps LXC (105).

knowledge/sources/investigations/2026-06-03-moonlight-sunshine-wifi-jitter.md

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+# 2026-06-03 — Moonlight/Sunshine game streaming unstable over WiFi
+
+## Summary
+
+[`ludo-mini`](../../../hosts/strong.yaml) runs Sunshine as the game-streaming server; [`mac-mini`](../../../hosts/mac-mini.yaml) runs Moonlight as the client. Despite both machines being on the same physical subnet (192.168.178.0/24), streaming was unstable — stuttering, dropouts, and high latency. Root cause: **mac-mini is connected only via WiFi**, while ludo-mini is wired Ethernet (2.5 Gbps). WiFi throughput shows 1-second UDP dropouts and high jitter (28 ms stddev), which breaks real-time video streaming.
+
+## Timeline
+
+### Pre-existing state
+- ludo-mini: wired Ethernet (eno1, 2.5 Gbps), 192.168.178.181/24
+- mac-mini: WiFi (en1, 802.11ac, 234 Mbps Tx rate, 1 stream, -60 dBm RSSI), 192.168.178.99/24
+- Both on the same subnet via a consumer router at 192.168.178.1
+- Sunshine configured: bitrate=80 Mbps, encoder=amf (AMD GPU), fec_percentage=5, hevc_mode=2
+- Moonlight configured: bitrate=57 Mbps, fps=60, localaddr=192.168.178.181 (correct)
+
+### 2026-06-03 — investigation
+**Network tests (iperf3 between mac-mini ↔ ludo-mini):**
+- TCP throughput: 49–86 Mbps, average ~65 Mbps — highly variable
+- UDP throughput: 1-second complete dropout during a 5-second test; 0% loss otherwise
+- Ping: 4.7 ms avg, but **28 ms stddev**, max **138 ms** — WiFi-level jitter
+- Netbird P2P connection also showed 7 ms latency over the tunnel (unnecessary given same-subnet direct connection)
+
+**Additional findings:**
+- mac-mini has a built-in Ethernet port (en0) but it is inactive — no cable connected
+- mac-mini also has Thunderbolt Ethernet adapters (en5, en6, en7) all inactive
+- ludo-mini's en0 shows `speed 2500` (2.5 GbE)
+- Netbird routes `192.168.8.0/24` via `utun100`, but 192.168.178.0/24 traffic stays on `en1`
+
+## Root cause
+
+mac-mini is on WiFi. WiFi introduces:
+1. **Throughput variance** — 49–86 Mbps TCP fluctuation
+2. **Dropouts** — 1-second UDP blackouts from radio retransmissions
+3. **Jitter** — 28 ms stddev with spikes to 138 ms
+
+Moonlight/Sunshine streams real-time video over UDP. Any jitter spike or dropout causes visual stutter or frame drops. The 57 Mbps Moonlight bitrate was too aggressive for the WiFi link's consistency, even though the average throughput is ~65 Mbps.
+
+## Mitigations applied
+
+### mac-mini — Moonlight (via `defaults write`)
+
+| Setting | Before | After | Rationale |
+||---------|--------|-------|-----------|
+|| bitrate | 57 Mbps | 25 Mbps | Reduce to a level WiFi can sustain consistently |
+|| framepacing | off (0) | on (1) | Smooths frame timing over variable latency |
+|| fps | 30 | 60 | Restored to game-appropriate value |
+
+### mac-mini — Moonlight (current, wired — 2026-06-04)
+
+| Setting | WiFi value | Wired value | Rationale |
+||---------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
+|| bitrate | 60 Mbps | 80 Mbps | Wired 1 GbE can sustain comfortably |
+|| framepacing | on (1) | off (0) | Wired latency is consistent, no smoothing needed |
+|| fps | 60 | 60 | Unchanged |
+
+### ludo-mini — Sunshine (via SSH)
+
+| Setting | WiFi value | Wired value | Rationale |
+||---------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
+|| bitrate | 40 Mbps | 80 Mbps | Wired can handle full bandwidth |
+|| fec_percentage | 2 | 5 | Restored to default — wired has no dropout concern |
+|| packetsize | 1024 | 1316 | Restored to default (Ethernet MTU) |
+
+Sunshine restarted after changes; confirmed active.
+
+## Resolution
+
+### 2026-06-04 — mac-mini wired to LAN
+
+mac-mini plugged into Ethernet (en0, 192.168.178.182). This definitively resolves the WiFi jitter that caused streaming instability. All WiFi-era conservative settings reverted to appropriate wired values on both ends.
+
+## Open questions
+
+~~1. **Ethernet wiring** — mac-mini has an active en0 port. Plugging it into the same switch/router as ludo-mini would eliminate WiFi jitter entirely. This is the definitive fix.~~ **RESOLVED** — mac-mini now wired via en0.
+2. **WiFi alternatives** — If wiring is impractical, a WiFi 6 (802.11ax) USB adapter or Thunderbolt-to-Ethernet adapter would help, but wired Ethernet is the only reliable solution for game streaming.
+3. **Netbird route** — `192.168.8.0/24` is routed over Netbird `utun100`. If Moonlight ever falls back to that subnet (ludo-mini's 192.168.8.133 LAN IP), traffic tunnels unnecessarily. Moonlight correctly uses 192.168.178.181, so this is not currently an issue.
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-06-04 — mac-mini wired to LAN, configs reverted from WiFi mitigations
+- mac-mini connected via en0 (wired Ethernet, 192.168.178.182), WiFi mitigations no longer needed
+- Moonlight: bitrate 60→80 Mbps, framepacing disabled
+- Sunshine: bitrate 40→80 Mbps, fec_percentage 2→5, packetsize restored to default (1316)
+- First root cause in investigation (Open questions #1) resolved

knowledge/sources/investigations/2026-06-06-authentik-session-lifetime.md

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+# 2026-06-06 — Frequent Authentik login prompts fixed (session duration)
+
+## Summary
+
+User needed to re-authenticate to Authentik several times per day. Root cause was the Django session being configured as a **session cookie** (cleared on browser close) with a short 24-hour lifetime. Fixed by extending both the session cookie lifetime and the user_login stage session duration to 30 days.
+
+## Timeline
+
+- **2026-06-06 ~23:00** — User reports "having to login to authentik several times per day"
+- **~23:10** — Investigation begins: check Authentik OAuth2 provider settings, proxy session table, Django session config
+- **~23:20** — Found `SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE=True` — the `authentik_session` cookie has no Max-Age, cleared on browser close
+- **~23:25** — Found the `user_login` stage has `session_duration=seconds=0`, which calls `session.set_expiry(0)` → `_session_expire_at_browser_close=True`
+- **~23:30** — Applied DB fix: updated `authentik_stages_user_login_userloginstage` → `session_duration='days=30'`
+- **~23:35** — Added `AUTHENTIK_SESSIONS__UNAUTHENTICATED_AGE=days=30` to `/opt/authentik.env` (maps to `sessions.unauthenticated_age` in Authentik config, setting `SESSION_COOKIE_AGE` to 30 days)
+- **~23:40** — Recreated container with `docker compose up -d` (restart doesn't re-read env file)
+- **~23:45** — Verified both changes took effect
+
+## Root cause
+
+Two independent but compounding issues:
+
+1. **`SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE=True`** — hardcoded in `/authentik/root/settings.py`. Makes the `authentik_session` cookie a session cookie (no `Max-Age`), cleared when the browser closes. Cannot be changed via env vars or config files (hardcoded in Python source).
+
+2. **`user_login` stage `session_duration=seconds=0`** — the default-authentication-login stage called `session.set_expiry(0)`, which in Django sets `_session_expire_at_browser_close=True` on the session object, overriding any session cookie lifetime set via `SESSION_COOKIE_AGE`.
+
+3. **`sessions.unauthenticated_age=days=1`** (default) — `SESSION_COOKIE_AGE` was 86,400 seconds (24 hours), so even with the browser left open, the server-side session data expired after 24 hours with no way to extend it (`SESSION_SAVE_EVERY_REQUEST=False`).
+
+### Why forward-auth worked but OAuth2 didn't
+
+- **Forward-auth (Caddy-gated services)** — The `authentik_proxy_*` cookie is a *persistent* cookie with 24-hour validity, set by the Authentik proxy outpost. It survives browser restart. Caddy's forward-auth validates this cookie directly with the outpost API — no Django session needed.
+- **OAuth2 (Gitea, Jellyfin, etc.)** — These services redirect to `auth.hubris.network/application/o/authorize/`, which checks the Django session (`authentik_session` cookie). If the browser was closed, this cookie is gone → user is redirected to the login form.
+
+## Changes applied
+
+### 1. Database — `authentik_stages_user_login_userloginstage`
+
+```sql
+UPDATE authentik_stages_user_login_userloginstage
+SET session_duration = 'days=30'
+WHERE stage_ptr_id = (
+    SELECT stage_uuid FROM authentik_flows_stage 
+    WHERE name = 'default-authentication-login'
+);
+```
+
+This causes the login stage to call `session.set_expiry(timedelta(days=30))`, which:
+- Sets `_session_expire_at_browser_close=False` for that session
+- Sets the session cookie `Max-Age` to 30 days (persistent cookie)
+- Sets the server-side session expiry to 30 days
+
+### 2. Environment — `AUTHENTIK_SESSIONS__UNAUTHENTICATED_AGE`
+
+Added to `/opt/authentik.env`:
+
+```
+AUTHENTIK_SESSIONS__UNAUTHENTICATED_AGE=days=30
+```
+
+This maps to config key `sessions.unauthenticated_age`, which Authentik's `settings.py` reads via:
+
+```python
+SESSION_COOKIE_AGE = timedelta_from_string(
+    CONFIG.get("sessions.unauthenticated_age", "days=1")
+).total_seconds()
+```
+
+Result: `SESSION_COOKIE_AGE` = 2,592,000 seconds (30 days). This is a fallback for sessions that don't go through the `user_login` stage or when the stage's explicit `set_expiry` doesn't apply.
+
+## Verification
+
+```python
+# Inside authentik-server container:
+import os
+os.environ.setdefault("DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE", "authentik.root.settings")
+import django
+django.setup()
+from django.conf import settings
+print("SESSION_COOKIE_AGE:", settings.SESSION_COOKIE_AGE)  # → 2592000.0
+print("SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE:", settings.SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE)  # → True
+
+from authentik.stages.user_login.models import UserLoginStage
+stage = UserLoginStage.objects.filter(name="default-authentication-login").first()
+print("session_duration:", stage.session_duration)  # → "days=30"
+```
+
+## Open questions
+
+- `SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=False` — Should be `True` since Authentik is HTTPS-only, but the custom `SessionMiddleware.is_secure()` method dynamically sets the cookie's `secure` flag based on the request, so it's fine.
+- 30 days is generous. Could be reduced to 7-14 days if desired. Change the DB value and env var accordingly.
+
+## Related
+
+- [Container 106 — auth-outpost](../../wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md)
+- [Authentik VPS migration](archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md)
+- [Ingress (VPS Traefik)](../../wiki/infrastructure/ingress.md)
+- `.hermes/plans/2026-06-06_232200-authentik-frequent-login-fix.md` — original plan
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-06-06 — created
+Documented the session lifetime investigation, root cause, and applied fixes.

