dtoro
d4d99a7473
Problem: the hexagonal refactor churns the backend tree for nine more phases; the UI delivery stack (web/ SPA, cmd/desktop Wails wrapper, compose/web image) must move to its own repo first so doc/layout rewrites land once on a backend-only tree. Change: - New repo git.hubris.network/dtoro/oikos-web (v0.33.0): web/, desktop/ (updateURL repointed to oikos-web releases), compose/, own CI (web + desktop jobs), own deploy script (CI-green gate, TOCTOU guard, version-tagged images, prune-to-3), own webhook receiver on :9798 + launchd unit, own compose project publishing the same 8091:80. - Cutover executed on mac-mini in order: oikos stack's web service stopped+removed, oikos-web project brought up on 8091; outer Caddy untouched (targets the published port) — serving + Authentik flow + /wails 404 quirk verified post-cutover. - Stripped from oikos: web/, cmd/desktop/, compose/web/, desktop CI workflow, ci.yml web job, Makefile ui/desktop/desktop-package/install targets, the compose web service, oikos-web from deploy.sh's fallback prune list; wails + go-keyring dropped from go.mod, vendor synced. - README / CONTRIBUTING / AGENTS.md / .agents dev+operations docs now point at the new repo; mbse + mascot design docs carry a path note. Risk: production SPA serving depends on the new pipeline now; rollback is versioned-image re-up of the old web service from a pre-split checkout (port 8091). Desktop builds installed before the split still check dtoro/oikos releases — one manual reinstall, noted in the oikos-web release notes. Verification: go vet, make test (race), make generate-check, golangci (no new findings; baseline down 400→365); post-cutover curls — localhost:8091 200, /wails/runtime.js 404, outer Caddy 302 Authentik.
2491 lines
119 KiB
JavaScript
2491 lines
119 KiB
JavaScript
/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.13 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.13/LICENSE */
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'use strict';
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function _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) {
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(null == a || a > r.length) && (a = r.length);
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for (var e = 0, n = Array(a); e < a; e++) n[e] = r[e];
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return n;
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}
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function _arrayWithHoles(r) {
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if (Array.isArray(r)) return r;
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}
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function _iterableToArrayLimit(r, l) {
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var t = null == r ? null : "undefined" != typeof Symbol && r[Symbol.iterator] || r["@@iterator"];
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if (null != t) {
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var e,
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n,
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i,
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u,
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a = [],
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f = true,
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o = false;
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try {
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if (i = (t = t.call(r)).next, 0 === l) ; else for (; !(f = (e = i.call(t)).done) && (a.push(e.value), a.length !== l); f = !0);
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} catch (r) {
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o = true, n = r;
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} finally {
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try {
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if (!f && null != t.return && (u = t.return(), Object(u) !== u)) return;
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} finally {
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if (o) throw n;
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}
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}
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return a;
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}
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}
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function _nonIterableRest() {
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throw new TypeError("Invalid attempt to destructure non-iterable instance.\nIn order to be iterable, non-array objects must have a [Symbol.iterator]() method.");
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}
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function _slicedToArray(r, e) {
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return _arrayWithHoles(r) || _iterableToArrayLimit(r, e) || _unsupportedIterableToArray(r, e) || _nonIterableRest();
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}
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function _unsupportedIterableToArray(r, a) {
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if (r) {
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if ("string" == typeof r) return _arrayLikeToArray(r, a);
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var t = {}.toString.call(r).slice(8, -1);
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return "Object" === t && r.constructor && (t = r.constructor.name), "Map" === t || "Set" === t ? Array.from(r) : "Arguments" === t || /^(?:Ui|I)nt(?:8|16|32)(?:Clamped)?Array$/.test(t) ? _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) : void 0;
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}
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}
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const entries = Object.entries,
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setPrototypeOf = Object.setPrototypeOf,
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isFrozen = Object.isFrozen,
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getPrototypeOf = Object.getPrototypeOf,
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getOwnPropertyDescriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;
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let freeze = Object.freeze,
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seal = Object.seal,
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create = Object.create; // eslint-disable-line import/no-mutable-exports
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let _ref = typeof Reflect !== 'undefined' && Reflect,
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apply = _ref.apply,
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construct = _ref.construct;
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if (!freeze) {
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freeze = function freeze(x) {
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return x;
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};
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}
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if (!seal) {
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seal = function seal(x) {
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return x;
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};
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}
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if (!apply) {
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apply = function apply(func, thisArg) {
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for (var _len = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len > 2 ? _len - 2 : 0), _key = 2; _key < _len; _key++) {
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args[_key - 2] = arguments[_key];
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}
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return func.apply(thisArg, args);
