plan: general gated execution — unlimited actions, gated by risk classifier

Evaluate the agent's action path against the OIKOS.md design. Finding: the
intended model (unlimited runbook-driven actions gated by a risk classifier)
already exists on paper and in scaffolding, but the live agent path regressed
to a hard-coded 5-action enum that bypasses the classifier. Plan a layered
realignment: (0) one general gated `run` primitive, (1) runbooks-as-data as the
reliable fast-path, (2) learning. Chosen v1 posture: approve-most (read-only
auto-runs, all state changes gate). Incremental, each step shippable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

plans/2026-07-10-general-gated-execution.md

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+# 2026-07-10 — General gated execution: from fixed actions to unlimited-but-gated
+
+**Status:** Planned
+
+## Goal
+
+Make Nomos able to do **anything** needed to maintain the homelab — provision
+LXCs, deploy services, debug, restart, fix configs, investigate — without that
+capability being a fixed enum of hand-coded actions. The action space is
+unlimited; the *gate* on it is a risk classifier + operator approval, not a
+whitelist of tricks. Knowledge (the graph + runbooks) supplies the *how*; the
+agent's reasoning supplies the *what*; the classifier supplies the *may I*.
+
+Operator directive (2026-07-10): **"The number of actions the agent should be
+able to do is unlimited. We need logic to gate destructive actions, but we
+should not limit what the agent can do."**
+
+Chosen autonomy posture for v1: **approve-most (cautious)** — only genuinely
+read-only commands auto-run; anything that changes state requires operator
+approval. We can relax later once the classifier and ledger have earned trust.
+
+## This is a realignment, not a new idea
+
+[.agents/OIKOS.md](../.agents/OIKOS.md) already specifies this exact model:
+
+> The classifier scores **risk class × blast radius × confidence** and routes:
+> auto-act / escalate / queue. The classifier can only *lower* autonomy relative
+> to policy, never raise it. When in doubt, escalate.
+> Act — execute through `homelab` commands or **runbooks** (never ad-hoc SSH).
+
+So the target architecture is the *documented* architecture. The problem is the
+implementation diverged from it on the agent's action path.
+
+## Gap analysis (grounded in code)
+
+| Designed (OIKOS.md) | Actually implemented today |
+|---|---|
+| Classifier routes every action by risk × blast × confidence | [`internal/policy/classify.go`](../internal/policy/classify.go) `ClassifySignal()` only classifies **Signals** (the Observe pipeline), by entity+action-type. It is **not** called by the agent's mutation path. |
+| Agent acts through unlimited **runbooks** | Agent acts through `request_execution` with a **hard-coded enum**: `restart, systemctl, pct_exec, apt_upgrade, pct_create` ([`internal/mcp/server.go`](../internal/mcp/server.go)), each bespoke Go, gated by per-action `if`s, not the classifier. New capability = new Go + redeploy. |
+| Runbooks/skills are executable data | `skills` table + `.agents/skills/*` + `knowledge_entities` exist and are *readable* (`get_skills`), but **nothing executes a runbook**. The knowledge is inert w.r.t. action. |
+| Auto-act loop consumes classified signals and acts | [`internal/actuator/actuator.go:124`](../internal/actuator/actuator.go) is a literal `"stub execution"` — it marks work done without doing it. |
+| "Never ad-hoc SSH" | `pct_exec` **is** ad-hoc SSH (arbitrary shell in a container) and **auto-runs with no approval or classification**. |
+
+Net: the elegant model exists as scaffolding (classifier, policy schema, risk
+classes, blast-radius graph walks, skills-as-data, ledger, and the
+approval+feedback plumbing hardened in the 2026-07-09/10 sessions), but the live
+agent→action path is a bag of tricks that bypasses all of it. Everything added
+in the recent LXC-deploy work (`pct_create` + DNS/VMID/template logic) made the