knowledge/sources/investigations/2026-06-06-caddyfile-truncation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# Investigation: Caddyfile truncation — all LAN services down (2026-06-06)
+
+**Date:** 2026-06-06
+**Status:** resolved
+**Duration:** ~10 hours (from last known good state ~12:39 UTC to restoration ~22:40 UTC)
+
+## Symptom
+
+All `*.hubris.network` URLs except `photos.hubris.network` and `auth.hubris.network` returned `tlsv1 alert internal error` or TCP timeouts from LAN/mesh clients. `dig @192.168.8.2` and `dig @100.122.255.254` both resolved to `192.168.8.175` correctly — DNS was fine. The issue was at the Caddy level.
+
+## Root cause
+
+The Caddyfile on LXC 121 was manually edited directly on the filesystem (not via the `dtoro/caddy-conf` git repo), reducing it from 260 lines/30+ site blocks to 43 lines with only 3 photo-related site blocks: `photos.hubris.network`, `prism.hubris.network`, and `photos2.hubris.network`.
+
+### Timeline
+
+| Time (UTC+2) | Event |
+|---|---|
+| Jun 04 23:43 | Last successful git-push deploy — full Caddyfile (260 lines) |
+| Jun 06 ~12:00 | Caddyfile manually edited locally, truncating to 3 sites |
+| Jun 06 12:39 | Deploy webhook triggered → `git pull --ff-only` failed: "Your local changes would be overwritten" |
+| Jun 06 14:13 | Deploy webhook triggered again → `deploy ok` (the truncated file was committed or merged somehow) |
+| Jun 06 22:34 | Investigation began |
+| Jun 06 22:43 | Caddyfile restored from `origin/master`, `systemctl reload caddy` |
+
+### Evidence
+
+- `git diff HEAD -- Caddyfile` on LXC 121: `+3 / -159` lines
+- Git reflog: HEAD at `32575ce` (fix: sab port 8081→8082), working tree diverged
+- Backup file `Caddyfile.bak.1780263919`: 225 lines, full original config
+- `git stash list` shows one auto-stash entry
+- `origin/master` at `1b977aa`: 260 lines, all site blocks present
+
+### Secondary root cause found during investigation
+
+**elementsynapse (LXC 118)** had `iface eth0 inet dhcp` internally despite `pct set 118 --net0 ... ip=192.168.8.239/24`. On DHCP lease renewal, dhclient grabbed `.244` from Technitium's pool. Caddy's `reverse_proxy 192.168.8.239:8008` was hitting a dead IP.
+
+This is the same class of drift as the June 5th incidents (paperless, HAOS, apps, mule-images). Elementsynapse was missed during the 2026-06-02 static-IP migration.
+
+## Fix applied
+
+1. **Caddyfile** → `git checkout --force origin/master -- Caddyfile` + `systemctl reload caddy`
+2. **elementsynapse** → replaced `iface eth0 inet dhcp` with static, killed dhclient, verified connectivity
+
+## Permanent safeguards (all deployed)
+
+| Safeguard | Location | What it does |
+|---|---|---|
+| Site-count guard | `/etc/caddy/scripts/deploy.sh` | Refuses reload if <20 `hubris.network` site blocks |
+| Dirty-tree auto-stash | `/etc/caddy/scripts/deploy.sh` | Stashes local edits before git pull |
+| Auto-backup | `/etc/caddy/scripts/deploy.sh` | Saves Caddyfile.bak.<timestamp> before any change, keeps 5 |
+| Caddy backend health | `/etc/cron.d/caddy-backend-health` on hubris | Runs `check-caddy-backends.sh` every 10 min |
+| DNS sync | `/etc/cron.d/dns-sync` on LXC 107 | Runs `dns-sync.py` every 10 min (was missing since 2026-06-04) |
+
+## Related
+
+- DHCP drift investigation (previous incident) — not filed as its own investigation; see the [DNS sync fix](../../../.hermes/plans/2026-06-05_170000-prevent-dhcp-ip-drift.md)
+- [Caddy (121)](../../wiki/containers/121-caddy.md)
+- [elementsynapse (118)](../../wiki/containers/118-elementsynapse.md)
+- [dns-sync script](../../../scripts/dns-sync.py)
+- [check-caddy-backends script](../../../scripts/check-caddy-backends.sh)

knowledge/sources/investigations/archive/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md

@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@
 
 ## Summary
 
-[`hubris`](../hosts/hubris.md) hard-locked repeatedly on 2026-04-21 (silent CPU hangs, no panic, no OOM, no MCE). Two contributors identified: idle CPU sitting at ~95 °C on the `performance` governor, and a USB-attached external SSD whose UAS interaction with the AMD USB4/Thunderbolt PCIe tunnel triggered hard locks. CPU thermal addressed via `cpu-epp.service`; drive removed 2026-04-22 as an A/B test. As of 2026-04-28 the host has 3+ days uptime — the drive looks like the primary contributor; `cpu-epp` remains as belt-and-suspenders.
+[`hubris`](../../../wiki/hosts/hubris.md) hard-locked repeatedly on 2026-04-21 (silent CPU hangs, no panic, no OOM, no MCE). Two contributors identified: idle CPU sitting at ~95 °C on the `performance` governor, and a USB-attached external SSD whose UAS interaction with the AMD USB4/Thunderbolt PCIe tunnel triggered hard locks. CPU thermal addressed via `cpu-epp.service`; drive removed 2026-04-22 as an A/B test. As of 2026-04-28 the host has 3+ days uptime — the drive looks like the primary contributor; `cpu-epp` remains as belt-and-suspenders.
 
 ## Timeline
 
 ### 2026-04-19 — drive attached
-External `Silicon Motion Portable SSD` (vid:pid `090c:2320`) attached for the new restic [backup pipeline](../infrastructure/backups.md). Pre-attach uptime had been 33 days stable.
+External `Silicon Motion Portable SSD` (vid:pid `090c:2320`) attached for the new restic [backup pipeline](../../../wiki/infrastructure/backups.md). Pre-attach uptime had been 33 days stable.
 
 ### 2026-04-19 → 2026-04-21 — first crashes
 Two hard crashes in 2.5 days (46 h then 12 h uptime). Kernel logs ended abruptly with routine apparmor entries — no panic, OOM, or MCE — the classic hard-lock signature. Preceded by `uas_eh_abort_handler` storms and xHCI resets on port 6-1.
@@ -24,13 +24,13 @@ Two hard crashes in 2.5 days (46 h then 12 h uptime). Kernel logs ended abruptly
 - **Mount-on-demand** for the drive: `/usr/local/sbin/backup-usb.sh attach|detach|status` toggles `/sys/bus/usb/devices/*/authorized` so the drive is de-authorized when no backup is running.
 
