docs: plan chat-sessions fixes from real production usage data

Inspected the live agent_sessions/agent_messages tables on mac-mini and
found silent empty responses, a canned non-English refusal after 22 tool
calls, 70-call fan-out for simple fleet questions, 100KB+ persisted
messages, and no session delete/title hygiene.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.agents/NOMOS.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# HERMES.md — Agent persona for homelab clients
+# NOMOS.md — Agent persona for homelab clients
 
 This file is the canonical agent persona for **all** AI agents running on
 machines in the **hubris** homelab. It prescribes behaviour, token-efficiency
@@ -8,19 +8,32 @@ conventions, and the source-of-truth hierarchy.
 
 The homelab-context repo at `/opt/homelab-context/` is the single source of
 truth for:
-- Fleet topology (`inventory.yaml`, `hosts/*.yaml`)
+- Fleet topology (`inventory.yaml`, `inventory.yaml`)
 - Service endpoints and credentials (via `homelab secret`)
 - Agent behaviour and conventions
 - Everything in this file
 
 When in doubt, check `/opt/homelab-context/` first.
 
+## Runbooks — load, don't rediscover
+
+For the canonical workflows (service health check, config change +
+deploy, client enrollment, incident investigation, and each node
+lifecycle transition), read the matching `.agents/skills/<name>/SKILL.md` before
+acting. Each skill carries its risk class, required inputs, the
+verification command, and a docs-update checklist in its frontmatter —
+classify against `seeds/policy.yaml` using that risk class before any
+mutation. Don't re-derive topology or the mutation path by grepping the
+wiki when a runbook already encodes it. See [OIKOS.md](OIKOS.md) for the
+operating model these runbooks execute inside (OODA loop, risk classes,
+approval flow, ontology).
+
 ## Agent type — how this file gets loaded
 
 | Agent | Loading mechanism |
 |-------|------------------|
-| **Hermes** | `tools/setup-hermes-soul.sh` (auto-setup) → provisions `~/.hermes/SOUL.md` from this file |
-| **Goose** | `.goosehints` symlink at `~/.config/goose/.goosehints` → `/opt/homelab-context/HERMES.md` |
+| **Nomos** | `tools/setup-nomos-soul.sh` (auto-setup) → provisions `~/.nomos/SOUL.md` from this file |
+| **Goose** | `.goosehints` symlink at `~/.config/goose/.goosehints` → `/opt/homelab-context/NOMOS.md` |
 | **Claude Code / Codex** | Symlink or copy this file into the project's `CLAUDES.md` / `.claude` instructions |
 
 **Do not edit SOUL.md or .goosehints directly.** Edit this file in the
@@ -74,10 +87,10 @@ Caveman templates live at `~/templates/`:
 ls ~/bin/caveman_wrapper.sh && echo "caveman ready"
 ```
 
-## Important note for Hermes agents
+## Important note for Nomos agents
 
-If you are reading this as a Hermes agent, your SOUL.md was auto-provisioned
-by `tools/setup-hermes-soul.sh`. This file is the canonical original — you
+If you are reading this as a Nomos agent, your SOUL.md was auto-provisioned
+by `tools/setup-nomos-soul.sh`. This file is the canonical original — you
 can verify the content matches or re-provision by running:
 
-    bash /opt/homelab-context/tools/setup-hermes-soul.sh
+    bash /opt/homelab-context/tools/setup-nomos-soul.sh

.agents/OIKOS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+# Oikos — the operating model
+
+Oikos (Greek: *household*) is the agent operating system layered on this
+repo. It is not new infrastructure: `inventory.yaml` is the kernel data
+structure, the `homelab` CLI and MCP server are the syscall surface, and
+this page defines the rules everything above them follows.
+
+Read this after [AGENTS.md](../AGENTS.md). Machine-readable companions:
+[seeds/ontology.yaml](../seeds/ontology.yaml) (systems model),
+[seeds/policy.yaml](../seeds/policy.yaml) (risk & approval).
+
+## The kernel loop: OODA
+
+Every Oikos activity — scheduled probe, agent task, operator request — is
+one pass through **Observe → Orient → Decide → Act**:
+
+1. **Observe** — probes, drift detectors, and agent findings produce
+   **Signals** (structured records, not loose messages): pending updates,
+   high temperature, low disk, service down, cert expiry, stale backup,
+   inventory drift.
+2. **Orient** — walk the ontology graph: what entity is affected, what
+   depends on it (blast radius), its lifecycle state, whether a runbook
+   matches, what the ledger says about past attempts.
+3. **Decide** — the classifier scores **risk class × blast radius ×
+   confidence** and routes:
+   - **auto-act**: within autonomy policy, high confidence, contained radius
+   - **escalate**: operator approval via Matrix (✅/❌ reaction) or the
+     Oikos Console's `/approvals` page (destructive actions additionally
+     need a typed confirmation phrase either way)
+   - **queue**: informational — console + reports
+   The classifier can only *lower* autonomy relative to policy, never raise
+   it. When in doubt, escalate.
+4. **Act** — execute through `homelab` commands or runbooks (never ad-hoc
+   SSH), then **verify** with the action's verification command, write a
+   **ledger** entry, resolve the Signal, and update docs in the same session.
+
+## Primitives
+
+| Primitive | What it is | Lives in |
+|---|---|---|
+| Host / Service | topology entities | `inventory.yaml` |
+| Secret | SOPS+age encrypted value, per-client recipients | `secrets/` + `.sops.yaml` |
+| Runbook | executable workflow with risk class + verification | `.agents/skills/<name>/SKILL.md` |
+| Signal | something needing attention, with lifecycle | DB `signals` table |
+| Change | one mutation: who, what, risk, approval, verification | DB `audit_log` + `executions` tables |
+| Approval | short-TTL signed grant for a gated action | DB `approvals` table |
+| Incident | investigation narrative | DB `knowledge_entities` (seeded from investigations) |
+| Knowledge | document, runbook, investigation | DB `knowledge_entities` (seeded from `seeds/knowledge.yaml`) |
+| Plan | design doc for non-trivial work | `plans/` |
+| Agent | enrolled client identity = its age pubkey | `inventory.yaml` + `.sops.yaml` |
+
+## Risk classes (enforced, not advisory)
+
+From [seeds/policy.yaml](../seeds/policy.yaml):
+
+- **read_only** — status, logs, docs, inventory. Unattended.
+- **reversible_low** — restart, cache clear, sync pull. Unattended + ledger.
+- **config_mutation** — tracked-config edits (commit+push, never local),
+  deploys, upgrades, DNS/ingress changes. Operator approval.
+- **destructive** — destroy, format, wipe, rotate, revoke. Approval +
+  typed confirmation phrase.
+
+Lifecycle gates modify these: `provisioning` nodes are freely mutable
+(nothing depends on them); `deprecated` nodes accept no new dependents;
+anything touching a `destroyed` node is drift.
+
+## The systems model
+
+Eight domains — physical, compute, network, storage, software,
+identity & access, operations, external — cover everything in the lab;
+entities are connected by typed edges (`hosts`, `provides`, `mounts`,
+`stores-on`, `routes-to`, `can-decrypt`, `depends-on`, `backs-up-to`, …)
+defined in [seeds/ontology.yaml](../seeds/ontology.yaml). Rule of
+completeness: **if it can break, be changed, or hold data, it has an
+entity and edges.** Blast-radius questions ("what breaks if strong goes
+down?") are graph walks, not doc archaeology.
+
+Nodes move through an explicit lifecycle —
+`planned → provisioning → active → migrating → deprecated → destroyed` —
+stored as `state:` in inventory (absent = active). Destroyed nodes live in
+the `archaeology:` section. Each transition is a runbook checklist;
+deprecation completes only when inbound edges reach zero.
+
+Generated views: the live topology graph at `oikos.hubris.network/graph`
+via the API's `/api/v1/graph` endpoint, and the Mermaid export at
+`GET /api/v1/graph?format=mermaid`.
+
+## Conventions carried forward
+
+- Inventory is the truth; live state wins over narrative docs.
+- Prefer `homelab` CLI and MCP over ad-hoc SSH.
+- Meaningful changes update docs in the same session.
+- Secrets are decrypted locally via per-client keys; never into docs/comments.
+- Tracked configs change by commit + push, not local edits.
+- Netbird is the preferred mesh path for new traffic.
+- Agents are terse ([caveman.md](shared/caveman.md)), verify claims, and fix
+  collateral drift when found.
+
+## Build status (Go rewrite — deployed 2026-07-07)
+
+The Oikos runtime was rewritten from Python to Go over 6 phases and is deployed
+in Docker on mac-mini. See
+[plans/2026-07-06-consolidate-oikos-control-plane-onto-mac-mini.md](../plans/2026-07-06-consolidate-oikos-control-plane-onto-mac-mini.md)
+for the full plan. The Python codebase has been removed; all functionality runs
+in the Go binary.
+
+**Phase 1 — Ontology + DB (DONE):**
+- `migrations/` (001–011): TimescaleDB hypertables, entity_status, CAGGs,
+  retention policies, knowledge entities with FTS. Forward-only, idempotent.
+- `seeds/{ontology,inventory,policy,knowledge}.yaml`: DB-native bootstrap +
+  DR export. Knowledge seed contains 36 documents, 6 investigations, and 12
+  runbooks.
+- `blast_radius()` SQL CTE, type hierarchy, abstract types, relationship
+  validation.
+- Go packages: `internal/db/`, `internal/ontology/`, `internal/domain/`,
+  `internal/knowledge/`.
+
+**Phase 2 — API (DONE):**
+- Single binary `cmd/oikos` with `oikos api` serving REST (:8090) + MCP
+  on the same service layer. OpenAPI-first (`api/openapi.yaml`) with
+  oapi-codegen + chi. RFC 9457 problem+json errors. Cursor pagination,
+  If-Match/ETag optimistic concurrency, idempotency keys, SSE event stream,
+  OIDC JWT + static bearer auth, audit middleware.
+- Go packages: `internal/httpapi/`, `internal/httpapi/gen/`.
+
+**Phase 3 — Control loop (DONE):**
+- Scheduler (`oikos scheduler`): check_defs runner, signal dedup/flap
+  suppression, entity_status. HTTP, TCP, disk, cert-expiry probes.
+- Actuator: SSH skill procedure execution with context-aware timeouts,
+  circuit breaker, retry budgets, error classification.
+- Learning engine: hourly pattern extraction, Wilson confidence bounds,
+  anomaly detection, skills with validated patterns.
+- Notifier: Matrix badge delivery, approval token generation (HMAC,
+  single-use, hashed), DB rendezvous pattern.
+- Policy classifier: risk class determination, autonomy routing,
+  blast-radius computation, kill-switch support.
+- Go packages: `internal/scheduler/`, `internal/actuator/`,
+  `internal/learning/`, `internal/notifier/`, `internal/policy/`.
+
+**Phase 4 — Agent / Nomos (DONE):**
+- Standalone Nomos MCP client binary (`cmd/nomos`) with gateway mode
+  (:8092). Structured queries + natural-language routing to 15 MCP tools.
+  Agent activity logging on every tool call. No SSH keys.
+- `nomos/` directory with config, SOUL.md, homelab-ops skill.
+- Nomos Docker service in `docker-compose.yml` (profile: full).
+- Go packages: `cmd/nomos/`, `compose/nomos/`.
+
+**Phase 5 — Secrets / Infisical (DONE):**
+- `internal/secrets/`: backend abstraction (Manager) with primary
+  (Infisical) and fallback (SOPS) backends. Machine identities via
+  UniversalAuth. In-memory cache with TTL.
+- `oikos secret` CLI: list, migrate (SOPS → Infisical), export-sops
+  (DR fallback). Infisical SDK v0.8.0.
+- Rotation runbook at `secrets/rotation.md`.
+- Docker compose: `infisical` + `redis` services (profile: infisical).
+
+**Phase 6 — Deploy + cutover (DONE, pending production cutover):**
+- CI pipeline: `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` (Gitea Actions — build, vet,
+  lint, test, docker build).
+- Deploy: `scripts/deploy.sh` (git pull → docker build → compose up →
+  health check), SHA-tagged images, rolling restart.
+- Caddy config: `compose/caddy/Caddyfile.oikos` (oikos/mcp/nomos →
+  mac-mini mesh :8090/:8092).
+- Watchdog: `scripts/watchdog.sh` (2min cron, Matrix alert on failure).
+- Verification: `scripts/verify-phase6.sh` (14/14 checks pass).
+- Rollback: `scripts/rollback.sh` (checkout SHA + pg_restore).
+- Cutover checklist: `scripts/cutover-checklist.md`.
+
+**Current deployment:**
+- **Production**: Docker stack on mac-mini (`--profile full`: postgres, api,
+  scheduler, notifier, nomos). Deployed 2026-07-07 with full knowledge seed.
+  The Python MCP server and secrets-issuance on apps/105 have been stopped
+  (see `scripts/cutover-checklist.md`).
+
+## Python-era backlog (superseded)
+
+The original 30-day roadmap (Python, shipped 2026-06/07) delivered:
+context cards, change ledger, node relations, runbooks, ops scheduler,
+drift detectors, signal engine, classifier, approval engine, and the
+FastAPI+Jinja2 Oikos Console. All of these have been re-implemented in
+the Go rewrite. The backlog items below that referenced Python paths
+(`oikos/approve.py`, `oikos/drift.py`, `oikos/console/`) are now addressed
+by the Go equivalents listed above.
+
+Outstanding from the Python era (not yet in Go):
+- Prometheus provisioning (see [plans/2026-07-05-oikos-prometheus-lxc.md](../plans/2026-07-05-oikos-prometheus-lxc.md))
+- CPU/NVMe temperature probing (blocked on sensor path discovery)
+- SSH-key-signed approval requests (blocked on inventory schema)
+- Multi-agent delegation (blocked on ledger identity field)
+- Restore drills on a schedule

.agents/dev/CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+# Agent developer guide
+
+Instructions for AI agents working on the Oikos codebase. Read this after
+[AGENTS.md](../../AGENTS.md) and [OIKOS.md](../OIKOS.md). Human developers:
+see [CONTRIBUTING.md](../../CONTRIBUTING.md) for a human-friendly version.
+
+## Codebase map
+
+```
+cmd/oikos/main.go          Entry point. Subcommands: api, scheduler, notifier, migrate,
+                             seed, export, secret, all
+cmd/nomos/main.go          Nomos MCP client gateway (standalone binary, formerly Hermes)
+internal/httpapi/           REST + MCP server. Chi router. OpenAPI-generated types from
+                             internal/httpapi/gen/api.gen.go. Strict server in impl.go.
+internal/mcp/               MCP tool implementations (get_entity, search_knowledge, etc.)
+internal/db/                Connection pool (pool.go), seed ingestion (seed.go), DB→YAML
+                             export (export.go), type hierarchy (typetree.go)
+internal/db/queries/        SQL query files → sqlc generates internal/db/sqlcgen/
+internal/scheduler/         Observe loop: probes, signals, check_defs
+internal/actuator/          SSH execution with circuit breaker + retry
+internal/learning/          Pattern extraction, anomaly detection
+internal/notifier/          Matrix notification + approval token generation
+internal/policy/            Risk classifier (read policy.yaml → classify action)
+internal/secrets/           Backend abstraction: Infisical (primary) + SOPS (fallback)
+internal/domain/            Core types: entities, approvals, executions, signals, patterns
+internal/ontology/          Type hierarchy validation, relationship checks
+internal/knowledge/         Knowledge YAML seed ingestion
+internal/config/            Config loading from env vars
+api/openapi.yaml            REST API contract. Source of truth for endpoints.
+api/codegen.yaml            oapi-codegen config → generates internal/httpapi/gen/
+migrations/                 Forward-only SQL. Format: NNN_name.up.sql. No down migrations.
+seeds/                      Bootstrap YAML. ontology.yaml, inventory.yaml, policy.yaml,
+                             knowledge.yaml. Regenerated from DB via oikos export.
+compose/                    Dockerfiles. oikos/ (multi-stage), nomos/ (distroless).
+                             Caddy config at compose/caddy/Caddyfile.oikos.
+scripts/                     Deploy, rollback, watchdog, verification, cutover checklist.
+nomos/                       Nomos config.yaml, SOUL.md, skills.
+.agents/                     Agent instruction files, domains, shared conventions, skills.
+plans/                       Design documents. active/ + done/.
+docs/adr/                    Architecture decision records. Numbered, prefix-sorted.
+```
+
+## Development loop
+
+```bash
+# Start dependencies
+make dev
+
+# Generate code after API/SQL changes
+make generate
+
+# Build
+make build
+
+# Run tests
+make test           # all unit tests
+make test-db        # integration tests (needs compose Postgres)
+
+# Lint
+make lint
+
+# CI drift guard (run before commit)
+make generate-check
+```
+
+## Adding a feature or phase
+
+Oikos features follow a phase model (read [OIKOS.md](../OIKOS.md) for the
+current phase status). To add a new capability:
+
+1. **ADR first.** Write an architecture decision record in `docs/adr/` with
+   the next sequence number. Document the decision, context, alternatives
+   considered, and consequences.
+2. **Plan.** If the change is non-trivial, create a plan in `plans/` following
+   the template in [page-templates.md](../shared/page-templates.md).
+3. **Schema.** If the feature needs new DB tables, write a forward-only
+   migration in `migrations/`. Use `IF NOT EXISTS` for idempotency.
+4. **API.** If the feature exposes endpoints, define them in
+   `api/openapi.yaml` first, then run `make generate`, then implement.
+5. **Domain.** Add types to `internal/domain/` before adding logic.
+6. **Tests.** Write tests alongside implementation. Integration tests go in
+   `*_test.go` in the relevant package, using the compose Postgres.
+7. **Policy.** If the feature introduces new mutation types, update
+   `seeds/policy.yaml` and the classifier in `internal/policy/`.
+8. **Run `make generate-check`** before commit to ensure generated code is
+   current.
+
+## SQL conventions
+
+- Queries live in `internal/db/queries/*.sql` with `-- name: FuncName :exec`
+  annotations for sqlc
+- Use `pgx/v5` driver. UUIDs use `pgtype.UUID`, timestamps use `time.Time`
+- CTEs for graph traversals (blast radius, dependency chains)
+- CAGGs and retention policies for TimescaleDB hypertables
+- FTS via `tsvector` + `tsquery` for knowledge search (migration 011)
+
+## OpenAPI codegen
+
+- Config: `api/codegen.yaml`. Uses `oapi-codegen/v2` with Chi server template
+- Generated output: `internal/httpapi/gen/api.gen.go` — never hand-edit
+- Strict server interface: `api.gen.go` generates the `StrictServerInterface`;
+  implement it in `internal/httpapi/impl.go`
+- Problem+JSON errors via `internal/httpapi/problem.go` — RFC 9457 format
+- Cursor pagination, If-Match/ETag, idempotency keys, SSE streaming
+
+## Testing philosophy
+
+- **Race detector always on.** `make test` runs `go test -race -cover ./...`
+- **Integration tests** use the compose Postgres. Run with `make test-db`.
+  Each test creates + tears down its own schema namespace.
+- **Coverage gates** in CI: policy + learning ≥ 80%, others ≥ 60%
+- Tests use `testing.T` directly, no assertion library
+- Table-driven tests for validation and classification logic
+
+## Migration rules
+
+- Forward-only. No down migrations (ADR 0008)
+- Idempotent: use `IF NOT EXISTS`, `DO $$ BEGIN ... END $$` blocks
+- Sequence numbers are sequential integers (001, 002, ...)
+- Each migration file is `NNN_name.up.sql`
+- Migrations are embedded in the binary via `migrations/embed.go`
+
+## Seed files
+
+- `seeds/ontology.yaml` — entity types, relationship types, lifecycles
+  (validated against schema in `internal/ontology/`)
+- `seeds/inventory.yaml` — hosts, services, entities (the topology)
+- `seeds/policy.yaml` — risk classes, approval rules, autonomy settings
+- `seeds/knowledge.yaml` — documents, investigations, runbooks (DB is source
+  of truth; this file is the DR export)
+- After DB changes via the API, run `make export` to regenerate seeds
+
+## Secrets handling
+
+- No secrets in code, config, or commits
+- Dev secrets in `.env` (gitignored)
+- Primary: Infisical (`internal/secrets/infisical.go`)
+- Fallback: SOPS + age (`internal/secrets/sops.go`)
+- Backend interface: `internal/secrets/backend.go`
+- Machine identities via Infisical UniversalAuth
+- In-memory cache with TTL for performance
+
+## Staging and deployment
+
+- CI pipeline: `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` — lint, vet, vulncheck, test, docker build
+- Deploy: `scripts/deploy.sh` — git pull → docker build → compose up → health check
+- Watchdog: `scripts/watchdog.sh` — 2-minute cron, Matrix alert on failure
+- Rollback: `scripts/rollback.sh` — checkout SHA + pg_restore
+- Cutover checklist: `scripts/cutover-checklist.md`
+
+## Writing conventions
+
+Apply [writing-style.md](../shared/writing-style.md) for all committed prose.
+Terse, reference-style, no marketing vocabulary. Code comments explain intent
+and trade-offs, not mechanics.
+
+Apply [caveman.md](../shared/caveman.md) for agent communication. The caveman
+standard applies to agent *chat responses*, not committed documentation.
+
+## Skills
+
+Agent skills live under `.agents/skills/<name>/SKILL.md`. Each skill has a
+frontmatter description that tools match against tasks. To add a skill:
+
+1. Create `.agents/skills/<name>/SKILL.md`
+2. Include frontmatter with description field
+3. Document the procedure following the runbook template
+4. Reference relevant files, commands, and policy classes
+
+Skills that require code (e.g. linting) may include companion scripts in the
+same directory.
+
+## When in doubt
+
+- Query MCP tools first (search_knowledge, get_entity)
+- Read the relevant ADR in `docs/adr/`
+- Grep the codebase: `rg <symbol> internal/`
+- Check `plans/` for in-progress work that may conflict
+- Classify any new mutation against `seeds/policy.yaml` before suggesting it

.agents/domains/knowledge/schema.md

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# Knowledge domain — schema
+
+The knowledge domain is the durable, authoritative current-state documentation of the homelab: one
+page per node and per cross-cutting system, synthesized from live state and evidence. It answers
+"what exists and how does it work right now."
+
+It follows the [LLM Wiki layer model](../../shared/llm-wiki.md) and the
+[writing-style](../../shared/writing-style.md) and [page-templates](../../shared/page-templates.md)
+rules.
+
+## The narrative / substrate split
+
+The knowledge wiki is **narrative**. It sits alongside a **machine-readable substrate** that it
+describes but never contains. The split is load-bearing: several programs read the substrate at
+fixed paths, so the wiki reorganization never moves it.
+
+| Layer | Location | Consumed by |
+|-------|----------|-------------|
+| Substrate — source of truth | `inventory.yaml` (root) | MCP server, `homelab` CLI, `oikos/` scheduler/drift/relations/gen-topology |
+| Substrate — generated host records | `inventory.yaml` (root) | Go `internal/mcp/` server, `bin/homelab`; the single source of truth |
+| Substrate — kernel + context cards | `oikos/` (code, `oikos/cards/`, `oikos/state.json`) | MCP `explain`, scheduler |
+| Narrative — synthesized wiki | `archive/knowledge/{hosts,containers,vms,infrastructure}/` | humans, agents via MCP `get_page` / `search_docs` |
+| Evidence — immutable sources | `knowledge/sources/` (references + investigations) | synthesis into wiki pages |
+
+## Wiki pages
+
+- **Node pages** (`archive/knowledge/containers/<id>-<name>.md`, `.../vms/<id>-<name>.md`,
+  `.../hosts/<name>.md`) follow the container/host template in
+  [page-templates.md](../../shared/page-templates.md): opening definition, `## At a glance`,
+  `## Role`, service/port map, storage, auto-deploy, `## Related`, `## Changelog`.
+- **Cross-cutting pages** (`archive/knowledge/infrastructure/<topic>.md`) follow the cross-cutting
+  template: `## Why`, `## Components`, `## How to apply`, `## Gotchas`, `## Related`, `## Changelog`.
+- Each `inventory.yaml` host entry carries a `doc_page:` field pointing at its narrative page.
+  Changing where a page lives means updating that field (read by `bin/homelab`).
+
+## The two logs
+
+- The per-page **`## Changelog`** records infrastructure changes and is machine-parsed
+  (`get_changelog`, the Oikos ledger). Keep the `### YYYY-MM-DD — title` shape.
+- **`knowledge/log.md`** is append-only and records *documentation-maintenance* operations only
+  (restructures, source ingests, lint sweeps): `## [YYYY-MM-DD] <op> | <summary>`. It never
+  duplicates the Oikos change ledger (`oikos/ledger.py`).
+
+## Same-session update rule
+
+A change to a node updates every page that references it in the same session — the node page, the
+section `README.md` table, the root `README.md`, the Caddy/DNS/ingress pages, the host page, and
+`inventory.yaml`. See [page-templates.md](../../shared/page-templates.md#same-session-update-rule).

.agents/domains/operations/schema.md

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# Operations domain — schema
+
+The operations domain holds the procedural and time-stamped documentation: runbooks (repeatable
+procedures), investigations (incident evidence), and plans (design docs for non-trivial work). It
+follows [writing-style](../../shared/writing-style.md); runbooks and plans use the imperative voice
+exception.
+
+Where each kind lives: runbooks are skills under [`.agents/skills/`](../../skills/); operator
+reference (command cheatsheet, enrollment, Hermes agent) lives in
+[`.agents/operations/`](../../operations/); investigations are sources under
+`knowledge/sources/investigations/`; plans stay in the repo-root `plans/` folder (below).
+
+## Plans always live in `plans/`
+
+**Any plan or design doc for the Homelab is written into the repo `plans/` folder as
+`plans/YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md` — never a scratch path, an agent-private plan location, or a chat
+message.** An agent drafting a plan:
+
+1. Writes the file under `plans/` using the plan template in [page-templates.md](../../shared/page-templates.md).
+2. Lists it in `plans/index.md`.
+3. On completion, moves it to `plans/done/` and updates the index status.
+
+This is the single source for homelab design intent; keeping it in-repo means the plan is
+versioned, reviewable, and reachable by MCP `get_page`/`search_docs` like any other doc.
+
+## Runbooks
+
+Repeatable procedures are skills — one folder per skill at `.agents/skills/<name>/SKILL.md`, with
+YAML front-matter that the Oikos policy and lifecycle machinery reads:
+
+```yaml
+---
+name: <name>
+risk_class: read_only | reversible_low | config_mutation | destructive
+inputs: [<param>, ...]
+verification: "<shell expression that proves success>"
+docs_update_checklist: [<doc artifacts to update>]
+transition: "<from> -> <to>"   # only for lifecycle runbooks
+---
+```
+
+`risk_class` values and the lifecycle `transition` states must match
+[`seeds/policy.yaml`](../../../seeds/policy.yaml) and [`seeds/ontology.yaml`](../../../seeds/ontology.yaml).
+
+## Investigations
+
+Incident records live in `knowledge/sources/investigations/YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md` and are **evidence sources** — written
+once at incident time, then linked from the changelogs of the nodes they implicate. Sections:
+`## Summary`, `## Timeline`, `## Root cause`, `## Mitigations applied`, `## Open questions`. Resolved
+incidents move to `knowledge/sources/investigations/archive/`.
+
+## The operations log
+
+`plans/log.md` and `knowledge/log.md` are append-only records of documentation operations on
+those areas (`## [YYYY-MM-DD] <op> | <summary>`), distinct from the Oikos change ledger.

.agents/operations/agent-enrollment.md

@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ this repo that auto-syncs every 5 min, a per-client age key for SOPS
 decryption, the `homelab` CLI, and an MCP endpoint in Claude Code's config.
 
 > Onboarding a Nous-Hermes-powered Goose agent on top of standard enrollment?
-> See [hermes-agent.md](./hermes-agent.md). It uses the same `bootstrap.sh`
-> with an additional `--with-hermes` flag.
+> See [nomos-agent.md](nomos-agent.md). It uses the same `bootstrap.sh`
+> with an additional `--with-nomos` flag.
 
 Architecture in [project_homelab_context_plan](https://… memory link); the
 operational reference is here.
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ hostname doesn't match any inventory entry. Two fixes:
 - **Rename the host**: `sudo hostnamectl set-hostname <inventory-name>`
   (Linux) or System Preferences → Sharing (macOS), then re-run.
 - **Rename the inventory entry**: edit `inventory.yaml` on hubris,
-  regenerate `hosts/*.yaml`, push. The next sync (≤5 min) propagates.
+  update `inventory.yaml`, push. The next sync (≤5 min) propagates.
 
 ### Getting onto Netbird
 
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Bootstrap auto-installs netbird and drives `netbird up` if the mesh isn't alread
 
 The new client runs bootstrap straight from a fresh OS. Bootstrap installs netbird (apt/dnf/brew based on the OS), then runs `netbird up --management-url https://netbird.hubris.network --ssh-jwt-cache-ttl 86400`. A device-code URL prints inline. The operator opens it (in a browser logged into Authentik), goes through identification → password → consent, and the CLI returns `Connected`. Bootstrap then proceeds with the rest of preflight.
 
-Pre-condition: the operator must be a registered user in Authentik (typically the lab owner). The first user-login against a netbird account with existing peers is added as `pending_approval=1` and needs an sqlite promotion to `owner` — see [124-authentik.md First-time owner promotion gotcha](../containers/124-authentik.md). Only needed once per account.
+Pre-condition: the operator must be a registered user in Authentik (typically the lab owner). The first user-login against a netbird account with existing peers is added as `pending_approval=1` and needs an sqlite promotion to `owner` — see [124-authentik.md First-time owner promotion gotcha](../../archive/knowledge/containers/106-auth-outpost.md). Only needed once per account.
 
 **Path A — setup-key (headless/scripted onboarding):**
 
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Useful for headless servers (no browser at all) or unattended cloud-init bootstr
 ### DNS prerequisite
 
 `*.hubris.network` resolves via the split-horizon dnsmasq on LXC 124
-([dns.md](../infrastructure/dns.md)) for LAN clients, **but only if the
+([dns.md](../../archive/knowledge/infrastructure/dns.md)) for LAN clients, **but only if the
 client uses 192.168.8.180 as its resolver**. Most LXCs and roaming
 workstations don't by default. Options:
 
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ If DNS isn't an option at all, override the URLs at bootstrap time:
 
 ```bash
 sudo HOMELAB_GITEA_TOKEN=... \
-     HOMELAB_REPO_URL=http://192.168.8.121:3000/dtoro/Homelab-Docs.git \
+     HOMELAB_REPO_URL=http://192.168.8.121:3000/dtoro/oikos.git \
      HOMELAB_ISSUANCE_NETBIRD=http://192.168.8.205:9820/issue \
      HOMELAB_MCP_URL=http://192.168.8.205:9810/mcp \
      bash /tmp/bootstrap.sh --with-mcp
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ TOKEN=...   # your Gitea PAT, scope read:repository
 
 # Fetch bootstrap.sh from gitea (HTTPS uses split-DNS → caddy).
 curl -fsSL -u "dtoro:$TOKEN" \
-  https://git.hubris.network/dtoro/Homelab-Docs/raw/branch/main/bootstrap.sh \
+  https://git.hubris.network/dtoro/oikos/raw/branch/main/bootstrap.sh \
   -o /tmp/bootstrap.sh
 
 # Run it.
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ arguments.
 
 If you also want the netbird `--ssh-jwt-cache-ttl` flag rationale to be
 visible to the classifier (it's not actually durable in 0.71.2, but the
-ControlMaster block is — see [runbook-dpkg-interrupted](runbook-dpkg-interrupted.md)
+ControlMaster block is — see [runbook-dpkg-interrupted](../skills/runbook-dpkg-interrupted/SKILL.md)
 for context), drop a free-text rule into `autoMode.allow` describing the
 authorization. Optional.
 
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ homelab client add my-new-machine
 # 4. On hubris: finalize the age public key.
 homelab client add my-new-machine --finalize-pubkey age1...
 # Updates inventory.yaml hosts.my-new-machine.age_pubkey, regenerates
-# hosts/*.yaml, commits + pushes. The 5-min sync propagates.
+# inventory.yaml, commits + pushes. The 5-min sync propagates.
 ```
 
 ## Granting a secret to a new client
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ The CLI prints a follow-up checklist that the operator must do manually:
 | --- | --- | --- |
 | `no hosts/<hostname>.yaml in the repo` | Hostname doesn't match inventory entry | Rename either side (see above) |
 | `fatal: could not read Username for 'http://192.168.8.121:3000'` | bootstrap.sh's credentials file has wrong scheme | Fixed in commit `de6f8be`; pull latest `bootstrap.sh` |
-| `gnutls_handshake() failed: TLS connection was non-properly terminated` cloning `git.hubris.network` | Client DNS resolves `*.hubris.network` to the public VPS IP | Configure split-DNS (LXC 180 / Netbird forwarder) or `/etc/hosts` override; or use `HOMELAB_REPO_URL=http://192.168.8.121:3000/dtoro/Homelab-Docs.git` |
+| `gnutls_handshake() failed: TLS connection was non-properly terminated` cloning `git.hubris.network` | Client DNS resolves `*.hubris.network` to the public VPS IP | Configure split-DNS (LXC 180 / Netbird forwarder) or `/etc/hosts` override; or use `HOMELAB_REPO_URL=http://192.168.8.121:3000/dtoro/oikos.git` |
 | `TLS/SSL connection has been closed (EOF)` connecting MCP | Same — `mcp.hubris.network` resolves to public VPS without this vhost | Same DNS fix |
 | `Invalid Host header` from MCP server | FastMCP's DNS-rebinding protection (default whitelist is 127.0.0.1 only) | Fixed in commit `6848640`; pull latest `mcp/server.py` and redeploy |
 | `python3-yaml` install fails on Fedora | Wrong package name | Use `python3-pyyaml` (Fedora) instead of `python3-yaml` (Debian) |
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ The CLI prints a follow-up checklist that the operator must do manually:
 | `homelab` CLI doesn't pick up repo updates | Pre-`02db…` bootstrap copied the binary instead of symlinking | One-time migration: `sudo ln -sfn /opt/homelab-context/bin/homelab /usr/local/bin/homelab`. New bootstraps use the symlink, which auto-tracks the synced repo. |
 | `homelab-context-sync.service` journal shows `fatal: could not read Username for 'https://git.hubris.network'` | Pre-fix bootstrap set the gitea credential helper via `git config --global`, which writes to `/root/.gitconfig` — invisible to the systemd timer's git process (no HOME set). | One-time migration: `sudo git config --system credential.helper "store --file=/etc/homelab-context/git-credentials"`. New bootstraps store the helper in `/etc/gitconfig` instead. |
 | Chat-mode `!` shell can't `sudo` (`a terminal is required to read the password`) | Claude Code's `!` invocation doesn't allocate a tty, and standard `sudo` won't read its password from stdin or a non-tty pipe. | Run the sudo'd command in a real terminal outside chat. For commands the agent issues repeatedly, configure passwordless sudo for the narrow set (e.g. `/etc/sudoers.d/homelab-self` with `<user> ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/dnf upgrade -y, /usr/bin/apt-get *`). |
-| `netbird status -d` reports `192.168.8.180:53 ... is Unavailable` but DNS actually works | netbird's UDP-53 probe times out over the relay latency (~90ms), but actual queries still flow through systemd-resolved. Cosmetic. | Ignore unless `dig @192.168.8.180 git.hubris.network` also fails — then check dnsmasq on [LXC 124](../containers/124-authentik.md). |
+| `netbird status -d` reports `192.168.8.180:53 ... is Unavailable` but DNS actually works | netbird's UDP-53 probe times out over the relay latency (~90ms), but actual queries still flow through systemd-resolved. Cosmetic. | Ignore unless `dig @192.168.8.180 git.hubris.network` also fails — then check dnsmasq on [LXC 124](../../archive/knowledge/containers/106-auth-outpost.md). |
 | `netbird ssh` rejected with `JWT authentication failed: validate token (expected issuer=https://netbird.hubris.network/oauth2 ...)` | Peer's SSH JWT validator cached the OLD embedded-Dex issuer from before the 2026-05-21 Authentik migration. `systemctl restart netbird` and `netbird down/up` don't clear it — `client/internal/engine_ssh.go` bails out of `updateSSH()` if the SSH server is already running. | Full daemon bounce: `sudo systemctl stop netbird; sleep 3; sudo systemctl start netbird`. Verify with `grep -iE "issuer\|audience" /var/log/netbird/client.log \| tail`. Apply once per peer post-migration. |
 | `netbird ssh` JWT passes but session closes with `user privilege check failed: user dtoro not found: unknown user dtoro` | netbird-ssh defaults the remote username to the LOCAL one (operator's laptop user). Hubris and LXCs only have `root`. | Always use explicit `root@` prefix manually: `netbird ssh -p 22022 root@proxmox-server.netbird.selfhosted`. `homelab ssh <host>` does this automatically via `inventory.yaml`'s per-host `ssh.user` field (defaults to `root`). |
 | `homelab ssh hubris` (or any host on the LAN) fails with `Connection refused` or hangs, despite mesh routing being up | Off-LAN networks (operator on a VPN / coffee shop / symmetric NAT) sometimes can't reach the LAN IP even with the netbird subnet route. | Newer homelab CLIs probe the LAN with a 1.5s TCP connect and transparently fall back to the netbird FQDN. If your `/usr/local/bin/homelab` is a symlink to `/opt/homelab-context/bin/homelab` it'll pick up the fix on the next 5-min context sync. Otherwise pull the latest from gitea. |
@@ -354,9 +354,9 @@ Added a new "Post-bootstrap: SSH reachability" section covering SSH key
 generation, pubkey publication, deployment to hosts, SSH config generation,
 and LAN IP registration. New workstations enrolled via this doc will
 automatically join the universal SSH mesh.
+### 2026-05-31 — cross-link to nomos-agent.md
 
-### 2026-05-31 — cross-link to hermes-agent.md
-Added a sibling page covering Nous-Hermes-on-Goose enrollment ([hermes-agent.md](./hermes-agent.md)) and noted it at the top of this page. The Hermes flow extends `bootstrap.sh` with `--with-hermes` and `homelab client add` with the same flag; it does not change the underlying enrollment steps documented here.
+Added a sibling page covering Nous-Hermes-on-Goose enrollment ([nomos-agent.md](nomos-agent.md)) and noted it at the top of this page. The Nomos flow extends `bootstrap.sh` with `--with-nomos` and `homelab client add` with the same flag; it does not change the underlying enrollment steps documented here.
 
 ### 2026-05-21 — netbird-ssh JWT issuer + username + LAN-fallback troubleshooting rows
 Added three rows to the troubleshooting table covering issues surfaced during the netbird vanilla migration: (1) post-migration SSH JWT validator cache stuck on old Dex issuer (full `systemctl stop/start` required, not `restart`), (2) `user not found` from netbird-ssh's local-username default (use explicit `root@`), and (3) homelab CLI's LAN→netbird-FQDN fallback for off-LAN operators. Companion code change: per-host `ssh.user` field in `inventory.yaml` + `homelab` CLI's `ssh_target()` helper.

.agents/operations/commands.md

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+# Operations cheatsheet
+
+Run from the [hubris host](../../archive/knowledge/hosts/hubris.md) as root. When working from `/root` on Linux you're already on hubris — don't `ssh hubris` / `ping hubris`.
+
+## Proxmox CLI
+
+| Command | Use |
+| --- | --- |
+| `pct list` / `qm list` | List LXC containers / VMs |
+| `pct config <id>` / `qm config <id>` | Container / VM config |
+| `pct exec <id> -- <cmd>` | Run command inside an LXC without entering it (no initgroups — see [media permissions](../../archive/knowledge/infrastructure/media-permissions.md)) |
+| `pct enter <id>` | Shell into a container |
+| `pct start <id>` / `pct stop <id>` | Boot / halt a container |
+| `pvesm status` | Storage pools status |
+| `pvesh get /nodes --output-format json` | Node summary as JSON |
+| `pvesh get /nodes/hubris/lxc/<id>/status/current` | Live container status |
+| `pvesh get /cluster/resources --type vm --output-format json` | Bulk per-LXC CPU/mem/disk (used by the `homelab-health-watchdog` Nomos cron — see [monitoring](../../archive/knowledge/infrastructure/monitoring.md); the old `claudio-monitor` this once fed is deprecated) |
+| `pveversion` | PVE version |
+| `journalctl -u pve-cluster -n 100` | PVE service logs |
+
+## Storage
+
+- Shared mount: `/mnt/library` (ext4 on lvmthin `library`).
+- Bind into a container: `pct set <id> -mp<N> /mnt/library/<sub>,mp=/data`
+- For the standard whole-tree mount: `pct set <id> -mp0 /mnt/library,mp=/mnt/library`. See [media permissions](../../archive/knowledge/infrastructure/media-permissions.md) for the GID-10000 onboarding recipe.
+
+## Reverse proxy
+
+- Caddyfile: `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` on [LXC 121](../../archive/knowledge/containers/121-caddy.md).
+- **CRITICAL:** This file is tracked in `dtoro/caddy-conf` (https://git.hubris.network/dtoro/caddy-conf). Never edit it directly on the LXC — commit + push to the repo instead. Caddy auto-deploys on push (see [auto-deploy](../../archive/knowledge/infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)). If you edit directly, the change will be lost on the next pull and agents won't know about it.
+- Hot reload: `pct exec 121 -- systemctl reload caddy`.
+- Validate: `pct exec 121 -- caddy validate --config /etc/caddy/Caddyfile`.
+- Git workflow shortcut: `pct exec 121 -- "cd /etc/caddy && git add Caddyfile && git commit -m '...' && git push"`.
+
+## DNS
+
+- Split-horizon authority: [Technitium DNS](https://technitium.com) on [dns (107)](../../archive/knowledge/containers/107-dns.md) at `192.168.8.2:53`. Web UI at `http://192.168.8.2`. (Formerly dnsmasq on the now-destroyed LXC 124 — decommissioned 2026-06-04.)
+- Add/edit records in the Technitium UI; the NetBird managed zone sync (`scripts/dns-sync.py` cron on 107) picks changes up within ~10 minutes.
+- Verify: `dig @192.168.8.2 +short <host>.hubris.network`.
+- See [DNS](../../archive/knowledge/infrastructure/dns.md).
+
+## Web access
+
+- `https://proxmox.hubris.network` or `https://192.168.8.77:8006` — Proxmox UI
+
+## Telemetry quick checks
+
+- `ras-mc-ctl --summary` — summary of any RAS events (memory / PCIe AER / thermal) since boot
+- `ras-mc-ctl --errors` — full event log
+- `cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq/energy_performance_preference` — should be `balance_power`
+- `cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq/scaling_governor` — should be `powersave`
+- `ls /sys/fs/pstore/ /var/lib/systemd/pstore/` — panic traces from a previous crash (empty for pure hardware hangs — see [investigation](../../archive/knowledge/investigations/archive/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md))
+
+## Fleet apt operations
+
+Two `homelab` subcommands wrap the common patterns; both fan out to hubris + every LXC.
+
+| Command | What it does |
+| --- | --- |
+| `homelab apt-audit [--target HOST]` | Per-host table: dpkg-interrupted state, holds, upgradable count, non-apt binaries in system paths, DNS health. Exits nonzero if any host has dpkg-interrupted state. |
+| `homelab apt-upgrade --target HOST` | Launch `apt update && apt upgrade` inside a transient `systemd-run --collect` unit on the target. Survives ssh teardown. Apt configured with `Acquire::Retries=3` + `ForceIPv4=true`. |
+| `homelab apt-upgrade --all` | Same, fanned out across the standard targets. |
+| `homelab apt-upgrade ... --status` | Show running unit + tail `/var/log/homelab-apt-upgrade.log` on each target. |
+| `homelab apt-upgrade ... --safe` | Take a pre-upgrade snapshot per LXC first (`pct snapshot` → `vzdump` fallback for bind-mounted LXCs). Refuses if any snapshot fails unless `--force`. |
+| `homelab apt-upgrade ... --force` | Skip both the dpkg-audit gate and snapshot-failure refusal. |
+
+PVE/kernel deferral on hubris: `homelab apt-upgrade --target hubris` will try every upgrade, including kernel + `pve-*`. To skip those, `apt-mark hold` the relevant packages on hubris first; `homelab apt-audit` shows held packages so you can confirm.
+
+## Oikos (agent OS layer)
+
+See [OIKOS.md](../OIKOS.md) for the operating model. Quick reference:
+
+| Command | What it does |
+| --- | --- |
+| `homelab service <name> explain\|health\|docs\|log\|actions\|history` | Service Console v0 — context card, cached health (`--live` to force a probe), docs, logs, safe actions + risk class, ledger history |
+| `homelab node <name> relations` | Ontology blast-radius query: what this host/service impacts, is affected by, and its full transitive blast radius |
+| `homelab change preflight <service>` | Dry-run report before mutating: risk class, current health, config repo, verification command |
+| `homelab decide <action> <entity>` | Decision classifier: risk × blast radius × confidence → auto-act or escalate |
+| `homelab signal list\|raise\|ack\|resolve\|mute` | The attention layer — pending updates, thresholds, drift, anything needing attention |
+| `homelab approval request\|list\|reply\|check` | Escalate-route grants (Matrix-delivered via Nomos, or the Oikos Console's `/approvals` page) |
+| `homelab restart <service> [--approval-id <id>]` | `--approval-id` is required whenever the service's risk class needs approval (e.g. `caddy`, `dns`) — refuses mechanically without a valid grant |
+
+Oikos Console (read-mostly dashboard): `oikos.hubris.network` once deployed — see [oikos/console/deploy/README.md](../../archive/oikos-cards/).
+
+## Related
+- [Hubris host](../../archive/knowledge/hosts/hubris.md)
+- [Containers index](../../archive/knowledge/containers/index.md)
+- [DNS](../../archive/knowledge/infrastructure/dns.md)
+- [Monitoring](../../archive/knowledge/infrastructure/monitoring.md)
+- [Auto-deploy](../../archive/knowledge/infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)
+- [Runbook: dpkg-interrupted recovery](../skills/runbook-dpkg-interrupted/SKILL.md) — what to do when apt got killed mid-transaction

.agents/operations/nomos-agent.md

@@ -1,29 +1,29 @@
-# Hermes agent — Nous-Hermes-powered Goose sessions on a homelab client
+# Nomos agent — LLM-powered terminal sessions on a homelab client
 
 Onboards [Nous Research's Hermes](https://nousresearch.com/) (a fine-tuned
 Llama variant) as a working terminal agent on a homelab client. Builds on top
-of standard client enrollment (see [agent-enrollment.md](./agent-enrollment.md))
+of standard client enrollment (see [agent-enrollment.md](agent-enrollment.md))
 — this page covers only the Hermes-specific additions.
 
 The agent runs as a [Goose](https://goose-docs.ai/) session. Goose provides:
 
 - The chat loop, multi-turn history, and streaming
-- The OpenRouter provider that routes to Nous Hermes
+- The OpenRouter provider that routes to the configured LLM
 - The built-in `developer` extension (shell + file editor — same surface Claude
   Code has)
 - A remote MCP extension pointed at `mcp.hubris.network` for read-only
   homelab context (`list_lxcs`, `tail_log`, `search_docs`, etc.)
 
-The persona is `/opt/homelab-context/HERMES.md`, symlinked as Goose's global
+The persona is `/opt/homelab-context/NOMOS.md`, symlinked as Goose's global
 `.goosehints` so it's injected into the system prompt on every session.
 
 ## Prerequisites
 
 | Requirement | How |
 | --- | --- |
-| Standard enrollment complete (`homelab whoami` works) | [agent-enrollment.md](./agent-enrollment.md) |
+| Standard enrollment complete (`homelab whoami` works) | [agent-enrollment.md](agent-enrollment.md) |
 | `secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml` exists with a real `sk-or-...` value | See "Seeding the OpenRouter key" below |
-| The host's `age_pubkey` is on the openrouter-api-key.yaml sops rule | `homelab client add <host> --finalize-pubkey <age1...> --with-hermes` |
+| The host's `age_pubkey` is on the openrouter-api-key.yaml sops rule | `homelab client add <host> --finalize-pubkey <age1...> --with-nomos` |
 
 ## Onboarding flow
 
@@ -33,37 +33,37 @@ homelab client add new-machine
 
 # 2. Join new-machine to Netbird (setup-key or OIDC).
 
-# 3. On new-machine: bootstrap with --with-hermes.
+# 3. On new-machine: bootstrap with --with-nomos.
 TOKEN=...   # gitea PAT, read:repository
 curl -fsSL -u "dtoro:$TOKEN" \
-  https://git.hubris.network/dtoro/Homelab-Docs/raw/branch/main/bootstrap.sh \
+  https://git.hubris.network/dtoro/oikos/raw/branch/main/bootstrap.sh \
   -o /tmp/bootstrap.sh
-sudo HOMELAB_GITEA_TOKEN=$TOKEN bash /tmp/bootstrap.sh --with-mcp --with-hermes
+sudo HOMELAB_GITEA_TOKEN=$TOKEN bash /tmp/bootstrap.sh --with-mcp --with-nomos
 
-# 4. Back on hubris: finalize the age pubkey AND grant the Hermes secret.
+# 4. Back on hubris: finalize the age pubkey AND grant the Nomos secret.
 homelab client add new-machine \
   --finalize-pubkey age1... \
-  --with-hermes
+  --with-nomos
 
 # 5. Wait ≤5 min for sync, then on new-machine:
-hermes "what LXCs are running?"
+nomos "what LXCs are running?"
 ```
 
-The bootstrap `--with-hermes` flag does five things, all idempotent:
+The bootstrap `--with-nomos` flag does five things, all idempotent:
 
 1. Downloads the latest Goose binary into the operator's `~/.local/bin/goose`
    (upstream installer) and symlinks `/usr/local/bin/goose` to it.
-2. Symlinks `/opt/homelab-context/bin/hermes` → `/usr/local/bin/hermes`.
-3. Symlinks `/opt/homelab-context/HERMES.md` → `/root/HERMES.md` (Linux) or
-   `/etc/HERMES.md` (macOS) for `cat`-as-operator convenience.
+2. Symlinks `/opt/homelab-context/bin/nomos` → `/usr/local/bin/nomos`.
+3. Symlinks `/opt/homelab-context/NOMOS.md` → `/root/NOMOS.md` (Linux) or
+   `/etc/NOMOS.md` (macOS) for `cat`-as-operator convenience.
 4. Drops `~/.config/goose/config.yaml` pinning the provider, model, and
    extensions (preserves any keys the operator added by hand).
-5. Symlinks `~/.config/goose/.goosehints` → HERMES.md, so the persona is
+5. Symlinks `~/.config/goose/.goosehints` → NOMOS.md, so the persona is
    injected as the system prompt on every session.
 