+bag *bigger* — reliable, but on the wrong axis.
+
+**Bones that already exist and get reused:** `internal/policy` (classifier +
+`computeBlastRadius`/`blast_radius()` SQL), `risk_classes`/`action_risk` tables,
+`seeds/policy.yaml`, `executions`/`approvals`/`audit_log`, the MCP SSH machinery,
+and the inline approval + execution-status feedback loop (chat polls
+`GET /executions/{id}`).
+
+## Target architecture — three layers
+
+### Layer 0 — one general gated primitive (the foundation)
+
+Collapse the fixed enum into essentially one tool:
+
+```
+run(target, command, purpose, [declared_risk])
+```
+
+- `target` — any host or LXC slug; resolves to SSH (host) or `pct exec` (LXC).
+- `command` — arbitrary shell.
+- `purpose` — the agent's stated intent (shown to the operator, feeds classify).
+- `declared_risk` — optional agent self-assessment.
+
+Every call flows through:
+
+1. **Classify** the command → `read_only | reversible_low | config_mutation |
+   destructive`. Rule-based:
+   - read-only **allowlist** (e.g. leading verb in `cat, ls, stat, journalctl,
+     systemctl status|is-active, pct config|status, df, free, uptime, ip, ss,
+     docker ps|logs, git status|log`) → `read_only`;
+   - destructive **denylist** (`rm -rf`, `dd`, `mkfs`, `wipefs`, `pct destroy`,
+     `qm destroy`, `shutdown`, `reboot`, `> /dev/`, `:(){ :|:& };:`, secret
+     exfiltration, piping remote scripts to a root shell) → `destructive`;
+   - anything writing state / installing / editing configs → `config_mutation`;
+   - **default → escalate** (`config_mutation`) when unsure.
+   The classifier may only make `declared_risk` **stricter**, never looser
+   (mirrors "can only lower autonomy, never raise").
+2. **Route** (approve-most posture):
+   - `read_only` → auto-run + ledger, no approval.
+   - `reversible_low` / `config_mutation` → **operator approval** (v1 gates all
+     state changes; a later posture can auto-run `reversible_low`).
+   - `destructive` → approval **+ typed confirmation phrase**.
+3. **Execute** (existing SSH/`pct exec`), **verify** (optional check command),
+   **ledger** (`executions` + `audit_log`), **stream feedback to chat** (reuse
+   the `GET /executions/{id}` polling + `InlineApproval` phases already built).
+
+Layer 0 alone delivers "the agent can attempt anything; state changes are gated."
+
+### Layer 1 — runbooks as executable data (reliability without rigidity)
+
+The hard-won procedures become **runbooks in the knowledge DB**, retrieved and
+executed step-by-step via Layer 0 — not frozen Go:
+
+- `pct_create` + its DNS-self-heal / VMID-collision / template-resolution /
+  locale logic becomes the canonical **"provision LXC" runbook** (parametric
+  steps the agent fills in and runs through `run`). The reliability survives as
+  documented, reusable steps rather than a compiled handler.
+- New capability = **new runbook (data)**, no redeploy.
+- Keep a *small* set of mechanical helpers where a shell step is genuinely
+  fiddly (e.g. "pick a free cluster VMID"), exposed as callable sub-tools — but
+  the flow is agent-driven, not enum-driven.
+
+This is the crucial **both/and**: the general primitive is the unlimited escape
+hatch; curated runbooks are the reliable fast-path so the agent doesn't
+re-derive DNS/VMID/docker every time (the exact thing that failed repeatedly in
+the 2026-07-09 sessions).
+
+### Layer 2 — learning closes the loop
+
+Successful ad-hoc `run` sequences get promoted into runbooks/patterns (the
+`learning` engine + `skills` table already exist for this); the failure ledger
+informs retries. The system grows more capable **as data**, not as code.
+
+## Safety model (the whole point of the gate)
+
+- **Default-escalate.** Nothing is *forbidden*; risky things need the operator's
+  "yes." Unknown/unparseable risk → approval.
+- **Hard denylist** for catastrophic patterns → always typed confirmation, even
+  if the agent declared them safe.
+- **Blast radius at approval time** — graph walk (`blast_radius()` exists):