 ### 2026-04-22 — recurrence after 30 h 37 m
-Same silent-cutoff signature at 18:42:08. Much longer than any pre-`cpu-epp` crash (12 h max), so `cpu-epp` helps but is not sufficient on its own. [claudio-monitor](../infrastructure/monitoring.md) showed healthy runtimes up to 43 s before the hang (no pre-crash degradation). No MCE / no RAS / pstore empty.
+Same silent-cutoff signature at 18:42:08. Much longer than any pre-`cpu-epp` crash (12 h max), so `cpu-epp` helps but is not sufficient on its own. [claudio-monitor](../../../wiki/infrastructure/monitoring.md) showed healthy runtimes up to 43 s before the hang (no pre-crash degradation). No MCE / no RAS / pstore empty.
 
 ### 2026-04-22 — `cpu-epp.service` design bug fixed
 Was `After=multi-user.target` + `WantedBy=multi-user.target` — queued behind `pve-guests.service`. The hottest window of every boot (20 LXCs + 1 VM coming up) ran on the `performance` governor. Fixed: now `After=sysinit.target` + `Before=pve-guests.service`.
 
 ### 2026-04-22 — drive removed (A/B test)
-User physically removed the external USB drive. [Backup timers disabled](../infrastructure/backups.md#status), fstab entry commented, drive de-authorized. Goal: confirm whether the drive + UAS + AMD USB4 PCIe-tunnel interaction is the dominant root cause.
+User physically removed the external USB drive. [Backup timers disabled](../../../wiki/infrastructure/backups.md#status), fstab entry commented, drive de-authorized. Goal: confirm whether the drive + UAS + AMD USB4 PCIe-tunnel interaction is the dominant root cause.
 
 ### 2026-04-23 — SSD cooling + thermal pads installed
 Cold-boot baseline (3 min uptime): nvme0n1 35 °C composite / sensor1 (controller) **53 °C**; nvme1n1 36 °C composite / both sensors ≤36 °C. Lifetime warning-time counters at install: nvme0n1 709 min warn + 5 min crit; nvme1n1 778 min warn + 45 min crit — both drives had spent real time in thermal warning historically.
@@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ Checked 2026-04-21. GMKtec is **not on LVFS**, so `fwupdmgr` can't update the Nu
 | `pcie_aspm=off pci=nomsi`                 | NOT applied | Reserved for if crashes recur without the drive    |
 
 ## Affected nodes
-- [Hubris host](../hosts/hubris.md)
-- [Backups (disabled)](../infrastructure/backups.md)
-- [Monitoring](../infrastructure/monitoring.md)
+- [Hubris host](../../../wiki/hosts/hubris.md)
+- [Backups (disabled)](../../../wiki/infrastructure/backups.md)
+- [Monitoring](../../../wiki/infrastructure/monitoring.md)
 
 ## Open questions
 - Will the host stay up indefinitely without the drive? (Test ongoing — 3+ days as of 2026-04-28.)

knowledge/sources/investigations/archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+# 2026-05-31 — Authentik migrated from LXC 124 to the VPS
+
+## Summary
+
+The NetBird management server (on the [VPS](../../../wiki/infrastructure/ingress.md)) crash-looped 1200+ times because it fetches the Authentik OIDC discovery document on startup, and Authentik was only reachable via the NetBird mesh — which was down *because* mgmt couldn't start. A classic bootstrap deadlock: **mgmt needs OIDC → OIDC needs the mesh → the mesh needs mgmt.**
+
+Resolved by moving Authentik off [LXC 124](../../../wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md) onto the VPS itself, so `auth.hubris.network` resolves to a container co-located with netbird-mgmt — no mesh dependency. A `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on the mgmt service makes the deadlock structurally impossible to recur.
+
+The full Authentik Postgres DB (all users, apps, passwords, groups) was migrated, so every gated app keeps working with no per-app reconfiguration.
+
+## Timeline
+
+### Trigger
+`netbird status` on clients showed `Management: Disconnected`; `netbird.hubris.network` unreachable. VPS `docker logs netbird-mgmt`:
+```
+Error: failed reading provided config file: /etc/netbird/management.json:
+OIDC configuration request returned status 504 with response: Gateway Timeout
+```
+The 504 came from VPS traefik trying to reach the old `auth-authentik` backend (`https://192.168.8.175`, home Caddy) over the down mesh.
+
+### Fix — Phase A (restore the mesh)
+1. Stood up Authentik on the VPS in `/opt/docker-compose.yml`: `authentik-postgres`, `authentik-redis`, `authentik-server`, `authentik-worker` (image `ghcr.io/goauthentik/server:2026.5.2`), on a dedicated `auth` Docker network (`172.30.1.0/24`). Traefik joined both `netbird` and `auth` networks.
+2. Removed the `auth-authentik` → `192.168.8.175` backend from `/opt/traefik-dynamic.yaml`; Authentik now routed via Docker provider labels.
+3. Added `depends_on: authentik-server: condition: service_healthy` to the mgmt service.
+4. Created the NetBird OAuth2 provider/app manually (only manual step), then mgmt auto-recovered within 30 s.
+
+### Fix — Phase B (full data migration)
+Once the mesh was back, the homelab DB was reachable:
+1. `ssh proxmox 'pct exec 124 -- docker exec authentik-postgresql-1 pg_dump -U authentik authentik'` → gzip.
+2. Stopped VPS authentik server/worker, dropped + recreated the VPS DB (connect to the `postgres` DB to drop `authentik`), restored the dump.
+3. **Swapped `AUTHENTIK_SECRET_KEY` in `/opt/authentik.env` to the homelab's key** — Authentik encrypts OAuth2 client secrets in the DB with this key; a mismatch makes every client secret unreadable and silently breaks all SSO.
+4. Restarted Authentik. All users / apps / passwords / groups present.
+
+Scripts left on the VPS: `/opt/migrate-authentik.sh` (re-runnable), `/opt/backup-authentik.sh` (daily cron, 14-day retention).
+
+### Fix — DNS cutover (the long tail)
+The real reason the browser kept hitting the *old* Authentik even after the VPS one was healthy: split-horizon dnsmasq on LXC 124 still had `address=/auth.hubris.network/192.168.8.175`, and the NetBird per-client resolver (`100.122.255.254`) cached it. Symptom: the login page console logged `authentik(early): version 2026.2.2` (the old LXC) instead of `2026.5.2` (the VPS).
+
+- Updated dnsmasq: `address=/auth.hubris.network/82.165.190.79`, `systemctl restart dnsmasq`.
+- `netbird down && netbird up` does **not** reliably flush the NetBird resolver cache. Immediate per-client fixes: `/etc/hosts` override (mac), `sudo resolvectl flush-caches` (Linux), `sudo dscacheutil -flushcache && sudo killall -HUP mDNSResponder` (mac).
+
+## Issues hit during the migration (and fixes)
+
+1. **Redirect URI error.** The restored DB had redirect URIs in `REGEX` matching mode; in Authentik 2026.5.x they failed to match. Fixed by switching to `STRICT` exact matching (Django ORM, `RedirectURIMatchingMode.STRICT`). Set all four: `http://localhost:53000/` (CLI), `https://netbird.hubris.network/{peers,nb-auth,nb-silent-auth}`.
+2. **Only the password field showed (no username).** NetBird passes `login_hint=<email>` in the OAuth2 URL → Authentik pre-identifies and skips the identification stage. Expected behavior; not a bug.
+3. **"Request has been denied. Unknown error."** Several overlapping causes: wrong password (reset via Django shell), reputation lockout after repeated failures (`Reputation.objects.all().delete()` — see [124-authentik](../../../wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md)), and **broken default expression policies**. The restored DB carried 8 default policies authored in old `return`-style syntax incompatible with 2026.5.x's eval context; `ak apply_blueprints` re-applied the current defaults.
+4. **Browser ran stale frontend JS.** Console showed `version 2026.2.2` while the backend was `2026.5.2` — because DNS still pointed at the old LXC (see DNS cutover above), not a cache issue.
+5. **WebAuthn devices dead post-migration.** Passkeys are device/origin-bound and don't survive a host move. Deleted all WebAuthn devices via Django ORM; users must re-register MFA.
+
+## Architecture delta
+
+| | Before | After |
+|---|---|---|
+| Authentik host | [LXC 124](../../../wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md) `192.168.8.180` | VPS `82.165.190.79`, `auth` Docker net `172.30.1.0/24` |
+| Version | `2026.2.2` | `2026.5.2` |
+| `auth.hubris.network` (LAN) | dnsmasq → `192.168.8.175` (Caddy) | dnsmasq → `82.165.190.79` (VPS traefik) |
+| `auth.hubris.network` (public) | IONOS wildcard → VPS → mesh → LXC 124 | IONOS wildcard → VPS → local container |
+| Reachability | mesh-only (split-horizon) | **public** (auth UI now exposed on the open internet) |
+| Redis | none (docs said 2026.x dropped it) | present (this deploy uses Redis) |
+| DB engine | sqlite? (`StoreConfig` in mgmt) / Postgres for Authentik | Postgres, separate from netbird |
+
+> **Security note:** the Authentik admin UI is now publicly reachable. Mitigated with a traefik `admin-allowlist` ipAllowList middleware on `/if/admin/` (currently `5.61.168.0/24`). Login/flow endpoints are public by necessity. The `auth` Docker network isolates Postgres/Redis from the netbird containers.
+
+## Lessons learned
+
+1. **Never put the IdP behind the VPN it authenticates.** The circular dependency is invisible until a restart, then it's total.
+2. **`depends_on: condition: service_healthy` is the structural fix.** Docker refuses to start mgmt until Authentik is healthy, regardless of boot order.
+3. **Migrating an Authentik DB requires carrying its `AUTHENTIK_SECRET_KEY`.** It encrypts client secrets at rest; a mismatch breaks SSO silently with no useful error.
+4. **Default expression policies break across major Authentik versions.** Always run `ak apply_blueprints` after restoring an older DB into a newer Authentik.
+5. **Split-horizon DNS + a VPN resolver cache = an invisible stale answer.** The NetBird resolver (`100.122.255.254`) outlives `netbird down/up`. Removing the dnsmasq override (fall through to public DNS) is the durable fix once a service is genuinely public.
+6. **Redirect URIs: prefer `STRICT` over `REGEX`** in Authentik 2026.x.
+7. **Frontend/backend version skew shows as "Unknown error."** Confirm which Authentik the browser actually loaded (`version` line in the console) before chasing backend logs.
+8. **WebAuthn/passkeys do not survive host migrations** — delete and re-enroll.
+
+## Forward-auth outpost — RESOLVED 2026-06-01
+
+Forward-auth apps (Paperless, qBittorrent, Artifacto) initially still validated against LXC 124's *embedded* outpost (Caddy → `192.168.8.180:9000`) — split-brain against the frozen DB. Pointing Caddy at `https://auth.hubris.network` instead fails: VPS Traefik rewrites `X-Forwarded-Host` → outpost can't match the app → 404 (tested + reverted).
+
+Fixed with a **dedicated LAN outpost** ([106 — auth-outpost](../../../wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md), `192.168.8.6`): `goauthentik/proxy` connects outbound to the VPS core and serves forward-auth locally; Caddy → outpost over the LAN, no Traefik, header preserved. Outpost `hubris-lan-outpost` carries the 3 proxy providers. Verified with 124-Authentik **stopped**. This was Phase 1 of the broader architecture migration (plan: VPS edge / hubris LAN core / Mac Mini redundancy).
+
+### 2026-06-05 — identification stage skip: broken "Trust me" reputation policy
+
+The default authentication flow was skipping the identification stage (showing only a password field with `pending_user: ""`), making login impossible. Root cause: a **"Trust me" reputation policy** (`threshold: -3`, `negate: true`) attached to the identification stage binding (#10). The `negate: true` + broken policy evaluation caused the stage binding to fail re-evaluation, and Authentik's `ReevaluateMarker` skipped the stage entirely.
+
+**Fix:** Deleted from Postgres:
+```sql
+DELETE FROM authentik_policies_policybinding WHERE policy_id = '<uuid>';
+DELETE FROM authentik_policies_reputation_reputationpolicy WHERE policy_ptr_id = '<uuid>';
+DELETE FROM authentik_policies_policy WHERE policy_uuid = '<uuid>';
+```
+The policy was orphaned (no matched type data or had incompatible evaluation). Removing it restores normal two-stage login (identification → password).
+
+**Note:** This is different from the 2026-05-31 issue where NetBird's `login_hint` OAuth2 param intentionally pre-identifies users. That was expected behavior; this was a genuine bug.
+
+## Outstanding
+
+- **NetBird client version skew.** Mac client is `0.68.3` vs mgmt `0.71.3`; NetBird-SSH cert exchange fails between them. Upgrade all clients toward `0.71.x`.
+- **republic-laptop** regular SSH publickey auth still rejected (correct `authorized_keys`/perms/SELinux context, yet denied — `sshd_config` `AuthorizedKeysFile` suspect). DNS not yet flushed there either.
+- **muli-laptop** needs `netbird down && netbird up` + `resolvectl flush-caches`.
+- **VPS port 22** opened for this repair; close once remote access is otherwise stable.
+- **Decommission LXC 124 Authentik** after a ~2-week dual-run validation. dnsmasq stays on 124 regardless (separate service).
+- **Reconcile [124-authentik](../../../wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md) provider notes** — docs describe a `Public`/PKCE provider; the migrated DB carries the `Confidential` `netbird-dashboard` client. Verify which is live and correct the page.
+- **sops-encrypt** the VPS secrets (`/opt/authentik.env`) into the `secrets/` tree.
+
+## Related
+- [124 — authentik](../../../wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md)
+- [DNS split-horizon](../../../wiki/infrastructure/dns.md)
+- [Public ingress (VPS traefik)](../../../wiki/infrastructure/ingress.md)
+- [Mesh migration](../../../wiki/infrastructure/mesh.md)