 ## Seeding the OpenRouter key
 
-The first time anyone enrolls with `--with-hermes`, the encrypted file
+The first time anyone enrolls with `--with-nomos`, the encrypted file
 `secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml` contains a placeholder. On hubris (or any
 existing recipient):
 
@@ -75,19 +75,19 @@ git -C /opt/homelab-context commit -m 'openrouter-api-key: seed real key'
 git -C /opt/homelab-context push
 ```
 
-Until this step happens, `hermes …` exits with `openrouter-api-key.yaml still
+Until this step happens, `nomos …` exits with `openrouter-api-key.yaml still
 contains the placeholder`. Subsequent enrollees get the real key automatically
-via `--with-hermes` (which adds them as a sops recipient on
+via `--with-nomos` (which adds them as a sops recipient on
 `secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml`).
 
 ## Granting the OpenRouter key to an already-enrolled host
 
-If a host was enrolled without `--with-hermes` and you want to add it later:
+If a host was enrolled without `--with-nomos` and you want to add it later:
 
 ```bash
 # On hubris:
 PUBKEY=$(homelab whoami --hostname <host> | grep age_pubkey | awk '{print $2}')
-homelab client add <host> --finalize-pubkey "$PUBKEY" --with-hermes
+homelab client add <host> --finalize-pubkey "$PUBKEY" --with-nomos
 ```
 
 `--finalize-pubkey` is required by the existing flow even when the pubkey is
@@ -101,12 +101,12 @@ re-run; only the secret recipient list changed.
 ```bash
 homelab whoami                                # standard enrollment OK
 homelab secret openrouter-api-key | head -c 8 # decrypts (prints `api_key:`)
-which goose && which hermes                   # binaries present
+which goose && which nomos                     # binaries present
 goose info -v                                  # provider/model wiring sane
-hermes "what LXCs are running?"                # interactive Goose session
+nomos "what LXCs are running?"                  # interactive Goose session
 
 # Non-interactive smoke test:
-echo "List the homelab MCP tools you have available" | hermes
+echo "List the homelab MCP tools you have available" | nomos
 ```
 
 ## Configuration
@@ -135,9 +135,9 @@ extensions:
 Override via env on a single bootstrap run:
 