+  "this restarts caddy → 8 downstream services."
+- **Preview / dry-run** where the command supports it.
+- **Kill-switch** (`global.auto_act`, per-target `never_auto_act.*`) already
+  exists; extend to a global "require approval for everything" flip.
+- **Full audit ledger** — every command, its classification, decision, actor,
+  output. Non-negotiable.
+- **Scope guards** — resolve `target` to a real entity first; refuse commands
+  against `destroyed`/unknown targets; cap output size (already done).
+
+## Honest risks / tradeoffs
+
+- Trades a small vetted surface (5 actions) for arbitrary root across the fleet,
+  LLM-driven, gated only by classifier + approval. Classifying arbitrary shell
+  perfectly is impossible; **default-escalate + hard denylist + always-on audit**
+  is the mitigation, not perfect classification.
+- Approve-most means more operator clicks initially. Acceptable while trust is
+  built; the posture is a config knob, not a rewrite.
+- Runbook-as-data can drift from reality like any doc; the ledger + verify step
+  + learning loop are the correction mechanism.
+
+## Migration path (incremental, each step shippable)
+
+1. **Command classifier** — extend `internal/policy` with
+   `ClassifyCommand(cmd, declaredRisk) → riskClass` (allowlist/denylist/default-
+   escalate + can-only-escalate rule). Unit-tested against a corpus of safe /
+   mutating / catastrophic commands.
+2. **`run` tool** — new MCP tool routing classify → gate → execute → the
+   existing feedback path. Ship alongside the current tools (no removal yet).
+3. **Approval context** — surface risk class + blast radius + purpose on the
+   approval (chat `InlineApproval` + Ops page); typed-confirmation for
+   destructive.
+4. **Runbook execution** — a "provision LXC" runbook (ports the current
+   `pct_create` logic) executed via `run`; validate parity with today's handler.
+5. **Retire the enum** — convert remaining hard-coded actions to runbooks; make
+   `request_execution` a thin deprecated alias or remove it.
+6. **Revive auto-act** — replace the actuator stub, reusing the *same* classifier
+   for the Observe→Act direction (signals), still approve-most.
+
+## Verification
+
+- Classifier corpus test: read-only commands auto-pass; a set of known
+  catastrophic commands always route to destructive+confirmation; ambiguous
+  commands escalate. No command auto-runs that mutates state.
+- End-to-end: operator asks Nomos a novel task **not** in the old enum (e.g.
+  "tail caddy's error log and restart it if it's flapping"); Nomos composes
+  `run` calls; read-only steps auto-run, the restart gates for approval; chat
+  shows live status; ledger records each command + classification.
+- Parity: "provision an LXC with a service" via the runbook path matches the
+  reliability proven for the `pct_create` handler (free VMID, DNS, install,
+  verify), then destroy.
+
+## Open questions for the operator
+
+- **Reversible-low posture:** keep gating restarts/syncs in v1 (chosen), or
+  auto-run them once the classifier is trusted?
+- **Confirmation phrase:** per-action typed phrase for destructive, or a global
+  one?
+- **Runbook authorship:** operator-authored only, or may Nomos propose new
+  runbooks (subject to approval) from successful ad-hoc sequences?
+- **Blast-radius threshold:** should a large blast radius force approval even for
+  otherwise-reversible actions?

plans/index.md

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ went sideways, open an investigation.
 | 2026-07-08 | [Liveness, drift, and UX cohesion](2026-07-08-liveness-drift-and-ux-cohesion.md) | In Progress |
 | 2026-07-09 | [Chat sessions: reliability, cost, and session-management fixes](2026-07-09-chat-sessions-improvements.md) | Planned |
 | 2026-07-09 | [Session execution, UX, and learning improvements](2026-07-09-session-execution-and-ux-fixes.md) | Planned |
+| 2026-07-10 | [General gated execution: unlimited actions, gated by risk](2026-07-10-general-gated-execution.md) | Planned |
 
 ## Done