knowledge/sources/investigations/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Investigations
+
+Time-stamped incident reports and experiments. One entry per incident; the entry is the canonical source. Per-node changelog entries link back here.
+
+## Active / recent
+
+| Date         | Title                                                              | Status        |
+| ------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------- |
+| 2026-06-06   | [Caddyfile truncation incident](2026-06-06-caddyfile-truncation.md) | Resolved — permanent safeguards deployed (site-count guard, auto-stash, auto-backup) |
+| 2026-06-06   | [Frequent Authentik login prompts — session lifetime fix](2026-06-06-authentik-session-lifetime.md) | Resolved — `session_duration=days=30`, `SESSION_COOKIE_AGE=30d` |
+| 2026-06-03   | [Moonlight/Sunshine streaming — WiFi jitter](2026-06-03-moonlight-sunshine-wifi-jitter.md) | Mitigations applied; definitive fix requires wiring mac-mini via Ethernet |
+| 2026-06-01   | [Mac-mini onboarding](2026-06-01-mac-mini-onboarding.md) | Onboarded |
+
+## Resolved (archived)
+
+See [`archive/`](archive/):
+
+| Date         | Title                                                              |
+| ------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| 2026-04-21   | [Hubris crash loop — thermal + USB drive](archive/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md) |
+| 2026-05-31   | [Authentik migrated from LXC 124 to the VPS](archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md) |
+
+## Conventions
+
+- File name: `YYYY-MM-DD-<slug>.md`. Use the *first* date if the incident spans multiple days.
+- Mandatory sections: Summary, Timeline, Root cause, Mitigations applied, Open questions.
+- Update the entry as the situation evolves; never rewrite history. Add new dated sections at the bottom.
+- Link back from every node's changelog that's affected.
+- Move to `archive/` when the incident is fully resolved and no longer actively referenced.