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};
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}
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if (!construct) {
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construct = function construct(Func) {
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for (var _len2 = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len2 > 1 ? _len2 - 1 : 0), _key2 = 1; _key2 < _len2; _key2++) {
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args[_key2 - 1] = arguments[_key2];
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}
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return new Func(...args);
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};
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}
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const arrayForEach = unapply(Array.prototype.forEach);
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const arrayLastIndexOf = unapply(Array.prototype.lastIndexOf);
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const arrayPop = unapply(Array.prototype.pop);
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const arrayPush = unapply(Array.prototype.push);
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const arraySplice = unapply(Array.prototype.splice);
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const arrayIsArray = Array.isArray;
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const stringToLowerCase = unapply(String.prototype.toLowerCase);
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const stringToString = unapply(String.prototype.toString);
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const stringMatch = unapply(String.prototype.match);
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const stringReplace = unapply(String.prototype.replace);
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const stringIndexOf = unapply(String.prototype.indexOf);
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const stringTrim = unapply(String.prototype.trim);
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const numberToString = unapply(Number.prototype.toString);
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const booleanToString = unapply(Boolean.prototype.toString);
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const bigintToString = typeof BigInt === 'undefined' ? null : unapply(BigInt.prototype.toString);
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const symbolToString = typeof Symbol === 'undefined' ? null : unapply(Symbol.prototype.toString);
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const objectHasOwnProperty = unapply(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty);
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const objectToString = unapply(Object.prototype.toString);
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const regExpTest = unapply(RegExp.prototype.test);
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const typeErrorCreate = unconstruct(TypeError);
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/**
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* Creates a new function that calls the given function with a specified thisArg and arguments.
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*
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* @param func - The function to be wrapped and called.
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* @returns A new function that calls the given function with a specified thisArg and arguments.
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*/
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function unapply(func) {
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return function (thisArg) {
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if (thisArg instanceof RegExp) {
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thisArg.lastIndex = 0;
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}
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for (var _len3 = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len3 > 1 ? _len3 - 1 : 0), _key3 = 1; _key3 < _len3; _key3++) {
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args[_key3 - 1] = arguments[_key3];
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}
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return apply(func, thisArg, args);
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};
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}
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/**
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* Creates a new function that constructs an instance of the given constructor function with the provided arguments.
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*
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* @param func - The constructor function to be wrapped and called.
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* @returns A new function that constructs an instance of the given constructor function with the provided arguments.
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*/
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function unconstruct(Func) {
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return function () {
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for (var _len4 = arguments.length, args = new Array(_len4), _key4 = 0; _key4 < _len4; _key4++) {
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args[_key4] = arguments[_key4];
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}
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return construct(Func, args);
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};
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}
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/**
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* Add properties to a lookup table
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*
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* @param set - The set to which elements will be added.
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* @param array - The array containing elements to be added to the set.
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* @param transformCaseFunc - An optional function to transform the case of each element before adding to the set.
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* @returns The modified set with added elements.
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*/
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function addToSet(set, array) {
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let transformCaseFunc = arguments.length > 2 && arguments[2] !== undefined ? arguments[2] : stringToLowerCase;
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if (setPrototypeOf) {
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// Make 'in' and truthy checks like Boolean(set.constructor)
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// independent of any properties defined on Object.prototype.
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// Prevent prototype setters from intercepting set as a this value.
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setPrototypeOf(set, null);
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}
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if (!arrayIsArray(array)) {
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return set;
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}
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let l = array.length;
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while (l--) {
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let element = array[l];
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if (typeof element === 'string') {
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const lcElement = transformCaseFunc(element);
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if (lcElement !== element) {
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// Config presets (e.g. tags.js, attrs.js) are immutable.