 ```bash
-HOMELAB_HERMES_MODEL=nousresearch/hermes-3-llama-3.1-405b \
-HOMELAB_HERMES_MCP_URI=https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp \
-  sudo bash /tmp/bootstrap.sh --with-hermes
+HOMELAB_NOMOS_MODEL=nousresearch/hermes-3-llama-3.1-405b \
+HOMELAB_NOMOS_MCP_URI=https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp \
+  sudo bash /tmp/bootstrap.sh --with-nomos
 ```
 
 Any keys you add by hand (e.g. `GOOSE_TEMPERATURE`, extra `extensions.*`) are
@@ -156,33 +156,33 @@ every tool call, use `approve`. See
 
 | Symptom | Cause | Fix |
 | --- | --- | --- |
-| `hermes: could not decrypt secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml` | Host isn't a recipient on the sops rule | `homelab client add <host> --finalize-pubkey <age1...> --with-hermes` from hubris |
-| `hermes: openrouter-api-key.yaml still contains the placeholder` | No real key has been seeded yet | See "Seeding the OpenRouter key" above |
-| Goose hangs on first `hermes` invocation with no output | Goose's interactive `configure` ran on first launch and is awaiting input | Re-run; the installer is supposed to skip it (CONFIGURE=false). If it persists, run `goose configure` once manually in a real terminal to commit the config. |
-| `homelab` extension fails to connect / no MCP tools listed | MCP server still runs SSE-only; Goose requires `streamable_http`. See follow-up #1 below. | Either: (a) migrate the FastMCP server to streamable_http (one-line change in `mcp/server.py` — `mcp.run(transport="streamable_http")` — then redeploy), or (b) accept that the agent works via the developer extension alone (shell + `homelab` CLI cover everything MCP would). |
-| `goose: command not found` after bootstrap | Upstream installer dropped binary in `~/.local/bin/` but `/usr/local/bin/goose` symlink didn't land | Re-run bootstrap with `--with-hermes`; the symlink step is at the end of the install block. If still missing, `ln -sfn ~/.local/bin/goose /usr/local/bin/goose` manually. |
+| `nomos: could not decrypt secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml` | Host isn't a recipient on the sops rule | `homelab client add <host> --finalize-pubkey <age1...> --with-nomos` from hubris |
+| `nomos: openrouter-api-key.yaml still contains the placeholder` | No real key has been seeded yet | See "Seeding the OpenRouter key" above |
+| Goose hangs on first `nomos` invocation with no output | Goose's interactive `configure` ran on first launch and is awaiting input | Re-run; the installer is supposed to skip it (CONFIGURE=false). If it persists, run `goose configure` once manually in a real terminal to commit the config. |
+| `homelab` extension fails to connect / no MCP tools listed | MCP server upgraded in Go rewrite (`internal/mcp/server.go`, Streamable HTTP via official MCP SDK). Old FastMCP SSE transport is deprecated. | Run `docker compose --profile full up` on mac-mini, or wait for the production cutover from apps/105. |
+| `goose: command not found` after bootstrap | Upstream installer dropped binary in `~/.local/bin/` but `/usr/local/bin/goose` symlink didn't land | Re-run bootstrap with `--with-nomos`; the symlink step is at the end of the install block. If still missing, `ln -sfn ~/.local/bin/goose /usr/local/bin/goose` manually. |
 | Tool calls hit OpenRouter rate limits | One shared key across many hosts | Future: per-host keys; for now, see the rate-limits guide referenced in `goose info -v`. |
 
 ## Cross-references
 
-- [agent-enrollment.md](./agent-enrollment.md) — base client onboarding the
-  Hermes flow assumes is done.
-- [`HERMES.md`](../HERMES.md) — the persona the Hermes agent reads on every
+- [agent-enrollment.md](agent-enrollment.md) — base client onboarding the
+  Nomos flow assumes is done.
+- [`NOMOS.md`](../NOMOS.md) — the persona the Nomos agent reads on every
   session start (via `~/.config/goose/.goosehints`).
-- [`bin/hermes`](../bin/hermes) — the wrapper that decrypts the OpenRouter key
+- [`bin/nomos`](../../bin/nomos) — the wrapper that decrypts the OpenRouter key
   and execs `goose session`.
-- [`bootstrap.sh`](../bootstrap.sh) — the `--with-hermes` flag's install block.
+- [`bootstrap.sh`](../../bootstrap.sh) — the `--with-nomos` flag's install block.
 
 ## Follow-ups
 
 1. **Migrate the MCP server to streamable_http.** Goose 1.x deprecated SSE
    (`"SSE transport is no longer supported - kept only for config file
    compatibility"` in `crates/goose/src/agents/extension.rs`). Our FastMCP
-   server at `mcp/server.py:336` still calls `mcp.run(transport="sse")`. Until
+   server at `internal/mcp/server.go` uses Streamable HTTP (official MCP SDK). Until
    that's changed, the `homelab` MCP extension in Goose will fail to connect.
    The developer extension (shell + edit) covers most ops without it; this is
    a polish item, not a blocker.
-2. **Per-host OpenRouter keys** for billing attribution. Today all Hermes
+2. **Per-host OpenRouter keys** for billing attribution. Today all Nomos
    hosts share one key.
 3. **Pin the model version** rather than tracking `nousresearch/hermes-4-405b`
    directly — OpenRouter periodically rotates the underlying weights.
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ templating + `~/bin/caveman_wrapper.sh` + `~/templates/*.txt` for token-
 efficient CLI output. Replaces raw `git pull` in launchd/systemd timers.
 Also created `tools/caveman/` with the wrapper script, JS renderer, and
 templates — the canonical source for all agent hosts.
-Captures the Hermes-on-Goose onboarding flow added in the same commit as
-`bootstrap.sh --with-hermes`, `bin/hermes`, the sops rule for
-`secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml`, and the `homelab client add --with-hermes`
+Captures the Nomos-on-Goose onboarding flow added in the same commit as
+`bootstrap.sh --with-nomos`, `bin/nomos`, the sops rule for
+`secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml`, and the `homelab client add --with-nomos`
 extension. MCP streamable_http migration is queued as follow-up #1.

.agents/shared/caveman.md

@@ -30,4 +30,4 @@ Code/commits/PRs: write normal. "stop caveman" or "normal mode": revert. Level p
 ---
 
 Source: https://github.com/JuliusBrussee/caveman
-Copy to `~/.hermes/skills/` for Hermes Agent, or `~/.claude/projects/<name>/SKILL.md` for Claude Code.
+Copy to `~/.nomos/skills/` for Nomos agent, or `~/.claude/projects/<name>/SKILL.md` for Claude Code.

.agents/shared/llm-wiki.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# LLM Wiki — the documentation contract
+
+How the narrative documentation in this repo is organized. The pattern is borrowed from the
+`sources / wiki / index / log` model: a durable synthesized layer (`archive/knowledge/`) built on top
+of immutable evidence (`knowledge/sources/`, incident records), with pure-listing indexes and an
+append-only operations log.
+
+This contract governs the **narrative layer only**. The machine-readable substrate — `inventory.yaml`,
+`secrets/`, `scripts/`, `bin/` — is not part of the wiki and never
+moves under it. See [the knowledge schema](../domains/knowledge/schema.md) for the split.
+
+## Layers
+
+- **Sources** are immutable raw material: incident records (`knowledge/sources/investigations/`), external reference
+  docs (`knowledge/sources/references/`), and the live system itself (`pct config`, `docker inspect`).
+  Read them; do not rewrite them into other sources.
+- **Wiki** (`archive/knowledge/`) is the synthesized, authoritative current-state layer: one page per
+  node (`containers/`, `vms/`, host narratives) and per cross-cutting system (`infrastructure/`). A
+  reader understands the topic from the wiki page without reading the sources.
+- **Index** (`index.md` / folder `README.md`) is a pure listing — every page in scope with a
+  one-line summary, and nothing else. Anything the section wants to say up front goes into a page
+  the index lists, not into the index.
+- **Log** (`log.md`) is append-only, recording *doc-maintenance operations* (restructures, source
+  ingests, lint sweeps) in single-line format: `## [YYYY-MM-DD] <op> | <summary>`.
+
+## Two logs, kept distinct
+
+- **`## Changelog`** on each node/topic page records *infrastructure* changes to that node. It is
+  machine-parsed (`get_changelog`, the Oikos ledger) — keep the `### YYYY-MM-DD — title` shape.
+- **`log.md`** per area records *documentation* operations only. It never duplicates the Oikos
+  change ledger (`oikos/ledger.py`), which stays authoritative for infra changes with
+  who/what/risk/approval/verification.
+
+## Rules
+
+- Wiki pages stay short and focused. A page past ~300 lines splits.
+- Pages stay flat under `wiki/<section>/` until there are enough to warrant a sub-group.
+- Every page follows [writing-style.md](writing-style.md).
+- Plans and design docs always live in the repo `plans/` folder (`plans/YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md`),
+  listed in `plans/index.md`, moved to `plans/done/` on completion — never a scratch path or a chat
+  message. See [the operations schema](../domains/operations/schema.md).

.agents/shared/page-templates.md

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+# Page templates for the Homelab Wiki
+
+The structural templates for each page type. Prose voice, vocabulary, and cross-reference rules live
+in [writing-style.md](writing-style.md); the layer model (sources / wiki / index / log) lives in
+[llm-wiki.md](llm-wiki.md).
+
+## File naming
+
+**Foundational / entry-point files:** ALL-CAPS
+
+- **Root level:** `AGENTS.md`, `README.md` — discovery paths for agents and humans.
+- **Agent instruction** (under `.agents/`): `OIKOS.md`, `HERMES.md` — foundational docs agents read before acting.
+- **Reference docs:** `GLOSSARY.md` — lookup reference (like classic repo conventions: LICENSE, CHANGELOG, GLOSSARY).
+
+**Content / narrative pages:** lowercase-with-dashes, date-prefixed as needed
+
+- **Container pages:** `<id>-<name>.md` (e.g. `101-jellyfin.md`, `132-rclone.md`). The `<id>` is the LXC/VM ordinal from `inventory.yaml`.
+- **Infrastructure / cross-cutting pages:** `<topic>.md` (e.g. `dns.md`, `auto-deploy.md`, `mesh.md`). Describes a system, not a specific node.
+- **Plans / investigations:** `YYYY-MM-DD-<slug>.md` (e.g. `2026-07-05-oikos-prometheus-lxc.md`). Date-sorted; slug is lowercase.
+- **Section indices:** `README.md` (lowercase, conventional). Prefer in folders; `index.md` only if both intro prose and listing coexist.
+
+**Skills / runbooks:** special case
+
+- **Folder structure:** `<name>/SKILL.md` where `<name>` is lowercase-with-dashes (e.g. `client-enrollment/SKILL.md`).
+- **The filename SKILL.md is always uppercase** — it acts as a signpost so tools and humans instantly recognize it as a skill.
+
+**General rules:** All paths use lowercase letters, numbers, and hyphens (no underscores). Uppercase is reserved for foundational docs (entry points + instruction) and filenames that signify document type (SKILL.md, GLOSSARY.md, etc.).
+
+## Voice
+
+Concise, technical, sysadmin-to-sysadmin. No marketing prose, no exclamation marks. Full rules in
+[writing-style.md](writing-style.md).
+
+## Page templates
+
+### Container page (`containers/<id>-<name>.md`)
+
+```markdown
+# <id> — `<name>`
+
+One-sentence purpose.
+
+## At a glance
+- **Hostname:** `<name>`
+- **IP:** `192.168.8.x`
+- **Privilege:** privileged | unprivileged
+- **Resources:** N cores / M GiB RAM / D GiB rootfs
+- **Mounts:** `/mnt/library` ↔ `/mnt/library` (if any)
+- **Public hostname:** `<sub>.hubris.network` (if proxied)
+
+## Role
+What it does, what it talks to.
+
+## Service / port map
+| Service | Listen | Notes |
+
+## Storage / config paths
+
+## Auto-deploy
+(if any) — link to [auto-deploy](../infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)
+
+## Related
+- [Caddy](121-caddy.md) (if proxied)
+- [DNS](../infrastructure/dns.md) (if has subdomain)
+- [Authentik](124-authentik.md) (if SSO)
+- ...
+
+## Changelog
+### YYYY-MM-DD — short title
+What changed, why, link to investigation if any.
+```
+
+### Cross-cutting page (`infrastructure/<topic>.md`)
+
+```markdown
+# <Topic>
+
+One-sentence summary.
+
+## Why
+Design rationale — what it replaces, what it solves.
+
+## Components
+Where it runs, what files matter.
+
+## How to apply / use
+Recipes.
+
+## Gotchas
+
+## Related
+Links to nodes that host or depend on this.
+
+## Changelog
+```
+
+### Plan (`plans/YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md`)
+
+```markdown
+# YYYY-MM-DD — <title>
+
+## Goal
+What this change achieves and why.
+
+## Current topology / state
+Diagram or description of what exists now.
+
+## Target topology / state
+What it looks like after.
+
+## Pre-flight checklist
+
+## Step-by-step procedure
+
+## Verification
+
+## Post-migration
+Changelog entries to write, index status to update.
+```
+
+### Investigation (`knowledge/sources/investigations/YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md`)
+
+```markdown
+# YYYY-MM-DD — <title>
+
+## Summary
+1-3 sentences.
+
+## Timeline
+
+## Root cause
+
+## Mitigations applied
+
+## Open questions
+```
+
+## Linking discipline
+
+- Every container page links to every cross-cutting page it participates in.
+- Every cross-cutting page lists the nodes that participate.
+- Every investigation links to the nodes it implicates *and* gets back-linked from each node's changelog.
+- Every plan links to the infrastructure pages it affects. When done, update the plan's status in `plans/index.md` and write changelog entries on affected node pages.
+
+## Changelog hygiene
+
+- Reverse-chronological (newest first).
+- One entry per discrete change, even if you make several in one day.
+- If a change spans nodes, repeat the entry on each affected page (different perspective is fine).
+- Don't rewrite history — entries are append-only. Mistakes get a follow-up entry that supersedes them.
+
+## Same-session update rule
+
+When you make a change to a node — migrate an LXC, update an IP, change a
+mount, deploy a new service — **update every relevant doc page in the same
+session.** A change that touches a container page must also update:
+
+- The `containers/index.md` table (IPs, host, mounts, status)
+- The `README.md` table (if the change affects listed columns)
+- The Caddy page site list (if the change affects `*.hubris.network` routing)
+- The DNS / ingress infrastructure pages (if the change affects routing)
+- The `hosts/{hubris,strong}.md` host page (if container count changes)
+- The `inventory.yaml` host entry (single source of truth)
+- The `infrastructure/topology.md` (generated from inventory, but regen if needed)
+
+The pattern of updating only one page and leaving stale references on others
+is a bug. If you're doing a multi-step migration, document the intermediate
+state with a changelog entry that says "pending — will finalize after Phase
+N."
+
+This rule is why Phase 2 of the strong migration (2026-07-05) caused
+widespread stale data: individual container pages were updated in the
+changelog but never had their At-a-glance sections, IPs, mount paths, or
+host attribution updated. Don't repeat that.

.agents/shared/writing-style.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# Writing Style
+
+Write like a technical reference, not a marketing page. Every sentence conveys new information.
+These rules govern **committed documentation** — wiki pages, READMEs, schemas, skills, `AGENTS.md`,
+plans, investigations, and code comments. They are separate from [caveman.md](caveman.md), which
+governs an agent's *chat responses*; the two do not conflict.
+
+New or rewritten pages follow these patterns from day one. Existing pages get updated the next time
+they are touched.
+
+## Vocabulary — never use these
+
+- Significance puffers: "pivotal", "crucial", "vital", "groundbreaking", "transformative", "testament", "paramount", "invaluable".
+- Analytical verbs: "delve", "leverage", "utilize", "facilitate", "foster", "showcase", "underscore", "streamline", "harness".
+- Poetic nouns: "tapestry", "landscape" (figurative), "realm", "paradigm", "ecosystem" (figurative), "journey" (figurative), "nexus", "cornerstone".
+- Promotional adjectives: "robust", "seamless", "innovative", "cutting-edge", "meticulous", "holistic", "comprehensive".
+- Opening crutches: "In today's world", "In the ever-evolving landscape of", "It's worth noting that", "It is important to note that".
+
+Use short, common words: "use" not "utilize", "help" not "facilitate", "show" not "demonstrate".
+
+## Voice
+
+Describe what systems do and how they work.
+
+- **Reference prose** (node pages, cross-cutting infrastructure descriptions, `## Role`, `## Why`,
+  `At a glance`) is third-person: state facts about the system, not instructions to a reader.
+- **Recipes, runbooks, and skills** are the exception: second-person imperative is allowed and
+  preferred where it makes a procedure clearer ("Edit the Caddyfile, commit + push", "Verify with
+  `dig +short`"). This matches how the operator actually works. The vocabulary, structure, and
+  cross-reference rules below still apply.
+
+## Page shape
+
+Every doc-level page follows the same shape so a reader scans it in one pass.
+
+1. **One H1 = the page title.** Node pages use `# <id> — \`<name>\``; topic pages use `# <Topic>`.
+2. **Opening definition.** First paragraph, 1–3 sentences, says what the thing is. No motivation, no marketing, no setup.
+3. **Body sections** in the natural order for the topic. Reuse the section templates in [page-templates.md](page-templates.md).
+4. **`## Changelog`** at the bottom of every node/topic page — reverse-chronological, append-only. This section is machine-parsed (Go MCP `get_changelog` in `internal/mcp/server.go`); keep the `### YYYY-MM-DD — title` shape.
+5. **Related links** only at the bottom, only when a reference cannot be woven inline.
+
+## Section indexes (folder READMEs)
+
+A folder's `README.md` opens with a 1–3 sentence prose intro that says what the section covers, then
+a single navigation table — `| Document | What it covers |` — and nothing else. No stale counts, no
+duplicated prose, no narrative between the intro and the table.
+
+## Structure rules
+
+- Make every sentence information-dense. Cut filler, qualifiers, and setup phrases. Lead with the concrete fact or action, not why it matters.
+- No participial tack-ons (", highlighting the importance of…"). If the clause adds information, make it a separate sentence.
+- **No meta-commentary about the content itself.** Do not narrate the page's own structure or linking strategy.
+- Prefer **tables** for enumerable items with internal structure (service/port maps, field lists, status grids). Reserve bullets for short non-structured lists.
+- Use the **bold-leading-phrase pattern** for structured points: `**Read-only by construction.** The MCP server never mutates state.` — a bold noun phrase, a period, then the explanation.
+- When enumerating across services or nodes, give each its own `###` sub-section or a table row, not one run-on paragraph.
+- Use backticks for code, paths, hostnames, and file names (`inventory.yaml`, `192.168.8.77`, `pct config`); italics for first-mention terminology.
+- Use `>` blockquotes for caveats and gaps that interrupt the main flow: `> **Outstanding gap.** DNS-vs-inventory drift check not yet wired.` One thought per blockquote.
+
+## Diagrams
+
+- Mermaid is the default for topology and flow diagrams. `infrastructure/topology.md` is generated by `oikos/gen-topology.py` — do not hand-edit it. (Go DB-native topology generation planned.)
+- ASCII box diagrams are fine for small shape diagrams; keep them to one screen.
+
+## Sourcing and cross-references
+
+- **Factual discipline.** Every claim is grounded in a cited source, an adjacent linked page, or a directly observable fact (`pct config`, `docker inspect`, running config). Do not write sentences that sound sourced but are inference. When docs disagree with live state, fix the doc and note it in the changelog.
+- **One-sided cross-references.** When two pages relate, the link lives in the page where the connection makes organizational sense. Do not add a back-pointer unless that direction also carries content the reader needs.
+- **Cross-references are content, not catalog.** Inline links arise from the surrounding prose; the linked page must be needed to understand the current sentence. A bottom-of-page "Related" list is the fallback, not the default.
+- Pages link with standard relative markdown links (e.g. a container page links to `../infrastructure/dns.md`), forming a navigable graph. Orphans are a bug.
+
+## Code comments and commit/PR prose
+
+- Comments explain intent, trade-offs, or constraints the code cannot convey. No diff narration, no type restatement, no section-divider comments.
+- Commit messages and PR descriptions are problem → change → risk → verification, not a file-by-file diff restatement.
+- The banned vocabulary applies the same way in comments and commit messages.

.agents/skills/client-enrollment/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+---
+name: client-enrollment
+risk_class: config_mutation
+inputs: [hostname, kind, role]
+verification: "homelab doctor (on the new client)"
+docs_update_checklist: [hosts_narrative_page_if_lxc_or_vm]
+---
+
+# Client enrollment
+
+Goal: bring a new host (workstation, LXC, VM) into inventory and the
+secrets model, with mesh membership only where it's actually needed.
+This wraps the existing `homelab client add` flow — see
+[operations/agent-enrollment.md](../../operations/agent-enrollment.md) for
+the full walkthrough; this runbook is the risk/lifecycle framing.
+
+1. On any enrolled client: `homelab client add <hostname>` — appends a
+   `hosts.<name>:` block to `inventory.yaml` (lifecycle `state: planned`
+   → `provisioning`, per [seeds/ontology.yaml](../../../seeds/ontology.yaml)),
+   commits + pushes.
+2. Netbird join is **optional, not a required step** — only needed for
+   hosts that must be reachable off-LAN (workstations that roam, e.g.
+   `republic-laptop`, `mac-mini`). A node reachable on the household LAN
+   (192.168.8.0/24 — most LXCs/VMs) doesn't need it: it's already
+   reachable directly, and off-LAN clients reach it too via hubris's
+   routed `192.168.8.0/24` Netbird network resource. Skip this step for
+   LAN-only nodes; do it (out-of-band, console or setup key) only for
+   hosts that need independent off-LAN reachability.
+3. On the new host: run `bootstrap.sh` (add `--with-nomos` to also
+   enroll the Hermes agent). This provisions `/etc/age/key.txt`, the
+   sync timer, and prints an age pubkey.
+4. Back on an enrolled client: `homelab client add <hostname>
+   --finalize-pubkey <age1...>` — sets `age_pubkey`, grants shared
+   secrets, re-keys SOPS, commits + pushes. This is the
+   `provisioning → active` transition.
+5. Verify: `homelab doctor` on the new client should show all checks
+   green (clone, sync timer, age key, CLI symlink, MCP reachable).
+
+Docs-update checklist: if the new host is an LXC/VM, add its narrative
+page under `containers/` or `vms/` and set `doc_page` in its inventory
+entry (host-level cards don't have a `doc_page` field yet — services do;
+narrative pages are still found via the generated `see_also` in
+`inventory.yaml`).

.agents/skills/config-change-deploy/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+---
+name: config-change-deploy
+risk_class: config_mutation
+inputs: [service_name, change_description]
+verification: "curl -sf <service_url> (or homelab service <name> health)"
+docs_update_checklist: [doc_page, changelog]
+---
+
+# Config change + deploy
+
+Goal: change a tracked config repo (Caddy, Gitea customizations, an app's
+own repo) and get it live, safely.
+
+1. `homelab change preflight <service>` — current health, the service's
+   `config_repo`, its risk class, and the verification command to run
+   after. If risk class requires approval (`config_mutation` or
+   `destructive`), stop and get operator sign-off before editing — see
+   `seeds/policy.yaml`.
+2. Clone/pull the `config_repo` (never edit the backend's working tree
+   directly — tracked configs change by commit + push, per
+   [OIKOS.md](../../OIKOS.md) conventions).
+3. Make the change, commit, push to `main`.
+4. The Gitea webhook fires the deploy pipeline for that repo (see
+   [infrastructure/auto-deploy.md](../../../archive/knowledge/infrastructure/auto-deploy.md) for
+   the exact receiver/reload for this service).
+5. Run the preflight's verification command. If it fails, check
+   `homelab service <name> log` for the reload/restart error.
+6. Record the change: once `oikos/ledger.py` is wired into deploy tooling
+   (Week 3), this is automatic; until then, note the change and outcome
+   in the relevant investigation/plan doc.
+
+Docs-update checklist: update the service's `doc_page` if the change
+alters its behavior, ingress route, or ownership; add a changelog entry
+if the page has one.

.agents/skills/docs-lint/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+---
+name: docs-lint
+risk_class: read_only
+inputs: [paths]
+verification: "python3 .agents/skills/docs-lint/lint.py"
+docs_update_checklist: []
+---
+
+# Docs lint
+
+Check committed documentation against the mechanical rules in
+[writing-style.md](../../shared/writing-style.md): banned vocabulary and broken relative markdown
+links. Prose-voice rules are not machine-checkable — those stay a review responsibility.
+
+Run from the repo root:
+
+    python3 .agents/skills/docs-lint/lint.py            # default: knowledge/ .agents/ operations/ investigations/ plans/
+    python3 .agents/skills/docs-lint/lint.py archive/knowledge/containers/104-gitea.md
+
+Exit code is non-zero when any violation is found, so it can gate a commit. The banned-vocabulary
+list mirrors `writing-style.md`; update both together if the standard changes.
+
+> **Known baseline.** `archive/knowledge/archive/knowledge/containers/101-jellyfin.md` links into a sibling repo
+> (`devops/homelab-authentik-admin`) that this checkout does not contain — expected, not a bug.
+> Any other broken link is a real regression; investigate before dismissing it as baseline noise.

.agents/skills/docs-lint/lint.py

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Lint committed docs against .agents/shared/writing-style.md.
+
+Checks two mechanical rules:
+  1. Banned vocabulary (significance puffers, analytical verbs, poetic nouns,
+     promotional adjectives, opening crutches).
+  2. Broken relative markdown links.
+
+Prose-voice rules are not machine-checkable; this covers the parts that are.
+Run from the repo root: python3 .agents/skills/docs-lint/lint.py [paths...]
+Exit 1 if any violation is found.
+"""
+import os, re, sys
+
+BANNED = [
+    "pivotal", "crucial", "vital", "groundbreaking", "transformative", "testament",
+    "paramount", "invaluable", "delve", "leverage", "utilize", "facilitate", "foster",
+    "showcase", "underscore", "streamline", "harness", "tapestry", "realm", "paradigm",
+    "nexus", "cornerstone", "robust", "seamless", "innovative", "cutting-edge",
+    "meticulous", "holistic", "comprehensive", "in today's world",
+    "it's worth noting", "it is important to note",
+]
+BAN_RE = re.compile(r'(?<![\w-])(' + "|".join(re.escape(w) for w in BANNED) + r')(?![\w-])', re.I)
+LINK = re.compile(r'\]\(([^)]+)\)')
+
+def iter_md(paths):
+    for p in paths:
+        if os.path.isfile(p) and p.endswith(".md"):
+            yield p
+        for root, dirs, files in os.walk(p):
+            dirs[:] = [d for d in dirs if d not in (".git", "node_modules")]
+            for f in files:
+                if f.endswith(".md"):
+                    yield os.path.join(root, f)
+
+def main(argv):
+    paths = argv or ["knowledge", ".agents", "operations", "investigations", "plans"]
+    violations = 0
+    # The style guide and this skill enumerate the banned words by definition.
+    ban_exempt = ("shared/writing-style.md", "skills/docs-lint/")
+    for f in sorted(set(iter_md(paths))):
+        check_banned = not any(x in f for x in ban_exempt)
+        fence = False
+        with open(f) as fh:
+            for ln, line in enumerate(fh, 1):
+                if line.lstrip().startswith("```"):
+                    fence = not fence; continue
+                if fence:
+                    continue
+                if check_banned:
+                    for m in BAN_RE.finditer(line):
+                        print(f"{f}:{ln}: banned word '{m.group(1)}'")
+                        violations += 1
+                for m in LINK.finditer(line):
+                    link = m.group(1)
+                    if re.match(r'^(https?:|mailto:|#|/)', link):
+                        continue
+                    path = re.split(r'[#?]', link)[0]
+                    if not path:
+                        continue
+                    tgt = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(f), path))
+                    if not os.path.exists(tgt):
+                        print(f"{f}:{ln}: broken link -> {link}")
+                        violations += 1
+    print(f"\n{violations} violation(s)")
+    return 1 if violations else 0
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main(sys.argv[1:]))

.agents/skills/incident-investigation/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+---
+name: incident-investigation
+risk_class: read_only
+inputs: [symptom, affected_entity]
+verification: "n/a — investigation produces a written record, not a state change"
+docs_update_checklist: [investigations_entry]
+---
+
+# Incident investigation
+
+Goal: understand what broke and why, before touching anything.
+
+1. `homelab service <name> explain` (or `homelab node <name> relations`
+   if the affected entity is a host) — get the blast radius and doc
+   pointer first. Don't start pulling logs blind.
+2. `homelab service <name> health` + `homelab service <name> log` (or
+   MCP `get_service_status` / `tail_log`) for the affected service.
+3. Walk the blast radius: is a shared dependency down (`caddy`, `dns`,
+   `authentik`, or the backend host itself)? `homelab node <name>
+   relations` shows "affected by" — check those first.
+4. `homelab apt-audit` if the symptom looks like a dpkg/upgrade
+   interaction.
+5. Check the change ledger for recent mutations to the affected entity
+   or anything upstream of it: `homelab service <name> history` (once
+   populated) or grep `ledger/*.jsonl`.
+6. Write findings to a new `knowledge/sources/investigations/<date>-<slug>.md` — symptom,
+   timeline, root cause, fix applied, prevention. This is the durable
+   record; don't rely on chat history.
+
+Docs-update checklist: always create the investigation entry. If the
+root cause was stale/wrong inventory data (a `doc_page`, `config_repo`,
+or `backend` that didn't match reality — this happened during Week 1
+kernel work, see the `authentik` backend fix), correct `inventory.yaml`
+in the same session.

.agents/skills/lifecycle-activate-node/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+---
+name: lifecycle-activate-node
+risk_class: config_mutation
+inputs: [node_name]
+verification: "homelab service <name> health (if it hosts a service); homelab doctor (if it's a client)"
+docs_update_checklist: [doc_page_complete]
+transition: "provisioning -> active"
+---
+
+# Lifecycle: activate a node
+
+Per [seeds/ontology.yaml](../../../seeds/ontology.yaml). Requires: age key
+enrolled if it needs secrets, mesh joined if it needs off-LAN reach,
+ingress live if public, health check answering, doc page complete,
+ledger entry.
+
+1. If the node is a `homelab` client: finish enrollment per
+   [client-enrollment.md](../client-enrollment/SKILL.md) (`--finalize-pubkey`,
+   mesh join, `homelab doctor` green).
+2. If it hosts a public service: add the `services:` entry in
+   `inventory.yaml` (backend, url, doc_page, config_repo, risk_notes —
+   see the Week-1 service contract fields) and wire the Caddy route in
+   `dtoro/caddy-conf`.
+3. Confirm the health check answers: `homelab service <name> health` or
+   a direct `curl`.
+4. Flip `state: provisioning` → `state: active` (or delete the `state:`
+   field — `active` is the default) in `inventory.yaml`.
+5. Complete the doc page (stub → full narrative: role, specs, how it's
+   configured, dependencies).
+6. Record the activation: `oikos/ledger.py append host:<name> activate
+   config_mutation --result ok` (or let the CLI wrapper do this once
+   Week 3's runbook automation lands).
+
+Regenerate derived data: `python3 mcp/build_host_files.py && python3
+inventory.yaml` so `inventory.yaml`, the topology diagram, and
+the context card all reflect the new state.

.agents/skills/lifecycle-deprecate-node/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+name: lifecycle-deprecate-node
+risk_class: config_mutation
+inputs: [node_name, replacement_node_or_reason]
+verification: "homelab node <name> relations — 'affected by' must be empty before completing"
+docs_update_checklist: [doc_page_deprecation_note]
+transition: "active -> deprecated"
+---
+
+# Lifecycle: deprecate a node
+
+Per [seeds/ontology.yaml](../../../seeds/ontology.yaml): a node keeps running
+but takes no new dependents. **Completion condition: zero remaining
+inbound `depends-on`/`routes-to` edges** — this is a hard gate, not a
+suggestion; `seeds/policy.yaml` `lifecycle_overrides.deprecated.refuse`
+lists `new-inbound-edges` as refused going forward.
+
+1. Set `state: deprecated` on the node.
+2. `homelab node <name> relations` — read `affected_by`. Every entry
+   there is something still relying on this node.
+3. Migrate or retire each dependent one at a time (point its `backend`/
+   `config_repo`/ingress route elsewhere, or deprecate it too if it's
+   being retired alongside).
+4. Re-run `homelab node <name> relations` after each dependent is moved.
+   The transition to `destroyed` is only safe once `affected_by` is
+   empty — check this every time, don't assume from memory.
+5. Note the deprecation on the doc page: reason, replacement (if any),
+   date.
+
+If step 2 shows dependents you didn't expect, stop and investigate
+before proceeding — that's exactly the kind of drift the Week-3 detector
+will catch automatically, but until then this manual check is the gate.
+
+Next (once `affected_by` is empty):
+[lifecycle-destroy-node.md](../lifecycle-destroy-node/SKILL.md).

.agents/skills/lifecycle-destroy-node/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+name: lifecycle-destroy-node
+risk_class: destructive
+inputs: [node_name]
+verification: "homelab node <name> relations returns unknown-entity; pct list on the backend no longer shows it"
+docs_update_checklist: [archaeology_entry, containers_index_update]
+transition: "deprecated -> destroyed"
+---
+
+# Lifecycle: destroy a node
+
+**Destructive.** Requires operator approval + typed confirmation phrase
+per `seeds/policy.yaml`. Requires (ontology): backups verified, secrets
+recipients removed + re-keyed, ingress/DNS removed, archaeology entry,
+ledger entry.
+
+1. Confirm the node is `deprecated` with zero `affected_by` edges
+   (`homelab node <name> relations`) — do not skip this even if the
+   deprecation runbook was followed recently; state can drift.
+2. If it's an enrolled client: `homelab client remove <name>` — revokes
+   the age key, re-keys SOPS, removes the inventory entry. This is
+   already destructive-class and confirmed in the CLI.
+3. Remove any ingress route (Caddy config repo) and DNS record still
+   pointing at it.
+4. Verify backups of anything on it are retained per policy before the
+   disk goes away (see `backs-up-to`).
+5. Destroy the LXC/VM (`pct destroy` / `qm destroy`).
+6. Move the `hosts.<name>:` block (if any inventory remnant survives
+   `client remove`, e.g. infra-only LXCs with no age key) into
+   inventory.yaml's `archaeology:` section: `pve_id`, `destroyed` date,
+   `reason`. Add a row to `containers/index.md` "Recently destroyed"
+   table (kept for human-readable browsing alongside the structured
+   data).
+7. `oikos/ledger.py append host:<name> destroy destructive --result ok`.
+8. Regenerate: `python3 mcp/build_host_files.py && python3
+   inventory.yaml` — the node drops out of `inventory.yaml` and
+   appears in the topology doc's archaeology table.
+
+If the destroy fails partway (e.g. secrets revoked but pct destroy
+errors), do not re-run step 2 — `client remove` is not idempotent
+against a second revocation attempt on the issuance server. Finish the
+remaining steps manually and note the partial state in an investigation.

.agents/skills/lifecycle-migrate-node/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+---
+name: lifecycle-migrate-node
+risk_class: config_mutation
+inputs: [node_name, source_host, target_host]
+verification: "homelab node <name> relations (re-check blast radius); homelab service <svc> health for every hosted service"
+docs_update_checklist: [doc_page_migration_note, inventory_host_and_lan_ip]
+transition: "active -> migrating -> active"
+---
+
+# Lifecycle: migrate a node
+
+Modeled on the strong Phase 1+2 migration
+([plans/2026-06-03_110000-library-ssd-migration-to-ludo-mini.md](../../../.hermes/plans/2026-06-03_110000-library-ssd-migration-to-ludo-mini.md)).
+Requires (ontology): preflight + backup-verified before migrating;
+post-verify + Caddy backends checked + mounts checked + docs updated
+before returning to `active`.
+
+1. `homelab change preflight <every service the node hosts>` — capture
+   current health as a baseline.
+2. Verify backups are current for anything with data at rest on the
+   node (see `backs-up-to` edges once populated).
+3. Set `state: migrating` in `inventory.yaml`.
+4. Perform the migration (pct/qm move, or create-on-target +
+   data-copy + destroy-source, per the specific case).
+5. Update `inventory.yaml`: new `host:`, `lan_ip`, `mesh` addresses for
+   the node; update every `services:` entry whose `backend` pointed at
+   it if the backend name itself changes (usually it doesn't — only the
+   `host:`/`lan_ip` on the guest entry moves).
+6. Post-verify: re-run the Week-1 drift check by hand — confirm Caddy's
+   backend IP for each affected service matches the new `lan_ip`
+   (automatic in Week 3's drift detector), confirm mounts still resolve.
+7. `homelab service <name> health` for every service the node hosts.
+8. Set `state: active`. Add a migration note to the node's doc page
+   (old host/IP → new, date, phase reference) — this repo's convention
+   for every past migration (see `archive/knowledge/containers/101-jellyfin.md`,
+   `containers/129-house.md`).
+
+Regenerate: `python3 mcp/build_host_files.py && python3
+inventory.yaml`.

.agents/skills/lifecycle-provision-node/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+---
+name: lifecycle-provision-node
+risk_class: config_mutation
+inputs: [node_name, kind, storage_pool]
+verification: "grep 'state: provisioning' inventory.yaml"
+docs_update_checklist: [doc_page_stub]
+transition: "planned -> provisioning"
+---
+
+# Lifecycle: provision a node
+
+Per [seeds/ontology.yaml](../../../seeds/ontology.yaml) `lifecycle.transitions`.
+Policy note: `provisioning` nodes get a lifecycle override —
+`config_mutation` actions downgrade to `reversible_low` because nothing
+depends on the node yet (see `seeds/policy.yaml` `lifecycle_overrides`).
+
+Requires (from ontology): inventory entry, IP reserved, storage pool
+chosen, doc page stub.
+
+1. Create the LXC/VM on its target Proxmox host (`pct create` /
+   `qm create`), choosing the storage pool deliberately — record it as
+   the `storage:` field once populated (Week 1 schema; not yet backfilled
+   for existing nodes).
+2. Add the inventory entry: `homelab client add <name>` for anything that
+   will run the `homelab` CLI, or a direct `hosts.<name>:` block with
+   `state: provisioning`, `kind`, `host`, `pve_id`, `lan_ip` for
+   infra-only LXCs that won't self-enroll.
+3. Stub the doc page (`containers/<pve_id>-<name>.md` or
+   `vms/<pve_id>-<name>.md`) — even a one-line "provisioning, see plan X"
+   is enough to satisfy the transition requirement.
+4. Reserve the IP in DNS/DHCP notes if it's a fixed LAN address.
+
+Next: [lifecycle-activate-node.md](../lifecycle-activate-node/SKILL.md).

.agents/skills/runbook-budget-from-csv/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+---
+name: budget-import-from-csv
+risk_class: config_mutation
+inputs: [csv_file]
+references: [containers/129-house.md]
+---
+
+# Runbook: Budget import from N26 CSV → Yuvomi
+
+Distil a bank-export CSV into Yuvomi's Budget and Subscriptions modules using
+the `yuvomi-mcp` tools. Run this whenever a new CSV period needs to be
+summarised into targets and fixed costs.
+
+---
+
+## Prerequisites
+
+- `yuvomi-mcp` is running on LXC 129 and connected as an MCP server in Claude.
+- The CSV is an N26 export (columns: Booking Date, Value Date, Partner Name,
+  Partner Iban, Type, Payment Reference, Account Name, Amount (EUR), …).
+- API token: `homelab secret yuvomi-api-token` (decrypts on any enrolled client).
+- Direct API base: `https://house.hubris.network/api/v1`
+
+---
+
+## API quirks (Yuvomi ≤ 0.77.x)
+
+- **Subscriptions live under `/budget/subscriptions`**, NOT `/subscriptions/`.
+  A top-level `/subscriptions` route returns 404.
+- `GET /budget/subscriptions` → `{ data: { subscriptions: [...], summary: {...} } }`
+- `GET /budget/subscriptions/meta` → `{ data: { categories: [...], payment_methods: [...] } }`
+- `POST /budget/subscriptions` → create a subscription (name, amount, billing_cycle,
+  cycle_interval, next_payment_date, currency, category_id, payment_method_id required)
+- `GET /budget/` (no month) → returns only **non-recurring** base entries.
+  Use `GET /budget/?month=YYYY-MM` to get all entries (recurring + one-time) for a month.
+- `GET /budget/categories` → expense category keys + income category names (German keys
+  like `"Erwerbseinkommen"`, `"Sozialleistungen"`, `"Geschenke & Transfers"`).
+- Budget entries: `amount` positive = income, negative = expense.
+- Recurring entries: set `is_recurring: 1` + `recurrence_interval: "monthly"`.
+  The `date` field sets the start month.
+- `recurrence_virtual: 1` smooths non-monthly amounts across all months in the summary
+  (e.g. 55.08 € quarterly → shows as ~18.36 €/month).
+- Custom RRULE strings (`recurrence_rule`) are **not accepted** by the API — use
+  `cycle_interval` on the subscription instead, or `recurrence_interval` on budget entries.
+
+---
+
+## Subscription category IDs (as of 2026-06-26)
+
+| id | name | budget_subcategory_key |
+|---|---|---|
+| 1 | Entertainment | subscription_entertainment |
+| 2 | Productivity | subscription_productivity |
+| 3 | Utilities | subscription_utilities |
+| 4 | Health | subscription_health |
+| 5 | Education | subscription_education |
+| 6 | Other | subscription_other |
+
+## Payment method IDs
+
+| id | name |
+|---|---|
+| 1 | Credit Card |
+| 2 | Debit Card |
+| 3 | PayPal |
+| 6 | Bank Transfer / SEPA |
+| 7 | Other |
+
+---
+
+## Step 1 — Categorise the transactions
+
+Skip these as internal/already-covered:
+- Fixed costs you'll enter as **subscriptions** (Miete, SWM, SYNVIA, Hundefutter,
+  Netflix, Grover, Rundfunk ARD, KuKita, Lillydoo)
+- Internal transfers (The Joy Pot ↔ Cookie, Hauptkonto, Tagesgeldkonto splits)
+- Identified income (Cookie Share, Kindergeld, Pocket Money credits, Distributor)
+- Fun Money pass-throughs (in and out same month → net zero)
+
+**Variable expense taxonomy:**
+
+| Category key | Subcategory key | Examples |
+|---|---|---|
+| `food` | `groceries` | E-Center, Knuspr, EDEKA, Tegut, VollCorner, Lidl, Netto, REWE, KoRo, Roast Market |
+| `food` | `restaurants_bars` | Restaurants, Lieferando, Cafes, Zeit für Brot, Baobab, Höflinger |
+| `personal_health` | `beauty_cosmetics` | DM, Rossmann |
+| `personal_health` | `pharmacy` | Apotheke, MVZ Dermatologie |
+| `transport` | `apps_taxi` | Uber, RYD GMBH, MVG, Handyparken |
+| `shopping_clothing` | `gifts` | Children products: Schlummersack, Catchy Kids, SP EVERY., Dukal, Berger-Lernwelt |
+| `shopping_clothing` | `clothes_shoes` | Zalando, Ernsting's, Schuhmair, Thalia, Vinted, Airbnb, Hotel at Booking.com |
+| `shopping_clothing` | `electronics` | Amazon, AMZN Mktp DE |
+| `housing` | `renovation_maintenance` | IKEA, Markus Festl, Granit, Sostrene Grene, Mol* tischdecken, Gaertnerei, Dehner |
+| `education` | `courses_college` | Kathrin Orlob (PEKiP), Nerina Aupperle |
+| `leisure` | `streaming` | WOW wowtv.de |
+| `financial_other` | `bank_fees` | Unidentified PayPal, Ratepay, N26 fees |
+| `Geschenke & Transfers` | *(income)* | One-off incoming transfers |
+
+---
+
+## Step 2 — Create subscriptions
+
+```
+get_subscriptions_meta()    ← get category_id and payment_method_id
+```
+
+**Standard Cookie household subscriptions (as of 2026-07):**
+
+| Name | Amount | billing_cycle | cycle_interval | category_id | payment_method_id |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| Miete | 1080.00 | monthly | 1 | 6 (Other) | 6 (Bank Transfer) |
+| Strom (SWM) | 79.00 | monthly | 1 | 3 (Utilities) | 6 |
+| Internet / TV / Telefon | 29.99 | monthly | 1 | 3 (Utilities) | 6 |
+| Hundefutter | 75.00 | monthly | 1 | 6 (Other) | 6 |
+| Netflix | 8.00 | monthly | 1 | 1 (Entertainment) | 6 |
+| Grover | 16.90 | monthly | 1 | 6 (Other) | 2 (Debit Card) |
+| Rundfunk ARD / ZDF | 55.08 | monthly | 3 | 1 (Entertainment) | 6 |
+| KuKita Daycare (Leon) | 503.00 | monthly | 1 | 5 (Education) | 6 |
+| Lillydoo diapers | 56.70 | monthly | 2 | 4 (Health) | 3 (PayPal) |
+
+Monthly equivalent total: **1,838.60 €** (Yuvomi applies cycle_interval to prorate).
+
+---
+
+## Step 3 — Add recurring income entries
+
+```
+stage_add_budget_entry(
+    title="Kindergeld",
+    amount=55.00,
+    category="Sozialleistungen",
+    date="YYYY-MM-01",
+    is_recurring=True,
+    recurrence_interval="monthly",
+)
+commit_pending(pending_id)
+```
+
+**Standard recurring income:**
+
+| Title | Amount | category |
+|---|---|---|
+| Kindergeld | +55.00 | Sozialleistungen |
+| Cookie Share | +2650.00 | Erwerbseinkommen *(see recommended amount below)* |
+
+---
+
+## Step 4 — Post variable transactions
+
+For each non-skipped CSV row, call `stage_add_budget_entry` with the mapped
+category/subcategory and the actual transaction amount and date. Use the Partner
+Name + Payment Reference as the title (truncate to 100 chars).
+
+---
+
+## Step 5 — Verify
+
+```
+get_budget_summary("YYYY-MM")
+list_subscriptions()
+```
+
+Expected for a full month with KuKita:
+- Fixed expenses ≥ 1,838 € (subscriptions)
+- Variable expenses ≥ 500 € (groceries alone)
+
+---
+
+## Cookie Share: how much to transfer monthly
+
+Calculated from Jan–Jun 2026 data (Cookie account, one-offs stripped):
+
+| | €/month |
+|---|---|
+| **Fixed costs (subscriptions)** | **1,839** |
+| Miete | 1,080 |
+| KuKita *(permanent from Jul 2026)* | 503 |
+| Strom + SYNVIA + Rundfunk + Netflix + Grover + Hundefutter + Lillydoo | 256 |
+| **Variable (6-month averages)** | **1,032** |
+| Groceries | 595 |
+| Children products | 142 |
+| Dining & cafes | 100 |
+| Transport | 66 |
+| Drugstore | 52 |
+| Clothing, Amazon, Pharmacy | 77 |
+| **Total monthly spend** | **≈ 2,871** |
+| Minus Kindergeld (fixed income) | −55 |
+| Minus Pocket Money (conservative ~600 €) | −600 |
+| **→ Recommended Cookie Share** | **≈ 2,650 €** |
+| With 200 € buffer | **≈ 2,850 €** |
+
+**Current Cookie Share (Jun 2026): 1,995 € — shortfall ~655 €.**
+
+The gap was covered by irregular Pocket Money top-ups (avg 962 €/mo over 6 months, but
+highly variable: 121 €–3,000 €). KuKita starting in June is the biggest step-up; raising
+Cookie Share to **2,650 €** makes the budget self-sufficient without relying on top-ups.
+
+---
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-06-29 — Corrections from first real import
+- Subscriptions endpoint is `/budget/subscriptions`, NOT `/subscriptions/` (404).
+- `recurrence_rule` RRULE strings are rejected by the API; use `cycle_interval` instead.
+- `GET /budget/` (no filter) returns only non-recurring entries; use `?month=` for full view.
+- Added Cookie Share recommendation (2,650 €/month) based on 6-month expense analysis.
+- Added full category taxonomy table.
+
+### 2026-06-29 — Initial runbook
+Created from Jan–Jun 2026 N26 Cookie account analysis.

.agents/skills/runbook-dpkg-interrupted/SKILL.md

@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+---
+name: recover-dpkg-interrupted
+risk_class: reversible_low
+verification: "dpkg --audit (should be clean); apt-get check"
+---
+
 # Runbook — recover from dpkg-interrupted state
 
 You're here because an apt run got killed mid-transaction and the target now
@@ -96,9 +102,9 @@ Then `systemctl status apt-recovery` from a fresh ssh to check progress.
 
 ## Related
 
-- [Operations cheatsheet](commands.md)
-- [Auto-deploy pipelines](../infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)
-- [Hubris host page](../hosts/hubris.md)
+- [Operations cheatsheet](../../operations/commands.md)
+- [Auto-deploy pipelines](../../../archive/knowledge/infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)
+- [Hubris host page](../../../archive/knowledge/hosts/hubris.md)
 
 ## Changelog
 

.agents/skills/service-health-check/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+---
+name: service-health-check
+risk_class: read_only
+inputs: [service_name]
+verification: "homelab service <name> health"
+docs_update_checklist: []
+---
+
+# Service health check
+
+Goal: determine whether a service is actually healthy, without ad-hoc SSH.
+
+1. `homelab service <name> explain` — read the context card: backend,
+   blast radius, doc pointer, risk notes.
+2. `homelab service <name> health` — live health probe (HTTP code against
+   the service's `url`/`endpoint`). Once the Week-3 scheduler ships, this
+   reads a cached snapshot by default; pass `--live` to force a fresh probe.
+3. If unhealthy, `homelab service <name> log` (or MCP `tail_log`) for the
+   last 200 lines.
+4. Cross-check blast radius: `homelab node <name> relations` — is this
+   entity's own backend host healthy? A downstream failure (e.g. `strong`
+   down) will show up here before the service's own logs explain anything.
+5. If the fix is a restart: classify first (`seeds/policy.yaml` —
+   `service-restart` is `reversible_low` unless the service has a
+   `service_overrides` entry, e.g. `caddy`/`dns` are `config_mutation`).
+   Unattended agents may act on `reversible_low` without approval.
+
+Docs-update checklist: none for a pure health check. If the investigation
+reveals stale `risk_notes` or a wrong `doc_page`, fix `inventory.yaml` in
+the same session.

.claude/launch.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "version": "0.0.1",
+  "configurations": [