knowledge/sources/references/cert-sync-and-traefik-config.md

@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+# Current cert sync script + traefik dynamic config
+
+Snapshot of the two artifacts that control public service exposure as of
+2026-07-05. Updated 2026-07-05: fixed Jellyfin backend from dead hubris IP
+(192.168.8.206) to new strong IP (192.168.8.246).
+
+## hubris-public-cert-sync.sh (PVE host, `/usr/local/bin/`)
+
+```bash
+#!/bin/bash
+# Mirrors home caddy's LE certs for publicly-exposed hubris.network hostnames
+# into the VPS traefik's /letsencrypt volume. Traefik file-watches the volume
+# and hot-reloads.
+#
+# Why: netbird-proxy's HostSNI(*) TCP passthrough intercepts ACME TLS-ALPN-01
+# challenges before traefik's allowACMEByPass can respond, so traefik can't
+# obtain its own cert. Home caddy uses IONOS DNS-01 (no such conflict);
+# we just mirror what it already has.
+#
+# Runs daily via hubris-public-cert-sync.timer.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+CADDY_LXC=121
+CADDY_BASE=/var/lib/caddy/.local/share/caddy/certificates/acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org-directory
+VPS_HOST=root@100.122.165.149
+VPS_DEST=/var/lib/docker/volumes/opt_netbird_traefik_letsencrypt/_data
+
+# Map: source hostname -> "crt_filename key_filename" on the VPS.
+# Stable names so traefik dynamic.yaml doesn't need edits on renewal.
+declare -A HOSTS=(
+  [artifacto.hubris.network]="fullchain.crt privkey.key"
+  [blog.hubris.network]="blog.fullchain.crt blog.privkey.key"
+  [trmnl.hubris.network]="trmnl.fullchain.crt trmnl.privkey.key"
+  [sso.hubris.network]="sso.fullchain.crt sso.privkey.key"
+  [media.hubris.network]="media.fullchain.crt media.privkey.key"
+  [paperless.hubris.network]="paperless.fullchain.crt paperless.privkey.key"
+)
+
+TMP=$(mktemp -d)
+trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
+
+for host in "${!HOSTS[@]}"; do
+  read -r crt_name key_name <<< "${HOSTS[$host]}"
+  pct pull "$CADDY_LXC" "$CADDY_BASE/$host/$host.crt" "$TMP/$crt_name"
+  pct pull "$CADDY_LXC" "$CADDY_BASE/$host/$host.key" "$TMP/$key_name"
+
+  if ssh -o BatchMode=yes "$VPS_HOST" "test -f $VPS_DEST/$crt_name && diff -q - $VPS_DEST/$crt_name" < "$TMP/$crt_name" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "hubris-public-cert-sync: $host unchanged"
+    continue
+  fi
+
+  scp -q -o BatchMode=yes "$TMP/$crt_name" "$TMP/$key_name" "$VPS_HOST:$VPS_DEST/"
+  echo "hubris-public-cert-sync: shipped $host ($(openssl x509 -in "$TMP/$crt_name" -noout -enddate))"
+done
+```
+
+### Adding a new host
+
+1. Caddy must already have the cert (verify `pct exec 121 -- ls "$CADDY_BASE/$host/"`)
+2. Add a line to the HOSTS array: `[new-host.hubris.network]="nickname.fullchain.crt nickname.privkey.key"`
+3. `systemctl start hubris-public-cert-sync.service` to sync immediately
+4. Verify certs landed: `ssh "$VPS_HOST" "ls -la $VPS_DEST/nickname.*"`
+5. Add matching `tls.certificates` entry in traefik dynamic config
+
+---
+
+## traefik-dynamic.yaml (VPS, `/opt/`)
+
+```yaml
+tcp:
+  serversTransports:
+    pp-v2:
+      proxyProtocol:
+        version: 2
+
+tls:
+  certificates:
+    - certFile: /letsencrypt/fullchain.crt
+      keyFile: /letsencrypt/privkey.key
+    - certFile: /letsencrypt/blog.fullchain.crt
+      keyFile: /letsencrypt/blog.privkey.key
+    - certFile: /letsencrypt/trmnl.fullchain.crt
+      keyFile: /letsencrypt/trmnl.privkey.key
+    - certFile: /letsencrypt/sso.fullchain.crt
+      keyFile: /letsencrypt/sso.privkey.key
+    - certFile: /letsencrypt/media.fullchain.crt
+      keyFile: /letsencrypt/media.privkey.key
+    - certFile: /letsencrypt/paperless.fullchain.crt
+      keyFile: /letsencrypt/paperless.privkey.key
+
+http:
+  routers:
+    artifacto-public:
+      rule: 'Host(`artifacto.hubris.network`) && (PathPrefix(`/p/`) || PathPrefix(`/static/`) || Path(`/healthz`))'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 10
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - artifacto-strip-sso
+        - artifacto-ratelimit
+      service: artifacto-public
+
+    blog-public:
+      rule: 'Host(`blog.hubris.network`)'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 10
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - blog-ratelimit
+      service: blog-public
+
+    trmnl-public:
+      rule: 'Host(`trmnl.hubris.network`)'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 10
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - trmnl-ratelimit
+      service: trmnl-public
+
+    matrix-public:
+      rule: 'Host(`matrix.hubris.network`) && !PathPrefix(`/.well-known/matrix/`)'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 10
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - matrix-ratelimit
+      service: matrix-public
+
+    matrix-wellknown:
+      rule: 'Host(`matrix.hubris.network`) && (PathPrefix(`/.well-known/matrix/`) || PathPrefix(`/.well-known/acme-challenge/`))'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 20
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      service: matrix-wellknown-svc
+
+    house-public:
+      rule: Host(`house.hubris.network`)
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 10
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - house-ratelimit
+      service: house-public
+
+    sso-public:
+      rule: 'Host(`sso.hubris.network`)'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 10
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - sso-ratelimit
+      service: sso-public
+
+    media-public:
+      rule: 'Host(`media.hubris.network`)'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 10
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - media-ratelimit
+      service: media-public
+
+    paperless-api-public:
+      rule: 'Host(`paperless.hubris.network`) && PathPrefix(`/api/`)'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 20
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - paperless-ratelimit
+      service: paperless-public
+
+    paperless-public:
+      rule: 'Host(`paperless.hubris.network`)'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 10
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - authentik-forwardauth
+        - paperless-ratelimit
+      service: paperless-public
+
+  middlewares:
+    artifacto-strip-sso:
+      headers:
+        customRequestHeaders:
+          X-Artifacto-Gateway: ""
+          X-Authentik-Username: ""
+          X-Authentik-Groups: ""
+          X-Authentik-Email: ""
+          X-Authentik-Name: ""
+          X-Authentik-Uid: ""
+          X-Authentik-Jwt: ""
+          X-Authentik-Meta-Jwks: ""
+          X-Authentik-Meta-Outpost: ""
+          X-Authentik-Meta-Provider: ""
+          X-Authentik-Meta-App: ""
+          X-Authentik-Meta-Version: ""
+
+    admin-allowlist:
+      ipAllowList:
+        sourceRange:
+          - "5.61.168.0/24"
+
+    artifacto-ratelimit:
+      rateLimit:
+        average: 50
+        period: 1s
+        burst: 100
+    blog-ratelimit:
+      rateLimit:
+        average: 100
+        period: 1s
+        burst: 200
+    trmnl-ratelimit:
+      rateLimit:
+        average: 20
+        period: 1s
+        burst: 40
+    matrix-ratelimit:
+      rateLimit:
+        average: 30
+        period: 1s
+        burst: 60
+    house-ratelimit:
+      rateLimit:
+        average: 30
+        period: 1s
+        burst: 60
+    sso-ratelimit:
+      rateLimit:
+        average: 30
+        period: 1s
+        burst: 60
+    media-ratelimit:
+      rateLimit:
+        average: 30
+        period: 1s
+        burst: 60
+    paperless-ratelimit:
+      rateLimit:
+        average: 20
+        period: 1s
+        burst: 40
+    authentik-forwardauth:
+      forwardAuth:
+        address: "http://192.168.8.6:9000/outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/traefik"
+        trustForwardHeader: true
+        authResponseHeaders:
+          - X-authentik-username
+          - X-authentik-groups
+          - X-authentik-email
+          - X-authentik-name
+          - X-authentik-uid
+          - X-authentik-jwt
+          - X-authentik-meta-jwks
+          - X-authentik-meta-outpost
+          - X-authentik-meta-provider
+          - X-authentik-meta-app
+          - X-authentik-meta-version
+
+  services:
+    artifacto-public:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://192.168.8.205:3100'
+    blog-public:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://192.168.8.205:8080'
+    trmnl-public:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://192.168.8.211:9851'
+    matrix-public:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://192.168.8.242:8008'
+    matrix-wellknown-svc:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://matrix-wellknown:80'
+    house-public:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://192.168.8.244:3000'
+    sso-public:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://192.168.8.6:9000'
+    media-public:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://192.168.8.246:8096'
+    paperless-public:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://192.168.8.130:8000'
+```
+
+### Adding a new service — four blocks needed
+
+1. **Router** — `http.routers.<name>-public` with `tls: {}` (not
+   `certResolver`)
+2. **Middleware** — rate limit, one per service
+3. **Service** — `http.services.<name>-public` with the backend URL
+4. **tls.certificates** — add a new `- certFile/keryFile` pair matching the
+   cert sync HOSTS entry
+
+### Key file naming convention
+
+| Cert name | Host | Convention |
+|-----------|------|------------|
+| `fullchain.crt` + `privkey.key` | `artifacto.hubris.network` | First service — no prefix |
+| `blog.fullchain.crt` + `blog.privkey.key` | `blog.hubris.network` | `{nickname}.fullchain.crt` |
+| `trmnl.fullchain.crt` + `trmnl.privkey.key` | `trmnl.hubris.network` | `{nickname}.fullchain.crt` |
+| `sso.fullchain.crt` + `sso.privkey.key` | `sso.hubris.network` | `{nickname}.fullchain.crt` |
+| `media.fullchain.crt` + `media.privkey.key` | `media.hubris.network` | `{nickname}.fullchain.crt` |
+| `paperless.fullchain.crt` + `paperless.privkey.key` | `paperless.hubris.network` | `{nickname}.fullchain.crt` |
+
+### ⚠️ Critical — keep backends in sync after LXC migrations
+
+When moving an LXC between Proxmox nodes, update **both**:
+1. **Caddy** (`/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` on LXC 121)
+2. **VPS traefik** (`/opt/traefik-dynamic.yaml` — via hubris bridge SSH)
+
+Jellyfin migration from hubris to strong (2026-07-05) was fixed in Caddy
+but **missed** in VPS traefik — old IP `192.168.8.206` remained. This caused
+Bad Gateway for off-LAN users. Use Python-based editing (see
+`references/traefik-config-editing.md`) for accurate surgical fixes.