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if (!isFrozen(array)) {
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array[l] = lcElement;
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}
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element = lcElement;
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}
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}
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set[element] = true;
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}
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return set;
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}
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/**
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* Clean up an array to harden against CSPP
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*
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* @param array - The array to be cleaned.
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* @returns The cleaned version of the array
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*/
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function cleanArray(array) {
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for (let index = 0; index < array.length; index++) {
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const isPropertyExist = objectHasOwnProperty(array, index);
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if (!isPropertyExist) {
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array[index] = null;
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}
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}
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return array;
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}
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/**
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* Shallow clone an object
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*
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* @param object - The object to be cloned.
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* @returns A new object that copies the original.
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*/
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function clone(object) {
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const newObject = create(null);
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for (const _ref2 of entries(object)) {
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var _ref3 = _slicedToArray(_ref2, 2);
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const property = _ref3[0];
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const value = _ref3[1];
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const isPropertyExist = objectHasOwnProperty(object, property);
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if (isPropertyExist) {
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if (arrayIsArray(value)) {
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newObject[property] = cleanArray(value);
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} else if (value && typeof value === 'object' && value.constructor === Object) {
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newObject[property] = clone(value);
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} else {
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newObject[property] = value;
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}
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}
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}
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return newObject;
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}
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/**
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* Convert non-node values into strings without depending on direct property access.
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*
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* @param value - The value to stringify.
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* @returns A string representation of the provided value.
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*/
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function stringifyValue(value) {
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switch (typeof value) {
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case 'string':
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{
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return value;
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}
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case 'number':
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{
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return numberToString(value);
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}
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case 'boolean':
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{
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return booleanToString(value);
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}
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case 'bigint':
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{
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return bigintToString ? bigintToString(value) : '0';
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}
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case 'symbol':
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{
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return symbolToString ? symbolToString(value) : 'Symbol()';
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}
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case 'undefined':
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{
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return objectToString(value);
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}
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case 'function':
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case 'object':
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{
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if (value === null) {
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return objectToString(value);
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}
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const valueAsRecord = value;
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const valueToString = lookupGetter(valueAsRecord, 'toString');
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if (typeof valueToString === 'function') {