+    {
+      "name": "web",
+      "runtimeExecutable": "npm",
+      "runtimeArgs": ["--prefix", "web", "run", "dev"],
+      "port": 5173
+    }
+  ]
+}

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# Oikos CI (Gitea Actions). Gates the deploy webhook on a green run (plan M1).
+# Mirrors `make lint`, `make test`, and the generated-code drift guard.
+name: ci
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+  pull_request:
+
+jobs:
+  build-test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    services:
+      postgres:
+        image: timescale/timescaledb:2.17.2-pg16
+        env:
+          POSTGRES_DB: oikos
+          POSTGRES_USER: oikos
+          POSTGRES_PASSWORD: oikos_dev
+        ports:
+          - 5432:5432
+        options: >-
+          --health-cmd "pg_isready -U oikos"
+          --health-interval 5s
+          --health-timeout 5s
+          --health-retries 10
+    env:
+      OIKOS_TEST_DATABASE_URL: postgres://oikos:oikos_dev@postgres:5432/oikos?sslmode=disable
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - uses: actions/setup-go@v5
+        with:
+          go-version: "1.26"
+          cache: true
+
+      - name: go vet
+        run: go vet ./...
+
+      - name: golangci-lint
+        uses: golangci/golangci-lint-action@v6
+        with:
+          version: latest
+          args: --timeout 5m
+        continue-on-error: true # advisory until the lint baseline is clean
+
+      - name: govulncheck
+        run: |
+          go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
+          govulncheck ./... || true # advisory
+
+      - name: generated code is up to date
+        run: make generate-check
+
+      - name: build
+        run: go build ./...
+
+      - name: test (race + coverage)
+        run: go test -race -covermode=atomic -coverprofile=coverage.out -timeout 300s ./...
+
+      - name: coverage gates (policy + learning ≥ 80%, others ≥ 60%)
+        run: |
+          go tool cover -func=coverage.out | tail -1
+          # Note: policy/ and learning/ packages land in Phase 3; enforce
+          # their 80% gate then. For now, report total coverage.
+
+  docker-build:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: docker build (verify image builds; no push)
+        run: docker build -f compose/oikos/Dockerfile -t oikos:ci .

.gitignore

@@ -1 +1,26 @@
-.DS_Store
+.DS_Store
+__pycache__/
+*.pyc
+
+# Regenerated every scheduler run; ephemeral health-probe cache.
+oikos/state.json
+
+# Compiled binaries (Go rewrite — bin/oikos, bin/nomos)
+bin/oikos
+bin/nomos
+oikos/oikos
+
+# Legacy Python oikos (superseded by cmd/oikos Go binary — Phase 1-6 rewrite).
+# oikos/ kernel files are still imported by bin/homelab for operational CLI
+# commands (ssh, pct, logs, restart, status, open, secret, client, sync, mcp).
+# Remove oikos/* when bin/homelab is ported to Go.
+backups/
+.env
+.infisical-credentials
+
+# Web UI (Svelte 5) — build artifacts. Ignore built output but keep the
+# .gitkeep placeholder so `//go:embed all:dist` (web/embed.go) compiles on a
+# fresh checkout before the UI is built.
+web/dist/*
+!web/dist/.gitkeep
+web/node_modules/

.sops.yaml

@@ -1,14 +1,12 @@
 # SOPS recipient rules.
 #
-# Each rule pins one or more age public keys as recipients for files matching
-# the path_regex. The build_host_files.py generator doesn't read this file;
-# `sops` does — to encrypt a new secret, run `sops -e secrets/<name>.yaml`
-# from the repo root and SOPS will pick the matching rule below.
+# SOPS is DR-fallback only — Infisical is the active secrets backend.
+# Files live in archive/secrets-sops-backup/ for cold recovery.
+# To encrypt a new DR secret: sops -e archive/secrets-sops-backup/<name>.yaml
 #
-# To grant a secret to a new client: add their age public key (from
+# To grant a DR secret to a new client: add their age public key (from
 # inventory.yaml `hosts.<name>.age_pubkey`) to the relevant rule below, then
-# run `sops updatekeys secrets/<name>.yaml` to re-encrypt without rotating
-# the ciphertext payload.
+# run `sops updatekeys archive/secrets-sops-backup/<name>.yaml` to re-encrypt.
 #
 # To revoke: remove the recipient from the relevant rule and run
 # `sops updatekeys` (this is what `homelab client remove` calls). Past
@@ -16,7 +14,7 @@
 # underlying credential if compromise is suspected.
 
 creation_rules:
-  - path_regex: ^secrets/hello\.yaml$
+  - path_regex: ^archive/secrets-sops-backup/hello\.yaml$
     # The "hello" secret is encrypted to every enrolled client so the bootstrap
     # decrypt test works for everyone. Add each new client's age_pubkey when
     # they enrol; re-key with `sops updatekeys -y secrets/hello.yaml`.
@@ -25,9 +23,11 @@ creation_rules:
       age1duyl8mkpgu80uv934dy8q7enqjms6yvdz264hme8uryuxmvvqesq6rusq0,
       age1vf8h7s8mqsn2q5eadgpdupsj4mwn8zguc77d85ws3xj40sl9rgksx2rxw6,
       age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs,
-      age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h
+      age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h,
+      age1rtwvdct6avjkr3cyxv3vue3vqx4d524fjfr3vk7xrnvyrylnry5sm54sn4,
+      age1pwtdws2thdh7vzp2dzttl3zxgcs2tgpcsjsqgw3q04nyml4kvuqq467u4x
 
-  - path_regex: ^secrets/gitea-pat\.yaml$
+  - path_regex: archive/secrets-sops-backupgitea-pat\.yaml$
     # Write-scoped Gitea PAT (dtoro user). Same recipient list as hello.yaml
     # since every enrolled client should be able to push (homelab client
     # add/remove, wiki edits, etc.).
@@ -36,19 +36,21 @@ creation_rules:
       age1duyl8mkpgu80uv934dy8q7enqjms6yvdz264hme8uryuxmvvqesq6rusq0,
       age1vf8h7s8mqsn2q5eadgpdupsj4mwn8zguc77d85ws3xj40sl9rgksx2rxw6,
       age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs,
-      age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h
+      age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h,
+      age1rtwvdct6avjkr3cyxv3vue3vqx4d524fjfr3vk7xrnvyrylnry5sm54sn4,
+      age1pwtdws2thdh7vzp2dzttl3zxgcs2tgpcsjsqgw3q04nyml4kvuqq467u4x
 
-  - path_regex: ^secrets/gitea-tokens\.yaml$
+  - path_regex: archive/secrets-sops-backupgitea-tokens\.yaml$
     # Workstations only.
     age: >-
-      # placeholder — fill with age_pubkey of: republic-laptop, mac-mini, ludo-mini, hubris
+      # placeholder — fill with age_pubkey of: republic-laptop, mac-mini, strong, hubris
 
-  - path_regex: ^secrets/webhook-hmacs\.yaml$
+  - path_regex: archive/secrets-sops-backupwebhook-hmacs\.yaml$
     # LXCs that run a webhook receiver.
     age: >-
       # placeholder — fill with age_pubkey of: apps, caddy
 
-  - path_regex: ^secrets/turn-shared-secret\.yaml$
+  - path_regex: archive/secrets-sops-backupturn-shared-secret\.yaml$
     # coturn TURN long-term-credential password. Consumed by hubris (which
     # renders /etc/turnserver.conf + /opt/management.json on the VPS via
     # `homelab render-vps-configs`). Other recipients are convenience for
@@ -58,9 +60,10 @@ creation_rules:
       age1duyl8mkpgu80uv934dy8q7enqjms6yvdz264hme8uryuxmvvqesq6rusq0,
       age1vf8h7s8mqsn2q5eadgpdupsj4mwn8zguc77d85ws3xj40sl9rgksx2rxw6,
       age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs,
-      age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h
+      age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h,
+      age1pwtdws2thdh7vzp2dzttl3zxgcs2tgpcsjsqgw3q04nyml4kvuqq467u4x
 
-  - path_regex: ^secrets/netbird-authentik-oidc\.yaml$
+  - path_regex: archive/secrets-sops-backupnetbird-authentik-oidc\.yaml$
     # Authentik OIDC client secret for the netbird-dashboard provider.
     # Consumed by hubris to render /opt/management.json on the VPS
     # (PKCEAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.ClientSecret).
@@ -69,9 +72,10 @@ creation_rules:
       age1duyl8mkpgu80uv934dy8q7enqjms6yvdz264hme8uryuxmvvqesq6rusq0,
       age1vf8h7s8mqsn2q5eadgpdupsj4mwn8zguc77d85ws3xj40sl9rgksx2rxw6,
       age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs,
-      age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h
+      age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h,
+      age1pwtdws2thdh7vzp2dzttl3zxgcs2tgpcsjsqgw3q04nyml4kvuqq467u4x
 
-  - path_regex: ^secrets/netbird-pat\.yaml$
+  - path_regex: archive/secrets-sops-backupnetbird-pat\.yaml$
     # NetBird API Personal Access Token. Consumed by the dns-sync job on the
     # `dns` LXC (107) to reconcile Technitium -> NetBird managed DNS zone.
     # (When 107 is enrolled, add its age_pubkey here and updatekeys.)
@@ -81,19 +85,19 @@ creation_rules:
       age1vf8h7s8mqsn2q5eadgpdupsj4mwn8zguc77d85ws3xj40sl9rgksx2rxw6,
       age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs
 
-  - path_regex: ^secrets/openrouter-api-key\.yaml$
-    # OpenRouter API key consumed by the `hermes` wrapper (bin/hermes) when
+  - path_regex: archive/secrets-sops-backupopenrouter-api-key\.yaml$
+    # OpenRouter API key consumed by the `nomos` wrapper (bin/nomos) when
     # spawning a Goose session. Recipients are any host that should run a
-    # Nous-Hermes agent. Add a host's age_pubkey here, then
+    # Nomos agent. Add a host's age_pubkey here, then
     # `sops updatekeys -y secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml`.
-    # See operations/hermes-agent.md.
+    # See operations/nomos-agent.md.
     age: >-
       age1xkklkvnk5z0fsnh6cfgv70hy9ksfy8rdprwerzw4yk3p4p7cxcqs2yvpz6,
       age1vf8h7s8mqsn2q5eadgpdupsj4mwn8zguc77d85ws3xj40sl9rgksx2rxw6,
       age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs,
       age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h
 
-  - path_regex: ^secrets/yuvomi-api-token\.yaml$
+  - path_regex: archive/secrets-sops-backupyuvomi-api-token\.yaml$
     # Named Bearer token for the Yuvomi REST API, consumed by yuvomi-mcp on
     # LXC 129 (house).
     age: >-
@@ -102,11 +106,29 @@ creation_rules:
       age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs,
       age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h
 
-  - path_regex: ^secrets/hermes-house-users\.yaml$
+  - path_regex: archive/secrets-sops-backuphermes-house-users\.yaml$
     # Signal number → Yuvomi user_id mapping (PII). Consumed by hermesd on LXC 129.
     age: >-
       age1xkklkvnk5z0fsnh6cfgv70hy9ksfy8rdprwerzw4yk3p4p7cxcqs2yvpz6,
       age1vf8h7s8mqsn2q5eadgpdupsj4mwn8zguc77d85ws3xj40sl9rgksx2rxw6,
       age1z62ff2ak9zj5ctcvaxwyyhedwjvlwgm2dkn9nk3wrwk8fkavcpmsqwc2vs,
       age1s07zs83ehtlg8jtwvr75ltc3c4cdlemfwjuxrwjtwkqxkl9tpggsyrzn2h
+
+  - path_regex: archive/secrets-sops-backupoikos-approval-hmac\.yaml$
+    # HMAC signing key for Oikos approval-grant tokens (oikos/approve.py).
+    # Recipients: apps (105, runs the approval engine alongside homelab-mcp)
+    # and hubris (admin/debug decrypt). See OIKOS.md "Approval engine".
+    age: >-
+      age1xkklkvnk5z0fsnh6cfgv70hy9ksfy8rdprwerzw4yk3p4p7cxcqs2yvpz6,
+      age1duyl8mkpgu80uv934dy8q7enqjms6yvdz264hme8uryuxmvvqesq6rusq0
+
+  - path_regex: archive/secrets-sops-backupoikos-console-deploy-secret\.yaml$
+    # Shared HMAC secret for the Gitea deploy webhook (id 14) ->
+    # oikos-console-deploy.service on apps (105). Generated + registered
+    # with Gitea before the apps-side install ran (see
+    # oikos/console/deploy/README.md "Status") — write this exact value
+    # into /etc/oikos-console-deploy/secret rather than letting
+    # webhook/install.sh generate a fresh one.
+    age: >-
+      age1duyl8mkpgu80uv934dy8q7enqjms6yvdz264hme8uryuxmvvqesq6rusq0
 # webhook noop 2026-05-20T18:16:57+02:00

AGENTS.md

@@ -4,11 +4,33 @@ You are running on a machine that is part of the **hubris** homelab. The full
 context is in this checkout at `/opt/homelab-context/`. This file is the entry
 point. Read it once at start, then keep working.
 
+- **New client?** Read [CLIENTS.md](CLIENTS.md) first.
+- **Developing on this repo?** Also read [.agents/dev/CONTRIBUTING.md](.agents/dev/CONTRIBUTING.md).
+
+The operating model — OODA loop, risk classes, approval rules, the ontology,
+and node lifecycle — is defined in [OIKOS.md](.agents/OIKOS.md). Before any mutation,
+classify the action against `seeds/policy.yaml`; when the class requires
+approval, stop and ask the operator.
+
+Agent-facing instruction lives under `.agents/`:
+`.agents/shared/` holds the conventions every agent applies
+([writing-style](.agents/shared/writing-style.md), [caveman](.agents/shared/caveman.md),
+[page-templates](.agents/shared/page-templates.md), [llm-wiki](.agents/shared/llm-wiki.md)), and
+`.agents/domains/` holds the per-domain schemas
+([knowledge](.agents/domains/knowledge/schema.md), [operations](.agents/domains/operations/schema.md)).
+
+**Source of truth:** The Postgres database is the single source of truth for all
+structured data and knowledge. It is bootstrapped from `seeds/` at deploy time:
+`seeds/ontology.yaml` (entity types, relationships, lifecycles), `seeds/inventory.yaml`
+(hosts, services, entities), `seeds/policy.yaml` (risk classes, approval rules), and
+`seeds/knowledge.yaml` (documents, investigations, runbooks). The old narrative wiki
+is archived at `archive/knowledge/` for historical reference.
+
 ## 1. Who you are
 
 Run `hostname` (Linux) or `scutil --get LocalHostName` (macOS), then read:
 
-    /opt/homelab-context/hosts/<your-hostname>.yaml
+    /opt/homelab-context/inventory.yaml
 
 That file tells you your role, your peers, what's mounted, and what services
 you host. If it does not exist, this client was not enrolled — stop and tell
@@ -17,75 +39,106 @@ the operator to run `homelab client add <hostname>` from an existing client.
 ## 2. The topology
 
 - `/opt/homelab-context/inventory.yaml` — every host, LXC, VM, and workstation
-  with their mesh addresses, roles, and service mappings. Treat this file as
-  authoritative; anything you read in narrative pages should agree with it.
-- `/opt/homelab-context/infrastructure/mesh.md` — Tailscale → Netbird state.
-  Both meshes are accepted today; Netbird is preferred for new traffic.
-- `/opt/homelab-context/infrastructure/dns.md` — split-horizon DNS via
-  dnsmasq on LXC 124. `*.hubris.network` resolves to 192.168.x.x on the LAN
-  and to mesh addresses off-LAN.
-- `/opt/homelab-context/operations/commands.md` — the operator's cheatsheet
-  for pct, caddy, dnsmasq. Use these verbs when you take actions.
+  with their mesh addresses, roles, and service mappings. This is the seed file;
+  at runtime the DB is authoritative (query via MCP `get_entity` or the REST API).
+- `/opt/homelab-context/seeds/knowledge.yaml` — full narrative knowledge: 36
+  documents, 6 investigations, 12 runbooks. Ingested into the DB on deploy.
+- `/opt/homelab-context/.agents/operations/commands.md` — the operator's cheatsheet
+  for pct, caddy, DNS, and the Oikos command surface.
 
 ## 3. The MCP server
 
 The homelab exposes a Model Context Protocol server with structured tools.
-Endpoint is in `inventory.yaml` under `services.homelab_mcp.endpoint`.
+Endpoint: `https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp`.
 
-Available tools:
+Available tools (21 total):
 
-  Context (pure read):
-    get_host(name), list_services(), find_service(name_or_role),
-    get_topology(), search_docs(query), get_page(path),
-    get_changelog(page, since?), whoami(hostname),
-    list_my_secrets(caller_pubkey?)
+  Context — observe + orient:
+    get_entity(slug), list_entities(type, limit, cursor),
+    get_relations(entity), get_blast_radius(entity),
+    search_knowledge(query) — ILIKE search over documents, investigations,
+      runbooks in the knowledge_entities table
+    get_patterns(status, entity_type, action) — learned action patterns
+    get_skills(status) — available automation skills
 
-  Management (read-only):
-    get_service_status(service), tail_log(service, lines=200),
-    list_lxcs(), get_lxc_state(lxc), ping_service(service)
+  Management — live state:
+    get_service_status(service_slug) — systemctl is-active on target host
+    tail_log(service_slug, lines=200) — journalctl
+    list_lxcs() — all LXC containers with ID, host, IP, health
+    get_lxc_state(lxc_slug) — pct status from Proxmox host
+    ping_service(service_slug) — HTTP reachability from entity_status
 
-Mutations are **not** exposed via MCP. Use the `homelab` CLI for those, with
-operator confirmation.
+  Oikos — decisions:
+    explain(service_slug) — compact context card (type, state, health, relations)
+    preflight(service_slug, action) — risk class + approval requirement
+    whoami(hostname) — entity record, peers, health for a client
+    get_change_history(entity_slug, limit=20) — last audit-log entries per entity
+    get_state_snapshot() — fleet health, disk, drift count
 
-**When to prefer MCP over grepping the clone:** any time you need to resolve a
-name to an address, look up service status, or search the wiki by content.
-Grep is fine for browsing or when MCP is unreachable.
+  Operations — observe + act:
+    get_health_summary() — fleet health counts (healthy/degraded/down/unknown)
+    get_signal_history(entity_slug, state, limit) — open + recent signals
+    get_audit_trail(entity_id) — audit log filter + browse
+    get_agent_activity(limit) — agent self-inspection
+    query_metrics(hours=24) — time-series metric bucketed averages
+    get_trend(entity_id, days=7) — metric slope over time
+    get_event_timeline(severity, entity_slug, limit) — recent events
 
-## 4. Wiki conventions
+  Execution — the single mutation path:
+    request_execution(target, action, params) — policy-gated.
+      reversible_low (restart, reload, pct_exec, apt audit) runs immediately;
+      config_mutation (systemctl enable/disable, apt upgrade) queues for operator
+      approval via Matrix, then executes on ✅.
+    get_execution_status(execution_id) — poll progress
 
-- Pages live under `containers/`, `hosts/`, `vms/`, `infrastructure/`,
-  `investigations/`, `operations/`. Cross-link liberally; orphans are bugs.
-- Every page ends with a `## Changelog` section, entries in reverse-chrono
-  order:
+**When to prefer MCP over grepping the clone:** always for knowledge queries.
+`search_knowledge("jellyfin hardware acceleration")` returns ranked results from
+the DB with entity links. `get_entity_knowledge("lxc:jellyfin")` returns documents,
+runbooks, and investigations in one call. Grep the clone only when MCP is
+unreachable.
 
-      ### YYYY-MM-DD — short title
-      one or two lines describing what changed and why.
+## 4. Knowledge conventions
 
-- Investigation files are dated and slugged: `YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md`.
-- Live state takes precedence over docs. If you observe a discrepancy, update
-  the docs *in the same session* (per the same-session update rule).
+All narrative knowledge (documents, investigations, runbooks) lives in the DB
+(`knowledge_entities` table) and is seeded from `seeds/knowledge.yaml`. Agents
+can register new knowledge via the API:
+
+```
+POST /api/v1/knowledge/{entity_slug}
+{"title": "...", "content": "...", "tags": ["..."]}
+```
+
+The DB is the truth. The old wiki files are in `knowledge/wiki/` pending archive
+per the DB-as-source-of-truth plan.
+
+- **Runbook procedures** live as `runbook` entities in the DB and as SKILL.md
+  files under `.agents/skills/<name>/`. They carry `risk_class`, `procedure`
+  (JSON-schema-validated), and are linked to entity types via `applies_to_type`.
+- **Investigations** are `investigation` entities linked to affected entities
+  via `about` edges.
+- **Documents** are `document` entities linked to entities via `documents` edges.
+  They carry `at_glance` (structured attributes) and `changelog` (parsed entries).
+- **Live state precedence.** If you observe a discrepancy between the docs and
+  running state, update the DB *in the same session* via the API. The `oikos export`
+  command regenerates `seeds/knowledge.yaml` for version control.
 
 ## 5. Acting on the homelab
 
-- **Read state**: prefer MCP tools, then files, then shell. Examples:
-  `homelab whoami`, `homelab list`, `homelab status`, `homelab logs caddy`.
-- **Cross-host actions** (caddy reload, pct exec, etc.): use the `homelab`
-  CLI — it resolves hostname → mesh address → ssh / pct path for you. Direct
-  SSH still works; the CLI just removes the lookup burden.
-- **Secrets**: never hardcode. Call `homelab secret <name>` to decrypt on
-  demand using the per-client age key at `/etc/age/key.txt`. Secrets ARE
-  available in this system — `list_my_secrets()` (MCP) shows what you can
-  decrypt.
-- **Mutations** (restart, edit configs, etc.): the `homelab` CLI's mutating
-  subcommands ask for confirmation. For ad-hoc work, SSH and edit directly —
-  but commit changes that touch tracked configs (caddy, gitea custom,
-  artifacto, mule-image, etc.; see `infrastructure/auto-deploy.md`).
-- **Wiki updates**: same-session rule applies to any meaningful state change
-  this client makes.
+- **Read state**: use MCP tools. Nomos (the AI agent) is the primary
+  operator interface — it has 21 MCP tools for observe/orient/decide/act.
+- **Actions** (restart, logs, apt, pct exec): Nomos calls `request_execution`
+  via MCP. `reversible_low` actions execute immediately; `config_mutation`
+  and `destructive` actions are queued for operator approval via Matrix.
+- **Secrets**: managed by Infisical (`oikos secret` subcommand for migration).
+  Never hardcode secrets — use env vars from `.env`.
+- **Mutations** (restart, edit configs, etc.): classified against
+  `seeds/policy.yaml`. `reversible_low` actions auto-execute;
+  `config_mutation`/`destructive` actions require approval.
+  a valid `--approval-id` from `homelab approval request` — see OIKOS.md.
 
 ## 6. Communication mode
 
-Read and apply `/opt/homelab-context/CAVEMAN.md` (if present). It defines the lab's
+Read and apply `/opt/homelab-context/.agents/shared/caveman.md` (if present). It defines the lab's
 terse-communication standard — drop filler, keep substance, use fragments.
 
 ## 7. Auto-setup mechanism
@@ -99,10 +152,10 @@ Currently auto-setup:
 - **Caveman + templates** (`tools/setup-caveman.sh`): Installs Caveman npm
   package, wrapper scripts, and compact output templates for token-efficient
   CLI output. Wrapper at `~/bin/caveman_wrapper.sh`.
-- **Hermes agent persona** (`tools/setup-hermes-soul.sh`): Provisions
-  `~/.hermes/SOUL.md` from `HERMES.md` on Hermes agents. This ensures every
-  Hermes agent follows the canonical homelab persona (token efficiency, source
-  of truth hierarchy). No-op on non-Hermes agents.
+- **Nomos agent persona** (`tools/setup-nomos-soul.sh`): Provisions
+  `~/.nomos/SOUL.md` from `NOMOS.md` on Nomos agents. This ensures every
+  Nomos agent follows the canonical homelab persona (token efficiency, source
+  of truth hierarchy). No-op on non-Nomos agents.
 
 To add a new auto-setup, create `tools/<name>.setup.sh` in the repo,
 commit and push. All enrolled clients pick it up within 5 minutes.
@@ -111,5 +164,6 @@ To trigger sync manually: `sudo homelab sync` or wait for the 5-min timer.
 
 ## 8. When in doubt
 
-Run `homelab mcp search_docs <query>` or `homelab mcp get_host <name>`.
-The clone is the fallback; MCP is the index.
+Use MCP tools: `search_knowledge <query>` for narrative context,
+`get_entity <slug>` for structured data, `get_entity_knowledge <slug>` for
+everything linked to an entity. The clone is the fallback; MCP is the index.

CLIENTS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+# Oikos — client guide
+
+If you are a homelab machine, this is what Oikos is and what it gives you.
+If you are an AI agent running on this machine, also read [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md).
+
+## What is Oikos?
+
+Oikos is the agentic operating system for the **hubris** Proxmox homelab. It
+observes state, classifies actions against policy, executes approved
+procedures, learns from outcomes, and notifies the operator. It runs as a
+Docker stack on mac-mini and exposes an MCP server + REST API.
+
+## What Oikos provides
+
+| Capability | How you access it |
+|------------|-------------------|
+| Entity query (topology, blast radius) | MCP `get_entity`, `get_blast_radius` |
+| Full-text knowledge search | MCP `search_knowledge` |
+| Service status + logs | MCP `get_service_status`, `tail_log` |
+| LXC inventory + state | MCP `list_lxcs`, `get_lxc_state` |
+| Context cards | MCP `explain` |
+| Pre-flight risk classification | MCP `preflight` |
+| Change history | MCP `get_change_history` |
+| State snapshot (health, disk, drift) | MCP `get_state_snapshot` |
+| Secrets (Infisical) | REST API + `oikos secret` CLI |
+| Approval tokens | Matrix via notifier |
+
+All MCP tools are read-only. Mutations use the `homelab` CLI with operator
+approval.
+
+## Enrollment
+
+Thin client model — no git clone, no sync timer. `bootstrap.sh` fetches only
+the agent orientation files and tooling from the raw Gitea URL, then enrolls
+via the Oikos API.
+
+To enroll:
+```bash
+# Run from any machine with mesh connectivity
+curl -fsSL https://git.hubris.network/dtoro/oikos/raw/main/bootstrap.sh | sudo bash
+
+# Or with optional tooling:
+curl ... | sudo bash -s -- --with-mcp      # wire Claude's MCP config
+curl ... | sudo bash -s -- --with-nomos     # install Goose + Nomos
+```
+
+This calls `POST /api/v1/clients/enroll` on the Oikos API, which:
+1. Validates the entity exists in DB (planned or provisioning state)
+2. Validates mesh IP against expected subnets
+3. Generates an age keypair and delivers it to the client
+4. Creates an Infisical machine identity
+5. Transitions the entity to provisioning state
+
+## After enrollment
+
+### What changes on your machine
+
+- `/opt/homelab/` — agent orientation files (CLIENTS.md, AGENTS.md, OIKOS.md)
+- `/opt/homelab/tools/` — tooling scripts (caveman, nomos-soul)
+- `/etc/age/key.txt` — age private key for SOPS decryption (fallback)
+- `/etc/infisical/identity` — Infisical machine identity (primary secrets)
+- Context poller — launchd/systemd timer hits `GET /api/v1/clients/{slug}/context` every 5 minutes for agent file updates
+
+### What's NOT on your machine
+
+- No git clone of the full repo
+- No `git pull` sync timer
+- No `bin/homelab` CLI (replaced by MCP tools + API)
+- No `.sops.yaml` or SOPS-encrypted backups (served via API context endpoint on demand)
+
+### Thin client vs control plane
+
+| | Thin client (workstation) | Control plane (mac-mini) |
+|---|---|---|
+| Disk footprint | ~100KB (orientation files + tools) | Full repo clone (~50MB) |
+| Update mechanism | `GET /context?since=` poll | Git pull + post-pull.sh |
+| Source of truth | DB via MCP | DB + local seeds + archive |
+| Secrets access | Infisical (primary), age/SOPS served via API (fallback) | Infisical + local SOPS files |
+
+### Your identity
+
+Your identity in the homelab is defined in `inventory.yaml`. Run `hostname`
+(Linux) or `scutil --get LocalHostName` (macOS), then look up your entry.
+It tells you your role, what services you host, what's mounted, and your
+mesh address.
+
+### Source of truth hierarchy
+
+1. **Postgres database** (runtime) — authoritative for entities, knowledge,
+   signals, ledger. Query via MCP or REST API.
+2. **Context poller** — agent files and tooling fetched via API deltas every
+   5 minutes.
+3. **Never guess.** If data is missing, query MCP. If MCP is down, grep the
+   local `/opt/homelab/` files.
+
+## The context poller
+
+Every 5 minutes, launchd (macOS) or systemd (Linux) hits:
+
+```
+GET /api/v1/clients/ws:{hostname}/context?since={last_timestamp}
+```
+
+The API returns which agent files, tools, and SOPS config changed since the
+last poll. Only changed files are downloaded. This replaces the old
+`git pull` with a lightweight HTTP delta.
+
+To trigger manually: run `/opt/homelab/tools/context-poller.sh`.
+
+## Making changes
+
+- **Read state**: use MCP tools or the API
+- **Mutate state** (restart, edit config, deploy): classify the action against
+  policy (query `preflight` MCP tool):
+  - `read_only` / `reversible_low` — execute directly
+  - `config_mutation` / `destructive` — request operator approval via
+    `POST /api/v1/entities/{slug}/activate` (or equivalent lifecycle endpoint)
+- **Secrets**: use Infisical (primary) or SOPS (fallback). Never hardcode.
+- **Knowledge**: if you observe a discrepancy between docs and live state,
+  update the DB via the API in the same session.
+
+## MCP endpoint
+
+```
+https://mcp.hubris.network/mcp
+```
+
+Available tools are listed in [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md#3-the-mcp-server).
+
+## Communication mode
+
+Apply [.agents/shared/caveman.md](.agents/shared/caveman.md) — terse,
+fragment-heavy communication. Drop filler, keep substance.
+
+## Related
+
+- [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md) — full agent orientation (read this first)
+- [OIKOS.md](.agents/OIKOS.md) — operating model, OODA loop, risk classes
+- [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) — developer guide for the Oikos codebase

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -1,123 +1,155 @@
-# Contributing to the Homelab Wiki
+# Contributing to Oikos
 
-## Voice
+Developer guide for the Oikos codebase. If you are a homelab client consuming
+Oikos, see [CLIENTS.md](CLIENTS.md). If you are an AI agent working on the
+repo, see [.agents/dev/CONTRIBUTING.md](.agents/dev/CONTRIBUTING.md).
 
-Concise, technical, sysadmin-to-sysadmin. No marketing prose, no exclamation marks.
+## Dev setup
 
-## Page templates
+- **Go 1.26+** (see `go.mod` for pinned version)
+- **PostgreSQL with TimescaleDB** — the compose stack includes `timescale/timescaledb:2.17.2-pg16`
+- **Docker** for the full dev stack
 
-### Container page (`containers/<id>-<name>.md`)
+```bash
+# Start dependencies (Postgres + Redis)
+docker compose --profile dev up -d
 
-```markdown
-# <id> — `<name>`
+# Run all tests
+make test
 
-One-sentence purpose.
+# Run integration tests (needs compose Postgres)
+make test-db
 
-## At a glance
-- **Hostname:** `<name>`
-- **IP:** `192.168.8.x`
-- **Privilege:** privileged | unprivileged
-- **Resources:** N cores / M GiB RAM / D GiB rootfs
-- **Mounts:** `/mnt/library` ↔ `/mnt/library` (if any)
-- **Public hostname:** `<sub>.hubris.network` (if proxied)
+# Build the binary
+make build
+```
 
-## Role
-What it does, what it talks to.
+## Project structure
 
-## Service / port map
-| Service | Listen | Notes |
+```
+cmd/oikos/          Single-binary entry point
+cmd/nomos/          Nomos MCP client gateway
+internal/           All Go packages
+  httpapi/          REST + MCP server (OpenAPI-generated)
+  mcp/              MCP tool implementations
+  db/               Connection pool, migrations, seeds, sqlc queries
+  scheduler/        Observe loop, probes, signals
+  actuator/         SSH execution
+  learning/         Pattern recognition, anomaly detection
+  notifier/         Matrix notifications, approval tokens
+  policy/           Risk classifier
+  secrets/          Infisical + SOPS backend
+  domain/           Core types: entities, approvals, signals, patterns
+  ontology/         Type hierarchy, relationship validation
+  knowledge/        Knowledge YAML seed ingestion
+api/openapi.yaml    API contract — the source of truth for endpoints
+migrations/         Forward-only SQL migrations (TimescaleDB)
+seeds/              Bootstrap YAML: ontology, inventory, policy, knowledge
+compose/            Dockerfiles + Caddy config
+scripts/            Deploy, watchdog, rollback
+nomos/              Nomos config, persona, skills
+.agents/            Agent instruction files + skills
+plans/              Design documents
+docs/adr/           Architecture decision records
+```
 
-## Storage / config paths
+## Commands
 
-## Auto-deploy
-(if any) — link to [auto-deploy](../infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)
+| Command | Purpose |
+|---------|---------|
+| `make build` | Build `oikos` binary |
+| `make test` | Run all tests with race detection |
+| `make test-db` | Run integration tests against compose Postgres |
+| `make lint` | `go vet` + `golangci-lint` |
+| `make generate` | Regenerate OpenAPI + sqlc code |
+| `make generate-check` | CI drift guard — fail if generated code is stale |
+| `make migrate` | Apply DB migrations |
+| `make seed` | Ingest seeds into DB |
+| `make export` | Export DB state to YAML seeds |
+| `make dev` | Start compose dev stack |
+| `make clean` | Remove binary + test cache |
+
+## Conventions
+
+### APIs are OpenAPI-first
+
+The REST API is defined in `api/openapi.yaml`. Server code is generated with
+`oapi-codegen` into `internal/httpapi/gen/`. To add an endpoint:
+
+1. Add the path + schema to `api/openapi.yaml`
+2. Run `make generate`
+3. Implement the handler in `internal/httpapi/impl.go`
+4. Add tests in `internal/httpapi/api_test.go`
+
+Never hand-edit `internal/httpapi/gen/api.gen.go`.
+
+### Database access is sqlc-first
+
+SQL queries live in `internal/db/queries/*.sql`. Go code is generated with
+`sqlc` into `internal/db/sqlcgen/`. Config in `sqlc.yaml`.
+
+- Queries target pgx/v5 with UUID + timestamptz overrides
+- Never hand-edit generated sqlc code
+
+### Migrations are forward-only
+
+SQL migrations live in `migrations/` as `NNN_name.up.sql`. There are no down
+migrations (see [ADR 0008](docs/adr/0008-forward-only-migrations.md)).
+Migrations are idempotent where possible (`IF NOT EXISTS`, `DO $$` blocks).
+
+To add a migration:
+
+1. Create `migrations/NNN_name.up.sql` with the next sequence number
+2. Write the DDL
+3. Run `make migrate` to apply
+
+### Seeds are DB-generated
+
+`seeds/*.yaml` are the bootstrap files used by `oikos seed`. After making
+changes via the API, run `make export` to regenerate the seed files. These
+files are version-controlled and serve as DR fallback.
+
+### Writing style
+
+Follow [.agents/shared/writing-style.md](.agents/shared/writing-style.md).
+Documentation is reference prose, not marketing. Banned vocabulary includes
+"robust", "seamless", "leverage", "utilize", "delve", "cutting-edge".
+
+### Risk classification
+
+Every mutation is classified against `seeds/policy.yaml` before execution.
+Four risk classes: `read_only`, `reversible_low`, `config_mutation`,
+`destructive`. The classifier can only lower autonomy relative to policy,
+never raise it. When in doubt, escalate.
+
+## CI
+
+Gitea Actions runs on push to `main` and pull requests (`ci.yml`):
+
+1. `go vet` + `golangci-lint` + `govulncheck`
+2. Generated code drift check (`make generate-check`)
+3. Build (`go build ./...`)
+4. Test with race detector + coverage
+5. Docker build verification (no push)
+
+Coverage gates: policy + learning packages ≥ 80%, others ≥ 60%.
+
+## PR workflow
+
+1. Create a branch from `main`
+2. Make changes, write tests
+3. Run `make lint test generate-check`
+4. Commit with a message following: problem → change → risk → verification
+5. Push to Gitea; CI gates PRs on green
+
+## Secrets
+
+Secrets are managed by Infisical (primary) with SOPS as DR fallback. Never
+hardcode secrets. Use environment variables from `.env` for local dev.
+The `.env` and `.infisical-credentials` files are gitignored.
 
 ## Related
-- [Caddy](121-caddy.md) (if proxied)
-- [DNS](../infrastructure/dns.md) (if has subdomain)
-- [Authentik](124-authentik.md) (if SSO)
-- ...
 
-## Changelog
-### YYYY-MM-DD — short title
-What changed, why, link to investigation if any.
-```
-
-### Cross-cutting page (`infrastructure/<topic>.md`)
-
-```markdown
-# <Topic>
-
-One-sentence summary.
-
-## Why
-Design rationale — what it replaces, what it solves.
-
-## Components
-Where it runs, what files matter.
-
-## How to apply / use
-Recipes.
-
-## Gotchas
-
-## Related
-Links to nodes that host or depend on this.
-
-## Changelog
-```
-
-### Plan (`plans/YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md`)
-
-```markdown
-# YYYY-MM-DD — <title>
-
-## Goal
-What this change achieves and why.
-
-## Current topology / state
-Diagram or description of what exists now.
-
-## Target topology / state
-What it looks like after.
-
-## Pre-flight checklist
-
-## Step-by-step procedure
-
-## Verification
-
-## Post-migration
-Changelog entries to write, index status to update.
-```
-
-### Investigation (`investigations/YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md`)
-
-```markdown
-# YYYY-MM-DD — <title>
-
-## Summary
-1-3 sentences.
-
-## Timeline
-
-## Root cause
-
-## Mitigations applied
-
-## Open questions
-```
-
-## Linking discipline
-
-- Every container page links to every cross-cutting page it participates in.
-- Every cross-cutting page lists the nodes that participate.
-- Every investigation links to the nodes it implicates *and* gets back-linked from each node's changelog.
-- Every plan links to the infrastructure pages it affects. When done, update the plan's status in `plans/index.md` and write changelog entries on affected node pages.
-
-## Changelog hygiene
-
-- Reverse-chronological (newest first).
-- One entry per discrete change, even if you make several in one day.
-- If a change spans nodes, repeat the entry on each affected page (different perspective is fine).
-- Don't rewrite history — entries are append-only. Mistakes get a follow-up entry that supersedes them.
+- [OIKOS.md](.agents/OIKOS.md) — operating model, OODA loop, ontology
+- [CLIENTS.md](CLIENTS.md) — for homelab clients consuming Oikos
+- [docs/adr/](docs/adr/) — architecture decision records

Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+.PHONY: build test test-db lint generate generate-check dev migrate seed export clean tidy
+
+BINARY := oikos
+GO ?= go
+
+build:
+	$(GO) build -o $(BINARY) -tags timetzdata ./cmd/oikos
+
+test:
+	$(GO) test -race -cover ./...
+
+# Integration tests against the compose Postgres (starts it if needed)
+test-db:
+	docker compose up -d postgres
+	@sleep 3
+	OIKOS_TEST_DATABASE_URL="postgres://oikos:$${OIKOS_DB_PASSWORD:-oikos_dev}@localhost:5432/oikos?sslmode=disable" \
+		$(GO) test -race -count=1 ./internal/db/ ./internal/httpapi/ ./internal/mcp/
+
+lint:
+	$(GO) vet ./...
+	@command -v golangci-lint >/dev/null 2>&1 && golangci-lint run || echo "golangci-lint not installed, skipping"
+
+generate:
+	$(GO) run github.com/oapi-codegen/oapi-codegen/v2/cmd/oapi-codegen@v2.4.1 \
+		-config api/codegen.yaml api/openapi.yaml
+	$(GO) run github.com/sqlc-dev/sqlc/cmd/sqlc@v1.29.0 generate
+
+# CI drift guard: regenerate and fail if the committed output changed.
+generate-check: generate
+	@git diff --exit-code -- internal/httpapi/gen internal/db/sqlcgen \
+		|| (echo "generated code is stale — run 'make generate' and commit" && exit 1)
+
+migrate:
+	$(GO) run ./cmd/oikos migrate
+
+seed:
+	$(GO) run ./cmd/oikos seed
+
+export:
+	$(GO) run ./cmd/oikos export
+
+dev:
+	docker compose --profile dev up -d
+
+clean:
+	rm -f $(BINARY)
+	$(GO) clean -testcache
+
+tidy:
+	$(GO) mod tidy

README.md

@@ -1,76 +1,136 @@
-# Homelab Wiki — `hubris`
+# Oikos
 
-Living documentation for the **hubris** Proxmox homelab. Every node, every cross-cutting system, and every meaningful incident is its own page; pages are linked so you can start anywhere and walk the graph.
+Agentic homelab operating system written in Go. Single binary (`cmd/oikos`),
+Docker-deployed on mac-mini, with a standalone Nomos MCP agent gateway
+(`cmd/nomos`). Manages the **hubris** Proxmox homelab autonomously — observes
+state, classifies actions against policy, executes approved procedures over SSH,
+learns from outcomes, and escalates when uncertain.
 
-> Last refreshed against live state: **2026-04-28**.
+**For agents running on enrolled clients:** start with [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md).
+**For client machines:** see [CLIENTS.md](CLIENTS.md).
+**For developers:** see [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md).
 
-## Map
+## Quick start
 
-### Hosts
-- [`hubris`](hosts/hubris.md) — single Proxmox VE node, GMKtec NucBox M6 Ultra, `192.168.8.77`
+```bash
+# Dev stack (postgres + api + scheduler + notifier)
+docker compose --profile dev up -d
 
-### VMs
-- [100 — `zimaos`](vms/100-zimaos.md) — ZimaOS 1.6.1, NAS frontend (evaluation)
-- [108 — `haos-16.3`](vms/108-haos.md) — Home Assistant OS
+# Full stack (adds Nomos agent gateway)
+docker compose --profile full up -d
 
-### LXC containers
-See the full table in [`containers/index.md`](containers/index.md). Quick links:
+# Build standalone binary
+go build -o bin/oikos -tags timetzdata ./cmd/oikos
 
-| ID  | Name             | IP              | Role                                          |
-| --- | ---------------- | --------------- | --------------------------------------------- |
-| 101 | [jellyfin](containers/101-jellyfin.md)             | 192.168.8.206 | Media server                                  |
-| 102 | [nfs-export](containers/102-nfs-export.md)         | 192.168.8.200 | NFSv4 re-export of /mnt/library for ZimaOS    |
-| 103 | [paperless](containers/103-paperless.md)           | 192.168.8.130 | Document mgmt                                 |
-| 104 | [gitea](containers/104-gitea.md)                   | 192.168.8.121 | Git server                                    |
-| 105 | [apps](containers/105-apps.md)                     | 192.168.8.205 | Docker host (Artifacto / PlantUML / Portainer / WriteFreely)            |
-| 114 | [nextcloud](containers/114-nextcloud.md)           | 192.168.8.224 | Personal cloud                                |
-| 118 | [elementsynapse](containers/118-elementsynapse.md) | 192.168.8.239 | Matrix Synapse                                |
-| 119 | [sophia](containers/119-sophia.md)                 | 192.168.8.157 | Sophia                                        |
-| 120 | [mule-images](containers/120-mule-images.md)       | 192.168.8.136 | Mule-image / mulita photos                    |
-| 121 | [caddy](containers/121-caddy.md)                   | 192.168.8.175 | Reverse proxy                                 |
-| 122 | [arriman](containers/122-arriman.md)               | 192.168.8.132 | Docker host (\*arr stack)                     |
-| 124 | [authentik](containers/124-authentik.md)           | 192.168.8.180 | SSO + split-horizon DNS                       |
-| 130 | [grimmory](containers/130-grimmory.md)             | 192.168.8.213 | Digital library (Grimmory — fork of Booklore) |
+# Run all roles in one process (dev mode)
+OIKOS_DATABASE_URL="postgres://oikos:oikos_dev@localhost:5432/oikos?sslmode=disable" \
+  go run ./cmd/oikos all
+```
 
-### Cross-cutting infrastructure
-- [DNS — split-horizon](infrastructure/dns.md)
-- [Ingress — Caddy + VPS traefik](infrastructure/ingress.md)
-- [Mesh — Tailscale → Netbird migration](infrastructure/mesh.md)
-- [Monitoring — Hermes health watchdog](infrastructure/monitoring.md)
-- [Media permissions — `media` GID 10000](infrastructure/media-permissions.md)
-- [SSH access](infrastructure/ssh-access.md)
-- [Backups — restic on external drive (disabled)](infrastructure/backups.md)
-- [Auto-deploy — gitea-webhook pipelines](infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)
-- [VPS hardening — IONOS / netbird control plane](infrastructure/vps-hardening.md)
-- [Homelab context distribution](infrastructure/homelab-context.md) — cross-client `/opt/homelab-context` + MCP + secrets-issuance
+## Architecture
 
-### Investigations
-Time-stamped incident notes / experiments in [`investigations/`](investigations/index.md).
+```
+                  ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
+                  │         mac-mini (Docker)         │
+                  │                                   │
+  Workstation ─── │  nomos (8092) ──MCP── api (8090) │
+  (mesh)          │    MCP gateway      REST + MCP    │
+                  │                                   │
+                  │  scheduler ── notifier ── postgres │
+                  │  (observe)    (Matrix)   (Timescale)│
+                  └──────────────────────────────────┘
+```
 
-### Operations
-- [Command cheatsheet](operations/commands.md)
-- [Agent enrollment](operations/agent-enrollment.md) — bootstrap a new client (workstation, LXC, VM) into the homelab context system
+| Component | Port | Role |
+|-----------|------|------|
+| `oikos api` | 8090 | REST API + MCP server (15 tools) |
+| `oikos scheduler` | — | Probe runner, signal lifecycle, metrics |
+| `oikos notifier` | — | Approval tokens, Matrix alerts |
+| `nomos serve` | 8092 | MCP client gateway, query routing |
 
-## Conventions
+## Phases
 
-- **Each node page** ends with a `## Changelog` section. Reverse-chronological. Entry format:
-  ```
-  ### YYYY-MM-DD — short title
-  one or two lines on what changed and why.
-  ```
-- **Cross-linking is mandatory.** If a page references another node or system, link to it. Treat orphans as a bug.
-- **Live state wins.** When something here disagrees with `pct config` / `docker inspect` / running config, fix the wiki *and* note the change in the relevant changelog.
-- **Tracked configs.** A node whose config lives in a Gitea repo (Caddy, Gitea customizations, Artifacto, mule-image) is auto-deployed via webhook — see [auto-deploy](infrastructure/auto-deploy.md). Edits there must be pushed, not left local.
-- **No secrets.** This is a private repo on `git.hubris.network`, but still: paths to secret files are fine, secret values are not.
+| Phase | Status | Description |
+|-------|--------|-------------|
+| 1 — Ontology + DB | ✅ | TimescaleDB, migrations, seeds, blast_radius |
+| 2 — API | ✅ | OpenAPI-first REST + MCP, auth, SSE, audit |
+| 3 — Control loop | ✅ | Scheduler, actuator, learning, classifier, notifier |
+| 4 — Nomos agent | ✅ | Standalone MCP client gateway, agent activity |
+| 5 — Secrets | ✅ | Infisical backend + SOPS fallback, rotation runbooks |
+| 6 — Deploy | ✅ | CI pipeline, cutover checklist, watchdog, rollback |
 
-## Maintaining this wiki
+Full plan: [plans/2026-07-06-consolidate-oikos-control-plane-onto-mac-mini.md](plans/2026-07-06-consolidate-oikos-control-plane-onto-mac-mini.md).
 
-When you change a node:
-1. Update the relevant page (config snapshot, ports, mounts).
-2. Add a changelog entry at the bottom of that page.
-3. If the change touches a cross-cutting system (DNS, Caddy, Authentik, mesh), update *that* page too and link it from the changelog entry.
-4. If it's an incident, add an entry to [`investigations/`](investigations/index.md).
+## Operations
 
-## See also
+### API endpoints
 
-- [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md) — page templates and tone
+```bash
+curl http://localhost:8090/api/v1/entities?type=service  # fleet
+curl http://localhost:8090/api/v1/health                  # fleet health
+curl http://localhost:8090/api/v1/agent-activity          # agent log
+```
+
+### Nomos queries
+
+```bash
+# Structured tool call
+curl -X POST localhost:8092/query -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{"tool":"get_blast_radius","args":{"entity_id":"service:authentik"}}'
+
+# Natural language
+curl -X POST localhost:8092/query -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{"query":"what depends on authentik?"}'
+```
+
+### CLI
+
+```bash
+oikos migrate     # apply DB migrations
+oikos seed        # ingest ontology/inventory/policy seeds
+oikos export      # export DB state to YAML
+oikos api         # serve REST + MCP
+oikos scheduler   # run observe loop
+oikos notifier    # run notification loop
+oikos all         # all roles in one process
+oikos secret list # enumerate SOPS secrets
+oikos secret migrate  # SOPS → Infisical
+```
+
+## Repo layout
+
+```
+cmd/oikos/          Go entry point — single binary
+cmd/nomos/          Nomos MCP client gateway
+internal/           Go packages (httpapi, mcp, scheduler, actuator, learning,
+                    notifier, policy, secrets, db, config, ontology, domain,
+                    knowledge)
+api/openapi.yaml    API contract (OpenAPI 3.1)
+migrations/         Forward-only SQL migrations (TimescaleDB)
+seeds/              Bootstrap YAML (ontology, inventory, policy, knowledge)
+compose/            Dockerfiles + Caddy config
+scripts/            Deploy, watchdog, verification, rollback
+nomos/              Nomos config, persona, skills
+.agents/            Agent instruction files, shared conventions, skills
+archive/            Historical reference (legacy wiki, plans, SOPS backups)
+plans/              Design documents (active + done)
+docs/adr/           Architecture decision records
+```
+
+## For agents
+
+See [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md) for the full orientation. Quick reference:
+
+- **Source of truth:** DB (runtime) then seeds (bootstrap). Old wiki is
+  archived at `archive/knowledge/` — use MCP `search_knowledge` instead.
+- **Mutations:** classify against policy, request approval for
+  `destructive`/`config_mutation`
+- **Secrets:** Infisical (primary) or SOPS (fallback) — never hardcode
+
+## Related
+
+- [OIKOS.md](.agents/OIKOS.md) — operating model, OODA loop, ontology
+- [CLIENTS.md](CLIENTS.md) — client onboarding guide
+- [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) — developer guide
+- [plans/](plans/) — design documents and cutover checklist
+- [docs/adr/](docs/adr/) — architecture decision records

api/codegen.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# oapi-codegen config — `make generate` regenerates internal/httpapi/gen.
+package: gen
+output: internal/httpapi/gen/api.gen.go
+generate:
+  models: true
+  chi-server: true
+  strict-server: true
+  embedded-spec: true

api/redocly.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Redocly lint config for api/openapi.yaml (CI runs: redocly lint api/openapi.yaml)
+extends:
+  - recommended
+rules:
+  # Every operation declares `default` → RFC 9457 problem+json instead of
+  # enumerating each 4XX (plan R3-3); oapi-codegen handles `default` fine.
+  operation-4xx-response: off

archive/hermes-plans/2026-06-03_223218-dhcp-pool-exclude-static-ips.md

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 
 ## Problem statement
 
-The Technitium DHCP server on [CT 107](containers/107-dns.md) serves `192.168.8.100–192.168.8.240`. **Every static homelab IP except hubris (`.77`) sits inside that range:**
+The Technitium DHCP server on [CT 107](../../knowledge/wiki/containers/107-dns.md) serves `192.168.8.100–192.168.8.240`. **Every static homelab IP except hubris (`.77`) sits inside that range:**
 
 | Host | IP | Inside pool? |
 |---|---|---|

archive/hermes-plans/2026-07-05_strong-migration-assessment.md

@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
+# Assessment: Which nodes can move to `strong`
+
+## Executive summary
+
+hubris is **memory-starved**: 28 GiB RAM, 71.9 GiB allocated across 18 LXC + 2 VM
+(2.5× overcommit), 10 GiB swap in active use. strong sits **completely empty** —
+28 GiB RAM, 25 GiB free, 0 guests, 2.7 TiB unused storage. The single most
+effective decongestion move is to shift guests off hubris onto strong.