knowledge/wiki/containers/101-jellyfin.md

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+# 101 — `jellyfin`
+
+Media server: serves the movies / TV / anime / music libraries from `/mnt/media_local` to LAN clients. Hardware transcoding via AMD Radeon 680M + RX 7600 VAAPI. Authentik SSO via OIDC.
+
+## At a glance
+- **Host:** **strong** (migrated from hubris 2026-07-05)
+- **IP:** `192.168.8.246`
+- **Privilege:** privileged (recreated on strong as priv)
+- **Resources:** 4 cores / 8 GiB RAM / 1 GiB swap / 16 GiB rootfs
+- **GPU:** `/dev/dri/renderD128` + `/dev/dri/card0` (AMD Radeon 680M iGPU + RX 7600 dGPU) passed via `dev0` / `dev1` in LXC config
+- **Mounts:** `/mnt/media_local` ↔ `/mnt/library`
+- **Public hostname:** [`media.hubris.network`](../infrastructure/dns.md) → [caddy](121-caddy.md) → `:8096`
+- **Version:** Jellyfin 10.11.11 (apt package, Ubuntu 24.04 noble repo)
+- **FFmpeg:** jellyfin-ffmpeg7 7.1.4
+
+## Service / port map
+
+| Service  | Listen | Notes |
+| -------- | ------ | ----- |
+| jellyfin | `:8096` | HTTP (caddy terminates TLS) |
+
+## Hardware acceleration (VAAPI)
+
+GPU is passed through to the LXC via `dev0: /dev/dri/renderD128,gid=993` and
+`dev1: /dev/dri/card0,gid=44` in
+`/etc/pve/lxc/101.conf` (strong). The `jellyfin` user is in the `render` (GID 993) and
+`video` groups inside the container.
+
+| GPU | Model | Role |
+|-----|-------|------|
+| Radeon 680M | iGPU (AMD Ryzen 7 PRO 6850U) | Primary VAAPI encoder/decoder |
+| RX 7600 | dGPU (add-in) | Secondary transcode, HEVC/AV1 encoding |
+
+Encoding settings (`/etc/jellyfin/encoding.xml`):
+- `HardwareAccelerationType`: `vaapi`
+- `VaapiDevice`: `/dev/dri/renderD128`
+- `EnableHardwareEncoding`: `true`
+- `AllowHevcEncoding`: `true`
+- `AllowAv1Encoding`: `true`
+- `EnableTonemapping`: `true`
+- `HardwareDecodingCodecs`: h264, hevc, vc1, vp9, av1
+- `EnableThrottling`: `true`
+- `EnableSegmentDeletion`: `true`
+
+Trickplay (`/etc/jellyfin/system.xml`):
+- `EnableHwAcceleration`: `true`
+- `EnableHwEncoding`: `true`
+
+## Authentik SSO (OIDC)
+
+Jellyfin uses the [SSO-Auth plugin](https://github.com/9p4/jellyfin-plugin-sso)
+v4.0.0.4 for Authentik OIDC login. No Caddy forward-auth gate — the SSO plugin
+handles auth directly via OIDC redirect flow.
+
+### Architecture
+
+```
+User → media.hubris.network → Caddy (TLS, no forward-auth) → Jellyfin :8096
+                                                                ↓
+                                                    Login page with "Sign in with Authentik" button
+                                                                ↓ (click)
+                                                    /sso/OID/start/Authentik
+                                                                ↓ (302 redirect)
+                                                    auth.hubris.network OIDC
+                                                                ↓ (login)
+                                                    /sso/OID/redirect/Authentik?code=...&state=...
+                                                                ↓
+                                                    Jellyfin SSO plugin validates token → logged in
+```
+
+### Components
+
+1. **SSO-Auth plugin** — installed at `/var/lib/jellyfin/plugins/SSO-Auth_4.0.0.4/`
+   - Config: `/var/lib/jellyfin/plugins/configurations/SSO-Auth.xml`
+   - Provider name: `Authentik`
+   - OIDC endpoint: `https://auth.hubris.network/application/o/jellyfin/`
+   - `SchemeOverride`: `https` (required — without it, plugin generates
+     `http://` redirect URIs that Authentik rejects)
+   - `EnableAuthorization`: `false` (prevents plugin from overwriting admin
+     permissions on each SSO login — see
+     [jellyfin-sso-plugin](../../../devops/homelab-authentik-admin/references/jellyfin-sso-plugin.md))
+   - `OidScopes`: `["email"]` (openid+profile added by default by the plugin;
+     must be non-null or `OidChallenge()` throws `ArgumentNullException`)
+
+2. **Authentik OIDC provider** — `Provider for Jellyfin` (PK 6)
+   - Client ID: `vt61t5Y2ZVtN6l3QjitkBvwUJjFKvSyl4TDBXcJx`
+   - Redirect URI: `https://media.hubris.network/sso/OID/redirect/Authentik`
+   - Application slug: `jellyfin`
+
+3. **SSO button injection** — `/usr/share/jellyfin/web/sso-inject.js`
+   - Injected via `<script defer src="sso-inject.js?v=3">` in `index.html`
+   - Polls for `.readOnlyContent` div on the login page, adds "Sign in with
+     Authentik" button linking to `/sso/OID/start/Authentik`
+   - Cache-busted with `?v=N` parameter (bump on changes)
+   - **Lost on apt upgrade** — re-inject the script tag and copy the JS file
+     after `apt-get upgrade jellyfin*`
+
+4. **Caddy config** — no forward-auth gate for media.hubris.network:
+   ```caddy
+   media.hubris.network {
+       tls { dns ionos {env.IONOS_AUTH_API_TOKEN} }
+       reverse_proxy 192.168.8.206:8096
+   }
+   ```
+
+### Known issues / pitfalls
+
+- **`OidScopes` must be non-null** — if the field is missing from the plugin
+  config XML, `OidChallenge()` throws `System.ArgumentNullException`. Always
+  include `OidScopes` in the provider config (even if empty array).
+- **`SchemeOverride: "https"` is required** — without it, the plugin generates
+  `http://` redirect URIs (from the internal HTTP listener). Authentik rejects
+  them with "Redirect URI Error".
+- **SSO button JS is not served by the plugin** — the `__plugin/SSO-Auth.js`
+  endpoint returns 404 on Jellyfin 10.11.x when the plugin is installed
+  manually (not via Jellyfin's plugin manager). The `sso-inject.js` workaround
+  in `index.html` is the fallback.
+- **No Caddy forward-auth gate** — the SSO plugin's OIDC redirect flow is
+  incompatible with Caddy's `import authentik` forward-auth. If both are
+  enabled, the forward-auth intercepts the OIDC callback and breaks the flow.
+  Use one or the other, not both. SSO plugin (OIDC redirect) is preferred.
+- **API key for setup** — a temp API key can be inserted directly into the
+  `ApiKeys` SQLite table for automated configuration:
+  ```sql
+  INSERT INTO ApiKeys VALUES (1, '2026-07-04', '2026-07-04', 'setup', 'jf-setup-key-...');
+  ```
+
+## Permissions
+Member of the [media GID 10000](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md) standard. Service user `jellyfin` is in the `media` group inside the container; `/mnt/media_local` on strong's ludo-lvm is owned `root:media` with mode `2775`.
+
+## Related
+- [Caddy reverse proxy](121-caddy.md)
+- [Media permissions](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md)
+- [arriman](122-arriman.md) — \*arr stack writes the libraries jellyfin reads
+- [DNS split-horizon](../infrastructure/dns.md)
+- [Authentik admin](../../../devops/homelab-authentik-admin/SKILL.md) — OIDC provider creation, SSO plugin config
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-07-06 — wiki: IP, host, GPU, mount path updated for strong migration
+Updated At-a-glance: IP 206→246, host hubris→strong, mount /mnt/library→/mnt/media_local, GPU Radeon 760M→680M+RX7600, privilege unpriv→priv. Permissions section updated. Changelog entry in 122-arriman.md updated similarly.
+
+### 2026-07-04 — VAAPI hardware acceleration + Authentik SSO + resource bump
+- Upgraded Jellyfin 10.11.8 → 10.11.11 (purge + reinstall to fix DB migration bug)
+- Enabled VAAPI hardware acceleration (Radeon 760M): h264/hevc/vc1/vp9/av1 decode + encode
+- Bumped resources: 2→4 cores, 4→8 GiB RAM, 512→1024 MiB swap
+- Enabled trickplay HW acceleration + throttling + segment deletion
+- Installed SSO-Auth plugin v4.0.0.4 with Authentik OIDC provider
+- Configured `SchemeOverride: https`, `OidScopes: ["email"]`, `EnableAuthorization: false`
+- Injected SSO button via `sso-inject.js` in web `index.html`
+- Removed Caddy forward-auth gate (incompatible with SSO plugin OIDC flow)
+- **Database was wiped** during cache relocation attempt — no LVM snapshot
+  existed. All watch states, user accounts, and library configs lost.
+  Libraries re-added via setup wizard.
+
+### 2026-04-28 — wiki entry created
+Initial documentation. No config changes.
+
+### 2026-04-20 — joined the `media` GID 10000 standard
+Idmap block applied; in-container `media` group at GID 10000 mapped to host GID 10000. See [media permissions](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md). Config backup: `/root/101.conf.bak.*`.

knowledge/wiki/containers/102-nfs-export.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Dedicated, single-purpose LXC that re-exports `/mnt/library` over NFSv4 to clien
 - **LAN DNS:** `nfs-export.hubris.network` → `192.168.8.200` (direct, no Caddy)
 - **Privilege:** privileged (`unprivileged: 0`) + `lxc.apparmor.profile: unconfined` — required for `nfs-kernel-server`
 - **Resources:** 1 core / 512 MiB RAM / 2 GiB rootfs / 256 MiB swap
-- **Mounts:** host `/mnt/library` ↔ container `/mnt/library` (same path on both sides — matches the bind-mount convention used by jellyfin, paperless, arriman, nextcloud, mule-images, plato, apps)
+- **Mounts:** host `/mnt/library` ↔ container `/mnt/library` (same path on both sides — matches the bind-mount convention used by jellyfin, paperless, arriman, nextcloud, mule-images, apps)
 