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const stringified = valueToString(valueAsRecord);
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return typeof stringified === 'string' ? stringified : objectToString(stringified);
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}
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return objectToString(value);
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}
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default:
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{
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return objectToString(value);
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}
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}
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}
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/**
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* This method automatically checks if the prop is function or getter and behaves accordingly.
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*
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* @param object - The object to look up the getter function in its prototype chain.
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* @param prop - The property name for which to find the getter function.
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* @returns The getter function found in the prototype chain or a fallback function.
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*/
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function lookupGetter(object, prop) {
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while (object !== null) {
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const desc = getOwnPropertyDescriptor(object, prop);
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if (desc) {
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if (desc.get) {
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return unapply(desc.get);
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}
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if (typeof desc.value === 'function') {
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return unapply(desc.value);
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}
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}
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object = getPrototypeOf(object);
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}
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function fallbackValue() {
|
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return null;
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}
|
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return fallbackValue;
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}
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function isRegex(value) {
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try {
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regExpTest(value, '');
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return true;
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} catch (_unused) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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const html$1 = freeze(['a', 'abbr', 'acronym', 'address', 'area', 'article', 'aside', 'audio', 'b', 'bdi', 'bdo', 'big', 'blink', 'blockquote', 'body', 'br', 'button', 'canvas', 'caption', 'center', 'cite', 'code', 'col', 'colgroup', 'content', 'data', 'datalist', 'dd', 'decorator', 'del', 'details', 'dfn', 'dialog', 'dir', 'div', 'dl', 'dt', 'element', 'em', 'fieldset', 'figcaption', 'figure', 'font', 'footer', 'form', 'h1', 'h2', 'h3', 'h4', 'h5', 'h6', 'head', 'header', 'hgroup', 'hr', 'html', 'i', 'img', 'input', 'ins', 'kbd', 'label', 'legend', 'li', 'main', 'map', 'mark', 'marquee', 'menu', 'menuitem', 'meter', 'nav', 'nobr', 'ol', 'optgroup', 'option', 'output', 'p', 'picture', 'pre', 'progress', 'q', 'rp', 'rt', 'ruby', 's', 'samp', 'search', 'section', 'select', 'shadow', 'slot', 'small', 'source', 'spacer', 'span', 'strike', 'strong', 'style', 'sub', 'summary', 'sup', 'table', 'tbody', 'td', 'template', 'textarea', 'tfoot', 'th', 'thead', 'time', 'tr', 'track', 'tt', 'u', 'ul', 'var', 'video', 'wbr']);
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const svg$1 = freeze(['svg', 'a', 'altglyph', 'altglyphdef', 'altglyphitem', 'animatecolor', 'animatemotion', 'animatetransform', 'circle', 'clippath', 'defs', 'desc', 'ellipse', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'filter', 'font', 'g', 'glyph', 'glyphref', 'hkern', 'image', 'inputmode', 'line', 'lineargradient', 'marker', 'mask', 'metadata', 'mpath', 'part', 'path', 'pattern', 'polygon', 'polyline', 'radialgradient', 'rect', 'stop', 'style', 'switch', 'symbol', 'text', 'textpath', 'title', 'tref', 'tspan', 'view', 'vkern']);
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const svgFilters = freeze(['feBlend', 'feColorMatrix', 'feComponentTransfer', 'feComposite', 'feConvolveMatrix', 'feDiffuseLighting', 'feDisplacementMap', 'feDistantLight', 'feDropShadow', 'feFlood', 'feFuncA', 'feFuncB', 'feFuncG', 'feFuncR', 'feGaussianBlur', 'feImage', 'feMerge', 'feMergeNode', 'feMorphology', 'feOffset', 'fePointLight', 'feSpecularLighting', 'feSpotLight', 'feTile', 'feTurbulence']);
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// List of SVG elements that are disallowed by default.
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// We still need to know them so that we can do namespace
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// checks properly in case one wants to add them to
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// allow-list.
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const svgDisallowed = freeze(['animate', 'color-profile', 'cursor', 'discard', 'font-face', 'font-face-format', 'font-face-name', 'font-face-src', 'font-face-uri', 'foreignobject', 'hatch', 'hatchpath', 'mesh', 'meshgradient', 'meshpatch', 'meshrow', 'missing-glyph', 'script', 'set', 'solidcolor', 'unknown', 'use']);
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const mathMl$1 = freeze(['math', 'menclose', 'merror', 'mfenced', 'mfrac', 'mglyph', 'mi', 'mlabeledtr', 'mmultiscripts', 'mn', 'mo', 'mover', 'mpadded', 'mphantom', 'mroot', 'mrow', 'ms', 'mspace', 'msqrt', 'mstyle', 'msub', 'msup', 'msubsup', 'mtable', 'mtd', 'mtext', 'mtr', 'munder', 'munderover', 'mprescripts']);
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// Similarly to SVG, we want to know all MathML elements,
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// even those that we disallow by default.