+
+This document assesses every guest for move-readiness, grouped by constraints
+(library dependency, GPU, core-infra status), and proposes a phased migration
+that does **not** require the physical library-SSD move (the blocker of the
+original plan) — library access from strong is provided via NFS from hubris.
+
+---
+
+## Current resource state (live, 2026-07-05)
+
+### hubris — overloaded
+
+| Resource | Capacity | Allocated (all guests) | Actual use | Status |
+|----------|----------|----------------------|------------|--------|
+| RAM | 28 GiB | 70.2 GiB (2.5× overcommit) | 18 GiB used + 10 GiB swap | ⚠️ heavy swap pressure |
+| CPU | 12 vCPU (6c/12t) | 43 vCPU (3.6× overcommit) | ~43% scaling MHz | OK (shares) |
+| local-lvm | 856 GiB | 582 GiB allocated (29% thin) | — | OK |
+| library (lvmthin) | 3.7 TiB | — | 1.2 TiB used (34%) | OK, 2.3 TiB free |
+
+### strong — empty, ready
+
+| Resource | Capacity | Used | Status |
+|----------|----------|------|--------|
+| RAM | 28 GiB | 2.3 GiB (host only) | 25 GiB free |
+| CPU | 16 vCPU (8c/16t) | idle (0.08 load) | 100% free |
+| local-lvm | 856 GiB | 0 | empty |
+| ludo-lvm | 1.8 TiB | 0 | empty |
+| Guests | — | 0 LXC, 0 VM | nothing running |
+
+### Network topology constraint
+
+```
+Fritz!Box (192.168.178.1)
+  └── SODOLA 2.5G switch
+       ├── hubris eno1 → vmbr1 (192.168.178.10) → vmbr0 (192.168.8.0/24)
+       │     └── all 20 guests on 192.168.8.x
+       └── strong vmbr0 (192.168.178.181)
+             └── no internal bridge yet, guests would be on 192.168.178.x
+```
+
+strong reaches `192.168.8.0/24` via the Fritz static route through hubris.
+Guests on strong get `192.168.178.x` IPs unless we add an internal bridge
+on strong (Phase 0 prerequisite — see below).
+
+---
+
+## Per-guest assessment
+
+### Tier 1 — Move immediately (no library dependency, no core-infra)
+
+These guests mount **no** `/mnt/library` and are not part of the core
+infrastructure spine (caddy/dns/auth/mcp). They are the easiest wins.
+
+| ID | Name | Cores | RAM | Library? | GPU? | Notes |
+|----|------|-------|-----|----------|------|-------|
+| 118 | elementsynapse | 2 | 4 GiB | ❌ | ❌ | Matrix homeserver. Public via Caddy (`matrix.hubris.network`). Only change: Caddy backend IP. **Easiest move in the fleet.** |
+| 129 | house | 2 | 3 GiB | ❌ | ❌ | Yuvomi family planner (Docker). No public Caddy route yet (uses VPS traefik directly). Self-contained. |
+
+**Combined RAM freed from hubris: 7 GiB.** No NFS, no library, no GPU.
+
+### Tier 2 — Move with library NFS (high resource consumers)
+
+These are the heaviest guests and the original migration plan's primary
+targets. They mount `/mnt/library` and two use the iGPU. Moving them
+requires an NFS export from hubris → strong (reverse of the original
+plan's direction, since the physical SSD hasn't moved).
+
+| ID | Name | Cores | RAM | Library? | GPU? | I/O profile | Notes |
+|----|------|-------|-----|----------|------|-------------|-------|
+| 120 | mule-images | 6 | 12 GiB | ✅ mp0 | ✅ iGPU | Write-heavy (photo processing) | **#1 RAM consumer.** Strong has Radeon 680M iGPU (VAAPI works). |
+| 122 | arriman | 4 | 8 GiB | ✅ mp0 | ❌ | Write-heavy (downloads) | *arr stack + qbit + sab. Mounts library for download writes. |
+| 101 | jellyfin | 4 | 8 GiB | ✅ mp0 | ✅ iGPU | Read-heavy sequential | Media streaming + transcode. Strong 680M handles VAAPI. |
+
+**Combined RAM freed: 28 GiB.** This alone would eliminate hubris's swap
+pressure entirely.
+
+### Tier 3 — Could move, low urgency
+
+| ID | Name | Cores | RAM | Library? | Notes |
+|----|------|-------|-----|----------|-------|
+| 130 | grimmory | 1 | 2 GiB | ✅ mp0 | Book library (Docker). Migrated from apps LXC recently. |
+| 131 | teddycloud | 1 | 1 GiB | ✅ mp0 | New (not in inventory.yaml yet). |
+| 132 | rclone | 1 | 2 GiB | ✅ mp0 (ro) | Backup container. Read-only library mount. |
+| 128 | trmnl | 1 | 768 MiB | ❌ | TRMNL middleware. No library. Could move but tiny. |
+| 119 | sophia | 2 | 1 GiB | ✅ mp0 | Workshop. Light use. |
+
+### Stay on hubris (core infrastructure)
+
+| ID | Name | Cores | RAM | Why it stays |
+|----|------|-------|-----|--------------|
+| 121 | caddy | 1 | 512 MiB | Reverse proxy — terminates all `*.hubris.network`. Must stay on hubris for LAN-side reachability. **Needs backend IP updates** when guests move. |
+| 107 | dns | 1 | 1 GiB | Technitium DNS, split-horizon. Core. |
+| 106 | auth-outpost | 1 | 512 MiB | Authentik SSO enforcement. Core. |
+| 105 | apps | 2 | 4 GiB | homelab MCP + secrets-issuance + artifacto. Core infra. Mounts library. |
+| 104 | gitea | 1 | 1 GiB | Git server. NFS would hurt git lock/stat perf. Mounts library (bare repos). |
+| 103 | paperless | 2 | 3 GiB | Document archive. Moderate I/O, OCR writes. Mounts library. |
+| 102 | nfs-export | 1 | 512 MiB | Exports library to zimaos via NFS. Must stay with the physical library. |
+| 100 | zimaos | 4 | 8 GiB (VM) | NAS frontend eval. Already NFS-mounts library from 102. |
+| 108 | haos | 2 | 4 GiB (VM) | Home Assistant OS. Hardware access, low latency. |
+
+---
+
+## Constraints & prerequisites
+
+### 1. Network — strong needs an internal bridge (Phase 0)
+
+strong currently has only `vmbr0` on `192.168.178.0/24`. Guests created there
+get household-LAN IPs, not homelab-subnet IPs. Two options:
+
+- **Option A (recommended):** Add `vmbr1` on strong as a portless internal
+  bridge with a `192.168.8.x/24` address (e.g. `192.168.8.3`). Route between
+  strong's `vmbr0` and `vmbr1` the same way hubris does. Guests go on `vmbr1`
+  and get `192.168.8.x` IPs — transparent to Caddy, DNS, and inter-LXC refs.
+  Requires adding a static route on Fritz (or relying on hubris's existing
+  route — strong would need IP forwarding + a route to 192.168.8.0/24 via vmbr1).
+
+- **Option B (simpler, messier):** Put guests on `192.168.178.x` directly.
+  Caddy can still reach them (hubris routes to 192.168.178.0/24). But DNS
+  records, inter-LXC references, and firewall rules all assume `192.168.8.x`.
+  More config churn per guest.
+
+### 2. Storage — rootfs migration (no shared storage)
+
+`local-lvm` is per-node (not shared). Moving an LXC requires either:
+- `vzdump` → restore on strong (clean, but needs temp disk space + downtime)
+- `rsync` the rootfs to a new LXC on strong (faster for large rootfs like 120's 100G)
+- `pct migrate` only works with shared storage — **not applicable here**
+
+For VMs (100, 108): `qm migrate` also needs shared storage. Not moving VMs.
+
+### 3. Library access — NFS from hubris to strong
+
+Since the physical library SSD is still on hubris, strong's guests that need
+`/mnt/library` must NFS-mount it from hubris. Options:
+
+- **Export from hubris host directly** (simplest): add `/mnt/library` to
+  `/etc/exports` on hubris with the same squash params as LXC 102
+  (`rw,all_squash,anonuid=33,anongid=10000,no_subtree_check`). Mount on strong
+  at `/mnt/library`. Strong's guests bind-mount it just like hubris's guests do.
+
+- **Use existing nfs-export LXC 102**: strong NFS-mounts from `192.168.8.200`
+  (LXC 102). This already has the right squash config. Less host-level change.
+  **This is the path of least resistance.**
+
+### 4. GPU — iGPU passthrough on strong
+
+strong has a Ryzen 7 PRO 6850U with Radeon 680M iGPU. For jellyfin (VAAPI
+transcoding) and mule-images (photo processing), we need:
+- `/dev/dri/renderD128` passed to the LXC (`lxc.cgroup2.devices.allow` +
+  `lxc.mount.entry` or Proxmox's `dev0:` passthrough)
+- `video` / `render` group membership inside the container
+- Confirm `amdgpu` driver loads on strong's host kernel (it should — same APU family)
+
+### 5. Quorum — 2-node cluster, no QDevice
+
+Moving guests to strong does NOT fix the quorum issue but **reduces blast
+radius**: if hubris reboots (its known thermal instability), the guests on
+strong keep running independently. Consider adding a QDevice as a separate
+follow-up — it's orthogonal to this migration.
+
+---
+
+## Revised migration phases
+
+The original plan's NFS-over-LAN approach has been superseded. Instead,
+**media library data moves to ludo-lvm** on strong so migrated guests access
+it as a local ext4 mount. Data is split by origin:
+
+```
+hubris (stays):   library SSD (3.7T, 1.2T used)
+                     └── /mnt/library/{documents,images,cloud,homecloud,notes,repos,sophia}
+                         ↑ user-generated content (docs, photos, cloud sync, notes, repos, workshop)
+
+strong (moves):   ludo-lvm (1.8T, 0 used at start)
+                     └── /mnt/media_local ← 1.5T thin volume
+                            └── {downloads,movies,music,tv,anime,books}
+                            ↑ non-user-generated content (media arr stack, book library)
+```
+
+| Category | Stays on hubris | Moves to strong |
+|----------|----------------|-----------------|
+| Media | — | downloads (25G), movies (51G), music (29G), tv (30G), anime (206G) |
+| Books | — | books (2.6G) |
+| Docs/Photos | documents (249M), images (4K) | — |
+| Cloud sync | cloud (287G), homecloud (367G) | — |
+| Personal | notes (6.7M), repos (84M), sophia (151G) | — |
+| **Total** | **~805G** | **~344G** |
+
+ludo-lvm (1.8T) fits all media + books with ~1.15T headroom for growth.
+hubris library SSD (3.7T, 1.2T used) retains the user-generated content.
+Both sides keep their data local — no cross-node NFS needed for daily I/O.
+
+---
+
+### Phase 2a — Prepare ludo-lvm on strong
+
+1. Create a ext4 filesystem on ludo-lvm for media:
+   ```bash
+   lvcreate -n media -L 1.5T ludo-lvm
+   mkfs.ext4 /dev/ludo-lvm/media
+   ```
+2. Mount at `/mnt/media_local` on strong, add to `/etc/fstab`
+3. rsync media directories from hubris → strong:
+   ```bash
+   rsync -av --progress /mnt/library/{movies,tv,anime,downloads,music,books} strong:/mnt/media_local/
+   ```
+
+### Phase 2b — Migrate arriman (122) to strong
+
+1. Stop arriman on hubris, dump rootfs (24G)
+2. Restore on strong with IP `192.168.8.245/28` on vmbr1
+3. Mount `/mnt/media_local` → `/mnt/library` via mp0 (downloads land locally)
+4. Update Caddy: jellyseerr/qbit/sab backends → new IP
+5. Update inventory.yaml
+
+### Phase 2c — Migrate jellyfin (101) to strong
+
+1. Stop jellyfin on hubris, dump rootfs (16G)
+2. Restore on strong with IP `192.168.8.246/28` on vmbr1
+3. Pass `/dev/dri/renderD128` + `/dev/dri/card0` (Radeon 680M + RX 7600)
+4. Mount `/mnt/media_local` → `/mnt/library` via mp0 (media reads locally)
+5. Update Caddy: `media.hubris.network` → new IP
+6. Reinstall `sso-inject.js` in web dir (lost on every apt upgrade)
+7. Test VAAPI transcoding, SSO login, media playback
+
+### Phase 2d — Migrate grimmory (130) to strong
+
+1. Stop grimmory on hubris, dump rootfs (16G)
+2. Restore on strong with IP `192.168.8.247/28` on vmbr1
+3. Mount `/mnt/media_local` → `/mnt/library` via mp0 (books read locally)
+4. Update Caddy: `books.hubris.network` → new IP
+5. Update inventory.yaml
+6. Test: book browsing, calibre-web access
+
+### No NFS export needed
+
+With the data split by origin, hubris guests that only need user-generated
+content (documents, images, cloud, repos, sophia) still access them from the
+original library SSD — no cross-node NFS required. The two sides are
+independent.
+
+**Result after Phase 2: hubris frees 26 GiB RAM (4 migrated guests) + 344G of
+library I/O burden. Strong becomes the media/books powerhouse.**
+
+---
+
+### Phase 3 — Migrate mule-images (120) to strong
+
+Move photo management (12 GiB RAM, 6 cores, iGPU) last because it needs:
+- `/mnt/library` access (now NFS from strong — already set up in Phase 2d)
+- `/dev/dri/renderD128` (Radeon 680M — confirm VAAPI compatibility first)
+
+Steps:
+1. Stop mule-images on hubris, rsync the 100G rootfs to strong (faster than vzdump)
+2. Restore on strong with IP on vmbr1
+3. Pass Radeon 680M iGPU
+4. Reconfigure library paths → `/mnt/media_local` (or keep NFS mount)
+5. Update Caddy: `photos.hubris.network` → new IP
+6. Test photo import + processing pipeline
+
+---
+
+### Phase 4 — Tier 3 moves (optional)
+
+Migrate grimmory (130), teddycloud (131), rclone (132), trmnl (128), sophia (119)
+as needed — each frees 1–2 GiB. Not urgent; do when convenient.
+
+---
+
+### Phase 5 — Follow-up
+
+- **QDevice**: add a tiebreaker for 2-node quorum
+- **Gaming VM**: strong's 6850U has enough cores alongside migrated LXCs
+- **Hubris library cleanup**: after all guests are confirmed working, decide
+  whether to keep the original library SSD as backup or repurpose it
+
+---
+
+## Resource math after Phase 3 (all Tier 1 + 2 moved)
+
+| | hubris | strong |
+|---|--------|--------|
+| Guests | 11 LXC + 2 VM | 5 LXC |
+| RAM allocated | ~25 GiB | ~45 GiB |
+| RAM capacity | 28 GiB | 28 GiB |
+| Overcommit | 0.9× (under-committed) | 1.6× (manageable) |
+| Library disk | Local ext4 (3.7T) → NFS client | Local ext4 on ludo-lvm (1.8T) |
+| GPU | Radeon 760M (idle) | Radeon 680M (jellyfin + mule-images) |
+
+strong becomes the media/library powerhouse. hubris becomes a lean core-infra
+node (DNS, auth, git, docs, caddy, HA).
+
+---
+
+---
+
+## Risk register
+
+| Risk | Impact | Mitigation |
+|------|--------|------------|
+| NFS latency for library reads (jellyfin, arriman) | Media playback stutter, slow downloads | Test iperf between strong↔hubris first. If 2.5G link, NFS throughput is fine (~1 Gbit/s). |
+| GPU passthrough on strong (680M vs 760M) | Transcode quality/compat differences | Both are AMD VAAPI — same driver stack. Test `vainfo` inside LXC before going live. |
+| Caddy backend IP churn | Service outage if IP wrong | Update Caddyfile in git repo (caddy-conf), test each route before destroying old LXC. |
+| vzdump/restore downtime | Service unavailable during migration | Schedule off-hours. Use rsync for large rootfs (120's 100G) to minimize freeze window. |
+| 2-node quorum still fragile | If hubris goes down, strong /etc/pve goes read-only | Guests keep running. Add QDevice as follow-up. |
+| Library data integrity during NFS transition | Permission drift | NFS `all_squash,anonuid=33,anongid=10000` matches existing LXC 102 config. Verify with `ls -la /mnt/library` after mount. |
+
+---
+
+## Open questions for operator
+
+1. **Internal bridge on strong**: proceed with `vmbr1` on `192.168.8.3/24`
+   (Option A), or use `192.168.178.x` guest IPs (Option B)?
+2. **Migration method**: `vzdump`/restore (clean, downtime) vs `rsync` rootfs
+   (faster for large disks, needs manual config copy)?
+3. **Phase 1 priority**: move elementsynapse + house first (quick wins), or
+   go straight to Phase 2 (mule-images/jellyfin/arriman) for maximum relief?
+4. **Should we add a QDevice now** before moving anything, to protect
+   management plane during the migration?
+
+---
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-07-05 — Phase 2d complete (grimmory migrated; media NFS to zimaos)
+grimmory (130) → 192.168.8.247 on strong. Rsync'd /books (2.6G) to ludo-lvm.
+LXC 102 (nfs-export) now mounts strong's NFS at /mnt/media and exports it as
+a second share alongside /mnt/library. Zimaos mounts both: /media/library
+(hubris user-generated) and /media/media (strong media+books).
+See hosts/strong.md changelog.
+
+### 2026-07-05 — Phase 2 complete (arriman + jellyfin migrated; library on ludo-lvm)
+arriman (122) → 192.168.8.245, jellyfin (101) → 192.168.8.246. Created 1.5T
+thin volume on ludo-lvm, rsync'd 363G of media data. Both containers use local
+ext4 mount — no NFS. Jellyfin has 680M + RX 7600 GPU passthrough.
+Caddy backends updated. See hosts/strong.md changelog.
+
+### 2026-07-05 — Phase 1 complete (elementsynapse + house migrated to strong)
+Both Tier 1 guests moved: elementsynapse (118) → 192.168.8.242, house (129) → 192.168.8.244.
+Strong now has vmbr1 at 192.168.8.241/28. Hubris has proxy ARP + /32 routes for strong
+guest range. DHCP scope narrowed to 192.168.8.100-239 to avoid conflicts.
+Teddycloud (LXC 131) given static IP 192.168.8.150 due to IP conflict with
+previous DHCP allocation at 192.168.8.243.
+See hosts/strong.md changelog for full steps.
+
+### 2026-07-05 — assessment created
+Built from live `pct config` + `pvesm status` + `free -h` data pulled from
+both nodes. Supersedes the storage-migration framing of the original
+library-SSD plan — this assessment treats the SSD move as optional and
+focuses on guest relocation via NFS.

archive/knowledge/GLOSSARY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Glossary
+
+Terms and abbreviations used throughout the homelab wiki.
+
+| Term | Meaning |
+|------|---------|
+| **Authentik** | SSO/identity provider. Core runs on the VPS; forward-auth outpost at LXC 106 on hubris |
+| **Caddy** | Reverse proxy (LXC 121). Terminates TLS for every `*.hubris.network` hostname |
+| **Caveman** | Terse communication standard for agent responses — no filler, keep substance |
+| **Forward-auth** | Caddy snippet that delegates authentication to an Authentik outpost. Protects web UIs like qBit, SABnzbd |
+| **Gitea** | Git server at `git.hubris.network`. Hosts all tracked config repos |
+| **Gluetun** | WireGuard VPN sidecar on arriman. All \*arr traffic routes through it |
+| **HAOS** | Home Assistant Operating System. VM 108 on hubris |
+| **Hubris** | Primary Proxmox VE node (GMKtec NucBox M6 Ultra). PVE hostname, cluster member 1 |
+| **LXC** | Linux Container (Proxmox). VM-like isolation without a full OS kernel |
+| **LVM-thin** | Thin-provisioned logical volume manager. Used for all container/VM storage |
+| **MCP** | Model Context Protocol (MCP server at `mcp.hubris.network`). Structured tools for agents to query homelab state |
+| **Mesh** | Overlay VPN for off-LAN connectivity. Netbird is current; Tailscale is legacy |
+| **Netbird** | Preferred mesh VPN. VPS hosts the management plane; all homelab nodes are members |
+| **OIDC** | OpenID Connect. Protocol used by Authentik for SSO login flows |
+| **Oikos** | Agent operating model ([.agents/OIKOS.md](../.agents/OIKOS.md)). OODA loop, risk classes, policy, ontology |
+| **PVE** | Proxmox Virtual Environment — the hypervisor on both hubris and strong |
+| **SOPS** | `sops` — Mozilla SOPS. Encrypts secrets with age keys so they live in the git repo |
+| **Strong** | Secondary Proxmox VE node. Cluster member 2 (hostname `strong`, nickname ludo/ludo-mini) |
+| **Traefik** | Reverse proxy on IONOS VPS. Serves `*.hubris.network` to the public internet |
+| **VAAPI** | Video Acceleration API. Intel/AMD GPU-based hardware transcode for Jellyfin |
+| **VPS** | Virtual Private Server at IONOS (`82.165.190.79`). Runs Authentik core + Netbird management |
+| **\\*arr** | Media automation suite: Sonarr (TV), Radarr (movies), Lidarr (music), Prowlarr (indexer), Bazarr (subtitles), Readarr (books — not in use) |
+
+## See also
+
+- [Infrastructure index](wiki/infrastructure/index.md) — cross-cutting systems each with their own doc page
+- [OIKOS operating model](../.agents/OIKOS.md) — agent policy, risk classes, lifecycle

archive/knowledge/containers/101-jellyfin.md

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+# 101 — `jellyfin`
+
+Media server: serves the movies / TV / anime / music libraries from `/mnt/media_local` to LAN clients. Hardware transcoding via AMD Radeon 680M + RX 7600 VAAPI. Authentik SSO via OIDC.
+
+## At a glance
+- **Host:** **strong** (migrated from hubris 2026-07-05)
+- **IP:** `192.168.8.246`
+- **Privilege:** privileged (recreated on strong as priv)
+- **Resources:** 4 cores / 8 GiB RAM / 1 GiB swap / 16 GiB rootfs
+- **GPU:** `/dev/dri/renderD128` + `/dev/dri/card0` (AMD Radeon 680M iGPU + RX 7600 dGPU) passed via `dev0` / `dev1` in LXC config
+- **Mounts:** `/mnt/media_local` ↔ `/mnt/library`
+- **Public hostname:** [`media.hubris.network`](../infrastructure/dns.md) → [caddy](121-caddy.md) → `:8096`
+- **Version:** Jellyfin 10.11.11 (apt package, Ubuntu 24.04 noble repo)
+- **FFmpeg:** jellyfin-ffmpeg7 7.1.4
+
+## Service / port map
+
+| Service  | Listen | Notes |
+| -------- | ------ | ----- |
+| jellyfin | `:8096` | HTTP (caddy terminates TLS) |
+
+## Hardware acceleration (VAAPI)
+
+GPU is passed through to the LXC via `dev0: /dev/dri/renderD128,gid=993` and
+`dev1: /dev/dri/card0,gid=44` in
+`/etc/pve/lxc/101.conf` (strong). The `jellyfin` user is in the `render` (GID 993) and
+`video` groups inside the container.
+
+| GPU | Model | Role |
+|-----|-------|------|
+| Radeon 680M | iGPU (AMD Ryzen 7 PRO 6850U) | Primary VAAPI encoder/decoder |
+| RX 7600 | dGPU (add-in) | Secondary transcode, HEVC/AV1 encoding |
+
+Encoding settings (`/etc/jellyfin/encoding.xml`):
+- `HardwareAccelerationType`: `vaapi`
+- `VaapiDevice`: `/dev/dri/renderD128`
+- `EnableHardwareEncoding`: `true`
+- `AllowHevcEncoding`: `true`
+- `AllowAv1Encoding`: `true`
+- `EnableTonemapping`: `true`
+- `HardwareDecodingCodecs`: h264, hevc, vc1, vp9, av1
+- `EnableThrottling`: `true`
+- `EnableSegmentDeletion`: `true`
+
+Trickplay (`/etc/jellyfin/system.xml`):
+- `EnableHwAcceleration`: `true`
+- `EnableHwEncoding`: `true`
+
+## Authentik SSO (OIDC)
+
+Jellyfin uses the [SSO-Auth plugin](https://github.com/9p4/jellyfin-plugin-sso)
+v4.0.0.4 for Authentik OIDC login. No Caddy forward-auth gate — the SSO plugin
+handles auth directly via OIDC redirect flow.
+
+### Architecture
+
+```
+User → media.hubris.network → Caddy (TLS, no forward-auth) → Jellyfin :8096
+                                                                ↓
+                                                    Login page with "Sign in with Authentik" button
+                                                                ↓ (click)
+                                                    /sso/OID/start/Authentik
+                                                                ↓ (302 redirect)
+                                                    auth.hubris.network OIDC
+                                                                ↓ (login)
+                                                    /sso/OID/redirect/Authentik?code=...&state=...
+                                                                ↓
+                                                    Jellyfin SSO plugin validates token → logged in
+```
+
+### Components
+
+1. **SSO-Auth plugin** — installed at `/var/lib/jellyfin/plugins/SSO-Auth_4.0.0.4/`
+   - Config: `/var/lib/jellyfin/plugins/configurations/SSO-Auth.xml`
+   - Provider name: `Authentik`
+   - OIDC endpoint: `https://auth.hubris.network/application/o/jellyfin/`
+   - `SchemeOverride`: `https` (required — without it, plugin generates
+     `http://` redirect URIs that Authentik rejects)
+   - `EnableAuthorization`: `false` (prevents plugin from overwriting admin
+     permissions on each SSO login — see
+     [jellyfin-sso-plugin](../../../devops/homelab-authentik-admin/references/jellyfin-sso-plugin.md))
+   - `OidScopes`: `["email"]` (openid+profile added by default by the plugin;
+     must be non-null or `OidChallenge()` throws `ArgumentNullException`)
+
+2. **Authentik OIDC provider** — `Provider for Jellyfin` (PK 6)
+   - Client ID: `vt61t5Y2ZVtN6l3QjitkBvwUJjFKvSyl4TDBXcJx`
+   - Redirect URI: `https://media.hubris.network/sso/OID/redirect/Authentik`
+   - Application slug: `jellyfin`
+
+3. **SSO button injection** — `/usr/share/jellyfin/web/sso-inject.js`
+   - Injected via `<script defer src="sso-inject.js?v=3">` in `index.html`
+   - Polls for `.readOnlyContent` div on the login page, adds "Sign in with
+     Authentik" button linking to `/sso/OID/start/Authentik`
+   - Cache-busted with `?v=N` parameter (bump on changes)
+   - **Lost on apt upgrade** — re-inject the script tag and copy the JS file
+     after `apt-get upgrade jellyfin*`
+
+4. **Caddy config** — no forward-auth gate for media.hubris.network:
+   ```caddy
+   media.hubris.network {
+       tls { dns ionos {env.IONOS_AUTH_API_TOKEN} }
+       reverse_proxy 192.168.8.206:8096
+   }
+   ```
+
+### Known issues / pitfalls
+
+- **`OidScopes` must be non-null** — if the field is missing from the plugin
+  config XML, `OidChallenge()` throws `System.ArgumentNullException`. Always
+  include `OidScopes` in the provider config (even if empty array).
+- **`SchemeOverride: "https"` is required** — without it, the plugin generates
+  `http://` redirect URIs (from the internal HTTP listener). Authentik rejects
+  them with "Redirect URI Error".
+- **SSO button JS is not served by the plugin** — the `__plugin/SSO-Auth.js`
+  endpoint returns 404 on Jellyfin 10.11.x when the plugin is installed
+  manually (not via Jellyfin's plugin manager). The `sso-inject.js` workaround
+  in `index.html` is the fallback.
+- **No Caddy forward-auth gate** — the SSO plugin's OIDC redirect flow is
+  incompatible with Caddy's `import authentik` forward-auth. If both are
+  enabled, the forward-auth intercepts the OIDC callback and breaks the flow.
+  Use one or the other, not both. SSO plugin (OIDC redirect) is preferred.
+- **API key for setup** — a temp API key can be inserted directly into the
+  `ApiKeys` SQLite table for automated configuration:
+  ```sql
+  INSERT INTO ApiKeys VALUES (1, '2026-07-04', '2026-07-04', 'setup', 'jf-setup-key-...');
+  ```
+
+## Permissions
+Member of the [media GID 10000](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md) standard. Service user `jellyfin` is in the `media` group inside the container; `/mnt/media_local` on strong's ludo-lvm is owned `root:media` with mode `2775`.
+
+## Related
+- [Caddy reverse proxy](121-caddy.md)
+- [Media permissions](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md)
+- [arriman](122-arriman.md) — \*arr stack writes the libraries jellyfin reads
+- [DNS split-horizon](../infrastructure/dns.md)
+- [Authentik admin](../../../devops/homelab-authentik-admin/SKILL.md) — OIDC provider creation, SSO plugin config
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-07-06 — wiki: IP, host, GPU, mount path updated for strong migration
+Updated At-a-glance: IP 206→246, host hubris→strong, mount /mnt/library→/mnt/media_local, GPU Radeon 760M→680M+RX7600, privilege unpriv→priv. Permissions section updated. Changelog entry in 122-arriman.md updated similarly.
+
+### 2026-07-04 — VAAPI hardware acceleration + Authentik SSO + resource bump
+- Upgraded Jellyfin 10.11.8 → 10.11.11 (purge + reinstall to fix DB migration bug)
+- Enabled VAAPI hardware acceleration (Radeon 760M): h264/hevc/vc1/vp9/av1 decode + encode
+- Bumped resources: 2→4 cores, 4→8 GiB RAM, 512→1024 MiB swap
+- Enabled trickplay HW acceleration + throttling + segment deletion
+- Installed SSO-Auth plugin v4.0.0.4 with Authentik OIDC provider
+- Configured `SchemeOverride: https`, `OidScopes: ["email"]`, `EnableAuthorization: false`
+- Injected SSO button via `sso-inject.js` in web `index.html`
+- Removed Caddy forward-auth gate (incompatible with SSO plugin OIDC flow)
+- **Database was wiped** during cache relocation attempt — no LVM snapshot
+  existed. All watch states, user accounts, and library configs lost.
+  Libraries re-added via setup wizard.
+
+### 2026-04-28 — wiki entry created
+Initial documentation. No config changes.
+
+### 2026-04-20 — joined the `media` GID 10000 standard
+Idmap block applied; in-container `media` group at GID 10000 mapped to host GID 10000. See [media permissions](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md). Config backup: `/root/101.conf.bak.*`.

archive/knowledge/containers/102-nfs-export.md

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ We considered three options before building this:
 
 | Option | Outcome |
 |---|---|
-| **NFS on hubris bare-metal host** | Best performance, but adds long-lived NFS/RPC daemons to a host with a recent crash episode ([hubris crash 2026-04-21/22](../investigations/index.md)). Rejected. |
+| **NFS on hubris bare-metal host** | Best performance, but adds long-lived NFS/RPC daemons to a host with a recent crash episode ([hubris crash 2026-04-21/22](../../sources/investigations/index.md)). Rejected. |
 | **SMB on host** | Same host-blast-radius problem, plus 30–50% lower throughput than NFS on Linux↔Linux. Rejected. |
 | **NFS in a dedicated LXC** ← this | Within ~2% of host performance (LXC is namespace isolation; IO path is unchanged), zero new daemons on hubris, matches the existing fleet pattern. Selected. |
 

archive/knowledge/containers/103-paperless.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Paperless-ngx for document management. Ingests scans / PDFs from `/mnt/library/d
 | paperless-task-queue, paperless-scheduler, paperless-consumer | — | systemd workers |
 
 ## Auth
-Behind [Authentik forward-auth](124-authentik.md). API path `/api/*` bypasses forward-auth (mobile clients can't follow the browser login redirect; bearer token still enforces auth on `/api`). Header propagation: `PAPERLESS_ENABLE_HTTP_REMOTE_USER=true` and `PAPERLESS_HTTP_REMOTE_USER_HEADER_NAME=HTTP_X_AUTHENTIK_USERNAME` in `/opt/paperless/paperless.conf`. Django auto-creates matching users on first SSO login.
+Behind [Authentik forward-auth](106-auth-outpost.md). API path `/api/*` bypasses forward-auth (mobile clients can't follow the browser login redirect; bearer token still enforces auth on `/api`). Header propagation: `PAPERLESS_ENABLE_HTTP_REMOTE_USER=true` and `PAPERLESS_HTTP_REMOTE_USER_HEADER_NAME=HTTP_X_AUTHENTIK_USERNAME` in `/opt/paperless/paperless.conf`. Django auto-creates matching users on first SSO login.
 
 ## Storage
 - Documents at `/mnt/library/documents` (owner `www-data:www-data`, mode 750 — *not* on the `media` group, by design).
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Behind [Authentik forward-auth](124-authentik.md). API path `/api/*` bypasses fo
 - ~~Disk usage was 86.9% at last legacy monitor reading on 2026-04-21~~ — resolved by growing rootfs to 16 GiB on 2026-05-15.
 
 ## Related
-- [Authentik](124-authentik.md)
+- [Authentik](106-auth-outpost.md)
 - [Caddy](121-caddy.md)
 - [DNS](../infrastructure/dns.md)
 - [Monitoring](../infrastructure/monitoring.md)

archive/knowledge/containers/104-gitea.md

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Initial documentation.
 Added `192.168.8.205`. See [Artifacto auto-deploy on apps (105)](105-apps.md).
 
 ### 2026-04-21 — `/etc/hosts` override for `auth.hubris.network` added
-For OIDC integration with [authentik (124)](124-authentik.md). Outside the PVE markers, with a hubris-hosts-override.service for idempotency.
+For OIDC integration with [authentik (124)](106-auth-outpost.md). Outside the PVE markers, with a hubris-hosts-override.service for idempotency.
 
 ### 2026-04-20 — gitea customizations + auto-deploy pipeline shipped
 `dtoro/gitea-customizations` repo created; webhook receiver at loopback `:9797` validates HMAC and runs `deploy.sh`. CAD and PlantUML loaders live in `footer.tmpl`.

archive/knowledge/containers/105-apps.md

@@ -45,7 +45,16 @@ Receiver at `/opt/artifacto-deploy/` (outside the app repo): `deploy.sh` + `webh
 ### Portainer
 Native OAuth2 (Settings → Authentication → OAuth → Custom). Manual endpoints (no OIDC discovery). Uses `portainer-uid` custom-claim scope from Authentik. Container is **not** compose-managed — safe to `docker run` recreate; data lives in named volume `portainer_data`. CLI flag: `--trusted-origins docker.hubris.network` (hostname only — `IsTrustedOrigin` rejects strings containing `://`).
 
-### homelab-mcp (`/opt/homelab-mcp/`)
+### homelab-mcp (`/opt/homelab-mcp/`) — DEPRECATED (Go rewrite, Phase 6)
+
+> **Status:** This Python MCP server is being replaced by the Go `oikos api` binary
+> running in Docker on mac-mini. Cutover pending — see
+> [scripts/cutover-checklist.md](../../scripts/cutover-checklist.md) for the
+> execution plan. The Go MCP uses the official MCP Go SDK (Streamable HTTP, not
+> FastMCP) with 15 tools including `get_blast_radius`, `request_execution`, and
+> `get_agent_activity`. Source: `internal/mcp/server.go`.
+
+**Current (Python) implementation — DO NOT MODIFY, awaiting cutover:**
 FastMCP server (Python venv at `/opt/homelab-mcp/.venv`). Reads from
 `/opt/homelab-context/` (this LXC is itself an enrolled
 [homelab-context](../infrastructure/homelab-context.md) client). Source
@@ -70,7 +79,10 @@ the server code). Listens on `0.0.0.0:9811`, secret in
 `dtoro/Homelab-Docs`. Deploy script reinstalls the service unit and
 restarts on push.
 
-### secrets-issuance (`/opt/secrets-issuance/`)
+### secrets-issuance (`/opt/secrets-issuance/`) — DEPRECATED (Go Phase 5)
+
+> **Status:** Replaced by `internal/secrets/` in the Go rewrite. Machine identities
+> are now managed via Infisical (`docker compose --profile infisical up`).
 Tiny HTTP service that issues per-client age keypairs the first time
 each client calls `/issue`. Idempotent: subsequent calls return the
 same key. Mesh+LAN source-IP gated via the `MESH_SUBNETS` env in
@@ -100,7 +112,7 @@ Native OIDC via `[oauth.generic]` in `config/config.ini`. `host = https://auth.h
 ## Related
 - [Gitea (104)](104-gitea.md) — uses the PlantUML server
 - [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md)
-- [Authentik (124)](124-authentik.md)
+- [Authentik (124)](106-auth-outpost.md)
 - [DNS](../infrastructure/dns.md)
 - [Auto-deploy](../infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)
 - [Public ingress (Artifacto + blog)](../infrastructure/ingress.md)
@@ -116,7 +128,7 @@ Two new services from the [homelab-context distribution plan](../infrastructure/
 `secrets-issuance.service` on `:9820` (per-client age-key provisioning).
 Caddy fronts both with Let's Encrypt; new vhosts on
 [caddy](121-caddy.md), split-horizon DNS entries on
-[authentik (124)](124-authentik.md). Gitea webhook ids 10 + 11 wire
+[authentik (124)](106-auth-outpost.md). Gitea webhook ids 10 + 11 wire
 auto-deploy. LXC is itself an enrolled context client
 (`/opt/homelab-context/`).
 

archive/knowledge/containers/106-auth-outpost.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # 106 — `auth-outpost`
 
-Authentik **forward-auth outpost** for LAN-gated apps. A stateless proxy that connects outbound to the [VPS Authentik core](../investigations/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md) and serves forward-auth locally, so [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md) never hairpins auth through VPS Traefik.
+Authentik **forward-auth outpost** for LAN-gated apps. A stateless proxy that connects outbound to the [VPS Authentik core](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md) and serves forward-auth locally, so [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md) never hairpins auth through VPS Traefik.
 
 ## At a glance
 - **Hostname:** `auth-outpost`
@@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ Authentik **forward-auth outpost** for LAN-gated apps. A stateless proxy that co
 - **Privilege:** privileged (Docker-in-LXC, `features: nesting=1`)
 - **Resources:** 1 core / 512 MiB / 4 GiB rootfs
 - **Mounts:** none
-- **Created:** 2026-06-01, Debian 13, replacing the embedded outpost on [124](124-authentik.md)
+- **Created:** 2026-06-01, Debian 13, replacing the embedded outpost on [124](106-auth-outpost.md)
 
 ## Role
 
-Runs one container — `ghcr.io/goauthentik/proxy` — that opens an outbound websocket to `https://auth.hubris.network` (the VPS core), pulls its proxy-provider config, and answers Caddy's `forward_auth` subrequests on `192.168.8.6:9000` (LAN-only bind). Because the call path is **Caddy → outpost (LAN)**, with no Traefik in between, `X-Forwarded-Host` is preserved — the failure that 404s when Caddy is pointed at `https://auth.hubris.network` directly (Traefik rewrites the header). See the [migration investigation](../investigations/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md).
+Runs one container — `ghcr.io/goauthentik/proxy` — that opens an outbound websocket to `https://auth.hubris.network` (the VPS core), pulls its proxy-provider config, and answers Caddy's `forward_auth` subrequests on `192.168.8.6:9000` (LAN-only bind). Because the call path is **Caddy → outpost (LAN)**, with no Traefik in between, `X-Forwarded-Host` is preserved — the failure that 404s when Caddy is pointed at `https://auth.hubris.network` directly (Traefik rewrites the header). See the [migration investigation](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md).
 
 ## Service / port map
 | Service | Listen | Notes |
@@ -42,15 +42,15 @@ Fix: the LAN outpost gets its **own** domain.
 **Lesson:** when the IdP core and the forward-auth outpost live on different hosts, the outpost needs a dedicated domain distinct from the core's — and proxy-provider `redirect_uris` must be regenerated, not just `external_host`.
 
 ## Related
-- [124 — authentik](124-authentik.md) — old embedded-outpost host (now DNS-only)
+- [124 — authentik](106-auth-outpost.md) — old embedded-outpost host (now DNS-only)
 - [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md) — forward-auth consumer
 - [Ingress (VPS traefik)](../infrastructure/ingress.md)
-- [Authentik VPS migration](../investigations/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md)
+- [Authentik VPS migration](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md)
 
 ## Changelog
 
 ### 2026-06-06 — Authentik session lifetime extended to 30 days
-VPS Authentik core `user_login` stage updated: `session_duration` changed from `seconds=0` (session cookie, cleared on browser close) to `days=30` (persistent 30-day cookie). Also set `AUTHENTIK_SESSIONS__UNAUTHENTICATED_AGE=days=30` in `/opt/authentik.env` on the VPS. See [investigation](../investigations/2026-06-06-authentik-session-lifetime.md).
+VPS Authentik core `user_login` stage updated: `session_duration` changed from `seconds=0` (session cookie, cleared on browser close) to `days=30` (persistent 30-day cookie). Also set `AUTHENTIK_SESSIONS__UNAUTHENTICATED_AGE=days=30` in `/opt/authentik.env` on the VPS. See [investigation](../../sources/investigations/2026-06-06-authentik-session-lifetime.md).
 
 ### 2026-06-01 — created; forward-auth cut over from LXC 124
-New dedicated LXC for the LAN forward-auth outpost (Phase 1 of the [architecture migration](../investigations/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md)). Deployed `goauthentik/proxy:2026.5.2` pointed at the VPS core; repointed Caddy `(authentik)` from `192.168.8.180:9000` → `192.168.8.6:9000`. Verified Paperless/qBittorrent/Artifacto return the SSO redirect with **124-Authentik stopped**, confirming the frozen instance is out of the path. dnsmasq stays on 124 until [DNS is relocated](124-authentik.md).
+New dedicated LXC for the LAN forward-auth outpost (Phase 1 of the [architecture migration](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md)). Deployed `goauthentik/proxy:2026.5.2` pointed at the VPS core; repointed Caddy `(authentik)` from `192.168.8.180:9000` → `192.168.8.6:9000`. Verified Paperless/qBittorrent/Artifacto return the SSO redirect with **124-Authentik stopped**, confirming the frozen instance is out of the path. dnsmasq stays on 124 until [DNS is relocated](106-auth-outpost.md).

archive/knowledge/containers/107-dns.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # 107 — `dns`
 
-Homelab DNS server (Technitium). Replaces the dnsmasq that lived on [124 — authentik](124-authentik.md); single-purpose, one job.
+Homelab DNS server (Technitium). Replaces the dnsmasq that lived on [124 — authentik](106-auth-outpost.md); single-purpose, one job.
 
 ## At a glance
 - **Hostname:** `dns`
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Authoritative split-horizon DNS for `hubris.network` on the LAN/mesh, plus recur
 - **Plain LAN clients (`192.168.178.x`):** Fritz!Box DHCP still hands out Fritz!Box itself (`192.168.178.1`) as DNS — no split-horizon for non-mesh clients. Changing this requires a secondary DNS fallback, which Fritz!OS 8.x doesn't expose in a single DHCP field.
 
 ## dns-sync (Technitium = authoring source)
-`/opt/dns-sync/sync.py` (cron `*/10`, logs `/var/log/dns-sync.log`) reconciles this zone's named A-records → the NetBird managed DNS zone via the NetBird API (`/api/dns/zones/{id}/records`). Token at `/opt/dns-sync/netbird-token` (mode 600; source of truth in sops `secrets/netbird-pat.yaml`). **Edit DNS only here**; the sync propagates to the mesh. It deletes NetBird records absent from Technitium. Tracked: [scripts/dns-sync.py](../scripts/dns-sync.py). *Why this exists:* NetBird won't forward to Technitium for mesh peers (self-IP / nameserver-group quirks), so we sync into the managed zone instead — see [dns.md](../infrastructure/dns.md).
+`/opt/dns-sync/sync.py` (cron `*/10`, logs `/var/log/dns-sync.log`) reconciles this zone's named A-records → the NetBird managed DNS zone via the NetBird API (`/api/dns/zones/{id}/records`). Token at `/opt/dns-sync/netbird-token` (mode 600; source of truth in sops `secrets/netbird-pat.yaml`). **Edit DNS only here**; the sync propagates to the mesh. It deletes NetBird records absent from Technitium. Tracked: [scripts/dns-sync.py](../../../scripts/dns-sync.py). *Why this exists:* NetBird won't forward to Technitium for mesh peers (self-IP / nameserver-group quirks), so we sync into the managed zone instead — see [dns.md](../infrastructure/dns.md).
 
 ## DHCP
 
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Technitium also runs a DHCP server for the homelab subnet (enabled 2026-06-02):
 Replaces the DHCP that was previously served by the Slate AX router. Static-IP LXCs (`.101–.239`) are excluded from the pool. Pool narrowed from `.100–.240` to `.241–.254` on 2026-06-03 to eliminate IP conflict risk.
 
 ## Related
-- [124 — authentik](124-authentik.md) — retired host of the old dnsmasq
+- [124 — authentik](106-auth-outpost.md) — retired host of the old dnsmasq
 - [DNS split-horizon](../infrastructure/dns.md)
 - [Mesh](../infrastructure/mesh.md)
 
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Added for [trmnl (128)](128-trmnl.md) (LAN path via [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md))
 Although the 2026-06-03 changelog claimed "cron */10", **no crontab was actually configured** on the LXC. The sync was running only via ad-hoc manual invocations during incident debugging. Fixed by adding `/etc/cron.d/dns-sync`.
 
 ### 2026-06-03 — DHCP pool narrowed to `.241–.254`
-Previous pool `.100–.240` overlapped with all static LXCs/VMs (`.101–.239`). Shrunk via API (`/api/dhcp/scopes/set`). 11 stale DHCP leases in `.101–.110` remain until natural expiry (2026-06-04). See [plan](../plans/2026-06-03-dhcp-pool-exclude-static-ips.md).
+Previous pool `.100–.240` overlapped with all static LXCs/VMs (`.101–.239`). Shrunk via API (`/api/dhcp/scopes/set`). 11 stale DHCP leases in `.101–.110` remain until natural expiry (2026-06-04). See [plan](../../../.hermes/plans/2026-06-03_223218-dhcp-pool-exclude-static-ips.md).
 
 ### 2026-06-03 — dns-sync added (Technitium → NetBird managed zone)
 This Technitium became the single DNS authoring source; `/opt/dns-sync/sync.py` (cron */10) reconciles named A-records into the NetBird managed zone via the API. Fixed previously-broken mesh names (`sso`, `nfs-export`, `mcp`, `secrets`) by adding them to the managed zone; reaped obsolete `files`/`photos-new`. See [dns.md](../infrastructure/dns.md).
@@ -64,4 +64,4 @@ This Technitium became the single DNS authoring source; `/opt/dns-sync/sync.py`
 Enabled Technitium's built-in DHCP server for `192.168.8.0/24` (scope `homelab`, range `.100–.240`, gateway `192.168.8.1`, DNS self). Previously the Slate AX sub-router served DHCP for the homelab subnet. With the Slate AX retired and Proxmox now the subnet router, Technitium takes over DHCP. Configured via the Technitium API (`/api/dhcp/scopes/set`). DHCP LXCs kept their Slate AX leases until expiry, then renewed from Technitium.
 
 ### 2026-06-01 — created; replaced dnsmasq on 124
-Stood up Technitium at `192.168.8.2`, imported the split-horizon zone (specific A + wildcard + MX/SPF/CAA), made it the primary nameserver in the NetBird `home-lab-dns` group. Verified all names resolve with dnsmasq/124 stopped; [LXC 124 retired](124-authentik.md).
+Stood up Technitium at `192.168.8.2`, imported the split-horizon zone (specific A + wildcard + MX/SPF/CAA), made it the primary nameserver in the NetBird `home-lab-dns` group. Verified all names resolve with dnsmasq/124 stopped; [LXC 124 retired](106-auth-outpost.md).

archive/knowledge/containers/114-nextcloud.md

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Personal cloud / file collaboration. Source-of-truth for the photo libraries sur
 - **Public hostname:** [`cloud.hubris.network`](../infrastructure/dns.md) → [caddy](121-caddy.md)
 
 ## Auth
-Native OIDC via `user_oidc` app. **Username override pattern**: Authentik user `dtoro` maps to local Nextcloud user `admin` via the `nc_uid` custom-claim scope. Configured via `occ user_oidc:provider <name> --mapping-uid=nc_uid` and `--scope="openid profile email <app>-uid"`. See [Authentik](124-authentik.md#per-app-username-override-pattern-authentik) for the full pattern.
+Native OIDC via `user_oidc` app. **Username override pattern**: Authentik user `dtoro` maps to local Nextcloud user `admin` via the `nc_uid` custom-claim scope. Configured via `occ user_oidc:provider <name> --mapping-uid=nc_uid` and `--scope="openid profile email <app>-uid"`. See [Authentik](106-auth-outpost.md#per-app-username-override-pattern-authentik) for the full pattern.
 
 Redirect URI: `/index.php/apps/user_oidc/code` (NOT `/apps/...` — pretty URLs aren't on).
 
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Apply with `systemctl restart mariadb` (not reload — `innodb_log_file_size` ne
 
 ## Related
 - [mulita (120)](120-mule-images.md) — reads NC user trees + writes back via WebDAV
-- [Authentik (124)](124-authentik.md)
+- [Authentik (124)](106-auth-outpost.md)
 - [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md)
 - [DNS](../infrastructure/dns.md)
 - [Mesh migration (DNS overrides explained)](../infrastructure/mesh.md)

archive/knowledge/containers/118-elementsynapse.md

@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ Matrix homeserver (Synapse). Backs `@dtoro:avispero`.
 
 ## At a glance
 - **Hostname:** `elementsynapse`
-- **IP:** `192.168.8.239`
+- **IP:** `192.168.8.242`
+- **Host:** **strong** (migrated from hubris 2026-07-05)
 - **Privilege:** **unprivileged**
 - **Resources:** 1 core / 2 GiB RAM / **16 GiB rootfs** (grown from 8 GiB on 2026-05-15 after disk-full incident)
 - **Mounts:** none from `/mnt/library`
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ All five bridges run as plain `docker compose` stacks under `/root/mautrix-<name
 - ~~Disk usage was 86.8% at last legacy monitor reading on 2026-04-21~~ — resolved by growing rootfs to 16 GiB on 2026-05-15.
 
 ## Related
-- ~~[claudio-bot (123)](123-claudio-bot.md)~~ — decommissioned 2026-06-04, replaced by Hermes Agent
+- ~~[claudio-bot (123)](archive/123-claudio-bot.md)~~ — decommissioned 2026-06-04, replaced by Hermes Agent
 - [Caddy](121-caddy.md)
 - [DNS](../infrastructure/dns.md)
 - [Monitoring](../infrastructure/monitoring.md)

archive/knowledge/containers/120-mule-images.md

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ For pushes from inside the LXC, gitea creds at `/etc/mule-deploy/git-credentials
 
 ## Related
 - [Nextcloud (114)](114-nextcloud.md) — source of truth for photo libraries
-- [Authentik (124)](124-authentik.md)
+- [Authentik (124)](106-auth-outpost.md)
 - [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md)
 - [DNS](../infrastructure/dns.md)
 - [Auto-deploy](../infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)

archive/knowledge/containers/121-caddy.md

@@ -11,16 +11,16 @@ The reverse proxy. Terminates TLS for every `*.hubris.network` hostname on the L
 - **Config:** `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` is a [git checkout of `dtoro/caddy-conf`](#auto-deploy)
 - **Cert source:** Let's Encrypt **DNS-01** via IONOS API (`IONOS_AUTH_API_TOKEN`).
 
-## Sites currently served (live as of 2026-04-28)
+## Sites currently served (live as of 2026-07-06)
 
 - `artifacto.hubris.network` → [apps (105)](105-apps.md) `:3100`
-- `auth.hubris.network` → [authentik (124)](124-authentik.md) `:9000`
 - `blog.hubris.network` → [apps (105)](105-apps.md) `:8080`
-- `books.hubris.network` → [apps (105)](105-apps.md) `:6060`
+- `books.hubris.network` → [grimmory (130)](130-grimmory.md) `:6060`
 - `cloud.hubris.network` → [nextcloud (114)](114-nextcloud.md) `:443`
 - `docker.hubris.network` → [apps (105)](105-apps.md) `:9443`
 - `git.hubris.network` → [gitea (104)](104-gitea.md) `:3000` (+ `handle_path /_plantuml/*` → apps `:8079`)
 - `home.hubris.network` → [haos VM (108)](../vms/108-haos.md) `192.168.8.101:8123`
+- `house.hubris.network` → [house (129)](129-house.md) `:3000`
 - `jellyseerr.hubris.network` → [arriman (122)](122-arriman.md) `:5056`
 - `matrix.hubris.network` → [elementsynapse (118)](118-elementsynapse.md) `:8008`
 - `media.hubris.network` → [jellyfin (101)](101-jellyfin.md) `:8096`
@@ -28,15 +28,18 @@ The reverse proxy. Terminates TLS for every `*.hubris.network` hostname on the L
 - `photos.hubris.network` → [mule-images (120)](120-mule-images.md) `:3000`
 - `proxmox.hubris.network` → [hubris host](../hosts/hubris.md) `:8006`
 - `qbit.hubris.network` → [arriman (122)](122-arriman.md) `:8080`
+- `roms.hubris.network` → [romm (134)](134-romm.md) `:80`
 - `sab.hubris.network` → [arriman (122)](122-arriman.md) `:8082` (Authentik forward-auth)
+- `teddy.hubris.network` → LXC 131 `192.168.8.150:8443`
+- `trmnl.hubris.network` → [trmnl (128)](128-trmnl.md) `:9851`
 
 > **Reminder:** Caddy alone isn't enough to make a new subdomain reachable on the LAN. Each one needs an entry in [DNS split-horizon](../infrastructure/dns.md) too.
 
 ## Snippet: `(authentik)` forward-auth
 
-A snippet at the top of the Caddyfile (used as `import authentik` in any site block) wires forward-auth to the embedded Authentik outpost. It points at `http://192.168.8.180:9000` directly (NOT `https://auth.hubris.network`) to avoid Caddy-to-self round-tripping that strips `X-Forwarded-Host`. The forward-auth block must explicitly set `header_up X-Forwarded-Host {host}`. See [Authentik](124-authentik.md#forward-auth-domain-level-setup).
+A snippet at the top of the Caddyfile (used as `import authentik` in any site block) wires forward-auth to the embedded Authentik outpost. It points at `http://192.168.8.180:9000` directly (NOT `https://auth.hubris.network`) to avoid Caddy-to-self round-tripping that strips `X-Forwarded-Host`. The forward-auth block must explicitly set `header_up X-Forwarded-Host {host}`. See [Authentik](106-auth-outpost.md#forward-auth-domain-level-setup).
 
-For apps with mobile clients, `/api/*` (or equivalent) bypasses forward-auth — see the per-app gotchas in [Authentik](124-authentik.md).
+For apps with mobile clients, `/api/*` (or equivalent) bypasses forward-auth — see the per-app gotchas in [Authentik](106-auth-outpost.md).
 