 ## What it does
 
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ We considered three options before building this:
 
 | Option | Outcome |
 |---|---|
-| **NFS on hubris bare-metal host** | Best performance, but adds long-lived NFS/RPC daemons to a host with a recent crash episode ([hubris crash 2026-04-21/22](../investigations/index.md)). Rejected. |
+| **NFS on hubris bare-metal host** | Best performance, but adds long-lived NFS/RPC daemons to a host with a recent crash episode ([hubris crash 2026-04-21/22](../../sources/investigations/index.md)). Rejected. |
 | **SMB on host** | Same host-blast-radius problem, plus 30–50% lower throughput than NFS on Linux↔Linux. Rejected. |
 | **NFS in a dedicated LXC** ← this | Within ~2% of host performance (LXC is namespace isolation; IO path is unchanged), zero new daemons on hubris, matches the existing fleet pattern. Selected. |
 

knowledge/wiki/containers/103-paperless.md

@@ -18,16 +18,16 @@ Paperless-ngx for document management. Ingests scans / PDFs from `/mnt/library/d
 | paperless-task-queue, paperless-scheduler, paperless-consumer | — | systemd workers |
 
 ## Auth
-Behind [Authentik forward-auth](124-authentik.md). API path `/api/*` bypasses forward-auth (mobile clients can't follow the browser login redirect; bearer token still enforces auth on `/api`). Header propagation: `PAPERLESS_ENABLE_HTTP_REMOTE_USER=true` and `PAPERLESS_HTTP_REMOTE_USER_HEADER_NAME=HTTP_X_AUTHENTIK_USERNAME` in `/opt/paperless/paperless.conf`. Django auto-creates matching users on first SSO login.
+Behind [Authentik forward-auth](106-auth-outpost.md). API path `/api/*` bypasses forward-auth (mobile clients can't follow the browser login redirect; bearer token still enforces auth on `/api`). Header propagation: `PAPERLESS_ENABLE_HTTP_REMOTE_USER=true` and `PAPERLESS_HTTP_REMOTE_USER_HEADER_NAME=HTTP_X_AUTHENTIK_USERNAME` in `/opt/paperless/paperless.conf`. Django auto-creates matching users on first SSO login.
 
 ## Storage
 - Documents at `/mnt/library/documents` (owner `www-data:www-data`, mode 750 — *not* on the `media` group, by design).
 
 ## Known issues
-- Disk usage was 86.9% at last claudio-monitor reading on 2026-04-21. Monitor or grow rootfs.
+- ~~Disk usage was 86.9% at last legacy monitor reading on 2026-04-21~~ — resolved by growing rootfs to 16 GiB on 2026-05-15.
 
 ## Related
-- [Authentik](124-authentik.md)
+- [Authentik](106-auth-outpost.md)
 - [Caddy](121-caddy.md)
 - [DNS](../infrastructure/dns.md)
 - [Monitoring](../infrastructure/monitoring.md)

knowledge/wiki/containers/104-gitea.md

@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ LXC has `/etc/hosts` override mapping `auth.hubris.network → 192.168.8.175` (r
 
 ## Changelog
 
+### 2026-06-24 — terminalito deploy webhook (id 12)
+Push webhook on `dtoro/terminalito` → `http://192.168.8.211:9797/deploy` ([trmnl (128)](128-trmnl.md)); `app.ini` `ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` extended with `192.168.8.211`. See [auto-deploy](../infrastructure/auto-deploy.md).
+
 ### 2026-04-28 — wiki entry created
 Initial documentation.
 
@@ -52,7 +55,7 @@ Initial documentation.
 Added `192.168.8.205`. See [Artifacto auto-deploy on apps (105)](105-apps.md).
 
 ### 2026-04-21 — `/etc/hosts` override for `auth.hubris.network` added
-For OIDC integration with [authentik (124)](124-authentik.md). Outside the PVE markers, with a hubris-hosts-override.service for idempotency.
+For OIDC integration with [authentik (124)](106-auth-outpost.md). Outside the PVE markers, with a hubris-hosts-override.service for idempotency.
 
 ### 2026-04-20 — gitea customizations + auto-deploy pipeline shipped
 `dtoro/gitea-customizations` repo created; webhook receiver at loopback `:9797` validates HMAC and runs `deploy.sh`. CAD and PlantUML loaders live in `footer.tmpl`.

knowledge/wiki/containers/105-apps.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # 105 — `apps`
 
-Docker host for everything that doesn't justify its own LXC. Currently runs Artifacto, Booklore, PlantUML server, Portainer (and historically WriteFreely / blog).
+Docker host for everything that doesn't justify its own LXC. Currently runs Artifacto, PlantUML server, Portainer (and historically WriteFreely / blog), plus the [homelab-context distribution services](../infrastructure/homelab-context.md) (MCP + secrets-issuance) since 2026-05-20. Booklore migrated to [grimmory (130)](130-grimmory.md) on 2026-06-29.
 
 ## At a glance
 - **Hostname:** `apps`
@@ -15,10 +15,11 @@ Docker host for everything that doesn't justify its own LXC. Currently runs Arti
 | Hostname                          | Container        | Backend port | Notes |
 | --------------------------------- | ---------------- | ------------ | ----- |
 | `docker.hubris.network`           | Portainer        | `:9443`      | Native OAuth2 via Authentik. Trusted-origins requires hostname only (no scheme/port). |
-| `books.hubris.network`            | Booklore         | `:6060`      | Native OIDC. Redirect URI `/oauth2-callback`. |
 | `artifacto.hubris.network`        | Artifacto        | `:3100`      | Public `/p/*`, `/static/*`, `/healthz` exposed via [VPS traefik](../infrastructure/ingress.md). |
 | `blog.hubris.network`             | WriteFreely      | `:8080`      | Native OIDC via `[oauth.generic]`. |
 | `git.hubris.network/_plantuml/*`  | PlantUML server  | `:8079`      | Same-origin route from [gitea (104)](104-gitea.md). |
+| `mcp.hubris.network`              | homelab-mcp      | `:9810`      | MCP server over SSE. No SSO — agent-facing, gated at source-IP layer. See [homelab-context](../infrastructure/homelab-context.md). |
+| `secrets.hubris.network`          | secrets-issuance | `:9820`      | Per-client age-key issuance. Mesh+LAN source-IP gated (`MESH_SUBNETS`). |
 
 ## Stacks
 
@@ -44,10 +45,50 @@ Receiver at `/opt/artifacto-deploy/` (outside the app repo): `deploy.sh` + `webh
 ### Portainer
 Native OAuth2 (Settings → Authentication → OAuth → Custom). Manual endpoints (no OIDC discovery). Uses `portainer-uid` custom-claim scope from Authentik. Container is **not** compose-managed — safe to `docker run` recreate; data lives in named volume `portainer_data`. CLI flag: `--trusted-origins docker.hubris.network` (hostname only — `IsTrustedOrigin` rejects strings containing `://`).
 
-### Booklore
-Native OIDC via Authentik (Settings → OIDC). Redirect URI `/oauth2-callback` (NOT `/api/oidc`). Container needs `extra_hosts: auth.hubris.network:192.168.8.175`. **Edit via Portainer UI** if it's a Portainer-managed stack.
+### homelab-mcp (`/opt/homelab-mcp/`)
+FastMCP server (Python venv at `/opt/homelab-mcp/.venv`). Reads from
+`/opt/homelab-context/` (this LXC is itself an enrolled
+[homelab-context](../infrastructure/homelab-context.md) client). Source
+is `dtoro/Homelab-Docs/mcp/server.py`; service unit
+`homelab-mcp.service` binds `0.0.0.0:9810`. DNS-rebinding protection
+disabled at the FastMCP layer because mesh+LAN gating is the actual
+trust boundary.
 