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const mathMlDisallowed = freeze(['maction', 'maligngroup', 'malignmark', 'mlongdiv', 'mscarries', 'mscarry', 'msgroup', 'mstack', 'msline', 'msrow', 'semantics', 'annotation', 'annotation-xml', 'mprescripts', 'none']);
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const text = freeze(['#text']);
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const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'command', 'commandfor', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns']);
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const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dominant-baseline', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-orientation', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
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const mathMl = freeze(['accent', 'accentunder', 'align', 'bevelled', 'close', 'columnalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspacing', 'columnspan', 'denomalign', 'depth', 'dir', 'display', 'displaystyle', 'encoding', 'fence', 'frame', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'largeop', 'length', 'linethickness', 'lquote', 'lspace', 'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathsize', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize', 'minsize', 'movablelimits', 'notation', 'numalign', 'open', 'rowalign', 'rowlines', 'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'rquote', 'scriptlevel', 'scriptminsize', 'scriptsizemultiplier', 'selection', 'separator', 'separators', 'stretchy', 'subscriptshift', 'supscriptshift', 'symmetric', 'voffset', 'width', 'xmlns']);
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const xml = freeze(['xlink:href', 'xml:id', 'xlink:title', 'xml:space', 'xmlns:xlink']);
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|
|
const MUSTACHE_EXPR = seal(/{{[\w\W]*|^[\w\W]*}}/g);
|
|
const ERB_EXPR = seal(/<%[\w\W]*|^[\w\W]*%>/g);
|
|
const TMPLIT_EXPR = seal(/\${[\w\W]*/g);
|
|
const DATA_ATTR = seal(/^data-[\-\w.\u00B7-\uFFFF]+$/); // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
|
|
const ARIA_ATTR = seal(/^aria-[\-\w]+$/); // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
|
|
const IS_ALLOWED_URI = seal(/^(?:(?:(?:f|ht)tps?|mailto|tel|callto|sms|cid|xmpp|matrix):|[^a-z]|[a-z+.\-]+(?:[^a-z+.\-:]|$))/i // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
|
|
);
|
|
const IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA = seal(/^(?:\w+script|data):/i);
|
|
const ATTR_WHITESPACE = seal(/[\u0000-\u0020\u00A0\u1680\u180E\u2000-\u2029\u205F\u3000]/g // eslint-disable-line no-control-regex
|
|
);
|
|
const DOCTYPE_NAME = seal(/^html$/i);
|
|
const CUSTOM_ELEMENT = seal(/^[a-z][.\w]*(-[.\w]+)+$/i);
|
|
// Markup-significant character probes used by _sanitizeElements.
|
|
// Shared module-level instances are safe despite the sticky /g flags:
|
|
// unapply() resets lastIndex for RegExp receivers before every call.
|
|
const ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE = seal(/<[/\w!]/g);
|
|
const COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE = seal(/<[/\w]/g);
|
|
const FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE = seal(/<\/no(script|embed|frames)/i);
|
|
const SELF_CLOSING_TAG = seal(/\/>/i);
|
|
|
|
// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Node/nodeType
|
|
const NODE_TYPE = {
|
|
element: 1,
|
|
attribute: 2,
|
|
text: 3,
|
|
cdataSection: 4,
|
|
entityReference: 5,
|
|
// Deprecated
|
|
entityNode: 6,
|
|
// Deprecated
|
|
processingInstruction: 7,
|
|
comment: 8,
|
|
document: 9,
|
|
documentType: 10,
|
|
documentFragment: 11,
|
|
notation: 12 // Deprecated
|
|
};
|
|
const getGlobal = function getGlobal() {
|
|
return typeof window === 'undefined' ? null : window;
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Creates a no-op policy for internal use only.
|
|
* Don't export this function outside this module!
|
|
* @param trustedTypes The policy factory.
|
|
* @param purifyHostElement The Script element used to load DOMPurify (to determine policy name suffix).
|
|
* @return The policy created (or null, if Trusted Types
|
|
* are not supported or creating the policy failed).
|
|
*/
|
|
const _createTrustedTypesPolicy = function _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, purifyHostElement) {
|
|
if (typeof trustedTypes !== 'object' || typeof trustedTypes.createPolicy !== 'function') {
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
// Allow the callers to control the unique policy name
|
|
// by adding a data-tt-policy-suffix to the script element with the DOMPurify.
|
|
// Policy creation with duplicate names throws in Trusted Types.
|
|
let suffix = null;
|
|
const ATTR_NAME = 'data-tt-policy-suffix';
|
|
if (purifyHostElement && purifyHostElement.hasAttribute(ATTR_NAME)) {
|
|
suffix = purifyHostElement.getAttribute(ATTR_NAME);
|
|
}
|
|
const policyName = 'dompurify' + (suffix ? '#' + suffix : '');
|
|
try {
|
|
return trustedTypes.createPolicy(policyName, {
|
|
createHTML(html) {
|
|
return html;
|
|
},
|
|
createScriptURL(scriptUrl) {
|
|
return scriptUrl;
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
// Policy creation failed (most likely another DOMPurify script has
|
|
// already run). Skip creating the policy, as this will only cause errors
|
|
// if TT are enforced.
