Implements the first slice of plans/2026-07-10-general-gated-execution.md:
Nomos gets one general execution tool instead of only a fixed action enum,
gated by an automatic risk classifier, and approval can be granted by the
operator just replying in chat instead of clicking a button.
- internal/policy/command.go: ClassifyCommand(cmd, declaredRisk) — rule-based
read-only allowlist + destructive denylist, default-escalate to
config_mutation for anything else. Classification can only ESCALATE the
caller's declared risk, never de-escalate it (destructive always wins even
if declared read_only). Compound commands (&&, ;, |, $()) never qualify for
the read-only fast path. Full test corpus.
- internal/mcp/server.go: new `run` MCP tool — target (host:/lxc:), command,
purpose, optional declared_risk. Read-only commands execute immediately;
everything else queues an approval exactly like pct_create today, executed
via httpapi's existing executeApprovedAction. Also fixes a real latent bug:
pct_exec resolved an LXC's host attribute without the "host:" prefix, so it
could never find the Proxmox host — new resolveExecTarget/resolveRunTarget
helpers (mcp + httpapi) fix this for both the new `run` action and existing
actions that route through the same execution path.
- internal/httpapi/phase3.go: "run" case in executeApprovedAction; fixes two
bugs found while wiring this up — (1) DecideApproval hardcoded risk_class to
'config_mutation' on every approve, silently corrupting the audit ledger for
every other risk class; (2) denying/revoking an approval never updated the
linked execution's status, so it stayed 'pending_approval' forever instead
of reflecting the decision.
- cmd/nomos/assent.go: deterministic (not LLM-judged) chat-assent detection.
Scoped to the immediately-preceding assistant turn's pending approvals only
— an old "yes" can't retroactively approve something new. Destructive-risk
actions are excluded from loose assent. Approves via the same HTTP decision
endpoint the UI button calls, so both paths share one audit trail.
- web/.../InlineApproval.svelte: self-healing poll — a pending approval card
now picks up being decided via ANY path (chat assent, Ops page, Matrix), not
just its own button. Previously the banner stayed stuck showing
Approve/Deny even after the action had already run elsewhere.
- nomos/SOUL.md: `run` is now the general capability ("no fixed menu, only a
risk gate"); documents chat-assent behavior and the destructive exception.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
119 lines
4.4 KiB
Go
119 lines
4.4 KiB
Go
package main
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
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)
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// Chat-assent approval: the operator authorizes a proposed action by
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// replying normally in chat ("go ahead", "yes", "do it") instead of clicking
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// a separate Approve button. This is deterministic (not LLM-judged) so it
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// can't be talked around by a model that misreads intent, and it only ever
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// looks at the assistant turn immediately preceding the operator's reply —
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// an old "yes" from three messages ago can never retroactively approve
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// something new. Destructive-risk actions are excluded: they always need the
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// explicit typed-confirmation flow, never loose assent.
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// pendingApproval is one gated action proposed in the immediately-preceding
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// assistant turn, extracted from its tool_result text.
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type pendingApproval struct {
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execID string
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destructive bool
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}
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// executionQueuedRE matches the "execution <uuid> queued" phrasing shared by
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// the run and request_execution/pct_create tool result messages.
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var executionQueuedRE = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)execution\s+([0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12})\s+queued`)
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// extractPendingApprovals scans the tool results of one assistant turn for
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// gated actions that are still awaiting a decision.
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func extractPendingApprovals(calls []persistedCall) []pendingApproval {
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var out []pendingApproval
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for _, c := range calls {
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text := c.resultText()
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m := executionQueuedRE.FindStringSubmatch(text)
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if m == nil {
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continue
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}
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out = append(out, pendingApproval{
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execID: m[1],
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destructive: strings.Contains(strings.ToUpper(text), "DESTRUCTIVE"),
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})
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}
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return out
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}
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// negationWords, checked first: any of these anywhere in the message means
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// the reply is NOT assent, even if a positive word also appears (e.g. "no,
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// don't restart it yet" contains neither "yes" nor "go ahead", but "wait"
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// alone should also block a stray "yes" a sentence later — checking negation
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// first and returning false errs toward re-confirming rather than assuming
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// consent, per "when in doubt, escalate").
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var negationWords = []string{
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"no", "nope", "don't", "do not", "stop", "wait", "hold on", "hold off",
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"not yet", "cancel", "nevermind", "never mind", "actually don't", "skip that",
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}
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// assentWords, checked only if no negation matched.
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var assentWords = []string{
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"go ahead", "goahead", "yes", "yep", "yeah", "yup", "do it", "proceed",
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"approve", "approved", "confirm", "confirmed", "ship it", "sounds good",
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"lgtm", "run it", "execute", "ok go", "okay go", "please do",
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}
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// isAssent reports whether msg is a plain-language authorization of a
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// pending proposal. Deliberately simple and auditable: a fixed word list,
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// not a model judgment call, so behavior is predictable and can't be
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// prompt-injected via the pending action's own content.
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func isAssent(msg string) bool {
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m := " " + strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(msg)) + " "
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for _, w := range negationWords {
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if strings.Contains(m, " "+w+" ") || strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(m), w+" ") || strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(m), w+",") {
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return false
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}
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}
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for _, w := range assentWords {
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if strings.Contains(m, w) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// approveExecution grants (or denies) a pending execution via the same HTTP
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// endpoint the chat UI's Approve button calls, so both paths share one code
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// path server-side (executeApprovedAction) and one audit trail. Returns the
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// decided status, or an error if the request failed outright (a 4xx for an
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// already-decided/expired approval is reported via ok=false, not a hard err,
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// since that's an expected race, not a bug).
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func (a *agent) approveExecution(ctx context.Context, execID string) (ok bool, status string, err error) {
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if a.apiBase == "" {
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return false, "", fmt.Errorf("no API base configured")
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}
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body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"decision": "approve"})
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost,
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a.apiBase+"/api/v1/approvals/"+execID+"/decision", bytes.NewReader(body))
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if err != nil {
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return false, "", err
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}
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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resp, err := a.httpClient.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return false, "", err
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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return false, "", nil // already decided / expired / not found — not a hard failure
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}
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var out struct {
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Status string `json:"status"`
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}
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json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&out)
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return true, out.Status, nil
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}
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