 ## Caddy environment
 
@@ -57,7 +60,7 @@ Gitea webhook id 2 on `dtoro/caddy-conf`. Receiver, deploy script, install scrip
 
 ## Related
 - [DNS split-horizon](../infrastructure/dns.md) — must add entry for every new subdomain
-- [Authentik (124)](124-authentik.md) — forward-auth + IdP
+- [Authentik (124)](106-auth-outpost.md) — forward-auth + IdP
 - [Auto-deploy](../infrastructure/auto-deploy.md)
 - [Public ingress (VPS traefik)](../infrastructure/ingress.md) — mirrors Caddy's certs to the VPS for public exposure
 - [Gitea (104)](104-gitea.md) — webhook source
@@ -82,7 +85,7 @@ Gitea webhook id 2 on `dtoro/caddy-conf`. Receiver, deploy script, install scrip
 - **Dirty-tree auto-stash:** stashes local changes before `git pull --ff-only` so the webhook doesn't fail on local edits
 - **Auto-backup:** saves `Caddyfile.bak.<timestamp>` before any modifications, keeps last 5
 
-Also: [elementsynapse LXC 118](../containers/118-elementsynapse.md) found to have DHCP-overridden static IP (actual `.244` vs config `.239`) during incident investigation — fixed.
+Also: [elementsynapse LXC 118](118-elementsynapse.md) found to have DHCP-overridden static IP (actual `.244` vs config `.239`) during incident investigation — fixed.
 
 ### 2026-06-02 — caddy.service unit missing; recreated
 After the Slate AX → SODOLA network migration, Caddy was not listening (ports 80/443 dead). Root cause: the custom hubris1 Debian package (`caddy_1:2.11.3-hubris1_amd64`) does not ship a systemd service unit file. The unit had previously existed but was lost (likely on a package reinstall). Recreated at `/lib/systemd/system/caddy.service` with standard Caddy service config + `EnvironmentFile=/etc/caddy/caddy.env` (already present in `caddy.service.d/override.conf`). **Risk:** the unit will be lost again if the package is reinstalled without the file being tracked. Fix: add the service unit to the `caddy-conf` repo or rebuild the hubris1 package to include it.

archive/knowledge/containers/122-arriman.md

@@ -4,10 +4,11 @@ Docker host running the \*arr stack via [`ezarr`](https://github.com/ezarr/ezarr
 
 ## At a glance
 - **Hostname:** `arriman`
-- **IP:** `192.168.8.132`
+- **IP:** `192.168.8.245`
+- **Host:** **strong** (migrated from hubris 2026-07-05)
 - **Privilege:** privileged
 - **Resources:** 4 cores / 8 GiB RAM / 24 GiB rootfs
-- **Mounts:** `/mnt/library` ↔ `/mnt/library`
+- **Mounts:** `/mnt/media_local` ↔ `/mnt/library`
 - **Public hostnames:** `jellyseerr` / `qbit` / `sab` (see below)
 
 ## Compose
@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ Member of [media GID 10000](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md). The LXC has
 
 ## Related
 - [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md)
-- [Authentik (124)](124-authentik.md) — forward-auth wiring + per-app `/api/*` bypass
+- [Authentik (124)](106-auth-outpost.md) — forward-auth wiring + per-app `/api/*` bypass
 - [DNS](../infrastructure/dns.md)
 - [Media permissions](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md)
 - [Hubris host](../hosts/hubris.md)

archive/knowledge/containers/128-trmnl.md

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Not yet SOPS-enrolled. The poll token is set directly in `/etc/trmnl-plugins/env
 - [VPS ingress](../infrastructure/ingress.md) — public edge (cert mirror + traefik router)
 - [DNS (107)](107-dns.md) — Technitium A record `trmnl → 192.168.8.175` (LAN path via Caddy)
 - [Gitea (104)](104-gitea.md) — source repo `dtoro/terminalito`
-- [Plan: 2026-06-24 TRMNL plugins LXC](../plans/2026-06-24-trmnl-plugins-lxc.md)
+- [Plan: 2026-06-24 TRMNL plugins LXC](../../../plans/2026-06-24-trmnl-plugins-lxc.md)
 
 ## Changelog
 ### 2026-06-24 — auto-deploy + LAN DNS wired

archive/knowledge/containers/129-house.md

@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ Yuvomi family planner (formerly Oikos). Self-hosted family planner with 14 modul
 ## At a glance
 
 - **Hostname:** `house`
-- **IP:** `192.168.8.212` (static)
+- **IP:** `192.168.8.244`
+- **Host:** **strong** (migrated from hubris 2026-07-05)
 - **Privilege:** unprivileged
 - **Resources:** 1 core / 1344 MiB RAM / 8 GiB rootfs (Debian 13)
 - **Mounts:** none
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ Yuvomi family planner (formerly Oikos). Self-hosted family planner with 14 modul
 - [DNS (107)](107-dns.md) — Technitium A record `house → 192.168.8.175` (LAN path via Caddy)
 - [Paperless (103)](103-paperless.md) — native DMS connector (API at `:8000`)
 - [TRMNL (128)](128-trmnl.md) — Google Calendar tokens source
-- [Deployment plan](../plans/2026-06-25-yuvomi-deployment.md)
+- [Deployment plan](../../../plans/done/2026-06-25-yuvomi-deployment.md)
 
 ## Changelog
 

archive/knowledge/containers/130-grimmory.md

@@ -5,17 +5,18 @@ Self-hosted digital library (eBooks, comics, audiobooks). Community fork/success
 ## At a glance
 
 - **Hostname:** `grimmory`
-- **IP:** `192.168.8.213` (static, set in PVE `net0` config — same pattern as all other LXCs)
+- **IP:** `192.168.8.247`
+- **Host:** **strong** (migrated from hubris 2026-07-05)
 - **Privilege:** privileged (UID = host UID for `/mnt/library` media GID)
 - **Resources:** 1 core / 2 GiB RAM / 16 GiB rootfs (Debian 13)
-- **Mounts:** `/mnt/library`
+- **Mounts:** `/mnt/media_local` ↔ `/mnt/library`
 - **Public hostname:** `books.hubris.network`
 
 ## Service / port map
 
 | Service | Listen | Notes |
 |---------|--------|-------|
-| Grimmory | `192.168.8.213:6060` | Docker Compose at `/opt/grimmory/` |
+| Grimmory | `192.168.8.247:6060` | Docker Compose at `/opt/grimmory/` |
 | MariaDB | internal only | Sidecar in the same compose stack |
 
 ## Compose
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ Uses Confidential client (client secret stored in Grimmory's DB — migrated fro
 - **Client type:** Confidential (client secret in `oidc_provider_details` in MariaDB `app_settings`)
 - **Redirect URI:** `https://books.hubris.network/oauth2-callback`
 - **Scopes:** openid, profile, email, offline_access
-- **Back-channel logout:** `http://192.168.8.213:6060/api/v1/auth/oidc/backchannel-logout`
+- **Back-channel logout:** `http://192.168.8.247:6060/api/v1/auth/oidc/backchannel-logout`
 - **Application slug:** `booklore` → Issuer URI: `https://auth.hubris.network/application/o/booklore/`
 
 ## Media permissions
@@ -53,8 +54,8 @@ LXC is privileged → in-container UID = host UID. Docker container gets media G
 ## Related
 
 - [apps (105)](105-apps.md) — previous host (Booklore)
-- [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md) — `books.hubris.network → 192.168.8.213:6060`
-- [Authentik (124)](124-authentik.md) — OIDC provider `Grimmory`
+- [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md) — `books.hubris.network → 192.168.8.247:6060`
+- [Authentik (124)](106-auth-outpost.md) — OIDC provider `Grimmory`
 - [DNS (107)](107-dns.md) — `books.hubris.network → 192.168.8.175` (unchanged from Booklore)
 - [Media permissions](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md)
 

archive/knowledge/containers/131-teddycloud.md

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# 131 — `teddycloud`
+
+Self-hosted [TeddyCloud](https://github.com/toniebox-reverse-engineering/teddycloud), a
+reimplementation of the Toniebox cloud backend — lets Tonie figurines play custom/ripped
+audio content against a local server instead of the official cloud.
+
+Predates the client-enrollment convention entirely; nobody wrote it down. Found and
+documented on 2026-07-06 after Oikos's drift detector (`oikos/drift.py`) flagged
+`pve_id 131` as live on hubris (via `pct list`) with no `inventory.yaml` entry — see
+[OIKOS.md](../../../.agents/OIKOS.md)'s Week 3 build-status note. `containers/132-rclone.md` had already
+mentioned it in passing ("LXC 131 was already taken by an undocumented `teddycloud`
+container"), and `hosts/strong.md`'s 2026-07-05 migration changelog fixed a DHCP conflict
+for it — but it never got its own inventory entry or doc page until now.
+
+## At a glance
+
+- **Hostname:** `teddycloud`
+- **Host:** hubris (confirmed via `pct config 131` run directly on hubris — the original
+  drift finding's `pct list` source)
+- **IP:** `192.168.8.150` (static; was briefly `192.168.8.243` via DHCP until the
+  2026-07-05 strong-migration work assigned it a fixed address — see hosts/strong.md)
+- **Privilege:** unconfirmed (not checked — read-only investigation didn't need it)
+- **Resources:** 1 core / 1 GiB RAM / 512 MiB swap / 16 GiB rootfs (`local-lvm`), Debian 12
+  (bookworm)
+- **Mounts:** `/mnt/library` (`mp0`)
+- **Public hostname:** `teddy.hubris.network` → `192.168.8.150:8443` (see
+  [caddy (121)](121-caddy.md))
+- **Enrollment:** none — no `age_pubkey`, not a `homelab` CLI client. It's a plain
+  docker-compose app container, not a fleet-managed host. No action needed unless it starts
+  needing secrets.
+
+## Service
+
+Runs via `docker compose` at `/opt/teddycloud` — container `teddycloud-teddycloud-1`,
+image `ghcr.io/toniebox-reverse-engineering/teddycloud:latest`, publishing `80`, `443`,
+`8080`, and `8443`. Caddy routes `teddy.hubris.network` to the `:8443` port.
+
+## Risk notes
+
+**No Caddy forward-auth gate** — unlike `sab.hubris.network` on the same Caddyfile (which
+is explicitly annotated `(Authentik forward-auth)`), `teddy.hubris.network` has no auth
+annotation. It's reachable to anyone on the LAN/mesh who can resolve the hostname. Not
+addressed as part of this doc pass — flagging it here since it's now visible in one place
+for the first time.
+
+## Related
+
+- [Hubris host](../hosts/hubris.md)
+- [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md) — terminates `teddy.hubris.network`
+- [rclone (132)](132-rclone.md) — landed on pve_id 132 specifically because 131 was already
+  taken by this container
+- [Containers index](index.md)
+- [OIKOS.md](../../../.agents/OIKOS.md) — drift detector that caught this
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-07-06 — documented for the first time (drift-caught)
+
+Added to `inventory.yaml` and given this page. Verified live via read-only `pct config 131`
++ `pct exec 131 -- ...` on hubris: hostname, IP, resources, and that it runs via
+`docker compose` (not a raw binary or systemd unit). No changes made to the running
+container — this is pure documentation catch-up.

archive/knowledge/containers/132-rclone.md

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+# 132 — `rclone`
+
+Off-host backup appliance. Mirrors selected `/mnt/library` folders to **Proton Drive**
+with a plain `rclone sync` (monthly), and serves rclone's Web GUI on the LAN for browsing
+and ad-hoc runs. **Replaces** the disabled restic-on-USB job — see [backups](../infrastructure/backups.md).
+
+Provisioned 2026-07-01. (LXC 131 was already taken by an undocumented `teddycloud` container,
+so this landed on **132**.)
+
+## At a glance
+
+- **Hostname:** `rclone`
+- **IP:** `192.168.8.214` (static, set in PVE `net0` config — same pattern as grimmory/authentik)
+- **Privilege:** privileged (root in-container = host root → reads every `/mnt/library` subtree,
+  incl. `homecloud/` and `documents/`, regardless of owner)
+- **Resources:** 1 core / 2 GiB RAM / 8 GiB rootfs (Debian 13) — bumped from 1 GiB on 2026-07-03
+  after `rclone-rcd.service` was OOM-killed under real load (see "Known issue" below)
+- **Mounts:** `/mnt/library` **read-only** (`mp0: /mnt/library,mp=/mnt/library,ro=1`) — a backup
+  job must never be able to write into the library
+- **Public hostname:** none — the UI is **LAN-only, no auth** (by design)
+
+## Service / port map
+
+| Service | Listen | Notes |
+|---------|--------|-------|
+| rclone Web GUI (`rcd`) | `192.168.8.214:5572` | `rclone-rcd.service`, **`--rc-no-auth`**, LAN-only. Browse `/mnt/library` + `proton:`, run ad-hoc syncs, live job status |
+| monthly mirror | — | `rclone-backup.service` + `.timer` (`OnCalendar=*-*-01 03:00`) |
+
+## Backup design
+
+- **Mode:** plain mirror — `rclone sync` (Proton mirrors local; deletions propagate; **no versioning**).
+- **Encryption:** Proton Drive's built-in E2E only (no rclone `crypt` overlay → files stay
+  browsable in Proton's web UI).
+- **Selected set:** `/etc/rclone-backup/folders.list` — one absolute source path per line
+  (`#`/blank ignored). This file *is* the picked set the monthly timer mirrors. Extensible to other
+  disks once bind-mounted into this LXC.
+- **Path mapping:** source `S` → `proton:library-backup/<S without leading slash>`
+  (e.g. `/mnt/library/notes` → `proton:library-backup/mnt/library/notes`).
+- **Runner:** `/usr/local/sbin/rclone-backup.sh [folder ...]` (Python, despite the `.sh` name — kept
+  the path stable) — no arg = every enabled line. Submits each folder as an **async job through the
+  rclone rc API** served by `rclone-rcd.service` (the same daemon backing the Web GUI on `:5572`),
+  so scheduled/ad-hoc runs show up live in the GUI's **Jobs panel**, not just in logs. Gentle on
+  Proton's rate limits (`Transfers=4, TPSLimit=8, FastList=true` via the rc `_config` payload). The
+  rc API here requires **POST for every call** including `job/status` and `core/stats` — GET with
+  query params 404s.
+- **Logs / "past runs":** per-run logs in `/var/log/rclone-backup/<safe>-<ts>.log`; one-line
+  JSON summary per run appended to `/var/log/rclone-backup/runs.jsonl`.
+- **Failure notify:** `OnFailure=rclone-backup-notify@%n.service` → logs to journal today;
+  **TODO** wire to Hermes `send_message` (Matrix) per [backups](../infrastructure/backups.md).
+
+## rclone + Proton Drive
+
+- **rclone** installed from the official binary (not apt) so the `protondrive` backend is present
+  (`rclone v1.74.3`).
+- Remote **`proton:`** (type `protondrive`). Config at `/root/.config/rclone/rclone.conf`, mode 600.
+  **This file is a secret** (holds the obscured Proton password + TOTP secret + session) — **never
+  commit it.** Escrow the Proton account creds in the password manager.
+- **Config gotchas** (from rclone docs/forum):
+  - Log into Proton via a **browser at least once** first, or key generation fails.
+  - For unattended runs, store the **TOTP _secret_** (not a 6-digit code) so rclone self-generates
+    codes; obscure with `rclone obscure`.
+  - Passwords with **extended-ASCII** characters are known to break auth.
+  - Proton's API is rate-limited → keep `--transfers`/`--tpslimit` conservative (baked into the runner).
+- **DR escrow (pending):** store the Proton creds as sops secret `secrets/protondrive.yaml`, granted
+  to this LXC's age key, so the remote can be rebuilt after a re-provision.
+
+## The UI (rclone Web GUI)
+
+`rclone rcd --rc-web-gui --rc-no-auth --rc-addr 0.0.0.0:5572` (assets auto-downloaded on first
+start). Reach it at **http://192.168.8.214:5572** on the LAN.
+
+> **Security note:** `--rc-no-auth` exposes *full* rclone control — including deleting remote data —
+> to anyone on the LAN (accepted per the design choice). The container has only a LAN NIC, so it is
+> not publicly reachable. Harden later by adding `--rc-user/--rc-pass` or fronting it with Authentik.
+
+## Tracked config (deferred)
+
+**Not yet tracked.** The runner, systemd units, and `folders.list` currently live as plain files
+directly on the LXC — fully functional, just not version-controlled or auto-deployed. A
+`dtoro/rclone` gitea repo package (runner, units, `install.sh`, webhook receiver) is pre-built and
+staged at `/root/rclone-repo` on the LXC for whenever this gets tracked (Shape A, like
+[caddy](121-caddy.md)). Gitea `ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` already includes `192.168.8.214` in anticipation.
+See [auto-deploy](../infrastructure/auto-deploy.md).
+
+**Selected folders (live in `/etc/rclone-backup/folders.list`):** `/mnt/library/cloud` (287G),
+`/mnt/library/documents` (249M), `/mnt/library/repos` (83M). `/mnt/library/notes` was synced once as
+a connectivity test (not in the recurring set). Proton quota checked: 2 TiB plan, ~1.65 TiB free
+after this set.
+
+## Enrollment gotcha: `pct exec` PATH
+
+`pct exec` (lxc-attach) does **not** source `/etc/environment` or run a login shell, so
+`/usr/local/bin` (where bootstrap installs `sops`) isn't on `$PATH` by default — bootstrap's own
+`command -v sops` post-install check failed under `pct exec` even though the binary installed fine.
+Fixed by symlinking `/usr/local/bin/{sops,homelab}` into `/usr/bin` (always on the minimal PATH),
+rather than relying on `/etc/environment`. Same category as the documented [`pct exec` no-initgroups
+gotcha](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md#gotchas) — worth adding to
+[agent-enrollment.md troubleshooting](../../../.agents/operations/agent-enrollment.md#troubleshooting) if it recurs
+on future LXC bootstraps.
+
+## Known issue: `rclone-rcd.service` OOM-killed under 1 GiB RAM (root cause, resolved)
+
+What looked like repeated "protondrive silently stalls" was actually **`rclone-rcd.service` (the rc
+API daemon backing the Web GUI and, since the rc-API redesign, all actual sync work) getting
+OOM-killed** under the original 1 GiB RAM allocation — `journalctl` confirms
+`A process of this unit has been killed by the OOM killer` at the exact moment a transfer had
+"frozen." systemd's own `Restart=on-failure` (5s) auto-respawns it, but every in-flight job's state
+is lost on the kill, which looked identical to a silent backend hang from the outside (frozen
+`core/stats`, no new log lines). **Fix: bumped the LXC's memory to 2 GiB** (`pct set 132 -memory
+2048` — applies live via the host cgroup, confirmed via `cat /sys/fs/cgroup/lxc/132/memory.max` on
+hubris, no container reboot needed). After the bump, the full folder set (`cloud` 287G, `documents`
+249M, `repos` 83M) completed cleanly with no further kills.
+
+**`rclone-backup-watchdog.timer`** (every 5 min) → `rclone-backup-watchdog.sh`: if
+`rclone-backup.service` is active but total transferred bytes (global `core/stats` on the rc API)
+haven't moved for 15 minutes, it restarts both `rclone-rcd.service` (clears any stuck/orphaned job —
+this is the actual daemon holding the work, not the thin wrapper) and then `rclone-backup.service`
+(`--no-block`, load-bearing — see below). Kept as a safety net even after the RAM fix, in case
+memory pressure returns under a larger folder set later. State kept in
+`/var/lib/rclone-backup/watchdog-state.json`, cleared whenever the service isn't running.
+
+**Two watchdog design bugs found and fixed while chasing this (2026-07-03):**
+1. **Wrong stats-group key.** Per-job progress polling queried `core/stats` under `job/<jobid>`,
+   but rclone tracks stats under whatever `_group` name the job was submitted with. Made a perfectly
+   healthy sync look stalled at 0 bytes for 22+ hours in its own log. Fixed by using the same
+   `group` variable consistently. **Lesson: distrust the per-run log's "progress bytes=" line during
+   an incident; cross-check with unfiltered `core/stats` first.**
+2. **Watchdog restarted only the thin wrapper, and blocked doing it.** The actual `rclone sync` work
+   runs inside `rclone-rcd.service`, not `rclone-backup.service` — restarting the wrapper alone left
+   any stuck job orphaned inside `rcd` while a new wrapper submitted a duplicate job on top. Worse,
+   `systemctl restart rclone-backup.service` (no `--no-block`) blocks until the *new* invocation's
+   long-running `ExecStart` exits — which could be hours — so the watchdog's own oneshot service
+   never logged "Finished," and `OnUnitActiveSec` (which schedules relative to the previous run
+   *finishing*) never fired again. The watchdog silently disabled itself after exactly one use.
+   Fixed: restart `rclone-rcd.service` first, then `rclone-backup.service` with `--no-block`.
+
+## Related
+
+- [Backups](../infrastructure/backups.md) — this job supersedes the disabled restic-on-USB backup
+- [Hubris host](../hosts/hubris.md) — owns `/mnt/library`
+- [Media permissions](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md) — read-only consumer of `/mnt/library`
+- [Containers index](index.md)
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-07-03 — root cause found (OOM, not Proton); RAM bumped to 2 GiB; full folder set completed
+
+What looked like repeated silent "protondrive stalls" turned out to be **`rclone-rcd.service`
+getting OOM-killed** under the original 1 GiB RAM allocation — confirmed via
+`journalctl -u rclone-rcd.service` showing `killed by the OOM killer` at the exact freeze point.
+Bumped the LXC to 2 GiB RAM (live, no reboot). After the bump: `cloud` (287G) completed cleanly
+(exit 0), `documents` (249M) completed with 1 minor error (259.7 MB transferred), `repos` (83M)
+completing as of this entry. Also fixed two real watchdog bugs found while chasing this (wrong
+stats-group key making a healthy sync look frozen; watchdog restarting only the wrapper with a
+blocking `systemctl restart`, causing it to silently disable itself after one use) — see "Known
+issue" above for full detail. The watchdog is kept as a safety net going forward even though the RAM
+bump addresses the actual root cause.
+
+### 2026-07-02 — runner rewritten to submit jobs via the rc API (GUI job visibility)
+
+The original runner (`rclone sync` invoked as a standalone CLI subprocess) was invisible to the Web
+GUI's Jobs panel — the GUI only tracks work submitted through its own `rcd` process. Rewrote
+`/usr/local/sbin/rclone-backup.sh` in Python, submitting each folder via `POST /sync/sync` with
+`_async: true` against `http://127.0.0.1:5572` (the running `rclone-rcd.service`), then polling
+`POST /job/status` + `POST /core/stats` (both **must be POST** — GET-with-querystring 404s on this
+rc API) until finished, logging periodic progress snapshots and the same `runs.jsonl` summary line
+as before. Verified live: submitted job visible in `POST /job/list`'s `runningIds` while running,
+completed cleanly (`success: true`) once done. Deployed via atomic rename (write-then-`mv`) rather
+than truncating in place, specifically so it wouldn't risk corrupting the still-running original
+`cloud`+`documents`+`repos` sync mid-flight (verified after the fact: that sync's bash process was
+unaffected, kept running to completion under the old in-memory script content). The already-running
+scheduled sync from before this change is a standalone process and won't retroactively appear in the
+GUI; every run after this point will.
+
+### 2026-07-02 — Proton Drive auth fixed; real folder set enabled; first live sync
+
+Initial `rclone config` failed 2FA (`422 ... auth/v4/2fa`) because a live 6-digit TOTP code was
+entered instead of the TOTP secret — reconfigured with the secret, auth now works
+(`rclone lsd proton:` lists the Drive). Verified end-to-end with a real sync of `/mnt/library/notes`
+(219 objects, 5.964 MiB, exit 0) — confirmed files land as plain, browsable objects on Proton (not
+an opaque archive), matching the plain-mirror + Proton-E2E design. Checked Proton quota (2 TiB
+plan, 1.945 TiB free) before enabling a large folder. `folders.list` set to the real selection:
+`cloud` (287G), `documents` (249M), `repos` (83M); a full sync of that set was kicked off via the
+actual `rclone-backup.service` unit (not an ad-hoc call) to validate the real monthly path early
+rather than waiting for the Aug 1 timer. Tracked-repo step (`dtoro/rclone` on gitea) deferred by
+choice — runner/units/`folders.list` remain plain files on the LXC for now; the repo package stays
+staged at `/root/rclone-repo` for later.
+
+### 2026-07-01 — provisioned; enrolled
+
+LXC 132 created (Debian 13, privileged, `192.168.8.214`, `/mnt/library` read-only). rclone v1.74.3
+installed from the official binary (`protondrive` backend present). Runner + monthly timer +
+`folders.list` deployed; rclone Web GUI (`rcd`, LAN-only no-auth) live on `:5572`. Enrolled into
+homelab-context (`--no-mesh`, LAN-only issuance): age key issued, inventory finalized, shared
+secrets granted, `homelab whoami` + `homelab secret hello` verified. Gitea `ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
+updated to include `192.168.8.214`. Hit and fixed a `pct exec` PATH gotcha (see below). Proton Drive
+remote, `dtoro/rclone` tracked repo + webhook, and the `secrets/protondrive.yaml` escrow remain
+operator-run follow-ups (credentialed steps — Proton password/2FA, repo creation). Restic-on-USB
+backup deprecated in the same change.

archive/knowledge/containers/133-seanime.md

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# seanime (LXC 133) — Seanime anime media server
+
+## Summary
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| VMID | 133 |
+| Host | strong |
+| Role | Anime media server (online streaming + torrent client) |
+| LAN IP | 192.168.8.248/28 (vmbr1) |
+| Public URL | https://seanime.hubris.network |
+| Backend | Seanime v3.9.0, systemd service |
+| Port | 43211 |
+
+## Mounts
+
+- `/anime` → `/mnt/media_local/anime` (ludo-lvm, bind mount) — existing anime collection
+
+## Services
+
+### Seanime (native binary)
+
+- Binary: `/opt/seanime/bin/seanime`
+- Data: `/opt/seanime/data/`
+- Config: `/opt/seanime/data/config.toml`
+- Service: `systemctl status seanime`
+- Flags: `--host 0.0.0.0 --port 43211 --datadir /opt/seanime/data --disable-password`
+- Config highlights:
+  - `secureMode = 'lax'` (allows non-local Caddy proxy)
+  - `trustedProxies = ['192.168.8.0/24']`
+
+### Torrent client (qBittorrent on arriman)
+
+- Host: `192.168.8.245:8080`
+- Auth: subnet whitelist (no password needed from homelab LAN)
+- qBittorrent config updated: `AuthSubnetWhitelist=192.168.8.0/24`
+
+### Extensions installed
+
+**Online streaming (8):**
+HiAnime, AniWatch, KickAssAnime, Anicrush, Animo, AniNeko, Senshi, Sudatchi
+
+## Caddy
+
+- Config: `seanime.hubris.network` block in `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` (dtoro/caddy-conf repo)
+- TLS: Let's Encrypt DNS-01 via IONOS API
+- Backend: `192.168.8.248:43211`
+
+## DNS
+
+- `seanime.hubris.network` A record → `192.168.8.175` (Caddy)
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-07-05 — initial creation
+- LXC 133 created on strong (Debian 13, 2 cores / 2 GiB)
+- Seanime v3.9.0 installed as native binary + systemd service
+- /anime bind mount from ludo-lvm
+- qBittorrent on arriman configured as torrent client
+- Caddy reverse proxy + DNS records set up
+- Online streaming extensions installed

archive/knowledge/containers/134-romm.md

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+# 134 — `romm`
+
+Self-hosted ROM manager ([RomM](https://romm.app)). Browse, search, and play
+your retro game library from the browser. Runs on Docker Compose with a
+MariaDB sidecar.
+
+## At a glance
+
+- **Hostname:** `romm`
+- **IP:** `192.168.8.249/28` (static, vmbr1 on strong)
+- **Privilege:** privileged
+- **Resources:** 1 core / 2 GiB RAM / 16 GiB rootfs (Debian 13, ludo-lvm)
+- **Mounts:** `/mnt/media_local` → `/mnt/library`
+- **Public hostname:** `roms.hubris.network`
+
+## Service / port map
+
+| Service | Listen | Notes |
+|---------|--------|-------|
+| RomM    | `192.168.8.249:80` | HTTP (Caddy terminates TLS) |
+| MariaDB | internal only       | Sidecar in the same compose stack |
+
+## Compose
+
+Located at `/opt/romm/docker-compose.yml`. Key points:
+
+- Image: `rommapp/romm:latest`
+- DB sidecar: `mariadb:latest` with healthcheck
+- ROM library: `/mnt/library/roms` → `/romm/library` (writable)
+- Resources (covers, etc.): Docker named volume `romm_resources` → `/romm/resources`
+- Saves/states: `/opt/romm/assets` → `/romm/assets`
+- Config: `/opt/romm/config` → `/romm/config`
+- Auth key: auto-generated, stored in `/opt/romm/.env`
+
+Environment (`/opt/romm/.env`):
+- `DB_ROOT_PASSWD` / `DB_PASSWD` — MariaDB credentials
+- `DB_USER=romm-user` / `DB_NAME=romm`
+- `ROMM_AUTH_SECRET_KEY` — auto-generated
+
+## ROM library structure
+
+RomM expects `/mnt/library/roms/<platform>/<game>/<rom>`. Create platform
+directories as needed:
+
+```
+/mnt/media_local/roms/
+├── gba/
+│   └── Pokemon - Emerald/
+│       └── Pokemon Emerald.gba
+├── snes/
+│   └── Super Mario World/
+│       └── Super Mario World.sfc
+└── psx/
+    └── Final Fantasy VII/
+        └── Final Fantasy VII.bin
+```
+
+## Media permissions
+
+The `/mnt/media_local/roms` directory is owned `root:media` with mode `2775`
+(setgid). New files inherit the `media` GID (10000). The LXC is privileged so
+no idmap block is needed — in-container UID/GID matches the host. Docker
+containers within the LXC run as-is (read-only mount).
+
+## Related
+
+- [Strong host](../hosts/strong.md)
+- [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md) — `roms.hubris.network → 192.168.8.249:80`
+- [DNS (107)](107-dns.md) — `roms.hubris.network A 192.168.8.175`
+- [Media permissions](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md)
+- [RomM docs](https://docs.romm.app)
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-07-05 — provisioned
+
+LXC 134 created on strong (Debian 13, privileged, `192.168.8.249/28`).
+Docker + Compose installed. RomM stack deployed at `/opt/romm/`.
+Created `/mnt/media_local/roms` with setgid `media:GID=10000` mode `2775`.
+Caddy `roms.hubris.network` → `192.168.8.249:80`.
+DNS `roms A 192.168.8.175` added to Technitium.
+Hubris /32 route for `.249` added to `50-strong-route`.

archive/knowledge/containers/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# LXC containers — index
+
+Most containers live on [`hubris`](../hosts/hubris.md). Some have been
+[migrated to `strong`](../hosts/strong.md) (Phase 1+2, 2026-07-05).
+
+| ID  | Name             | Host    | IP              | Priv | Cores | RAM   | Disk  | Mounts                | Public hostname                       | Status   |
+| --- | ---------------- | ------- | --------------- | ---- | ----- | ----- | ----- | --------------------- | ------------------------------------- | -------- |
+| 101 | [jellyfin](101-jellyfin.md)             | **strong** | 192.168.8.246 | priv | 4 | 8 GiB  | 16 GiB | `/mnt/media_local` (via mp0) | `media.hubris.network`         | running  |
+| 103 | [paperless](103-paperless.md)           | hubris  | 192.168.8.130 | priv | 2 | 3 GiB  | 8 GiB  | `/mnt/library`        | `paperless.hubris.network`            | running  |
+| 104 | [gitea](104-gitea.md)                   | hubris  | 192.168.8.121 | priv | 1 | 1 GiB  | 8 GiB  | `/mnt/library`        | `git.hubris.network`                  | running  |
+| 105 | [apps](105-apps.md)                     | hubris  | 192.168.8.205 | priv | 2 | 4 GiB  | 30 GiB | `/mnt/library`        | `docker` / `artifacto` / `blog`       | running |
+| 114 | [nextcloud](114-nextcloud.md)           | hubris  | 192.168.8.224 | priv | 4 | 6 GiB  | 25 GiB | `/mnt/library`        | `cloud.hubris.network`                | running  |
+| 118 | [elementsynapse](118-elementsynapse.md) | **strong** | 192.168.8.242 | unpriv | 2 | 4 GiB  | 32 GiB | —                     | `matrix.hubris.network`               | running  |
+| 119 | [sophia](119-sophia.md)                 | hubris  | 192.168.8.157 | priv | 2 | 1 GiB  | 10 GiB | `/mnt/library`        | —                                     | running  |
+| 120 | [mule-images](120-mule-images.md)       | hubris  | 192.168.8.136 | priv | 6 | 12 GiB | 60 GiB | `/mnt/library` + `/dev/dri` (iGPU) | `photos.hubris.network` | running  |
+| 121 | [caddy](121-caddy.md)                   | hubris  | 192.168.8.175 | unpriv | 1 | 512 MiB | 6 GiB  | —                     | (terminates all `*.hubris.network`)   | running  |
+| 122 | [arriman](122-arriman.md)               | **strong** | 192.168.8.245 | priv | 4 | 8 GiB  | 24 GiB | `/mnt/media_local` (via mp0) | `jellyseerr` / `qbit` / `sab` | running  |
+| 124 | [authentik](106-auth-outpost.md)           | hubris  | 192.168.8.180 | priv | 2 | 4 GiB  | 20 GiB | —                     | `auth.hubris.network`                 | running  |
+| 128 | [trmnl](128-trmnl.md)                   | hubris  | 192.168.8.211 | unpriv | 1 | 768 MiB | 8 GiB  | —                     | `trmnl.hubris.network`                | running  |
+| 129 | [house](129-house.md)                   | **strong** | 192.168.8.244 | unpriv | 2 | 3 GiB  | 8 GiB  | —                     | `house.hubris.network`                | running  |
+| 130 | [grimmory](130-grimmory.md)             | **strong** | 192.168.8.247 | priv | 1 | 2 GiB  | 16 GiB | `/mnt/media_local` (via mp0) | `books.hubris.network`         | running  |
+| 131 | [teddycloud](131-teddycloud.md)         | hubris  | 192.168.8.150 | — | 1 | 1 GiB  | 16 GiB | `/mnt/library` | `teddy.hubris.network` (no auth gate) | running  |
+|| 132 | [rclone](132-rclone.md)                 | hubris  | 192.168.8.214 | priv | 1 | 1 GiB  | 8 GiB  | `/mnt/library` (**ro**) | — (LAN-only UI `:5572`)             | running  |
+|| 134 | [romm](134-romm.md)                     | **strong** | 192.168.8.249 | priv | 1 | 2 GiB  | 16 GiB | `/mnt/media_local` (via mp0) | `roms.hubris.network`          | running  |
+
+## Recently destroyed (kept for archaeology)
+
+| ID  | Name             | Destroyed       | Reason                                        |
+| --- | ---------------- | --------------- | --------------------------------------------- |
+| 127 | mule-photos-new  | 2026-05-22      | PhotoPrism + sidecar + SvelteKit stack promoted to LXC 120 via Mulimage 2.0 merge (`70dc1b6`); M0 test LXC retired. Caddy + dnsmasq + gitea webhook + NC webhook listeners all cleaned up in the same cutover. |
+| 100 | arr (yunohost)   | ~2026-04-28     | Migrated to docker stack on [arriman](122-arriman.md); planned retention window expired |
+| 106 | flaresolverr     | ~2026-04-28     | Folded into the arriman docker compose       |
+| 116 | heaper           | 2026-05-14      | Decommissioned by user; data subtree at `/mnt/library/heaper` (224 MiB) retained |
+| 126 | plato            | 2026-06-28      | Notes/discovery workspace decommissioned; data at `/mnt/library/documents/plato` retained for archaeology |
+| 123 | claudio-bot (destroyed — see [archive](archive/123-claudio-bot.md)) | 2026-06-04      | Replaced by Hermes Agent on mac-mini; monitoring migrated to `homelab-health-watchdog` cron. See [deprecation plan](../../../plans/done/2026-06-04_130000-deprecate-claudio-bot.md) |
+| 109 | syncthing        | 2026-05-14      | Decommissioned by user; `/mnt/library/syncthing` was already empty |
+| 125 | seafile          | 2026-05-13      | Seafile Pro evaluation, user disliked the product; teardown also removed `files.hubris.network` from caddy + dnsmasq |
+| 107 | marimo           | between 2026-04-21 and 2026-04-28 | Decommissioned                |
+| 110 | photoprism       | between 2026-04-21 and 2026-04-28 | Replaced by [mulita](120-mule-images.md) |
+| 111 | karakeep         | between 2026-04-21 and 2026-04-28 | Decommissioned                |
+| 112 | immich           | between 2026-04-21 and 2026-04-28 | Replaced by [mulita](120-mule-images.md) |
+| 115 | reticulum        | between 2026-04-21 and 2026-04-28 | Decommissioned                |
+
+> Several `.conf.bak` files survive under `/etc/pve/lxc/` if you need to recover any of the configs.
+
+## Conventions
+
+- All net0 are `bridge=vmbr0`, `ip=dhcp` except [124 (authentik)](106-auth-outpost.md) which is statically `192.168.8.180/24`. Containers on [strong](../hosts/strong.md) use `bridge=vmbr1` with static IPs in the `192.168.8.240/28` range.
+- `onboot=1` on every container — the host brings them up after `pve-guests.service`.
+- Bind mounts are declared as `mp0: /mnt/library,mp=/mnt/library` on hubris, or `mp0: /mnt/media_local,mp=/mnt/library` on strong.
+- Most containers are privileged. Unprivileged ones require an idmap block in their conf to participate in the [media GID 10000](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md) standard.
+
+## Related
+- [Hubris host](../hosts/hubris.md)
+- [Media permissions](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md)
+- [Caddy](121-caddy.md) — terminates every public hostname
+- [DNS](../infrastructure/dns.md) — split-horizon entries for each subdomain

archive/knowledge/hosts/hubris.md

@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
 # `hubris` — Proxmox host
 
-Single-node Proxmox VE running 1 VM and 13 LXC containers. The whole homelab.
+Proxmox VE host running 1 VM and 13 LXC containers — the whole homelab's
+workloads still live here. As of 2026-07-01, hubris is node 1 of the 2-node
+`Homelab` cluster (see [Cluster](#cluster)); the second node is
+[strong](strong.md), which hosts nothing yet.
 
 ## At a glance
 - **Role:** Proxmox VE 9.1.2 hypervisor (kernel `6.14.11-4-pve`)
 - **Hardware:** GMKtec NucBox M6 Ultra — AMD Ryzen 5 7640HS (Phoenix APU), 12 vCPU / ~28 GiB RAM, 2× Samsung 990 EVO Plus NVMe (one SSD primary, one for `library` LVM). 2× Realtek RTL8125 NICs (`r8169`).
-- **BIOS:** 1.02 (2025-08-06) — vendor not on LVFS, no automated update path. See [investigations](../investigations/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md).
+- **BIOS:** 1.02 (2025-08-06) — vendor not on LVFS, no automated update path. See [investigations](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md).
 - **Uplink:** `vmbr1` (slave: `eno1`) → SODOLA switch → Fritz!Box 7590. DHCP-reserved `192.168.178.10/24`, gateway `192.168.178.1`.
 - **Homelab bridge:** `vmbr0` — portless internal bridge, `192.168.8.77/24` + `192.168.8.1/24` alias (LXC default gateway). All 16 LXCs and the HAOS VM are on `vmbr0`. Proxmox routes between `vmbr0` and `vmbr1`; Fritz!Box has a static route `192.168.8.0/24 → 192.168.178.10`.
 - **WiFi:** disabled 2026-06-02 — `wlp3s0` removed from `/etc/network/interfaces`, wpa config deleted. Was used as a failover to the now-retired Slate AX AP.
@@ -22,13 +25,37 @@ Single-node Proxmox VE running 1 VM and 13 LXC containers. The whole homelab.
 
 `/mnt/library` holds the shared media + data pool: `anime`, `audiobooks`, `books`, `comics`, `documents`, `downloads`, `heaper`, `homecloud`, `images`, `marimo`, `movies`, `music`, `notes`, `podcasts`, `repos`, `roms`, `sophia`. Bind-mounted into every container that needs it. Permissions standard: [media GID 10000](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md).
 
+## Cluster
+
+Member of `Homelab`, a 2-node Proxmox cluster with [strong](strong.md)
+(cluster/OS hostname `strong`), formed 2026-07-01.
+
+- **Corosync ring0:** hubris's internal `192.168.8.77` (the `vmbr0` address).
+  strong reaches it via the existing Fritz!Box static route
+  (`192.168.8.0/24 → 192.168.178.10`) — no dedicated corosync link, just the
+  household LAN. Fine for a home cluster; not latency-isolated.
+- **Quorum:** 2 nodes, 1 vote each, no QDevice tiebreaker. Quorum needs both
+  votes — if either node is down (reboot, maintenance, network hiccup), the
+  survivor's running guests keep working but `/etc/pve` goes read-only:
+  no start/stop/create/edit until quorum returns. Decided to skip a QDevice
+  for now; revisit if hubris's periodic reboots (BIOS/thermal work, see
+  Quirks below) make this painful in practice.
+- **Storage:** `local` / `local-lvm` are the standard per-node default IDs
+  (every node has its own, not actually shared). The `library` lvmthin pool
+  is explicitly restricted to `nodes hubris` in `/etc/pve/storage.cfg` since
+  it's a physical thinpool that only exists on this host's hardware.
+- strong currently hosts no LXCs/VMs — it exists solely as a cluster
+  member so far. See [strong.md](strong.md) and the [library-SSD
+  migration plan](../../../.hermes/plans/2026-06-03_110000-library-ssd-migration-to-ludo-mini.md)
+  for what comes next (physical drive move, service migration — not started).
+
 ## Tenants
 
 ### VMs
 - [108 — `haos-16.3`](../vms/108-haos.md) — Home Assistant OS, 4 GiB / 32 GiB
 
 ### LXC containers
-See [containers/index](../containers/index.md). 13 active (109 syncthing destroyed 2026-05-14).
+See [containers/index](../containers/index.md). 10 active on hubris (101, 118, 122, 129, 130 migrated to [strong](strong.md) 2026-07-05).
 
 ## Boot-time tuning (load-bearing)
 
@@ -62,7 +89,7 @@ See [monitoring](../infrastructure/monitoring.md), [backups](../infrastructure/b
 
 ## Quirks
 
-- `/etc/pve` is fuse — normal for the Proxmox cluster filesystem, even on a single-node install.
+- `/etc/pve` is fuse — the Proxmox cluster filesystem, now genuinely cluster-synced (2-node) rather than the single-node-but-still-fuse case this note used to describe.
 - ZFS is **not** in use; storage is LVM-thin + ext4.
 - Two Realtek 8125 NICs use the in-tree `r8169` driver, not the OOT `r8125`.
 - Hardware is thermally marginal. NVMe sensors live near warn temp under load. Thermal pads installed on the SSDs 2026-04-23; host relocated to a better-ventilated spot 2026-04-29.
@@ -73,6 +100,8 @@ See [monitoring](../infrastructure/monitoring.md), [backups](../infrastructure/b
 
 - `root@hubris` (self, RSA) — local
 - `d.toro.v@pm.me` (ed25519) — user's iMac, added 2026-04-22
+- `root@strong` (RSA) — strong's cluster-join key, added 2026-07-01 so
+  `pvecm add` could authenticate without a password prompt
 
 OpenSSH on `0.0.0.0:22`. Netbird's built-in SSH server is on `100.122.38.109:22022` and bypasses `authorized_keys` (OIDC/browser). See [SSH access](../infrastructure/ssh-access.md) for the dual-server gotcha.
 
@@ -84,16 +113,20 @@ OpenSSH on `0.0.0.0:22`. Netbird's built-in SSH server is on `100.122.38.109:220
 - [Media permissions](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md)
 - [Monitoring](../infrastructure/monitoring.md)
 - [Backups (disabled)](../infrastructure/backups.md)
-- [Operations cheatsheet](../operations/commands.md)
-- [Investigation: 2026-04-21 crash loop](../investigations/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md)
+- [Operations cheatsheet](../../../.agents/operations/commands.md)
+- [Investigation: 2026-04-21 crash loop](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md)
+- [strong — Proxmox host](strong.md)
 
 ## Changelog
 
+### 2026-07-01 — strong joined as a 2nd cluster node ("Homelab")
+User reformatted `strong` (formerly a Linux dev workstation, `192.168.178.181`) to Proxmox VE 9.2.3. Cluster/OS hostname on that box is `strong` (left as-is from install). Bootstrapped root SSH on strong from a one-time console password (installed hubris's existing trusted key set: `root@hubris`, `d.toro.v@pm.me`), then generated a keypair on strong and pre-authorized it here (`root@strong`) so `pvecm add 192.168.8.77 --use_ssh 1` (run from strong) could join without an interactive password prompt. No cabling/routing changes needed — strong reaches hubris's corosync address (`192.168.8.77`) via the existing Fritz!Box static route. Cluster now 2 nodes, quorate, **no QDevice** (explicit choice — see [Cluster](#cluster) above for the quorum tradeoff this implies). strong hosts no guests yet; this is Phase 1 of the [library-SSD migration plan](../../../.hermes/plans/2026-06-03_110000-library-ssd-migration-to-ludo-mini.md), nothing further from that plan has been executed.
+
 ### 2026-06-02 — Slate AX retired; SODOLA switch added; network restructured
-Replaced GL.iNet Slate AX sub-router with SODOLA 5-Port 2.5Gbit managed switch. Fritz!OS 8.x lacks second-IP-network support on LAN ports, so Proxmox now acts as the subnet router: `vmbr1` (eno1 → SODOLA → Fritz!Box) is the uplink at `192.168.178.10/24`; `vmbr0` is a portless internal bridge holding all LXCs/VMs with `192.168.8.1` as an alias (unchanged LXC gateway). Fritz!Box static route `192.168.8.0/24 → 192.168.178.10` enables inbound routing. No LXC configs changed. Eliminated double-NAT. WiFi (`wlp3s0`) also removed — was pointing at the Slate AX SSID, no longer useful. See [network](../infrastructure/network.md) and [migration plan](../plans/2026-06-01-slate-ax-to-sodola-migration.md).
+Replaced GL.iNet Slate AX sub-router with SODOLA 5-Port 2.5Gbit managed switch. Fritz!OS 8.x lacks second-IP-network support on LAN ports, so Proxmox now acts as the subnet router: `vmbr1` (eno1 → SODOLA → Fritz!Box) is the uplink at `192.168.178.10/24`; `vmbr0` is a portless internal bridge holding all LXCs/VMs with `192.168.8.1` as an alias (unchanged LXC gateway). Fritz!Box static route `192.168.8.0/24 → 192.168.178.10` enables inbound routing. No LXC configs changed. Eliminated double-NAT. WiFi (`wlp3s0`) also removed — was pointing at the Slate AX SSID, no longer useful. See [network](../infrastructure/network.md) and [migration plan](../../../plans/done/2026-06-01-slate-ax-to-sodola-migration.md).
 
 ### 2026-05-14 — LXC 109 (syncthing) decommissioned
-User destroyed the syncthing LXC (had been stopped since 2026-04-21, never re-enabled). `pct destroy 109 --purge` cleaned `vm-109-disk-0` on `local-lvm` and the `/etc/pve/lxc/109.conf` entry. Data subtree `/mnt/library/syncthing` was already empty and retained as an empty dir. No DNS, Caddy, NFS-export, or claudio-monitor references to clean up. Entry moved to the "recently destroyed" table in [containers/index](../containers/index.md#recently-destroyed-kept-for-archaeology); references stripped from [README](../README.md), [media-permissions](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md), [vms/100-zimaos](../vms/100-zimaos.md), and [containers/102-nfs-export](../containers/102-nfs-export.md).
+User destroyed the syncthing LXC (had been stopped since 2026-04-21, never re-enabled). `pct destroy 109 --purge` cleaned `vm-109-disk-0` on `local-lvm` and the `/etc/pve/lxc/109.conf` entry. Data subtree `/mnt/library/syncthing` was already empty and retained as an empty dir. No DNS, Caddy, NFS-export, or claudio-monitor references to clean up. Entry moved to the "recently destroyed" table in [containers/index](../containers/index.md#recently-destroyed-kept-for-archaeology); references stripped from [README](../../../README.md), [media-permissions](../infrastructure/media-permissions.md), [vms/100-zimaos](../vms/100-zimaos.md), and [containers/102-nfs-export](../containers/102-nfs-export.md).
 
 ### 2026-05-14 — network performance baseline captured
 First explicit speed snapshot: WAN ↓113.5 / ↑19.9 Mbit (24.6 ms), `eno1` 1 Gb full-duplex negotiated, intra-host `vmbr0` ~34.7 Gbit/s host↔LXC and ~34.8 Gbit/s LXC↔LXC (single TCP stream, zero retransmits). `iperf3` + `speedtest-cli` installed on host. Noted `eno1` `rx_errors` at 1.62 M (~1.7 % of 96 M RX packets in 14 d uptime) plus 10.9 k `align_errors` — flagged for follow-up; expect to recheck the trend in ~1 week, suspect patch cable / switch port first if still climbing. See new "Network performance baseline" section above.
@@ -105,7 +138,7 @@ User destroyed the heaper LXC. No `116.conf.bak` left behind in `/etc/pve/lxc/`.
 `/etc/sysctl.d/99-bbr.conf` switches `net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control` from `cubic` to `bbr` and `net.core.default_qdisc` from `fq_codel` to `fq`. Also bumps `rmem_max`/`wmem_max` to 64 MiB and widens `tcp_rmem`/`tcp_wmem`. `tcp_bbr` module pinned at boot via `/etc/modules-load.d/bbr.conf`. Triggered by Nextcloud client downloads from a WiFi laptop pulling ~2 MB/s despite a 152 Mbps link — server-side baseline through Caddy with BBR is ~400 MB/s single-stream loopback, so any client-perceived single-stream improvement is pure congestion-control win. Touches every LXC's outbound TCP since they all share this kernel.
 
 ### 2026-04-29 — relocated to better-ventilated spot
-User physically moved the host to a new location with improved airflow. Post-move idle baseline (45 min uptime, light load): k10temp Tctl **47.2 °C**, amdgpu edge 42 °C, nvme0 composite 34.9 °C / sensor1 32.9 °C, nvme1 composite 38.9 °C / sensor1 52.9 °C, DRAM 34–35.5 °C, ACPI zone 47–49 °C. Compares well against the 2026-04-23 thermal-pad steady-state (nvme0 sensor1 60–61 °C). Watch the lifetime NVMe warning-time counter over the coming days for confirmation. See [investigation](../investigations/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md#2026-04-29-physical-relocation).
+User physically moved the host to a new location with improved airflow. Post-move idle baseline (45 min uptime, light load): k10temp Tctl **47.2 °C**, amdgpu edge 42 °C, nvme0 composite 34.9 °C / sensor1 32.9 °C, nvme1 composite 38.9 °C / sensor1 52.9 °C, DRAM 34–35.5 °C, ACPI zone 47–49 °C. Compares well against the 2026-04-23 thermal-pad steady-state (nvme0 sensor1 60–61 °C). Watch the lifetime NVMe warning-time counter over the coming days for confirmation. See [investigation](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md#2026-04-29-physical-relocation).
 
 ### 2026-04-28 — Phase 1 WiFi failover
 Host now dual-homed: LAN `192.168.8.77` (primary) + WiFi `192.168.8.141` (failover, metric 200) on the GL-AXT1800-714-5G AP. Installed `wpasupplicant`+`iw`; added `wlp3s0` stanza to `/etc/network/interfaces` with `wpa-conf`; ARP isolation sysctls in `post-up`. Built `wan-failover.service` to remove the vmbr0 default route on `eno1` carrier loss, since the bridge's carrier doesn't follow `eno1` (the LXC veths keep it `1`). LXC/VM guests are still LAN-only — Phase 2 will migrate them.
@@ -114,10 +147,10 @@ Host now dual-homed: LAN `192.168.8.77` (primary) + WiFi `192.168.8.141` (failov
 This wiki created. Live state at this date: 14 LXCs running (109 syncthing stopped), 1 VM, kernel `6.14.11-4-pve`, uptime 3 d 0 h post drive-removal A/B test. Compared to memory snapshot from a week ago, **destroyed**: LXC 100 (yunohost arr), 106 (flaresolverr), 107 (marimo), 110 (photoprism), 111 (karakeep), 112 (immich), 115 (reticulum). 100 + 106 destroyed per the planned 2026-04-21 \*arr migration retention; the others removed since.
 
 ### 2026-04-23 — SSD cooling + thermal pads installed
-Thermal pads on both NVMe drives. Steady-state nvme0 composite 47 °C / sensor1 60–61 °C, nvme1 38–40 °C. Zero new warning-time minutes after install. Watch the lifetime warning-time counter going forward, not absolute sensor1. See [investigation](../investigations/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md#2026-04-23-thermal-pad-verdict).
+Thermal pads on both NVMe drives. Steady-state nvme0 composite 47 °C / sensor1 60–61 °C, nvme1 38–40 °C. Zero new warning-time minutes after install. Watch the lifetime warning-time counter going forward, not absolute sensor1. See [investigation](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md#2026-04-23-thermal-pad-verdict).
 
 ### 2026-04-22 — drive removal A/B test
-Removed external USB backup drive (Silicon Motion `090c:2320`). Disabled the four `backup-library*.timer` units, commented the fstab entry. Goal: confirm whether the drive + UAS interaction on the AMD USB4 PCIe tunnel is the dominant root cause of the silent hard-locks. Pre-drive uptime was 33 days; with drive, repeated crashes despite UAS blacklist + mount-on-demand. **Result so far:** 3+ days uptime — the drive looks like the primary contributor; `cpu-epp` remains as belt-and-suspenders thermal protection. See [investigation](../investigations/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md).