|
|
console.warn('TrustedTypes policy ' + policyName + ' could not be created.');
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
const _createHooksMap = function _createHooksMap() {
|
|
return {
|
|
afterSanitizeAttributes: [],
|
|
afterSanitizeElements: [],
|
|
afterSanitizeShadowDOM: [],
|
|
beforeSanitizeAttributes: [],
|
|
beforeSanitizeElements: [],
|
|
beforeSanitizeShadowDOM: [],
|
|
uponSanitizeAttribute: [],
|
|
uponSanitizeElement: [],
|
|
uponSanitizeShadowNode: []
|
|
};
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Resolve a set-valued configuration option: a fresh set built from
|
|
* cfg[key] when it is an own array property (seeded with a clone of
|
|
* options.base when given, case-normalized via options.transform),
|
|
* the fallback set otherwise.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param cfg the cloned, prototype-free configuration object
|
|
* @param key the configuration property to read
|
|
* @param fallback the set to use when the option is absent or not an array
|
|
* @param options transform and optional base set to merge into
|
|
* @returns the resolved set
|
|
*/
|
|
const _resolveSetOption = function _resolveSetOption(cfg, key, fallback, options) {
|
|
return objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, key) && arrayIsArray(cfg[key]) ? addToSet(options.base ? clone(options.base) : {}, cfg[key], options.transform) : fallback;
|
|
};
|
|
function createDOMPurify() {
|
|
let window = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : getGlobal();
|
|
const DOMPurify = root => createDOMPurify(root);
|
|
DOMPurify.version = '3.4.13';
|
|
DOMPurify.removed = [];
|
|
if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== NODE_TYPE.document || !window.Element) {
|
|
// Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
|
|
// so that you can pass your own Window
|
|
DOMPurify.isSupported = false;
|
|
return DOMPurify;
|
|
}
|
|
let document = window.document;
|
|
const originalDocument = document;
|
|
const currentScript = originalDocument.currentScript;
|
|
window.DocumentFragment;
|
|
const HTMLTemplateElement = window.HTMLTemplateElement,
|
|
Node = window.Node,
|
|
Element = window.Element,
|
|
NodeFilter = window.NodeFilter,
|
|
_window$NamedNodeMap = window.NamedNodeMap;
|
|
_window$NamedNodeMap === void 0 ? window.NamedNodeMap || window.MozNamedAttrMap : _window$NamedNodeMap;
|
|
window.HTMLFormElement;
|
|
const DOMParser = window.DOMParser,
|
|
trustedTypes = window.trustedTypes;
|
|
const ElementPrototype = Element.prototype;
|
|
const cloneNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'cloneNode');
|
|
const remove = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'remove');
|
|
const getNextSibling = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'nextSibling');
|
|
const getChildNodes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'childNodes');
|
|
const getParentNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'parentNode');
|
|
const getShadowRoot = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'shadowRoot');
|
|
const getAttributes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'attributes');
|
|
const getNodeType = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeType') : null;
|
|
const getNodeName = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeName') : null;
|
|
const getOwnerDocument = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'ownerDocument') : null;
|
|
// As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
|
|
// new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
|
|
// (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
|
|
// a new empty registry is used when creating a template contents owner
|
|
// document, so we use that as our parent document to ensure nothing
|
|
// is inherited.
|
|
if (typeof HTMLTemplateElement === 'function') {
|
|
const template = document.createElement('template');
|
|
if (template.content && template.content.ownerDocument) {
|
|
document = template.content.ownerDocument;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
let trustedTypesPolicy;
|
|
let emptyHTML = '';
|
|
// The instance's own internal Trusted Types policy. Unlike a caller-supplied
|
|
// `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY`, this is created at most once — Trusted Types throws
|
|
// on duplicate policy names — and is the only policy allowed to persist
|
|
// across configurations and survive `clearConfig()`.