-> ⚠️ **Never `docker compose up` Portainer-managed stacks from the host shell.** Portainer's compose state lives at `/var/lib/docker/volumes/portainer_data/_data/compose/<N>/`. Running `docker compose up -d <svc>` from the host triggers recreates of OTHER services in the stack and silently destroys bind-mounted data. **This wiped Booklore's mariadb data on 2026-04-22.** Use the Portainer UI editor for compose changes. See [mesh migration](../infrastructure/mesh.md#critical-never-docker-compose-up-portainer-managed-stacks) for the full warning.
+- Endpoint: `https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp` (Caddy → `:9810`). StreamableHTTP transport (POST `/mcp`).
+- 14 tools registered: `get_host`, `list_services`, `find_service`,
+  `get_topology`, `search_docs`, `get_page`, `get_changelog`, `whoami`,
+  `list_my_secrets` (context); `get_service_status`, `tail_log`,
+  `list_lxcs`, `get_lxc_state`, `ping_service` (read-only management).
+- Management tools shell out via SSH using a dedicated `mcp-reader` key
+  (planned; not provisioned yet — management tools fail until then).
+
+#### Auto-deploy pipeline (homelab-mcp)
+Receiver at `/opt/homelab-mcp/mcp/deploy/webhook/` (in-tree alongside
+the server code). Listens on `0.0.0.0:9811`, secret in
+`/etc/homelab-mcp-deploy/secret`, systemd unit
+`homelab-mcp-deploy.service`. Gitea webhook id 10 on
+`dtoro/Homelab-Docs`. Deploy script reinstalls the service unit and
+restarts on push.
+
+### secrets-issuance (`/opt/secrets-issuance/`)
+Tiny HTTP service that issues per-client age keypairs the first time
+each client calls `/issue`. Idempotent: subsequent calls return the
+same key. Mesh+LAN source-IP gated via the `MESH_SUBNETS` env in
+`secrets-issuance.service`. State (per-client keys + denylist) lives at
+`/var/lib/secrets-issuance/` (NOT in the repo).
+
+- Endpoint: `https://secrets.hubris.network/issue` (Caddy → `:9820`).
+- `/revoke` is admin-token-gated by `/etc/secrets-issuance/admin-token`;
+  shreds the local key file and adds the hostname to the denylist.
+  Called by `homelab client remove`.
+- Trust subnets today: `100.122.0.0/16` (Netbird), `100.64.0.0/10`
+  (Tailscale), `192.168.8.0/24` (LAN). Tighten if the LAN gets
+  untrusted devices.
+
+#### Auto-deploy pipeline (secrets-issuance)
+Receiver at `/opt/secrets-issuance/secrets-issuance/deploy/webhook/`,
+port `9821`, secret in `/etc/secrets-issuance-deploy/secret`, unit
+`secrets-issuance-deploy.service`. Gitea webhook id 11.
 
 ### WriteFreely (`/opt/writefreely-docker/`)
 Native OIDC via `[oauth.generic]` in `config/config.ini`. `host = https://auth.hubris.network`, scope `openid profile email`, `map_user_id = sub`. Redirect URI in Authentik: `https://blog.hubris.network/oauth/callback/generic`. Container has `extra_hosts: auth.hubris.network:192.168.8.175`. First-time users with a local WF account must connect SSO via Customize/Settings → Linked Accounts.
@@ -59,13 +100,26 @@ Native OIDC via `[oauth.generic]` in `config/config.ini`. `host = https://auth.h
 ## Related
 - [Gitea (104)](104-gitea.md) — uses the PlantUML server
 - [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md)
-- [Authentik (124)](124-authentik.md)
+- [Authentik (124)](106-auth-outpost.md)
 - [DNS](../infrastructure/dns.md)
 - [Auto-deploy](../infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)
 - [Public ingress (Artifacto + blog)](../infrastructure/ingress.md)
 
 ## Changelog
 
+### 2026-06-29 — Booklore migrated to Grimmory on LXC 130
+Booklore stack removed from Portainer. MariaDB dump taken first, then restored into [grimmory (130)](130-grimmory.md)'s fresh MariaDB. `books.hubris.network` Caddy backend updated to `192.168.8.213:6060`. Authentik OIDC provider updated to Public client type (PKCE) for Grimmory compatibility.
+
+### 2026-05-20 — homelab-mcp + secrets-issuance live
+Two new services from the [homelab-context distribution plan](../infrastructure/homelab-context.md):
+`homelab-mcp.service` on `:9810` (MCP read+management surface) and
+`secrets-issuance.service` on `:9820` (per-client age-key provisioning).
+Caddy fronts both with Let's Encrypt; new vhosts on
+[caddy](121-caddy.md), split-horizon DNS entries on
+[authentik (124)](106-auth-outpost.md). Gitea webhook ids 10 + 11 wire
+auto-deploy. LXC is itself an enrolled context client
+(`/opt/homelab-context/`).
+
 ### 2026-04-28 — wiki entry created
 Initial documentation.
 

knowledge/wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# 106 — `auth-outpost`
+
+Authentik **forward-auth outpost** for LAN-gated apps. A stateless proxy that connects outbound to the [VPS Authentik core](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md) and serves forward-auth locally, so [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md) never hairpins auth through VPS Traefik.
+
+## At a glance
+- **Hostname:** `auth-outpost`
+- **IP:** `192.168.8.6` (static)
+- **Privilege:** privileged (Docker-in-LXC, `features: nesting=1`)
+- **Resources:** 1 core / 512 MiB / 4 GiB rootfs
+- **Mounts:** none
+- **Created:** 2026-06-01, Debian 13, replacing the embedded outpost on [124](106-auth-outpost.md)
+
+## Role
+
+Runs one container — `ghcr.io/goauthentik/proxy` — that opens an outbound websocket to `https://auth.hubris.network` (the VPS core), pulls its proxy-provider config, and answers Caddy's `forward_auth` subrequests on `192.168.8.6:9000` (LAN-only bind). Because the call path is **Caddy → outpost (LAN)**, with no Traefik in between, `X-Forwarded-Host` is preserved — the failure that 404s when Caddy is pointed at `https://auth.hubris.network` directly (Traefik rewrites the header). See the [migration investigation](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md).
+
+## Service / port map
+| Service | Listen | Notes |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| authentik proxy outpost | `192.168.8.6:9000` | `/outpost.goauthentik.io/*` (ping, auth/caddy) |
+
+## Config paths
+- `/opt/authentik-outpost/docker-compose.yml` — `ghcr.io/goauthentik/proxy:2026.5.2`, `AUTHENTIK_HOST=https://auth.hubris.network`, `AUTHENTIK_INSECURE=false`, port bound `192.168.8.6:9000`.
+- `/opt/authentik-outpost/.env` (mode 600, **untracked**) — `AUTHENTIK_TOKEN` for outpost `hubris-lan-outpost` (sops-encrypt into `secrets/` — TODO Phase 5).
+
+## The outpost object (VPS Authentik)
+- Outpost **`hubris-lan-outpost`** (type proxy), providers: `hubris-forward-auth` (domain, Paperless + domain-level apps), `Provider for Torrent` (qBittorrent), `Provider for Artifacto` (single).
+- Health: VPS admin → Applications → Outposts → last-seen current; `curl http://192.168.8.6:9000/outpost.goauthentik.io/ping` → `204`; container log `Successfully connected websocket`.
+
+## Caddy wiring
+[Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md) `(authentik)` snippet `reverse_proxy`/`forward_auth` → `http://192.168.8.6:9000` (was `192.168.8.180:9000` on LXC 124). Tracked in `dtoro/caddy-conf`.
+
+## `sso.hubris.network` — the callback domain (critical)
+Domain-level (`forward_domain`) providers redirect the browser to `{external_host}/outpost.goauthentik.io/callback` after login. On LXC 124 that `external_host` was `auth.hubris.network`, which resolved (LAN) to Caddy → the 124 outpost — same box, so it worked. Post-migration `auth.hubris.network` points to the **VPS core**, so the callback hit the wrong outpost → **400 / redirect-uri mismatch**.
+
+Fix: the LAN outpost gets its **own** domain.
+- DNS: `sso.hubris.network → 192.168.8.175` (Caddy). *(in dnsmasq today — must be carried into Technitium in DNS Phase 2.)*
+- Caddy: site `sso.hubris.network { tls dns ionos; reverse_proxy 192.168.8.6:9000 }` (in `caddy-conf`).
+- Authentik: `hubris-forward-auth` and `Provider for Torrent` have `external_host=https://sso.hubris.network`; their `redirect_uris` must match (`set_oauth_defaults()` regenerates them from `external_host` — changing `external_host` alone does NOT update them).
+- `Provider for Artifacto` is `forward_single` on its own domain, so it was unaffected.
+
+**Lesson:** when the IdP core and the forward-auth outpost live on different hosts, the outpost needs a dedicated domain distinct from the core's — and proxy-provider `redirect_uris` must be regenerated, not just `external_host`.
+
+## Related
+- [124 — authentik](106-auth-outpost.md) — old embedded-outpost host (now DNS-only)
+- [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md) — forward-auth consumer
+- [Ingress (VPS traefik)](../infrastructure/ingress.md)
+- [Authentik VPS migration](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md)
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-06-06 — Authentik session lifetime extended to 30 days
+VPS Authentik core `user_login` stage updated: `session_duration` changed from `seconds=0` (session cookie, cleared on browser close) to `days=30` (persistent 30-day cookie). Also set `AUTHENTIK_SESSIONS__UNAUTHENTICATED_AGE=days=30` in `/opt/authentik.env` on the VPS. See [investigation](../../sources/investigations/2026-06-06-authentik-session-lifetime.md).
+
+### 2026-06-01 — created; forward-auth cut over from LXC 124
+New dedicated LXC for the LAN forward-auth outpost (Phase 1 of the [architecture migration](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md)). Deployed `goauthentik/proxy:2026.5.2` pointed at the VPS core; repointed Caddy `(authentik)` from `192.168.8.180:9000` → `192.168.8.6:9000`. Verified Paperless/qBittorrent/Artifacto return the SSO redirect with **124-Authentik stopped**, confirming the frozen instance is out of the path. dnsmasq stays on 124 until [DNS is relocated](106-auth-outpost.md).