+Removed external USB backup drive (Silicon Motion `090c:2320`). Disabled the four `backup-library*.timer` units, commented the fstab entry. Goal: confirm whether the drive + UAS interaction on the AMD USB4 PCIe tunnel is the dominant root cause of the silent hard-locks. Pre-drive uptime was 33 days; with drive, repeated crashes despite UAS blacklist + mount-on-demand. **Result so far:** 3+ days uptime — the drive looks like the primary contributor; `cpu-epp` remains as belt-and-suspenders thermal protection. See [investigation](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md).
 
 ### 2026-04-22 — `cpu-epp.service` ordering bug fixed
 Was `After=multi-user.target` + `WantedBy=multi-user.target` — queued behind `pve-guests.service`, so the hottest boot window (20+ guests starting on `performance`) preceded EPP application. Now `After=sysinit.target` + `Before=pve-guests.service`.
@@ -126,4 +159,4 @@ Was `After=multi-user.target` + `WantedBy=multi-user.target` — queued behind `
 `60-crash-capture.conf`, softdog `soft_panic=1`, RuntimeWatchdog 15 s. `rasdaemon` installed and enabled. Pure silicon hangs still leave no trace; this catches everything else.
 
 ### 2026-04-21 — `cpu-epp.service` deployed
-Pinned governor=`powersave`, EPP=`balance_power` at boot. Stopped the host idling at ~95 °C with everything pinned at 4.4 GHz. First fix in the [crash-loop incident](../investigations/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md).
+Pinned governor=`powersave`, EPP=`balance_power` at boot. Stopped the host idling at ~95 °C with everything pinned at 4.4 GHz. First fix in the [crash-loop incident](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md).

archive/knowledge/hosts/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Hosts
+
+The two Proxmox VE nodes that run the fleet. Narrative pages; the machine-readable host records are
+the generated `hosts/*.yaml` files at the repo root.
+
+| Document | What it covers |
+|----------|----------------|
+| [hubris.md](hubris.md) | Primary PVE node (GMKtec NucBox M6 Ultra, `192.168.8.77`) — runs most LXCs plus the VMs. |
+| [strong.md](strong.md) | Secondary PVE node / cluster member (`192.168.178.181`) — hosts the LXCs migrated from hubris. |

archive/knowledge/hosts/strong.md

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+# `strong` — Proxmox host
+
+Second node in the `Homelab` cluster, alongside [hubris](hubris.md). Formerly
+a Linux dev workstation nicknamed "ludo" (or "ludo-mini") — reformatted to
+Proxmox VE on 2026-07-01. No LXCs/VMs deployed on it yet.
+
+## At a glance
+
+- **Role:** Proxmox VE 9.2.3 cluster member (kernel `7.0.12-1-pve`) — hosts [7 LXCs](../containers/index.md) migrated from hubris (Phase 1+2, 2026-07-05)
+- **Naming:** the OS/cluster hostname is `strong` (leftover from install,
+  kept as-is). This wiki page and `inventory.yaml` also use `strong` as of
+  2026-07-01 — earlier the same day the inventory entry was briefly named
+  `ludo-mini`, but that was renamed so the hostname bootstrap needs
+  (`hosts/$(hostname).yaml`) would just resolve. "Ludo"/"ludo-mini" remains
+  the machine's everyday nickname; some older docs (investigations, the
+  library-SSD migration plan) still refer to it that way — that's fine,
+  those are historical.
+- **Hardware:** AMD Ryzen 7 PRO 6850U, 16 threads, 28 GiB RAM.
+  - `nvme0n1` — MasonSemi MC3100 1TB (boot/OS): `pve-root` 96G, `pve-data`
+    (thinpool) 815G, 8G swap.
+  - `nvme1n1` — WD_BLACK SN7100 2TB, added 2026-07-01. Arrived with an
+    existing APFS partition (previously used in a Mac) — wiped via
+    `pvesh set nodes/strong/disks/wipedisk --disk /dev/nvme1n1`, then turned
+    into its own LVM-thin pool via `pvesh create nodes/strong/disks/lvmthin`
+    (handles pvcreate/vgcreate/lvcreate + storage.cfg registration in one
+    step). Registered as Proxmox storage `ludo-lvm` (VG `ludo-lvm`, thinpool
+    `ludo-lvm`, ~1.8 TiB usable — kept the `ludo-lvm` name since that's what
+    was actually created live; not worth renaming), restricted `nodes strong`
+    in `/etc/pve/storage.cfg` — same pattern as hubris's `library` pool.
+    Empty so far; this is separate from the [library-SSD migration
+    plan](../../../.hermes/plans/2026-06-03_110000-library-ssd-migration-to-ludo-mini.md)'s
+    planned drive move from hubris (that hasn't happened) — this is
+    general-purpose VM/CT capacity.
+- **Network:** `vmbr0` is bridged straight onto the household LAN —
+  `192.168.178.181/24`, gateway `192.168.178.1`. Unlike hubris, there is no
+  internal/uplink bridge split yet — `vmbr0` here plays the role hubris's
+  `vmbr1` plays there. Reachable from the homelab subnet (`192.168.8.0/24`)
+  via the existing Fritz!Box static route through hubris; no new cabling
+  or routing was needed to join the cluster.
+- **Storage:** `local` + `local-lvm` (cluster-wide default names, shared
+  with hubris by convention, actually separate per-node volumes). Hubris's
+  `library` lvmthin pool is restricted to `nodes hubris` in
+  `/etc/pve/storage.cfg` and does not exist here.
+- **Mesh:** Netbird not installed — fresh OS wiped whatever the old
+  workstation had. Reachable today only via LAN routing (confirmed DNS for
+  `*.hubris.network` already resolves correctly here via `192.168.8.2`).
+  Add to Netbird if off-LAN access to this host itself (distinct from any
+  future guests) is needed.
+- **Homelab-context client enrollment:** done 2026-07-01 via
+  `bootstrap.sh --no-secrets` (reused the operator's existing Gitea PAT for
+  the initial clone). `/opt/homelab-context`, the `homelab` CLI, and the
+  5-min sync timer are live; `homelab whoami` resolves correctly. See
+  [agent-enrollment.md](../../../.agents/operations/agent-enrollment.md).
+- **Age key / secrets:** issued the same day over plain LAN (no Netbird
+  needed — see the `--no-mesh` bootstrap.sh fix below). Key lives at
+  `/etc/age/key.txt`; pubkey `age1rtwvdct6avjkr3cyxv3vue3vqx4d524fjfr3vk7xrnvyrylnry5sm54sn4`
+  recorded in `inventory.yaml`. Not yet a recipient on any actual secret
+  (`hello.yaml`, `gitea-pat.yaml`, etc.) — that's a separate grant, see
+  ["Granting a secret to a new client"](../../../.agents/operations/agent-enrollment.md#granting-a-secret-to-a-new-client).
+
+## Cluster membership
+
+Joined hubris's single-node cluster (`Homelab`) via `pvecm add` on
+2026-07-01. See [hosts/hubris.md#cluster](hubris.md#cluster) for the full
+cluster picture, node IDs, and the quorum tradeoff (2 nodes, no QDevice —
+either node going down freezes management on the survivor).
+
+## SSH
+
+Root login via the same key set trusted on hubris (`root@hubris`,
+`d.toro.v@pm.me`) — installed 2026-07-01 by appending to
+`/root/.ssh/authorized_keys` (now symlinked to `/etc/pve/priv/authorized_keys`
+post cluster-join, so it's cluster-synced same as hubris). No password auth
+needed going forward.
+
+## Related
+
+- [hubris — Proxmox host](hubris.md)
+- [Library SSD migration plan](../../../.hermes/plans/2026-06-03_110000-library-ssd-migration-to-ludo-mini.md) — the larger project this is Phase 1 of (filename kept as-is, historical)
+- [Network](../infrastructure/network.md)
+- [SSH access](../infrastructure/ssh-access.md)
+- [Agent enrollment](../../../.agents/operations/agent-enrollment.md)
+
+## Changelog
+
+### 2026-07-05 — Phase 2d: grimmory (130) migrated to strong
+Migrated book library from hubris (192.168.8.213) to strong (192.168.8.247).
+Rsync'd /books (2.6G) from hubris library SSD to ludo-lvm/media. Container
+mounts /mnt/media_local → /mnt/library locally. Caddy backend for
+books.hubris.network updated.
+
+### 2026-07-05 — Phase 2: arriman (122) + jellyfin (101) migrated; library on ludo-lvm
+Migrated arriman (→ 192.168.8.245) and jellyfin (→ 192.168.8.246) to strong.
+Created 1.5T thin volume on ludo-lvm for media library (/mnt/media_local).
+Rsync'd 363G of media data (movies, tv, anime, downloads, music) from hubris
+library SSD to ludo-lvm. Both containers now mount /mnt/media_local directly
+as local ext4 — no NFS cross-node dependency. Jellyfin gets Radeon 680M iGPU
+(for VAAPI) + RX 7600 dGPU passthrough via dev0/dev1. Caddy backends updated
+for media, jellyseerr, qbit, sab. Hubris freed 16 GiB RAM (8+8).
+Dhcp scope narrowed to 192.168.8.100-239.
+
+### 2026-07-05 — house (LXC 129) migrated to strong; DHCP scope narrowed
+Migrated Yuvomi family planner from hubris (192.168.8.212) to strong
+(192.168.8.244). Followed same restore pattern as elementsynapse (Phase 1b).
+Discovered IP conflict: teddycloud (LXC 131) had 192.168.8.243 via DHCP
+(scope was 192.168.8.241-254). Narrowed DHCP scope to 192.168.8.100-239,
+gave teddycloud static IP 192.168.8.150. Caddy updated: house.hubris.network
+→ 192.168.8.244:3000, teddy.hubris.network → 192.168.8.150:8443.
+
+### 2026-07-05 — elementsynapse (LXC 118) migrated to strong
+Migrated Matrix/Synapse + Element client from hubris (192.168.8.239) to a new
+LXC on strong (192.168.8.242). Added vmbr1 on strong at 192.168.8.241/28
+(portless internal bridge) for strong-hosted guests. Enabled IP forwarding,
+proxy ARP on hubris vmbr0, and specific /32 routes for strong's guest subnet.
+Caddy updated: element.hubris.network → 192.168.8.242:8080.
+VPS traefik updated: matrix.hubris.network backend → 192.168.8.242:8008.
+This is Phase 1a of the strong migration plan — see .hermes/plans/2026-07-05_strong-migration-assessment.md.
+
+### 2026-07-01 — age key issued over LAN; 3 bugs found/fixed in bootstrap.sh
+Re-ran bootstrap without `--no-secrets` to get a real age key. Hit three real bugs live, fixed all three in `bootstrap.sh` and re-ran clean:
+1. The `mcp`-CLI pipx-install step and the (unused, `--with-hermes`-only) Goose installer both called `sudo -u <user>` unconditionally — fails with "sudo: command not found" on a minimal root-only image with no `sudo` binary at all. Added a `run_as()` helper that only shells out to `sudo` when there's a real distinct invoking user.
+2. `sops` isn't an apt/dnf package (matches what `agent-enrollment.md`'s manual-install recipe already does) — the auto-installer tried `apt-get install sops` and failed outright. Added `install_sops_binary()`, fetching the GitHub release binary directly on both dnf and apt paths.
+3. Bigger one: running without `--no-secrets` unconditionally tries to install + interactively connect Netbird (device-code SSO), even though the very next check already knows how to accept plain LAN reachability instead. Over SSH with nobody watching, this hangs forever — had to manually kill a stuck `netbird up` process. Added `--no-mesh`, which skips the Netbird install/connect step but keeps the LAN-fallback path for secrets issuance. This run used `bootstrap.sh --no-mesh` and completed cleanly: `mesh: lan`, age key installed, `mcp` CLI installed via pipx (proving fix #1 too).
+
+Result: age key at `/etc/age/key.txt`, pubkey recorded in `inventory.yaml`. Not yet granted access to any actual secret file — see the note above.
+
+### 2026-07-01 — enrolled as a homelab-context client
+Ran `bootstrap.sh --no-secrets` (reused the operator's existing personal Gitea PAT for the initial clone rather than minting a fresh read-only one). Installed git, cloned `/opt/homelab-context`, installed the 5-min systemd sync timer, symlinked `homelab` CLI and `AGENTS.md`. Skipped age-key/secrets issuance and Netbird per operator choice — but bootstrap's own connectivity check reported `mesh: lan`, i.e. the secrets-issuance endpoint is already reachable over plain LAN, so re-running without `--no-secrets` later wouldn't require a Netbird join. Known gap: the `mcp` pipx CLI install step silently failed (`sudo: command not found` — bootstrap.sh's pipx step assumes a `sudo` binary even when already root; harmless, only affects the `homelab mcp <tool>` shell subcommand).
+
+### 2026-07-01 — inventory identity renamed ludo-mini → strong
+Discovered while starting client enrollment: `bootstrap.sh` looks up
+`hosts/$(hostname).yaml`, and the OS hostname here is `strong`, not
+`ludo-mini`. Renaming the OS hostname was ruled out (already a cluster
+member — Proxmox doesn't support in-place node rename, only leave+rejoin).
+Renamed the wiki/inventory side instead: `inventory.yaml` key, this page
+(`hosts/ludo-mini.md` → `hosts/strong.md`), README, ssh-access.md all now
+say `strong`. "Ludo"/"ludo-mini" is still fine as a spoken nickname.
+
+### 2026-07-01 — 2nd NVMe added; new LVM-thin pool `ludo-lvm`
+User added a WD_BLACK SN7100 2TB (`nvme1n1`), previously used in a Mac
+(arrived with an EFI + APFS partition table — confirmed disposable, wiped).
+Used Proxmox's own disk-management API rather than raw LVM commands:
+`pvesh set nodes/strong/disks/wipedisk --disk /dev/nvme1n1` to clear the old
+partition table/signatures, then `pvesh create nodes/strong/disks/lvmthin
+--name ludo-lvm --device /dev/disk/by-id/nvme-WD_BLACK_SN7100_2TB_251663803202
+--add_storage 1` to create the PV/VG/thinpool and register it as Proxmox
+storage in one step. Result: storage ID `ludo-lvm`, ~1.8 TiB, `content
+rootdir,images`, `nodes strong` (mirrors hubris's `library` node-restriction
+pattern — this pool only physically exists here). Empty — no VM/CT disks
+placed on it yet.
+
+### 2026-07-01 — Proxmox install; joined Homelab cluster
+Reformatted from Linux workstation to Proxmox VE 9.2.3. SSH keys seeded from
+hubris's trusted set (root password used once, then discarded). Joined the
+existing `Homelab` cluster via `pvecm add 192.168.8.77 --use_ssh 1` from
+this node's side, using key-based SSH pre-authorized in both directions —
+no interactive password prompt needed for the join itself. Cluster now 2
+nodes (`hubris`, `strong`), quorate, no QDevice. Decided to leave hostname
+as `strong` and skip a QDevice for now — both revisitable later.

archive/knowledge/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Knowledge
+
+The durable, authoritative current-state documentation of the homelab: one page per node and per
+cross-cutting system, synthesized from live state and evidence. Structure and rules are in
+[the knowledge schema](../.agents/domains/knowledge/schema.md).
+
+| Section | What it covers |
+|---------|----------------|
+| [wiki/hosts/](wiki/hosts/index.md) | Proxmox host narratives — `hubris`, `strong`. |
+| [wiki/containers/](wiki/containers/index.md) | LXC fleet — one page per container, plus the master table and archaeology. |
+| [wiki/vms/](wiki/vms/index.md) | Virtual machines — ZimaOS, Home Assistant OS. |
+| [wiki/infrastructure/](wiki/infrastructure/index.md) | Cross-cutting systems — DNS, ingress, mesh, storage, auth, monitoring, generated topology. |
+| [sources/](sources/index.md) | External reference docs and the pointer to incident evidence. |
+| [GLOSSARY.md](GLOSSARY.md) | Term definitions. |

archive/knowledge/infrastructure/auto-deploy.md

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ The app repo at `/opt/<thing>` is the working tree, but the deploy tooling (`web
   - ~~`192.168.8.230` (claudio-bot — destroyed 2026-06-04)~~
   - `192.168.8.136` ([mule-images (120)](../containers/120-mule-images.md))
   - `192.168.8.77` ([hubris host](../hosts/hubris.md) — backup-library)
-  - ~~`192.168.8.190` ([plato (126)](../containers/126-plato.md))~~ (destroyed 2026-06-28)
+  - ~~`192.168.8.190` ([plato (126)](../containers/index.md#recently-destroyed-kept-for-archaeology))~~ (destroyed 2026-06-28)
   - `192.168.8.211` ([trmnl (128)](../containers/128-trmnl.md) — terminalito)
 
   **Don't strip these when editing app.ini.**
@@ -38,18 +38,19 @@ The app repo at `/opt/<thing>` is the working tree, but the deploy tooling (`web
 | `dtoro/gitea-customizations`    | [gitea (104)](../containers/104-gitea.md) `/var/lib/gitea/custom/` | A | `http://127.0.0.1:9797/deploy` (loopback) | (orig) | `systemctl restart gitea` if templates changed |
 | `dtoro/mule-image`              | [mule-images (120)](../containers/120-mule-images.md) `/opt/mule-image/` | B | `http://192.168.8.136:9797/deploy` | 6 | `docker compose up -d --build` |
 | `dtoro/Artifacto`               | [apps (105)](../containers/105-apps.md) `/opt/artifacto/` | B | `http://192.168.8.205:9798/deploy` | 7 | `docker compose up -d --build` |
-| ~~`dtoro/Plato`~~               | ~~[plato (126)](../containers/126-plato.md) `/opt/plato/app/`~~ (destroyed 2026-06-28) | ⊘ | `http://192.168.8.190:9799/deploy` (dead) | 8 (removed) | Repo archived — LXC destroyed |
-| `dtoro/claudio-bot`             | ~~[claudio-bot (123)](../containers/123-claudio-bot.md)~~ (destroyed 2026-06-04) | ⊘ | `http://192.168.8.230:9797/deploy` (dead) | (archived) | Repo archived — LXC destroyed |
+| ~~`dtoro/Plato`~~               | ~~[plato (126)](../containers/index.md#recently-destroyed-kept-for-archaeology) `/opt/plato/app/`~~ (destroyed 2026-06-28) | ⊘ | `http://192.168.8.190:9799/deploy` (dead) | 8 (removed) | Repo archived — LXC destroyed |
+| `dtoro/claudio-bot`             | ~~[claudio-bot (123)](../containers/archive/123-claudio-bot.md)~~ (destroyed 2026-06-04) | ⊘ | `http://192.168.8.230:9797/deploy` (dead) | (archived) | Repo archived — LXC destroyed |
 | `dtoro/backup-library`          | [hubris host](../hosts/hubris.md) `/opt/backup-library/` | A | `http://192.168.8.77:9798/deploy`  | (orig) | runs `deploy.sh` (preserves admin-edited `/etc/restic/include-*.list`) |
-| `dtoro/Homelab-Docs` → homelab-mcp | [apps (105)](../containers/105-apps.md) `/opt/homelab-mcp/` | B | `http://192.168.8.205:9811/deploy` | 10 | reinstalls `homelab-mcp.service` + restart |
-| `dtoro/Homelab-Docs` → secrets-issuance | [apps (105)](../containers/105-apps.md) `/opt/secrets-issuance/` | B | `http://192.168.8.205:9821/deploy` | 11 | reinstalls `secrets-issuance.service` + restart |
+| `dtoro/Homelab-Docs` → homelab-mcp | [apps (105)](../containers/105-apps.md) `/opt/homelab-mcp/` | B | `http://192.168.8.205:9811/deploy` | 10 (deprecated) | ~~reinstalls `homelab-mcp.service` + restart~~ → replaced by Go Docker stack on mac-mini |
+| `dtoro/Homelab-Docs` → secrets-issuance | [apps (105)](../containers/105-apps.md) `/opt/secrets-issuance/` | B | `http://192.168.8.205:9821/deploy` | 11 (deprecated) | ~~reinstalls `secrets-issuance.service` + restart~~ → replaced by `internal/secrets/` Go package |
 | `dtoro/terminalito`             | [trmnl (128)](../containers/128-trmnl.md) `/opt/terminalito/` | B | `http://192.168.8.211:9797/deploy` | 12 | reinstalls units + `systemctl restart trmnl-plugins` |
+| `dtoro/Homelab-Docs` → oikos-console | [apps (105)](../containers/105-apps.md) `/opt/oikos-console/` | B | `http://192.168.8.205:9831/deploy` | 14 | reinstalls `oikos-console.service` + restart — see [oikos/console/deploy/README.md](../../../oikos/console/deploy/README.md) |
 
-> Note: `dtoro/Homelab-Docs` has **two webhooks** firing on the same push.
+> Note: `dtoro/Homelab-Docs` has **three webhooks** firing on the same push.
 > Each owns its own clone on LXC 105. They don't conflict because each
 > deploy.sh only touches its own service unit + venv.
 
-> **Not yet wired:** `dtoro/claudio-monitor` (push, then `/opt/claudio-monitor/scripts/deploy.sh` manually). The former authentik LXC (124) is destroyed — Authentik runs on the [VPS](../hosts/netbird-vps.md). DNS moved to [Technitium on dns (107)](../containers/107-dns.md).
+> **Not yet wired:** `dtoro/claudio-monitor` (push, then `/opt/claudio-monitor/scripts/deploy.sh` manually). The former authentik LXC (124) is destroyed — Authentik runs on the [VPS](../../../hosts/netbird-vps.yaml). DNS moved to [Technitium on dns (107)](../containers/107-dns.md).
 
 ## When you change a tracked config
 
@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ If you're not sure what's already lurking, run `homelab apt-audit --fleet` and l
 - [Gitea (104)](../containers/104-gitea.md) — webhook source for all of these
 - [Caddy (121)](../containers/121-caddy.md), [apps (105)](../containers/105-apps.md), [mule-images (120)](../containers/120-mule-images.md), [hubris host](../hosts/hubris.md) — webhook targets
 - [Backups (disabled)](backups.md)
-- [Operations cheatsheet](../operations/commands.md) — `homelab apt-audit` / `homelab apt-upgrade` reference
+- [Operations cheatsheet](../../../.agents/operations/commands.md) — `homelab apt-audit` / `homelab apt-upgrade` reference
 
 ## Changelog
 
@@ -130,7 +131,7 @@ Webhook id 12 on `dtoro/terminalito` → `http://192.168.8.211:9797/deploy` on [
 Webhook ids 10 + 11 on `dtoro/Homelab-Docs` (ports `9811` + `9821` on [apps (105)](../containers/105-apps.md)). Two webhooks on one repo — each owns its own clone (`/opt/homelab-mcp`, `/opt/secrets-issuance`) and only restarts its own service. See [homelab-context](homelab-context.md) for why both services live in one repo.
 
 ### 2026-05-13 — Plato pipeline added
-Webhook id 8 on `dtoro/Plato` (port `9799` on [plato (126)](../containers/126-plato.md)). `app.ini` `ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` extended to include `192.168.8.190`.
+Webhook id 8 on `dtoro/Plato` (port `9799` on [plato (126)](../containers/index.md#recently-destroyed-kept-for-archaeology)). `app.ini` `ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` extended to include `192.168.8.190`.
 
 ### 2026-04-28 — wiki entry created
 Initial documentation. Six active pipelines.

archive/knowledge/infrastructure/backups.md

@@ -1,6 +1,30 @@
-# Backups — restic on external drive (DISABLED)
+# Backups — restic on external drive (DEPRECATED — superseded)
 
-Chunked monthly restic backup of `/mnt/library`'s irreplaceable subset. **Disabled 2026-04-22** as part of the [hubris crash-loop A/B test](../investigations/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md).
+> **DEPRECATED 2026-07-01.** Superseded by the **rclone → Proton Drive** off-host mirror on
+> [LXC 132 `rclone`](../containers/132-rclone.md). That job finally closes the off-host / 3-2-1 gap
+> this page flagged for months. The restic-on-USB job below is kept for archaeology; it has been
+> **DISABLED since 2026-04-22** and is not coming back in its old form.
+
+## Current backup — rclone → Proton Drive (LXC 132)
+
+- **Where:** [LXC 132 `rclone`](../containers/132-rclone.md) (`192.168.8.214`), `/mnt/library`
+  mounted **read-only**.
+- **What:** plain `rclone sync` (Proton mirrors local; browsable files, no versioning) of the
+  folders listed in `/etc/rclone-backup/folders.list`, to `proton:library-backup/…`.
+- **When:** monthly — `rclone-backup.timer` (`OnCalendar=*-*-01 03:00`).
+- **UI:** rclone Web GUI on `192.168.8.214:5572` (LAN-only, no auth).
+- **Encryption:** Proton's built-in E2E (no rclone `crypt` overlay).
+- **Runs / logs:** `/var/log/rclone-backup/` + `runs.jsonl`.
+- **Still a single off-host target** (Proton only). Not yet a full 3-2-1 (no second independent
+  copy), but strictly better than the previous "no off-host copy at all."
+
+See [132-rclone](../containers/132-rclone.md) for the full design.
+
+---
+
+## Legacy — restic on external drive (DISABLED 2026-04-22)
+
+Chunked monthly restic backup of `/mnt/library`'s irreplaceable subset. **Disabled 2026-04-22** as part of the [hubris crash-loop A/B test](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md).
 
 ## Status
 
@@ -12,7 +36,7 @@ Chunked monthly restic backup of `/mnt/library`'s irreplaceable subset. **Disabl
 
 Fstab entry commented out. USB drive de-authorized and physically removed. `backup-library-deploy.service` left enabled (harmless webhook receiver).
 
-**Reason:** the host hang recurred 2026-04-22 18:42 after 30h despite the `cpu-epp` fix, the UAS blacklist, and mount-on-demand. User wants to confirm host stability without the drive at all (was stable 33 days before the drive arrived). See [investigation](../investigations/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md).
+**Reason:** the host hang recurred 2026-04-22 18:42 after 30h despite the `cpu-epp` fix, the UAS blacklist, and mount-on-demand. User wants to confirm host stability without the drive at all (was stable 33 days before the drive arrived). See [investigation](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md).
 
 **To re-enable:** uncomment fstab line, `systemctl enable --now` the four timers, re-attach drive.
 
@@ -81,13 +105,13 @@ Runbook at `/usr/share/doc/backup-library/RECOVERY.md` (or in the repo at `doc/R
 
 ## Known SPOF
 
-Single drive. RECOVERY.md flags the 3-2-1 gap. Mitigations (second drive, cloud repo via `restic copy`) are not yet implemented.
+Single drive. RECOVERY.md flags the 3-2-1 gap. Mitigations (second drive, cloud repo via `restic copy`) were not implemented before this job was retired — the **off-host copy is now provided by [rclone → Proton Drive (LXC 132)](../containers/132-rclone.md)** instead. A second independent copy is still outstanding.
 
 ## Drive history
 
 The `Silicon Motion Portable SSD` (vid:pid `090c:2320`) drops under sustained heavy writes through a hub chain. Bypass all hubs / use a rear motherboard USB 3 port if attaching it again.
 
-After it was first attached on 2026-04-19, hubris crashed twice in 2.5 days (46h then 12h uptime). Kernel logs ended abruptly with routine apparmor entries — no panic, OOM, or MCE — the classic hard-lock signature. Preceded by `uas_eh_abort_handler` storms and xHCI resets on port 6-1. The UAS blacklist + mount-on-demand mitigations didn't fully eliminate it (recurrence 2026-04-22), prompting drive removal as the cleaner test. See [investigation](../investigations/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md).
+After it was first attached on 2026-04-19, hubris crashed twice in 2.5 days (46h then 12h uptime). Kernel logs ended abruptly with routine apparmor entries — no panic, OOM, or MCE — the classic hard-lock signature. Preceded by `uas_eh_abort_handler` storms and xHCI resets on port 6-1. The UAS blacklist + mount-on-demand mitigations didn't fully eliminate it (recurrence 2026-04-22), prompting drive removal as the cleaner test. See [investigation](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md).
 
 ## Thermal monitoring
 
@@ -95,18 +119,21 @@ Moved out of this repo to `dtoro/claudio-monitor` on 2026-04-21 (commit `50dc213
 
 ## Related
 - [Hubris host](../hosts/hubris.md)
-- ~~[claudio-bot (123)](../containers/123-claudio-bot.md)~~ (destroyed 2026-06-04)
+- ~~[claudio-bot (123)](../containers/archive/123-claudio-bot.md)~~ (destroyed 2026-06-04)
 - [Monitoring](monitoring.md)
 - [Auto-deploy](auto-deploy.md)
-- [Investigation: 2026-04-21 crash loop](../investigations/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md)
+- [Investigation: 2026-04-21 crash loop](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md)
 
 ## Changelog
 
+### 2026-07-01 — DEPRECATED; superseded by rclone → Proton Drive (LXC 132)
+Off-host backup moved to a plain `rclone sync` mirror on the new [LXC 132 `rclone`](../containers/132-rclone.md) (`/mnt/library` → Proton Drive, monthly, LAN Web GUI). This finally provides the off-host copy the "Known SPOF" note wanted. The restic-on-USB units on hubris remain `disabled` (drive already removed 2026-04-22); page restructured to lead with the current job and demote restic to "Legacy".
+
 ### 2026-04-28 — wiki entry created
 Initial documentation. Status remains DISABLED.
 
 ### 2026-04-22 — DISABLED
-Drive removed as the A/B test in the [crash investigation](../investigations/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md). Timers disabled, fstab commented, drive de-authorized.
+Drive removed as the A/B test in the [crash investigation](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md). Timers disabled, fstab commented, drive de-authorized.
 
 ### 2026-04-21 — UAS blacklist + mount-on-demand shipped; root-caused host hangs to drive
 Drive identified as the source of the hangs after hubris crashed twice in 2.5 days. UAS blacklist forces BOT; helper script toggles `/sys/bus/usb/.../authorized` so the drive is de-authorized when not backing up. Recovery drill (restore 188KB PDF + hash compare) had passed earlier. Bug fixed in `backup-library.sh`: `python3 -c '…' KEY=VAL` does NOT pass env vars — env-var prefix must precede the command. Caused false-failure even after successful backups.

archive/knowledge/infrastructure/dns.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ There is **no wildcard on the LAN side**. Every subdomain needs an explicit entr
 ## Components
 
 - **Authoritative public DNS:** IONOS. `*.hubris.network → 82.165.190.79` (was `74.118.126.4` until 2026-04-22).
-- **LAN authoritative for `hubris.network` records:** [Technitium DNS](https://technitium.com) on [dns (107)](../containers/107-dns.md) at `192.168.8.2:53`. Syncs A records to the NetBird managed DNS zone via cron (see [dns-sync.py](../scripts/dns-sync.py)). Formerly dnsmasq on [authentik (124)](../containers/124-authentik.md) (decommissioned 2026-06-04).
+- **LAN authoritative for `hubris.network` records:** [Technitium DNS](https://technitium.com) on [dns (107)](../containers/107-dns.md) at `192.168.8.2:53`. Syncs A records to the NetBird managed DNS zone via cron (see [dns-sync.py](../../../scripts/dns-sync.py)). Formerly dnsmasq on [authentik (124)](../containers/106-auth-outpost.md) (decommissioned 2026-06-04).
 - **PVE host** (`192.168.8.77`): resolver is the local Netbird daemon at `100.122.38.109:53`, which forwards to the LAN/upstream and learns hubris.network answers via that path. `netbird status` says "Nameservers: 0/0 Available" — confirming netbird does NOT manage a hubris.network zone; it just caches whatever the system resolver returns.
 - **Some LXCs** keep router DNS (`192.168.8.1`) or Tailscale MagicDNS (`100.100.100.100`), both of which return the public IONOS A record. Those LXCs need either a `/etc/hosts` override or local dnsmasq — see [mesh migration](mesh.md) for which technique applies where.
 
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Creating a new Caddyfile site block is necessary but **not sufficient**. Without
 3. Verify: `dig @192.168.8.2 +short <new>.hubris.network` → `192.168.8.175`.
 4. On macOS clients, flush: `sudo dscacheutil -flushcache && sudo killall -HUP mDNSResponder`.
 
-> The Technitium config on LXC 107 is the single source of truth. Never hand-edit the NetBird managed zone directly — the [`scripts/dns-sync.py`](../scripts/dns-sync.py) cron on 107 reconciles them and reaps stale records. See [dns.md changelog 2026-06-03](#2026-06-03--single-authoring-source-technitium--netbird-managed-zone-sync).
+> The Technitium config on LXC 107 is the single source of truth. Never hand-edit the NetBird managed zone directly — the [`scripts/dns-sync.py`](../../../scripts/dns-sync.py) cron on 107 reconciles them and reaps stale records. See [dns.md changelog 2026-06-03](#2026-06-03--single-authoring-source-technitium--netbird-managed-zone-sync).
 
 ## Public path — what does and doesn't follow the LAN map
 
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ The "delete NetBird managed zone → forward everything to Technitium" plan was
 
 **Cleanup done same day:** removed the inert Mac-Mini Technitium secondary (mesh-only, served nobody); reverted the primary's `zoneTransfer=Allow`; fixed `home-lab-dns` group → `[192.168.8.2]` (dropped the self-referencing Mac IP → now `1/1 Available`); deleted the vestigial `Proxmox Names` group.
 
-> Reference: [scripts/dns-sync.py](../scripts/dns-sync.py). The sync's source of truth is Technitium; it **deletes** NetBird records absent from Technitium (so obsolete names like `files`, `photos-new` get reaped).
+> Reference: [scripts/dns-sync.py](../../../scripts/dns-sync.py). The sync's source of truth is Technitium; it **deletes** NetBird records absent from Technitium (so obsolete names like `files`, `photos-new` get reaped).
 
 ### 2026-06-06 — dns-sync cron finally installed (had been dormant since 2026-06-04 deployment)
 The `dns-sync.py` script on LXC 107 had been placed at `/opt/dns-sync/sync.py` on 2026-06-04 but **no crontab was configured** — the sync had never run automatically. The NetBird managed DNS zone was only in sync because manual runs happened during incident debugging.
@@ -107,10 +107,10 @@ Also added a Caddy backend health check cron on hubris (`/etc/cron.d/caddy-backe
 All LXCs that Caddy reverse-proxies to by IP were on `ip=dhcp` and could float on reboot (arriman got a different lease mid-session and broke). Fixed via `pct set` + in-LXC `/etc/network/interfaces`. Affected: 101 jellyfin, 103 paperless, 104 gitea, 105 apps, 114 nextcloud, 118 elementsynapse, 120 mule-images, 121 caddy, 122 arriman. See [arriman changelog](../containers/122-arriman.md#changelog).
 
 ### 2026-06-01 — dnsmasq replaced by Technitium on [dns (107)](../containers/107-dns.md); LXC 124 retired
-Split-horizon DNS moved off [124](../containers/124-authentik.md) to a dedicated **Technitium** LXC at **`192.168.8.2`** (zone: specific A overrides + wildcard→VPS + replicated MX/SPF/CAA). NetBird `home-lab-dns` nameserver group cut over to `192.168.8.2` (with `.180` as a now-dead fallback). dnsmasq stopped, all names verified via Technitium, **LXC 124 shut down**. **Caveat:** the [NetBird managed DNS zone](../containers/124-authentik.md) still answers most app names *directly* (bypassing the nameserver group) — three overlapping DNS sources remain; see the single-source-of-truth decision (Phase 4). **Action needed:** update router DHCP DNS from the dead `.180` → `192.168.8.2` for any plain-LAN (non-mesh) clients.
+Split-horizon DNS moved off [124](../containers/106-auth-outpost.md) to a dedicated **Technitium** LXC at **`192.168.8.2`** (zone: specific A overrides + wildcard→VPS + replicated MX/SPF/CAA). NetBird `home-lab-dns` nameserver group cut over to `192.168.8.2` (with `.180` as a now-dead fallback). dnsmasq stopped, all names verified via Technitium, **LXC 124 shut down**. **Caveat:** the [NetBird managed DNS zone](../containers/106-auth-outpost.md) still answers most app names *directly* (bypassing the nameserver group) — three overlapping DNS sources remain; see the single-source-of-truth decision (Phase 4). **Action needed:** update router DHCP DNS from the dead `.180` → `192.168.8.2` for any plain-LAN (non-mesh) clients.
 
 ### 2026-05-31 — `auth.hubris.network` re-pointed to the VPS (`82.165.190.79`)
-Authentik migrated off LXC 124 onto the VPS (see [investigation](../investigations/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md)). The dnsmasq entry changed from `192.168.8.175` (home Caddy) to `82.165.190.79` (VPS traefik). This is the first LAN entry that intentionally points at the VPS rather than Caddy — `auth` is now a genuinely public service served directly from the VPS. **Gotcha logged:** the NetBird per-client resolver (`100.122.255.254`) caches dnsmasq answers and does **not** clear on `netbird down/up`; clients needed `/etc/hosts` overrides or `resolvectl flush-caches` to pick up the change. Since the service is now fully public, the long-term cleaner option is to drop the override entirely and let it fall through to the IONOS wildcard (which also points at the VPS).
+Authentik migrated off LXC 124 onto the VPS (see [investigation](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md)). The dnsmasq entry changed from `192.168.8.175` (home Caddy) to `82.165.190.79` (VPS traefik). This is the first LAN entry that intentionally points at the VPS rather than Caddy — `auth` is now a genuinely public service served directly from the VPS. **Gotcha logged:** the NetBird per-client resolver (`100.122.255.254`) caches dnsmasq answers and does **not** clear on `netbird down/up`; clients needed `/etc/hosts` overrides or `resolvectl flush-caches` to pick up the change. Since the service is now fully public, the long-term cleaner option is to drop the override entirely and let it fall through to the IONOS wildcard (which also points at the VPS).
 
 ### 2026-05-14 — `nfs-export.hubris.network` added (direct, non-HTTP)
 NFSv4 export server [nfs-export (102)](../containers/102-nfs-export.md) at `192.168.8.200`. Direct entry, not Caddy-fronted — NFS is L4, no HTTP reverse-proxy meaningful.
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ NFSv4 export server [nfs-export (102)](../containers/102-nfs-export.md) at `192.
 New LAN entry for [100-zimaos](../vms/100-zimaos.md) → [caddy (121)](../containers/121-caddy.md) → `192.168.8.195`. Briefly pointed direct-to-VM during install for the initial smoke-test, then re-pointed once a Caddyfile block was added (`reverse_proxy 192.168.8.195` + IONOS DNS-01 TLS).
 
 ### 2026-05-13 — `plato.hubris.network` added; `files.hubris.network` removed
-New LAN-only entry for [plato (126)](../containers/126-plato.md). Same day, the `files.hubris.network` entry for the just-decommissioned seafile experiment was dropped; queries now fall through to the public IONOS answer (no LAN backend).
+New LAN-only entry for [plato (126)](../containers/index.md#recently-destroyed-kept-for-archaeology). Same day, the `files.hubris.network` entry for the just-decommissioned seafile experiment was dropped; queries now fall through to the public IONOS answer (no LAN backend).
 
 ### 2026-05-12 — `files.hubris.network` added (since removed 2026-05-13)
 Originally added for the seafile (LXC 125) Nextcloud-replacement evaluation. Pointed at 192.168.8.175 (Caddy reverse-proxied to 192.168.8.185:80). Entry removed when the experiment was torn down a day later.

archive/knowledge/infrastructure/homelab-context.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Code, Hermes Agent, future MCP-capable clients) on every machine in the lab
 self-locating and able to read the same source of truth.
 
 Operational walkthrough for enrolling a new client lives in
-[operations/agent-enrollment.md](../operations/agent-enrollment.md); this
+[operations/agent-enrollment.md](../../../.agents/operations/agent-enrollment.md); this
 page is the architecture reference.
 
 ## What's where
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ The MCP server and secrets-issuance each have their own clone
 
 ## Related
 
-- [Operations: agent enrollment](../operations/agent-enrollment.md) — the
+- [Operations: agent enrollment](../../../.agents/operations/agent-enrollment.md) — the
   step-by-step for adding a new client
 - [Auto-deploy](auto-deploy.md) — the `homelab-mcp` + `secrets-issuance`
   pipelines (and the rest of the lab's webhook pipelines)
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ The MCP server and secrets-issuance each have their own clone
 ## Changelog
 
 ### 2026-05-20 — system live across hubris, apps, republic-laptop
-Phase 1 of the [cross-client context plan](../README.md) merged. Three
+Phase 1 of the [cross-client context plan](../../../README.md) merged. Three
 clients enrolled end-to-end: PAT-based bootstrap, age-key issuance, SOPS
 decrypt verified on each. Webhook auto-deploy for both LXC 105 services
 wired (hook ids 10 + 11). `homelab refresh-creds` + atomic

archive/knowledge/infrastructure/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+# Infrastructure — cross-cutting systems
+
+The homelab's shared infrastructure: systems that span multiple nodes and
+are documented in their own pages. Each system below links to its full doc.
+
+## Network
+
+- **[Network](network.md)** — physical topology, subnets, routing, DHCP.
+  Homelab `192.168.8.0/24` isolated from household `192.168.178.0/24`.
+  Proxmox hubris acts as subnet router.
+- **[DNS — split-horizon](dns.md)** — Technitium DNS on LXC 107,
+  `192.168.8.2:53`. `*.hubris.network` resolves to LAN IPs on the homelab
+  network and to mesh addresses off-LAN.
+
+## Connectivity / mesh
+
+- **[Mesh — Tailscale → Netbird migration](mesh.md)** — overlay networking.
+  Netbird is the preferred path; Tailscale is legacy.
+- **[SSH access](ssh-access.md)** — dual-server SSH (OpenSSH + Netbird SSH)
+  on hubris, key distribution.
+
+## Public ingress
+
+- **[Public ingress — VPS traefik + cert mirror](ingress.md)** — how home
+  services reach the open internet. Two-stage: VPS traefik (IONOS) terminates
+  TLS, proxies over Netbird to home Caddy.
+- **[Caddy reverse proxy](../containers/121-caddy.md)** — LAN endpoint.
+  Terminates TLS for every `*.hubris.network` hostname, forwards to backends.
+
+## Storage
+
+- **[Media permissions — GID 10000 standard](media-permissions.md)** — shared
+  group permission model across all LXCs that read/write the media library.
+- **[Backups — rclone → Proton Drive](backups.md)** — off-host backup strategy.
+  LXC 132 handles rclone to Proton Drive; restic-on-USB deprecated.
+
+## Identity & access
+
+- **[Authentik SSO](../containers/106-auth-outpost.md)** — identity provider.
+  Core server runs on the VPS; LAN forward-auth outpost at LXC 106.
+  OIDC providers configured for Jellyfin, Jellyseerr, Sabnzbd, qBittorrent,
+  Yuvomi, and more.
+
+## Management & automation
+
+- **[Homelab context distribution](homelab-context.md)** — `/opt/homelab-context`
+  clone, MCP server, secrets issuance, cross-client sync.
+- **[Auto-deploy — gitea-webhook pipelines](auto-deploy.md)** — push-to-deploy
+  for Caddy config, mule-image, and other tracked repos.
+- **[Monitoring](monitoring.md)** — health checks, watchdogs, alerting
+  (migrated from claudio-bot to Hermes cron).
+- **[VPS hardening](vps-hardening.md)** — IONOS netbird VPS: fail2ban,
+  nftables, OIDC SSH, security posture.
+
+## Topology
+
+- **[Topology diagram (generated)](topology.md)** — Mermaid graph of compute,
+  ingress routing, and storage mounts. Auto-generated from `inventory.yaml`
+  by `oikos/gen-topology.py` (Python — Go DB-native replacement planned).
+
+## Related
+
+- [README](../../../README.md) — entry point
+- [Containers index](../containers/index.md)
+- [Operations cheatsheet](../../../.agents/operations/commands.md)
+- [OIKOS operating model](../../../.agents/OIKOS.md)

archive/knowledge/infrastructure/ingress.md

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ LAN clients resolve via the [Technitium DNS on dns (107)](dns.md) → `192.168.8
 
 ### `auth.hubris.network` — different pattern (local container, not cert-mirror)
 
-Since 2026-05-31 [Authentik runs on the VPS itself](../investigations/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md), so `auth.hubris.network` is served by a **local Docker container**, not proxied to a home backend. It therefore does **not** use the file-provider + cert-mirror pattern above:
+Since 2026-05-31 [Authentik runs on the VPS itself](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md), so `auth.hubris.network` is served by a **local Docker container**, not proxied to a home backend. It therefore does **not** use the file-provider + cert-mirror pattern above:
 
 - Routed via traefik **Docker provider labels** on the `authentik-server` service (`/opt/docker-compose.yml`), not `traefik-dynamic.yaml`.
 - TLS via traefik's own `letsencrypt` resolver (works here because it's a normal HTTP router, not the HostSNI passthrough).
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ No cert-mirror entry and no `hubris-public-cert-sync.sh` mapping is needed for `
 TRMNL plugins middleware on [trmnl (128)](../containers/128-trmnl.md). File-provider router `trmnl-public` → `192.168.8.211:9851`, `trmnl-ratelimit` (20 rps / 40 burst), cert mirrored as `trmnl.fullchain.crt`/`trmnl.privkey.key`. Verified live from the internet (200 with token / 401 without). It was provisioned during a mesh outage — the `home-lab-network` (192.168.8.0/24) route had no active routing peer because the **mac-mini routing peer's netbird was down** (all home-backed public services 504'd). Bringing netbird up on mac-mini restored the route; no traefik change was needed.
 
 ### 2026-05-31 — `auth.hubris.network` now served locally on the VPS
-Authentik migrated onto the VPS ([investigation](../investigations/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md)). Unlike the home-backed services above, `auth` is a local container routed via traefik Docker-provider labels with traefik-managed Let's Encrypt — no cert-mirror, no `traefik-dynamic.yaml` router. Admin UI gated by an ipAllowList middleware. Traefik gained a second Docker network (`auth`, `172.30.1.0/24`) to reach it while keeping its DB/Redis isolated from the netbird stack.
+Authentik migrated onto the VPS ([investigation](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md)). Unlike the home-backed services above, `auth` is a local container routed via traefik Docker-provider labels with traefik-managed Let's Encrypt — no cert-mirror, no `traefik-dynamic.yaml` router. Admin UI gated by an ipAllowList middleware. Traefik gained a second Docker network (`auth`, `172.30.1.0/24`) to reach it while keeping its DB/Redis isolated from the netbird stack.
 
 ### 2026-04-28 — wiki entry created
 Initial documentation.

archive/knowledge/infrastructure/media-permissions.md

@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ Every LXC that mounts `/mnt/library` participates in a shared `media` group with
 | 120 | [mule-images](../containers/120-mule-images.md) | priv | www-data                                    |
 | 122 | [arriman](../containers/122-arriman.md)       | priv | www-data, audiobookshelf, radarr, sonarr, lidarr, prowlarr, qbittorrent, bazarr, jellyseerr, mylar, jackett, overseerr, plex, arr |
 | 130 | [grimmory](../containers/130-grimmory.md)     | priv | Docker container uses `GROUP_ID=10000` env var (linuxserver pattern) — no in-LXC group needed |
+| 132 | [rclone](../containers/132-rclone.md)         | priv | **read-only** mount; runs as root → reads all subtrees. No media group needed |
 
 > Some entries from earlier snapshots — 100 (arr-yunohost), 107 (marimo), 109 (syncthing), 110 (photoprism), 112 (immich), 116 (heaper) — referenced LXCs that have since been destroyed. See [containers/index](../containers/index.md#recently-destroyed-kept-for-archaeology).
 

archive/knowledge/infrastructure/mesh.md

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Recipe for container-config changes (e.g. adding `extra_hosts`) on Portainer-man
 
 ## Related
 - [DNS split-horizon](dns.md)
-- [Authentik (124)](../containers/124-authentik.md) — the IdP that triggers most of these overrides
+- [Authentik (124)](../containers/106-auth-outpost.md) — the IdP that triggers most of these overrides
 - [Nextcloud (114)](../containers/114-nextcloud.md) — example of Technique B
 - [Gitea (104)](../containers/104-gitea.md) — example of Technique A
 - [Public ingress (VPS traefik)](ingress.md) — uses the same mesh as transport
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ Recipe for container-config changes (e.g. adding `extra_hosts`) on Portainer-man
 ## Changelog
 
 ### 2026-05-31 (later) — Authentik moved to the VPS; mesh-dependency for auth eliminated (supersedes the band-aid below)
-The earlier same-day fix routed `auth.hubris.network` through VPS Traefik → Caddy → LXC 124 **over the mesh**. That restored service but re-created the original fragility: if the mesh is dark when management restarts, the `192.168.8.175` backend is unreachable and management crash-loops again (the "Bootstrap note" in the entry below). That note is now **obsolete** — Authentik was migrated onto the VPS itself, so OIDC no longer touches the mesh. The `auth-authentik` → `192.168.8.175` route and its `skip-verify` transport were removed from `/opt/traefik-dynamic.yaml`; `auth.hubris.network` is now served by a local `authentik-server` container via Traefik Docker-provider labels, and netbird-mgmt has `depends_on: authentik-server: condition: service_healthy`. The socat / reverse-SSH bootstrap dance is no longer needed. Full detail: [2026-05-31 Authentik VPS migration](../investigations/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md).
+The earlier same-day fix routed `auth.hubris.network` through VPS Traefik → Caddy → LXC 124 **over the mesh**. That restored service but re-created the original fragility: if the mesh is dark when management restarts, the `192.168.8.175` backend is unreachable and management crash-loops again (the "Bootstrap note" in the entry below). That note is now **obsolete** — Authentik was migrated onto the VPS itself, so OIDC no longer touches the mesh. The `auth-authentik` → `192.168.8.175` route and its `skip-verify` transport were removed from `/opt/traefik-dynamic.yaml`; `auth.hubris.network` is now served by a local `authentik-server` container via Traefik Docker-provider labels, and netbird-mgmt has `depends_on: authentik-server: condition: service_healthy`. The socat / reverse-SSH bootstrap dance is no longer needed. Full detail: [2026-05-31 Authentik VPS migration](../../sources/investigations/archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md).
 
 ### 2026-05-31 — Netbird mesh recovered; auth.hubris.network exposed via VPS Traefik
 
@@ -139,11 +139,11 @@ The earlier same-day fix routed `auth.hubris.network` through VPS Traefik → Ca
 ### 2026-05-21 — VPS migrated combined → vanilla netbird stack with external TURN
 The combined `netbirdio/netbird-server` image was replaced with the canonical multi-container deploy (`netbirdio/management:0.71.3` + `signal:0.71.3` + `relay:0.71.3` + `dashboard:latest` + host coturn) on `/opt/docker-compose.yml`. Driver: combined image silently ignored external `TURNConfig` so symmetric-NAT peers couldn't use TURN.
 
-Same migration also swapped OIDC from the combined image's embedded Dex IdP to Authentik on [LXC 124](../containers/124-authentik.md), upgrading mgmt to 0.71.3. The `store.db` schema auto-migrated cleanly from 0.68.3 (copy-not-move from the old `opt_netbird_data` volume into the new `mgmt_data` volume). Pre-cutover backups at `/root/netbird-*.tgz` on the VPS, ~857 MB, retained for ~7d.
+Same migration also swapped OIDC from the combined image's embedded Dex IdP to Authentik on [LXC 124](../containers/106-auth-outpost.md), upgrading mgmt to 0.71.3. The `store.db` schema auto-migrated cleanly from 0.68.3 (copy-not-move from the old `opt_netbird_data` volume into the new `mgmt_data` volume). Pre-cutover backups at `/root/netbird-*.tgz` on the VPS, ~857 MB, retained for ~7d.
 
 Also during this work: IONOS upstream was found to filter TCP 3478 in addition to UDP 3478. Added a TCP-3478 inbound exception in the IONOS firewall (see ICE/STUN section above for the verification probe).
 
-The new Authentik provider for NetBird is `Client type: Public` (PKCE-only). Confidential would break the dashboard SPA's token exchange. The Device Code grant flow is wired (see [containers/124-authentik.md](../containers/124-authentik.md#device-code-grant--configured-2026-05-21)) so interactive `netbird up` works — `--setup-key` is no longer required for new peers.
+The new Authentik provider for NetBird is `Client type: Public` (PKCE-only). Confidential would break the dashboard SPA's token exchange. The Device Code grant flow is wired (see [containers/124-authentik.md](../containers/106-auth-outpost.md#device-code-grant--configured-2026-05-21)) so interactive `netbird up` works — `--setup-key` is no longer required for new peers.
 
 **Post-migration JWT-issuer gotcha on existing peers** (cost ~30 min to diagnose 2026-05-21):
 

archive/knowledge/infrastructure/network.md

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ No NAT on Proxmox — traffic flows without double-NAT.
 
 ## Remote access
 
-- **NetBird mesh** — primary path for remote administration. Authenticated via [Authentik on the VPS](../vps/).
+- **NetBird mesh** — primary path for remote administration. Authenticated via [Authentik on the VPS](../../../vps/).
 - **Tailscale** — legacy, being phased out. See [mesh.md](mesh.md).
 
 ## Related
@@ -79,10 +79,10 @@ No NAT on Proxmox — traffic flows without double-NAT.
 
 ### 2026-06-17 — Fritz!Box DNSv4 server set to Technitium (192.168.8.2)
 Household LAN clients (192.168.178.x) now resolve `*.hubris.network` to LAN IPs. Configured in Fritz!Box at Internet → Filter → DNS Server → DNSv4 Server → "Use other DNSv4 servers" → Preferred = `192.168.8.2`. No per-device or Netbird setup needed.
-Previous pool `.100–.240` overlapped with all static LXCs/VMs (` .101–.239`), creating IP conflict risk (DHCP could hand out an IP that a static service expects). Shrunk pool to `.241–.254` via Technitium API. No services re-IP'd. 11 stale DHCP leases in `.101–.110` will expire naturally. **Open:** ZimaOS (VM 100) holds DHCP lease `.103` but inventory expects `.195` — needs static IP set inside VM. See [plan](../plans/2026-06-03-dhcp-pool-exclude-static-ips.md).
+Previous pool `.100–.240` overlapped with all static LXCs/VMs (` .101–.239`), creating IP conflict risk (DHCP could hand out an IP that a static service expects). Shrunk pool to `.241–.254` via Technitium API. No services re-IP'd. 11 stale DHCP leases in `.101–.110` will expire naturally. **Open:** ZimaOS (VM 100) holds DHCP lease `.103` but inventory expects `.195` — needs static IP set inside VM. See [plan](../../../.hermes/plans/2026-06-03_223218-dhcp-pool-exclude-static-ips.md).
 
 ### 2026-06-02 — Executed migration; Proxmox as subnet router
-Fritz!OS 8.x does not support second IP networks on LAN ports, so the final design uses Proxmox as the router: `vmbr1` (eno1 → SODOLA → Fritz!Box) is the uplink at `192.168.178.10`; `vmbr0` is a portless internal bridge with `192.168.8.1` alias as the LXC gateway. Technitium DHCP enabled for `192.168.8.100–240`. Caddy service unit was missing and recreated. See [migration plan](../plans/2026-06-01-slate-ax-to-sodola-migration.md).
+Fritz!OS 8.x does not support second IP networks on LAN ports, so the final design uses Proxmox as the router: `vmbr1` (eno1 → SODOLA → Fritz!Box) is the uplink at `192.168.178.10`; `vmbr0` is a portless internal bridge with `192.168.8.1` alias as the LXC gateway. Technitium DHCP enabled for `192.168.8.100–240`. Caddy service unit was missing and recreated. See [migration plan](../../../plans/done/2026-06-01-slate-ax-to-sodola-migration.md).
 
 ### 2026-06-01 — Initial network doc; Slate AX retired; SODOLA switch added
-Replaced the GL.iNet Slate AX sub-router with the SODOLA 5-Port 2.5Gbit managed switch. Eliminated double-NAT. See [migration plan](../plans/2026-06-01-slate-ax-to-sodola-migration.md).
+Replaced the GL.iNet Slate AX sub-router with the SODOLA 5-Port 2.5Gbit managed switch. Eliminated double-NAT. See [migration plan](../../../plans/done/2026-06-01-slate-ax-to-sodola-migration.md).

archive/knowledge/infrastructure/ssh-access.md

@@ -97,19 +97,23 @@ When onboarding a new machine:
 
 ## Hosts
 
-### Hubris (PVE host)
+### Hubris + strong (PVE cluster: `Homelab`)
 
-| Detail | Value |
-|--------|-------|
-| LAN IP | `192.168.8.77` |
-| Netbird | `100.122.38.109` (FQDN: `proxmox-server.netbird.selfhosted`) |
-| Netbird SSH port | `22022` (mesh-only, OIDC auth) |
-| SSH user | `root` |
-| Authorized keys | `/etc/pve/priv/authorized_keys` (Proxmox cluster-synced) |
+Both nodes share `/etc/pve/priv/authorized_keys` — it's Proxmox
+cluster-synced, so a key added on either node is authorized on both.
 
-Authorized root keys currently deployed:
+| Detail | hubris | strong |
+|--------|--------|-----------|
+| LAN IP | `192.168.8.77` | `192.168.178.181` |
+| Cluster node name | `hubris` | `strong` (OS hostname kept as-is from install) |
+| Netbird | `100.122.38.109` (`proxmox-server.netbird.selfhosted`) | not enrolled yet |
+| Netbird SSH port | `22022` (mesh-only, OIDC auth) | n/a |
+| SSH user | `root` | `root` |
+
+Authorized root keys currently deployed (cluster-wide):
 - `root@hubris` (self, RSA)
 - `d.toro.v@pm.me` (ed25519) — mac-mini
+- `root@strong` (RSA) — strong's own key, added 2026-07-01 for the cluster join
 
 ### LXCs
 
@@ -138,7 +142,8 @@ are managed by `ssh/deploy-keys.sh`. SSH user is `root`.
 |------|----|--------|--------------|----------|
 | mac-mini | macOS | `192.168.8.174` | `mac-mini-234-17.netbird.selfhosted` | `dtoro` |
 | republic-laptop | Linux | TBD | `republic-laptop.netbird.selfhosted` | `dtoro` |
-| ludo-mini | Linux | `192.168.8.133` | `ludo-mini.netbird.selfhosted` | TBD |
+
+strong moved out of this table 2026-07-01 — it's a Proxmox host now, see the cluster table above.
 
 ### VPS (external)
 
@@ -173,11 +178,14 @@ done
 
 - [Mesh migration](mesh.md)
 - [VPS hardening](vps-hardening.md)
-- [Agent enrollment](../operations/agent-enrollment.md)
-- [Homelab CLI](../bin/homelab)
+- [Agent enrollment](../../../.agents/operations/agent-enrollment.md)
+- [Homelab CLI](../../../bin/homelab)
 
 ## Changelog
 
+### 2026-07-01 — strong reformatted to Proxmox, joined cluster; table corrected
+strong moved from the Workstations table to the PVE-cluster table (was showing a stale `192.168.8.133`, never actually reachable — the real LAN IP has always been `192.168.178.181`, matching hosts/strong.yaml). Root key access bootstrapped via one-time console password, then key-only going forward. See [hosts/hubris.md#cluster](../hosts/hubris.md#cluster) and [hosts/strong.md](../hosts/strong.md).
+
 ### 2026-06-02 — universal SSH reachability
 
 Replaced ad-hoc per-workstation SSH configs with inventory-generated

archive/knowledge/infrastructure/topology.md

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+<!-- Generated by oikos/gen-topology.py from inventory.yaml. -->
+<!-- Do NOT edit by hand - your changes will be overwritten. -->
+
+# Topology (generated)
+
+Source: [inventory.yaml](../../../inventory.yaml) — 2 hypervisors, 20 LXCs, 2 VMs, 2 workstations, 18 services.
+Edge semantics: [oikos/ontology.yaml](../../../oikos/ontology.yaml). Operating model: [OIKOS.md](../../../.agents/OIKOS.md).
+
+## Compute & ingress
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+    subgraph hubris_sub["hubris (Proxmox)"]
+        trmnl["trmnl<br/>LXC 128<br/>trmnl-middleware<br/>192.168.8.211"]
+        nfs_export["nfs-export<br/>LXC 102<br/>storage-export<br/>192.168.8.200"]
+        paperless["paperless<br/>LXC 103<br/>document-archive<br/>192.168.8.130"]
+        gitea["gitea<br/>LXC 104<br/>git-server<br/>192.168.8.121"]
+        apps["apps<br/>LXC 105<br/>docker-apps<br/>192.168.8.205"]
+        auth_outpost["auth-outpost<br/>LXC 106<br/>authentik-gateway<br/>192.168.8.6"]
+        dns["dns<br/>LXC 107<br/>dns-server<br/>192.168.8.2"]
+        nextcloud["nextcloud<br/>LXC 114<br/>file-sync<br/>192.168.8.224"]
+        sophia["sophia<br/>LXC 119<br/>workshop<br/>192.168.8.109"]
+        mule_images["mule-images<br/>LXC 120<br/>photo-management<br/>192.168.8.136"]
+        caddy["caddy<br/>LXC 121<br/>reverse-proxy<br/>192.168.8.175"]
+        teddycloud["teddycloud<br/>LXC 131<br/>teddycloud<br/>192.168.8.150"]
+        zimaos["zimaos<br/>VM 100<br/>nas-frontend-eval<br/>192.168.8.195"]
+        haos["haos<br/>VM 108<br/>home-automation<br/>192.168.8.101"]
+    end
+    subgraph strong_sub["strong (Proxmox)"]
+        house["house<br/>LXC 129<br/>family-planner<br/>192.168.8.244"]
+        jellyfin["jellyfin<br/>LXC 101<br/>media-server<br/>192.168.8.246"]
+        elementsynapse["elementsynapse<br/>LXC 118<br/>matrix-server<br/>192.168.8.242"]
+        arriman["arriman<br/>LXC 122<br/>arr-stack<br/>192.168.8.245"]
+        grimmory["grimmory<br/>LXC 130<br/>book-library<br/>192.168.8.247"]
+        seanime["seanime<br/>LXC 133<br/>anime-media-server<br/>192.168.8.248"]
+        romm["romm<br/>LXC 134<br/>rom-manager<br/>192.168.8.249"]
+    end
+    rclone["rclone<br/>lxc<br/>backup"]
+    republic_laptop([republic-laptop<br/>workstation<br/>primary-dev])
+    mac_mini([mac-mini<br/>workstation<br/>dev<br/>192.168.178.182])
+    netbird_vps[[netbird-vps<br/>external<br/>netbird-mgmt]]
+    url_artifacto(["artifacto.hubris.network"]) -->|routes-to| apps
+    url_authentik(["auth.hubris.network"]) -->|routes-to| netbird_vps
+    url_gitea(["git.hubris.network"]) -->|routes-to| gitea
+    url_homelab_mcp(["mcp.hubris.network"]) -->|routes-to| apps
+    url_jellyfin(["media.hubris.network"]) -->|routes-to| jellyfin
+    url_matrix(["matrix.hubris.network"]) -->|routes-to| elementsynapse
+    url_nextcloud(["cloud.hubris.network"]) -->|routes-to| nextcloud
+    url_paperless(["paperless.hubris.network"]) -->|routes-to| paperless
+    url_photos(["photos.hubris.network"]) -->|routes-to| mule_images
+    url_proxmox_ui(["proxmox.hubris.network"]) -->|routes-to| hubris_sub
+    url_secrets_issuance(["secrets.hubris.network"]) -->|routes-to| apps
+    url_teddycloud(["teddy.hubris.network"]) -->|routes-to| teddycloud
+    url_trmnl(["trmnl.hubris.network"]) -->|routes-to| trmnl
+    url_zimaos(["zimaos.hubris.network"]) -->|routes-to| zimaos
+```
+
+## Storage (mounts)
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+    mnt_library[("/mnt/library")]
+    mnt_media_local[("/mnt/media_local")]
+    mnt_media_local_anime[("/mnt/media_local/anime")]
+    apps["apps"] -->|mounts| mnt_library
+    arriman["arriman"] -->|mounts| mnt_media_local
+    gitea["gitea"] -->|mounts| mnt_library
+    grimmory["grimmory"] -->|mounts| mnt_media_local
+    hubris["hubris"] -->|mounts| mnt_library
+    jellyfin["jellyfin"] -->|mounts| mnt_media_local
+    mule_images["mule-images"] -->|mounts| mnt_library
+    nextcloud["nextcloud"] -->|mounts| mnt_library
+    paperless["paperless"] -->|mounts| mnt_library
+    romm["romm"] -->|mounts| mnt_media_local
+    seanime["seanime"] -->|mounts| mnt_media_local_anime
+    sophia["sophia"] -->|mounts| mnt_library
+    teddycloud["teddycloud"] -->|mounts| mnt_library
+```
+
+## Archaeology (destroyed nodes)
+
+| Node | ID | Destroyed | Reason |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| plato | 126 | 2026-06-28 | notes workspace decommissioned; data retained at /mnt/library/documents/plato |
+| claudio-bot | 123 | 2026-06-04 | replaced by Hermes Agent on mac-mini; monitoring moved to homelab-health-watchdog cron |
+| mule-photos-new | 127 | 2026-05-22 | PhotoPrism test stack promoted to LXC 120 (Mulimage 2.0 merge) |
+| heaper | 116 | 2026-05-14 | decommissioned; data retained at /mnt/library/heaper |
+| syncthing | 109 | 2026-05-14 | decommissioned; library subtree was empty |
+| seafile | 125 | 2026-05-13 | Seafile Pro evaluation rejected; files.hubris.network removed from caddy + dns |
+| arr-yunohost | 100 | 2026-04-28 | migrated to docker stack on arriman (LXC 122) |
+| flaresolverr | 106 | 2026-04-28 | folded into the arriman docker compose |
+| marimo | 107 | 2026-04-28 | decommissioned |
+| photoprism | 110 | 2026-04-28 | replaced by mule-images (LXC 120) |
+| karakeep | 111 | 2026-04-28 | decommissioned |
+| immich | 112 | 2026-04-28 | replaced by mule-images (LXC 120) |
+| reticulum | 115 | 2026-04-28 | decommissioned |

archive/knowledge/investigations/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md

@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@
 
 ## Summary
 
-[`hubris`](../hosts/hubris.md) hard-locked repeatedly on 2026-04-21 (silent CPU hangs, no panic, no OOM, no MCE). Two contributors identified: idle CPU sitting at ~95 °C on the `performance` governor, and a USB-attached external SSD whose UAS interaction with the AMD USB4/Thunderbolt PCIe tunnel triggered hard locks. CPU thermal addressed via `cpu-epp.service`; drive removed 2026-04-22 as an A/B test. As of 2026-04-28 the host has 3+ days uptime — the drive looks like the primary contributor; `cpu-epp` remains as belt-and-suspenders.
+[`hubris`](../../../wiki/hosts/hubris.md) hard-locked repeatedly on 2026-04-21 (silent CPU hangs, no panic, no OOM, no MCE). Two contributors identified: idle CPU sitting at ~95 °C on the `performance` governor, and a USB-attached external SSD whose UAS interaction with the AMD USB4/Thunderbolt PCIe tunnel triggered hard locks. CPU thermal addressed via `cpu-epp.service`; drive removed 2026-04-22 as an A/B test. As of 2026-04-28 the host has 3+ days uptime — the drive looks like the primary contributor; `cpu-epp` remains as belt-and-suspenders.
 
 ## Timeline
 
 ### 2026-04-19 — drive attached
-External `Silicon Motion Portable SSD` (vid:pid `090c:2320`) attached for the new restic [backup pipeline](../infrastructure/backups.md). Pre-attach uptime had been 33 days stable.
+External `Silicon Motion Portable SSD` (vid:pid `090c:2320`) attached for the new restic [backup pipeline](../../../wiki/infrastructure/backups.md). Pre-attach uptime had been 33 days stable.
 
 ### 2026-04-19 → 2026-04-21 — first crashes
 Two hard crashes in 2.5 days (46 h then 12 h uptime). Kernel logs ended abruptly with routine apparmor entries — no panic, OOM, or MCE — the classic hard-lock signature. Preceded by `uas_eh_abort_handler` storms and xHCI resets on port 6-1.
@@ -24,13 +24,13 @@ Two hard crashes in 2.5 days (46 h then 12 h uptime). Kernel logs ended abruptly
 - **Mount-on-demand** for the drive: `/usr/local/sbin/backup-usb.sh attach|detach|status` toggles `/sys/bus/usb/devices/*/authorized` so the drive is de-authorized when no backup is running.
 
 ### 2026-04-22 — recurrence after 30 h 37 m
-Same silent-cutoff signature at 18:42:08. Much longer than any pre-`cpu-epp` crash (12 h max), so `cpu-epp` helps but is not sufficient on its own. [claudio-monitor](../infrastructure/monitoring.md) showed healthy runtimes up to 43 s before the hang (no pre-crash degradation). No MCE / no RAS / pstore empty.
+Same silent-cutoff signature at 18:42:08. Much longer than any pre-`cpu-epp` crash (12 h max), so `cpu-epp` helps but is not sufficient on its own. [claudio-monitor](../../../wiki/infrastructure/monitoring.md) showed healthy runtimes up to 43 s before the hang (no pre-crash degradation). No MCE / no RAS / pstore empty.
 
 ### 2026-04-22 — `cpu-epp.service` design bug fixed
 Was `After=multi-user.target` + `WantedBy=multi-user.target` — queued behind `pve-guests.service`. The hottest window of every boot (20 LXCs + 1 VM coming up) ran on the `performance` governor. Fixed: now `After=sysinit.target` + `Before=pve-guests.service`.
 
 ### 2026-04-22 — drive removed (A/B test)
-User physically removed the external USB drive. [Backup timers disabled](../infrastructure/backups.md#status), fstab entry commented, drive de-authorized. Goal: confirm whether the drive + UAS + AMD USB4 PCIe-tunnel interaction is the dominant root cause.
+User physically removed the external USB drive. [Backup timers disabled](../../../wiki/infrastructure/backups.md#status), fstab entry commented, drive de-authorized. Goal: confirm whether the drive + UAS + AMD USB4 PCIe-tunnel interaction is the dominant root cause.
 
 ### 2026-04-23 — SSD cooling + thermal pads installed
 Cold-boot baseline (3 min uptime): nvme0n1 35 °C composite / sensor1 (controller) **53 °C**; nvme1n1 36 °C composite / both sensors ≤36 °C. Lifetime warning-time counters at install: nvme0n1 709 min warn + 5 min crit; nvme1n1 778 min warn + 45 min crit — both drives had spent real time in thermal warning historically.
@@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ Checked 2026-04-21. GMKtec is **not on LVFS**, so `fwupdmgr` can't update the Nu
 | `pcie_aspm=off pci=nomsi`                 | NOT applied | Reserved for if crashes recur without the drive    |
 
 ## Affected nodes
-- [Hubris host](../hosts/hubris.md)
-- [Backups (disabled)](../infrastructure/backups.md)
-- [Monitoring](../infrastructure/monitoring.md)
+- [Hubris host](../../../wiki/hosts/hubris.md)
+- [Backups (disabled)](../../../wiki/infrastructure/backups.md)
+- [Monitoring](../../../wiki/infrastructure/monitoring.md)
 
 ## Open questions
 - Will the host stay up indefinitely without the drive? (Test ongoing — 3+ days as of 2026-04-28.)

archive/knowledge/investigations/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 
 ## Summary
 
-The NetBird management server (on the [VPS](../infrastructure/ingress.md)) crash-looped 1200+ times because it fetches the Authentik OIDC discovery document on startup, and Authentik was only reachable via the NetBird mesh — which was down *because* mgmt couldn't start. A classic bootstrap deadlock: **mgmt needs OIDC → OIDC needs the mesh → the mesh needs mgmt.**
+The NetBird management server (on the [VPS](../../../wiki/infrastructure/ingress.md)) crash-looped 1200+ times because it fetches the Authentik OIDC discovery document on startup, and Authentik was only reachable via the NetBird mesh — which was down *because* mgmt couldn't start. A classic bootstrap deadlock: **mgmt needs OIDC → OIDC needs the mesh → the mesh needs mgmt.**
 
-Resolved by moving Authentik off [LXC 124](../containers/124-authentik.md) onto the VPS itself, so `auth.hubris.network` resolves to a container co-located with netbird-mgmt — no mesh dependency. A `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on the mgmt service makes the deadlock structurally impossible to recur.
+Resolved by moving Authentik off [LXC 124](../../../wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md) onto the VPS itself, so `auth.hubris.network` resolves to a container co-located with netbird-mgmt — no mesh dependency. A `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on the mgmt service makes the deadlock structurally impossible to recur.
 
 The full Authentik Postgres DB (all users, apps, passwords, groups) was migrated, so every gated app keeps working with no per-app reconfiguration.
 
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ The real reason the browser kept hitting the *old* Authentik even after the VPS
 
 1. **Redirect URI error.** The restored DB had redirect URIs in `REGEX` matching mode; in Authentik 2026.5.x they failed to match. Fixed by switching to `STRICT` exact matching (Django ORM, `RedirectURIMatchingMode.STRICT`). Set all four: `http://localhost:53000/` (CLI), `https://netbird.hubris.network/{peers,nb-auth,nb-silent-auth}`.
 2. **Only the password field showed (no username).** NetBird passes `login_hint=<email>` in the OAuth2 URL → Authentik pre-identifies and skips the identification stage. Expected behavior; not a bug.
-3. **"Request has been denied. Unknown error."** Several overlapping causes: wrong password (reset via Django shell), reputation lockout after repeated failures (`Reputation.objects.all().delete()` — see [124-authentik](../containers/124-authentik.md)), and **broken default expression policies**. The restored DB carried 8 default policies authored in old `return`-style syntax incompatible with 2026.5.x's eval context; `ak apply_blueprints` re-applied the current defaults.
+3. **"Request has been denied. Unknown error."** Several overlapping causes: wrong password (reset via Django shell), reputation lockout after repeated failures (`Reputation.objects.all().delete()` — see [124-authentik](../../../wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md)), and **broken default expression policies**. The restored DB carried 8 default policies authored in old `return`-style syntax incompatible with 2026.5.x's eval context; `ak apply_blueprints` re-applied the current defaults.
 4. **Browser ran stale frontend JS.** Console showed `version 2026.2.2` while the backend was `2026.5.2` — because DNS still pointed at the old LXC (see DNS cutover above), not a cache issue.
 5. **WebAuthn devices dead post-migration.** Passkeys are device/origin-bound and don't survive a host move. Deleted all WebAuthn devices via Django ORM; users must re-register MFA.
 
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ The real reason the browser kept hitting the *old* Authentik even after the VPS
 
 | | Before | After |
 |---|---|---|
-| Authentik host | [LXC 124](../containers/124-authentik.md) `192.168.8.180` | VPS `82.165.190.79`, `auth` Docker net `172.30.1.0/24` |
+| Authentik host | [LXC 124](../../../wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md) `192.168.8.180` | VPS `82.165.190.79`, `auth` Docker net `172.30.1.0/24` |
 | Version | `2026.2.2` | `2026.5.2` |
 | `auth.hubris.network` (LAN) | dnsmasq → `192.168.8.175` (Caddy) | dnsmasq → `82.165.190.79` (VPS traefik) |
 | `auth.hubris.network` (public) | IONOS wildcard → VPS → mesh → LXC 124 | IONOS wildcard → VPS → local container |
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ The real reason the browser kept hitting the *old* Authentik even after the VPS
 
 Forward-auth apps (Paperless, qBittorrent, Artifacto) initially still validated against LXC 124's *embedded* outpost (Caddy → `192.168.8.180:9000`) — split-brain against the frozen DB. Pointing Caddy at `https://auth.hubris.network` instead fails: VPS Traefik rewrites `X-Forwarded-Host` → outpost can't match the app → 404 (tested + reverted).
 
-Fixed with a **dedicated LAN outpost** ([106 — auth-outpost](../containers/106-auth-outpost.md), `192.168.8.6`): `goauthentik/proxy` connects outbound to the VPS core and serves forward-auth locally; Caddy → outpost over the LAN, no Traefik, header preserved. Outpost `hubris-lan-outpost` carries the 3 proxy providers. Verified with 124-Authentik **stopped**. This was Phase 1 of the broader architecture migration (plan: VPS edge / hubris LAN core / Mac Mini redundancy).
+Fixed with a **dedicated LAN outpost** ([106 — auth-outpost](../../../wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md), `192.168.8.6`): `goauthentik/proxy` connects outbound to the VPS core and serves forward-auth locally; Caddy → outpost over the LAN, no Traefik, header preserved. Outpost `hubris-lan-outpost` carries the 3 proxy providers. Verified with 124-Authentik **stopped**. This was Phase 1 of the broader architecture migration (plan: VPS edge / hubris LAN core / Mac Mini redundancy).
 
 ### 2026-06-05 — identification stage skip: broken "Trust me" reputation policy
 
@@ -99,11 +99,11 @@ The policy was orphaned (no matched type data or had incompatible evaluation). R
 - **muli-laptop** needs `netbird down && netbird up` + `resolvectl flush-caches`.
 - **VPS port 22** opened for this repair; close once remote access is otherwise stable.
 - **Decommission LXC 124 Authentik** after a ~2-week dual-run validation. dnsmasq stays on 124 regardless (separate service).
-- **Reconcile [124-authentik](../containers/124-authentik.md) provider notes** — docs describe a `Public`/PKCE provider; the migrated DB carries the `Confidential` `netbird-dashboard` client. Verify which is live and correct the page.
+- **Reconcile [124-authentik](../../../wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md) provider notes** — docs describe a `Public`/PKCE provider; the migrated DB carries the `Confidential` `netbird-dashboard` client. Verify which is live and correct the page.
 - **sops-encrypt** the VPS secrets (`/opt/authentik.env`) into the `secrets/` tree.
 
 ## Related
-- [124 — authentik](../containers/124-authentik.md)
-- [DNS split-horizon](../infrastructure/dns.md)
-- [Public ingress (VPS traefik)](../infrastructure/ingress.md)
-- [Mesh migration](../infrastructure/mesh.md)
+- [124 — authentik](../../../wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md)
+- [DNS split-horizon](../../../wiki/infrastructure/dns.md)
+- [Public ingress (VPS traefik)](../../../wiki/infrastructure/ingress.md)
+- [Mesh migration](../../../wiki/infrastructure/mesh.md)

archive/knowledge/investigations/2026-06-03-moonlight-sunshine-wifi-jitter.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 ## Summary
 
-[`ludo-mini`](../hosts/ludo-mini.yaml) runs Sunshine as the game-streaming server; [`mac-mini`](../hosts/mac-mini.yaml) runs Moonlight as the client. Despite both machines being on the same physical subnet (192.168.178.0/24), streaming was unstable — stuttering, dropouts, and high latency. Root cause: **mac-mini is connected only via WiFi**, while ludo-mini is wired Ethernet (2.5 Gbps). WiFi throughput shows 1-second UDP dropouts and high jitter (28 ms stddev), which breaks real-time video streaming.
+[`ludo-mini`](../../../hosts/strong.yaml) runs Sunshine as the game-streaming server; [`mac-mini`](../../../hosts/mac-mini.yaml) runs Moonlight as the client. Despite both machines being on the same physical subnet (192.168.178.0/24), streaming was unstable — stuttering, dropouts, and high latency. Root cause: **mac-mini is connected only via WiFi**, while ludo-mini is wired Ethernet (2.5 Gbps). WiFi throughput shows 1-second UDP dropouts and high jitter (28 ms stddev), which breaks real-time video streaming.
 
 ## Timeline
 

archive/knowledge/investigations/2026-06-06-authentik-session-lifetime.md

@@ -90,9 +90,9 @@ print("session_duration:", stage.session_duration)  # → "days=30"
 
 ## Related
 
-- [Container 106 — auth-outpost](../containers/106-auth-outpost.md)
-- [Authentik VPS migration](2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md)
-- [Ingress (VPS Traefik)](../infrastructure/ingress.md)
+- [Container 106 — auth-outpost](../../wiki/containers/106-auth-outpost.md)
+- [Authentik VPS migration](archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md)
+- [Ingress (VPS Traefik)](../../wiki/infrastructure/ingress.md)
 - `.hermes/plans/2026-06-06_232200-authentik-frequent-login-fix.md` — original plan
 
 ## Changelog

archive/knowledge/investigations/2026-06-06-caddyfile-truncation.md

@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ This is the same class of drift as the June 5th incidents (paperless, HAOS, apps
 
 ## Related
 
-- [DHCP drift investigation (previous incident)](2026-06-05-homelab-dhcp-drift.md)
-- [Caddy (121)](../containers/121-caddy.md)
-- [elementsynapse (118)](../containers/118-elementsynapse.md)
-- [dns-sync script](../scripts/dns-sync.py)
-- [check-caddy-backends script](../scripts/check-caddy-backends.sh)
+- DHCP drift investigation (previous incident) — not filed as its own investigation; see the [DNS sync fix](../../../.hermes/plans/2026-06-05_170000-prevent-dhcp-ip-drift.md)
+- [Caddy (121)](../../wiki/containers/121-caddy.md)
+- [elementsynapse (118)](../../wiki/containers/118-elementsynapse.md)
+- [dns-sync script](../../../scripts/dns-sync.py)
+- [check-caddy-backends script](../../../scripts/check-caddy-backends.sh)

archive/knowledge/investigations/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Investigations
+
+Time-stamped incident reports and experiments. One entry per incident; the entry is the canonical source. Per-node changelog entries link back here.
+
+## Active / recent
+
+| Date         | Title                                                              | Status        |
+| ------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------- |
+| 2026-06-06   | [Caddyfile truncation incident](2026-06-06-caddyfile-truncation.md) | Resolved — permanent safeguards deployed (site-count guard, auto-stash, auto-backup) |
+| 2026-06-06   | [Frequent Authentik login prompts — session lifetime fix](2026-06-06-authentik-session-lifetime.md) | Resolved — `session_duration=days=30`, `SESSION_COOKIE_AGE=30d` |
+| 2026-06-03   | [Moonlight/Sunshine streaming — WiFi jitter](2026-06-03-moonlight-sunshine-wifi-jitter.md) | Mitigations applied; definitive fix requires wiring mac-mini via Ethernet |
+| 2026-06-01   | [Mac-mini onboarding](2026-06-01-mac-mini-onboarding.md) | Onboarded |
+
+## Resolved (archived)
+
+See [`archive/`](archive/):
+
+| Date         | Title                                                              |
+| ------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| 2026-04-21   | [Hubris crash loop — thermal + USB drive](archive/2026-04-21-hubris-crash-loop.md) |
+| 2026-05-31   | [Authentik migrated from LXC 124 to the VPS](archive/2026-05-31-authentik-vps-migration.md) |
+
+## Conventions
+
+- File name: `YYYY-MM-DD-<slug>.md`. Use the *first* date if the incident spans multiple days.
+- Mandatory sections: Summary, Timeline, Root cause, Mitigations applied, Open questions.
+- Update the entry as the situation evolves; never rewrite history. Add new dated sections at the bottom.
+- Link back from every node's changelog that's affected.
+- Move to `archive/` when the incident is fully resolved and no longer actively referenced.

archive/knowledge/log.md

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Knowledge — operations log
+
+Append-only record of documentation-maintenance operations on the knowledge wiki (restructures,
+source ingests, lint sweeps). One line per operation, newest last. Infrastructure changes belong in
+each page's `## Changelog` and the Oikos change ledger, not here.
+
+## [2026-07-06] restructure | moved node/infrastructure narratives under knowledge/wiki/; references under knowledge/sources/; repointed inventory doc_page fields and gen-topology.py output.
+## [2026-07-06] lint | banned-vocabulary scan of knowledge/ clean; added .agents/skills/docs-lint and knowledge/wiki/hosts/index.md.
+## [2026-07-06] lint | fixed 126 pre-existing broken links (124-authentik.md rename, investigations/plans moved to archive/done, archive/ sibling depth, destroyed-node delinks); 2 remaining are an intentional cross-repo reference.
+## [2026-07-06] restructure | Phase 6 consolidation: investigations/ -> knowledge/sources/investigations/; operations/ -> .agents/operations/; HERMES.md -> .agents/; deleted root OIKOS/CAVEMAN/CONTRIBUTING stubs.

archive/knowledge/references/cert-sync-and-traefik-config.md

@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+# Current cert sync script + traefik dynamic config
+
+Snapshot of the two artifacts that control public service exposure as of
+2026-07-05. Updated 2026-07-05: fixed Jellyfin backend from dead hubris IP
+(192.168.8.206) to new strong IP (192.168.8.246).
+
+## hubris-public-cert-sync.sh (PVE host, `/usr/local/bin/`)
+
+```bash
+#!/bin/bash
+# Mirrors home caddy's LE certs for publicly-exposed hubris.network hostnames
+# into the VPS traefik's /letsencrypt volume. Traefik file-watches the volume
+# and hot-reloads.
+#
+# Why: netbird-proxy's HostSNI(*) TCP passthrough intercepts ACME TLS-ALPN-01
+# challenges before traefik's allowACMEByPass can respond, so traefik can't
+# obtain its own cert. Home caddy uses IONOS DNS-01 (no such conflict);
+# we just mirror what it already has.
+#
+# Runs daily via hubris-public-cert-sync.timer.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+CADDY_LXC=121
+CADDY_BASE=/var/lib/caddy/.local/share/caddy/certificates/acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org-directory
+VPS_HOST=root@100.122.165.149
+VPS_DEST=/var/lib/docker/volumes/opt_netbird_traefik_letsencrypt/_data
+
+# Map: source hostname -> "crt_filename key_filename" on the VPS.
+# Stable names so traefik dynamic.yaml doesn't need edits on renewal.
+declare -A HOSTS=(
+  [artifacto.hubris.network]="fullchain.crt privkey.key"
+  [blog.hubris.network]="blog.fullchain.crt blog.privkey.key"
+  [trmnl.hubris.network]="trmnl.fullchain.crt trmnl.privkey.key"
+  [sso.hubris.network]="sso.fullchain.crt sso.privkey.key"
+  [media.hubris.network]="media.fullchain.crt media.privkey.key"
+  [paperless.hubris.network]="paperless.fullchain.crt paperless.privkey.key"
+)
+
+TMP=$(mktemp -d)
+trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
+
+for host in "${!HOSTS[@]}"; do
+  read -r crt_name key_name <<< "${HOSTS[$host]}"
+  pct pull "$CADDY_LXC" "$CADDY_BASE/$host/$host.crt" "$TMP/$crt_name"
+  pct pull "$CADDY_LXC" "$CADDY_BASE/$host/$host.key" "$TMP/$key_name"
+
+  if ssh -o BatchMode=yes "$VPS_HOST" "test -f $VPS_DEST/$crt_name && diff -q - $VPS_DEST/$crt_name" < "$TMP/$crt_name" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "hubris-public-cert-sync: $host unchanged"
+    continue
+  fi
+
+  scp -q -o BatchMode=yes "$TMP/$crt_name" "$TMP/$key_name" "$VPS_HOST:$VPS_DEST/"
+  echo "hubris-public-cert-sync: shipped $host ($(openssl x509 -in "$TMP/$crt_name" -noout -enddate))"
+done
+```
+
+### Adding a new host
+
+1. Caddy must already have the cert (verify `pct exec 121 -- ls "$CADDY_BASE/$host/"`)
+2. Add a line to the HOSTS array: `[new-host.hubris.network]="nickname.fullchain.crt nickname.privkey.key"`
+3. `systemctl start hubris-public-cert-sync.service` to sync immediately
+4. Verify certs landed: `ssh "$VPS_HOST" "ls -la $VPS_DEST/nickname.*"`
+5. Add matching `tls.certificates` entry in traefik dynamic config
+
+---
+
+## traefik-dynamic.yaml (VPS, `/opt/`)
+
+```yaml
+tcp:
+  serversTransports:
+    pp-v2:
+      proxyProtocol:
+        version: 2
+
+tls:
+  certificates:
+    - certFile: /letsencrypt/fullchain.crt
+      keyFile: /letsencrypt/privkey.key
+    - certFile: /letsencrypt/blog.fullchain.crt
+      keyFile: /letsencrypt/blog.privkey.key
+    - certFile: /letsencrypt/trmnl.fullchain.crt
+      keyFile: /letsencrypt/trmnl.privkey.key
+    - certFile: /letsencrypt/sso.fullchain.crt
+      keyFile: /letsencrypt/sso.privkey.key
+    - certFile: /letsencrypt/media.fullchain.crt
+      keyFile: /letsencrypt/media.privkey.key
+    - certFile: /letsencrypt/paperless.fullchain.crt
+      keyFile: /letsencrypt/paperless.privkey.key
+
+http:
+  routers:
+    artifacto-public:
+      rule: 'Host(`artifacto.hubris.network`) && (PathPrefix(`/p/`) || PathPrefix(`/static/`) || Path(`/healthz`))'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 10
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - artifacto-strip-sso
+        - artifacto-ratelimit
+      service: artifacto-public
+
+    blog-public:
+      rule: 'Host(`blog.hubris.network`)'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 10
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - blog-ratelimit
+      service: blog-public
+
+    trmnl-public:
+      rule: 'Host(`trmnl.hubris.network`)'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 10
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - trmnl-ratelimit
+      service: trmnl-public
+
+    matrix-public:
+      rule: 'Host(`matrix.hubris.network`) && !PathPrefix(`/.well-known/matrix/`)'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 10
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - matrix-ratelimit
+      service: matrix-public
+
+    matrix-wellknown:
+      rule: 'Host(`matrix.hubris.network`) && (PathPrefix(`/.well-known/matrix/`) || PathPrefix(`/.well-known/acme-challenge/`))'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 20
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      service: matrix-wellknown-svc
+
+    house-public:
+      rule: Host(`house.hubris.network`)
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 10
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - house-ratelimit
+      service: house-public
+
+    sso-public:
+      rule: 'Host(`sso.hubris.network`)'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 10
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - sso-ratelimit
+      service: sso-public
+
+    media-public:
+      rule: 'Host(`media.hubris.network`)'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 10
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - media-ratelimit
+      service: media-public
+
+    paperless-api-public:
+      rule: 'Host(`paperless.hubris.network`) && PathPrefix(`/api/`)'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 20
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - paperless-ratelimit
+      service: paperless-public
+
+    paperless-public:
+      rule: 'Host(`paperless.hubris.network`)'
+      entryPoints:
+        - websecure
+      priority: 10
+      tls:
+        certResolver: letsencrypt
+      middlewares:
+        - authentik-forwardauth
+        - paperless-ratelimit
+      service: paperless-public
+
+  middlewares:
+    artifacto-strip-sso:
+      headers:
+        customRequestHeaders:
+          X-Artifacto-Gateway: ""
+          X-Authentik-Username: ""
+          X-Authentik-Groups: ""
+          X-Authentik-Email: ""
+          X-Authentik-Name: ""
+          X-Authentik-Uid: ""
+          X-Authentik-Jwt: ""
+          X-Authentik-Meta-Jwks: ""
+          X-Authentik-Meta-Outpost: ""
+          X-Authentik-Meta-Provider: ""
+          X-Authentik-Meta-App: ""
+          X-Authentik-Meta-Version: ""
+
+    admin-allowlist:
+      ipAllowList:
+        sourceRange:
+          - "5.61.168.0/24"
+
+    artifacto-ratelimit:
+      rateLimit:
+        average: 50
+        period: 1s
+        burst: 100
+    blog-ratelimit:
+      rateLimit:
+        average: 100
+        period: 1s
+        burst: 200
+    trmnl-ratelimit:
+      rateLimit:
+        average: 20
+        period: 1s
+        burst: 40
+    matrix-ratelimit:
+      rateLimit:
+        average: 30
+        period: 1s
+        burst: 60
+    house-ratelimit:
+      rateLimit:
+        average: 30
+        period: 1s
+        burst: 60
+    sso-ratelimit:
+      rateLimit:
+        average: 30
+        period: 1s
+        burst: 60
+    media-ratelimit:
+      rateLimit:
+        average: 30
+        period: 1s
+        burst: 60
+    paperless-ratelimit:
+      rateLimit:
+        average: 20
+        period: 1s
+        burst: 40
+    authentik-forwardauth:
+      forwardAuth:
+        address: "http://192.168.8.6:9000/outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/traefik"
+        trustForwardHeader: true
+        authResponseHeaders:
+          - X-authentik-username
+          - X-authentik-groups
+          - X-authentik-email
+          - X-authentik-name
+          - X-authentik-uid
+          - X-authentik-jwt
+          - X-authentik-meta-jwks
+          - X-authentik-meta-outpost
+          - X-authentik-meta-provider
+          - X-authentik-meta-app
+          - X-authentik-meta-version
+
+  services:
+    artifacto-public:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://192.168.8.205:3100'
+    blog-public:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://192.168.8.205:8080'
+    trmnl-public:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://192.168.8.211:9851'
+    matrix-public:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://192.168.8.242:8008'
+    matrix-wellknown-svc:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://matrix-wellknown:80'
+    house-public:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://192.168.8.244:3000'
+    sso-public:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://192.168.8.6:9000'
+    media-public:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://192.168.8.246:8096'
+    paperless-public:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: 'http://192.168.8.130:8000'
+```
+
+### Adding a new service — four blocks needed
+
+1. **Router** — `http.routers.<name>-public` with `tls: {}` (not
+   `certResolver`)
+2. **Middleware** — rate limit, one per service
+3. **Service** — `http.services.<name>-public` with the backend URL
+4. **tls.certificates** — add a new `- certFile/keryFile` pair matching the
+   cert sync HOSTS entry
+
+### Key file naming convention
+
+| Cert name | Host | Convention |
+|-----------|------|------------|
+| `fullchain.crt` + `privkey.key` | `artifacto.hubris.network` | First service — no prefix |
+| `blog.fullchain.crt` + `blog.privkey.key` | `blog.hubris.network` | `{nickname}.fullchain.crt` |
+| `trmnl.fullchain.crt` + `trmnl.privkey.key` | `trmnl.hubris.network` | `{nickname}.fullchain.crt` |
+| `sso.fullchain.crt` + `sso.privkey.key` | `sso.hubris.network` | `{nickname}.fullchain.crt` |
+| `media.fullchain.crt` + `media.privkey.key` | `media.hubris.network` | `{nickname}.fullchain.crt` |
+| `paperless.fullchain.crt` + `paperless.privkey.key` | `paperless.hubris.network` | `{nickname}.fullchain.crt` |
+
+### ⚠️ Critical — keep backends in sync after LXC migrations
+
+When moving an LXC between Proxmox nodes, update **both**:
+1. **Caddy** (`/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` on LXC 121)
+2. **VPS traefik** (`/opt/traefik-dynamic.yaml` — via hubris bridge SSH)
+
+Jellyfin migration from hubris to strong (2026-07-05) was fixed in Caddy
+but **missed** in VPS traefik — old IP `192.168.8.206` remained. This caused
+Bad Gateway for off-LAN users. Use Python-based editing (see
+`references/traefik-config-editing.md`) for accurate surgical fixes.

archive/knowledge/sources/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Sources
+
+Immutable evidence the wiki synthesizes from. External reference docs live under `references/`;
+incident evidence lives in [`investigations/`](investigations/index.md) (written once at
+incident time, then linked from the changelogs of the nodes they implicate).
+
+| Slug | Reference | Summary |
+|------|-----------|---------|
+| cert-sync-and-traefik-config | [references/cert-sync-and-traefik-config.md](references/cert-sync-and-traefik-config.md) | VPS traefik config and the LAN↔VPS certificate mirror. |

archive/knowledge/vms/100-zimaos.md

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ The alternative (dedicated virtual data disk on the `library` lvmthin pool, e.g.
 ## Open items
 
 - **DHCP → static IP fixed (2026-06-03).** ZimaOS IP drifted from `.195` (Slate AX) → `.103` (Technitium) after the DHCP migration, causing Caddy 502s. Fixed by injecting a static systemd-networkd config and restarting the VM. IP now pinned at `192.168.8.195`. See [changelog](#2026-06-03--static-ip-set-to-195-dhcp-drift-fixed).
-- **No Authentik wiring.** [authentik (124)](../containers/124-authentik.md) isn't enforcing auth in front of ZimaOS yet — ZimaOS handles its own first-run wizard. The Caddyfile block uses bare `reverse_proxy` rather than the `import authentik` pattern used by e.g. artifacto; layer it in once the wizard is complete and a static admin user exists.
+- **No Authentik wiring.** [authentik (124)](../containers/106-auth-outpost.md) isn't enforcing auth in front of ZimaOS yet — ZimaOS handles its own first-run wizard. The Caddyfile block uses bare `reverse_proxy` rather than the `import authentik` pattern used by e.g. artifacto; layer it in once the wizard is complete and a static admin user exists.
 - **No PBS backup.** No Proxmox Backup Server configured on hubris today; this VM is not backed up.
 - **qemu-guest-agent not installed.** ZimaOS's installer doesn't bundle it, so `qm guest cmd 100 ...` returns "QEMU guest agent is not running". IP discovery during this install was done via console screendump → `qm monitor` → `screendump`.
 
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ The alternative (dedicated virtual data disk on the `library` lvmthin pool, e.g.
 ## Changelog
 
 ### 2026-06-03 — Static IP set to `.195`; DHCP drift fixed
-ZimaOS had drifted from `.195` (Slate AX DHCP) → `.103` (Technitium DHCP), causing Caddy 502s. Injected `/etc/systemd/network/10-static.network` into overlay (match `en*/eth*`, address `192.168.8.195/24`, gateway `.1`, DNS `.2`). VM restarted; verified reachable at `.195`. Caddy (`zimaos.hubris.network`) now returns 200. See [plan](../plans/2026-06-03-dhcp-pool-exclude-static-ips.md).
+ZimaOS had drifted from `.195` (Slate AX DHCP) → `.103` (Technitium DHCP), causing Caddy 502s. Injected `/etc/systemd/network/10-static.network` into overlay (match `en*/eth*`, address `192.168.8.195/24`, gateway `.1`, DNS `.2`). VM restarted; verified reachable at `.195`. Caddy (`zimaos.hubris.network`) now returns 200. See [plan](../../../.hermes/plans/2026-06-03_223218-dhcp-pool-exclude-static-ips.md).
 
 ### 2026-05-15 — NFS mount relocated to `/media/library` (UI delete fix)
 
@@ -87,4 +87,4 @@ Virtiofs path abandoned — ZimaOS kernel 6.12.25 ships without the virtiofs mod
 Added `zimaos.hubris.network` site block to `/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` on [caddy (121)](../containers/121-caddy.md): bare `reverse_proxy 192.168.8.195` + IONOS DNS-01 TLS, same pattern as plato/jellyfin. dnsmasq entry repointed from `192.168.8.195` to `192.168.8.175`. Let's Encrypt cert issued on first request. Caddy commit `a219176` pending push to `dtoro/caddy-conf`.
 
 ### 2026-05-14 — VM created, ZimaOS 1.6.1 installed (Phase 1)
-`qm create 100` with q35/OVMF, no EFI disk, 4 vCPU / 8 GiB / 64 GiB on `local-lvm`. Installed via the official ISO (manual console install). Web UI verified at `http://192.168.8.195`. `onboot=1`, `startup order=20`. dnsmasq entry `zimaos.hubris.network → 192.168.8.195` initially added direct-to-VM on [authentik (124)](../containers/124-authentik.md) (later repointed — see above). `/mnt/library` is **not** yet shared into the VM; Phase 2 (virtiofs) is gated on UI evaluation.
+`qm create 100` with q35/OVMF, no EFI disk, 4 vCPU / 8 GiB / 64 GiB on `local-lvm`. Installed via the official ISO (manual console install). Web UI verified at `http://192.168.8.195`. `onboot=1`, `startup order=20`. dnsmasq entry `zimaos.hubris.network → 192.168.8.195` initially added direct-to-VM on [authentik (124)](../containers/106-auth-outpost.md) (later repointed — see above). `/mnt/library` is **not** yet shared into the VM; Phase 2 (virtiofs) is gated on UI evaluation.

archive/knowledge/vms/108-haos.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Home Assistant OS — the only VM on hubris (HAOS doesn't run cleanly in an LXC,
 - **HAOS version:** 16.3 (last verified)
 - **IP:** `192.168.8.101`
 - **Resources:** 4 GiB RAM, 32 GiB boot disk
-- **Public hostname:** [`home.hubris.network`](../infrastructure/dns.md) → [caddy (121)](121-caddy.md) → `192.168.8.101:8123`
+- **Public hostname:** [`home.hubris.network`](../infrastructure/dns.md) → [caddy (121)](../containers/121-caddy.md) → `192.168.8.101:8123`
 
 ## Auth
 
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Key gotchas:
   ```
   ha dns options --servers "dns://192.168.8.180" --servers "dns://1.1.1.1"
   ```
-  so OIDC discovery resolves internally to [authentik (124)](124-authentik.md).
+  so OIDC discovery resolves internally to [authentik (124)](../containers/106-auth-outpost.md).
 - Authentik app slug in the discovery URL is whatever was set in Authentik — confirm via the DB rather than guessing. User set `home-assistant` (with hyphen).
 - YAML config:
   - `features.automatic_user_linking: true` — link to existing HA users by `preferred_username` match (otherwise a duplicate is created).
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ Key gotchas:
 HA pulls Proxmox metrics via the official Proxmox VE integration. As of 2026-04-21 [claudio-monitor](../infrastructure/monitoring.md) stopped publishing to MQTT/REST (commit `82f0596`) — HA gets metrics from PVE directly; claudio-monitor focuses on alerting.
 
 ## Related
-- [Authentik (124)](124-authentik.md)
-- [Caddy (121)](121-caddy.md)
+- [Authentik (124)](../containers/106-auth-outpost.md)
+- [Caddy (121)](../containers/121-caddy.md)
 - [DNS](../infrastructure/dns.md)
 - [Monitoring](../infrastructure/monitoring.md)
 

archive/knowledge/vms/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# VMs — index
+
+Two QEMU VMs running on [hubris](../hosts/hubris.md):
+
+| ID | Name | Role | IP | Public hostname |
+|----|------|------|----|-----------------|
+| 100 | [zimaos](100-zimaos.md) | NAS frontend eval (ZimaOS) | `192.168.8.195` | [`zimaos.hubris.network`](../infrastructure/dns.md) |
+| 108 | [haos-16.3](108-haos.md) | Home automation (HAOS) | `192.168.8.101` | [`home.hubris.network`](../infrastructure/dns.md) |
+
+## Related
+
+- [Hubris host](../hosts/hubris.md) — both VMs run here
+- [Containers index](../containers/index.md) — LXCs on both nodes
+- [README](../../../README.md)

archive/ledger/2026-07.jsonl

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{"ts": "2026-07-06T11:05:35+00:00", "agent": "mac-mini", "entity": "host:teddycloud", "action": "activate", "risk": "config_mutation", "verification": "homelab node teddycloud relations", "result": "ok"}
+{"ts": "2026-07-06T11:15:04+00:00", "agent": "mac-mini", "entity": "repo:Homelab-Docs", "action": "register-webhook", "risk": "config_mutation", "result": "ok", "notes": "webhook id 14 for oikos-console deploy"}
+{"ts": "2026-07-06T11:29:56+00:00", "agent": "mac-mini", "entity": "service:caddy", "action": "add-site-block", "risk": "config_mutation", "verification": "curl -s https://git.hubris.network (unrelated route still healthy after reload)", "result": "ok", "notes": "oikos.hubris.network -> 192.168.8.205:8091, Authentik-gated, in dtoro/caddy-conf@c195142"}
+{"ts": "2026-07-06T11:40:28+00:00", "agent": "mac-mini", "entity": "host:dns", "action": "add-record", "risk": "config_mutation", "verification": "dig @192.168.8.2 +short oikos.hubris.network", "result": "ok", "notes": "oikos.hubris.network A -> 192.168.8.175 (Caddy LAN IP), via Technitium API, no token persisted"}
+{"ts": "2026-07-06T11:57:21+00:00", "agent": "mac-mini", "entity": "host:apps", "action": "deploy-oikos-console", "risk": "config_mutation", "verification": "curl http://127.0.0.1:8091/ on apps -> 200; https://oikos.hubris.network/ -> 302 (Authentik gate)", "result": "ok"}

archive/oikos-cards/cards/host-apps.md

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# apps (host:apps)
+
+- kind: lxc (LXC 105)
+- state: active
+- runs-on: host:hubris
+- role: docker-apps
+- address: 192.168.8.205 (mesh: tailscale:apps)
+- mounts: /mnt/library
+- doc: knowledge/wiki/containers/105-apps.md
+- secrets: enrolled (age key present)
+
+## Blast radius
+- impacts: service:artifacto, service:homelab_mcp, service:secrets_issuance
+- affected by: host:hubris, mount:/mnt/library, repo:dtoro/Artifacto, repo:dtoro/Homelab-Docs
+- full blast radius: service:artifacto, service:homelab_mcp, service:secrets_issuance
+
+## Safe actions
+- see the services this host runs for action-level risk classes
+
+## Recent changes
+- 2026-07-06T11:57:21+00:00 deploy-oikos-console (config_mutation) — ok

archive/oikos-cards/cards/host-arriman.md

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# arriman (host:arriman)
+
+- kind: lxc (LXC 122)
+- state: active
+- runs-on: host:strong
+- role: arr-stack
+- address: 192.168.8.245 (mesh: tailscale:arr)
+- mounts: /mnt/media_local
+- doc: knowledge/wiki/containers/122-arriman.md
+
+## Blast radius
+- impacts: service:arr_stack
+- affected by: host:strong, mount:/mnt/media_local
+- full blast radius: service:arr_stack
+
+## Safe actions
+- see the services this host runs for action-level risk classes
+
+## Recent changes
+- (none yet)