|
|
let defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
|
|
let defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved = false;
|
|
// Tracks whether we are already inside a call to the configured Trusted Types
|
|
// policy (`createHTML` or `createScriptURL`). If a supplied policy callback
|
|
// itself calls `DOMPurify.sanitize` (the cause of #1422), `sanitize` would
|
|
// re-enter the policy and recurse until the stack overflows. We detect that
|
|
// re-entry and throw a clear, actionable error instead. The guard is shared
|
|
// across both callbacks, because either one re-entering `sanitize` triggers
|
|
// the same unbounded recursion.
|
|
let IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY = 0;
|
|
const _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy = function _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy() {
|
|
if (IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY > 0) {
|
|
throw typeErrorCreate('A configured TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY callback (createHTML or ' + 'createScriptURL) must not call DOMPurify.sanitize, as that causes ' + 'infinite recursion. Do not pass a policy whose callbacks wrap ' + 'DOMPurify as TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY; see the "DOMPurify and Trusted ' + 'Types" section of the README.');
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
const _createTrustedHTML = function _createTrustedHTML(html) {
|
|
_assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy();
|
|
IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY++;
|
|
try {
|
|
return trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(html);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY--;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
const _createTrustedScriptURL = function _createTrustedScriptURL(scriptUrl) {
|
|
_assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy();
|
|
IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY++;
|
|
try {
|
|
return trustedTypesPolicy.createScriptURL(scriptUrl);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY--;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
// Lazily resolve (and cache) the instance's internal default policy.
|
|
// Resolution is attempted at most once: a successful `createPolicy` cannot be
|
|
// repeated (Trusted Types throws on duplicate names), and a failed or
|
|
// unsupported attempt must not be retried on every parse.
|
|
const _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy = function _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy() {
|
|
if (!defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved) {
|
|
defaultTrustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, currentScript);
|
|
defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved = true;
|
|
}
|
|
return defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
|
|
};
|
|
const _document = document,
|
|
implementation = _document.implementation,
|
|
createNodeIterator = _document.createNodeIterator,
|
|
createDocumentFragment = _document.createDocumentFragment,
|
|
getElementsByTagName = _document.getElementsByTagName;
|
|
const importNode = originalDocument.importNode;
|
|
let hooks = _createHooksMap();
|
|
/**
|
|
* Expose whether this browser supports running the full DOMPurify.
|
|
*/
|
|
DOMPurify.isSupported = typeof entries === 'function' && typeof getParentNode === 'function' && implementation && implementation.createHTMLDocument !== undefined;
|
|
const MUSTACHE_EXPR$1 = MUSTACHE_EXPR,
|
|
ERB_EXPR$1 = ERB_EXPR,
|
|
TMPLIT_EXPR$1 = TMPLIT_EXPR,
|
|
DATA_ATTR$1 = DATA_ATTR,
|
|
ARIA_ATTR$1 = ARIA_ATTR,
|
|
IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1 = IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,
|
|
ATTR_WHITESPACE$1 = ATTR_WHITESPACE,
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT$1 = CUSTOM_ELEMENT;
|
|
let IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = IS_ALLOWED_URI;
|
|
/**
|
|
* We consider the elements and attributes below to be safe. Ideally
|
|
* don't add any new ones but feel free to remove unwanted ones.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* allowed element names */
|
|
let ALLOWED_TAGS = null;
|
|
const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...html$1, ...svg$1, ...svgFilters, ...mathMl$1, ...text]);
|
|
/* Allowed attribute names */
|
|
let ALLOWED_ATTR = null;
|
|
const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR = addToSet({}, [...html, ...svg, ...mathMl, ...xml]);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Configure how DOMPurify should handle custom elements and their attributes as well as customized built-in elements.
|
|
* @property {RegExp|Function|null} tagNameCheck one of [null, regexPattern, predicate]. Default: `null` (disallow any custom elements)
|
|
* @property {RegExp|Function|null} attributeNameCheck one of [null, regexPattern, predicate]. Default: `null` (disallow any attributes not on the allow list)
|
|
* @property {boolean} allowCustomizedBuiltInElements allow custom elements derived from built-ins if they pass CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck. Default: `false`.
|
|
*/
|
|
let CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = Object.seal(create(null, {
|
|
tagNameCheck: {
|
|
writable: true,
|
|
configurable: false,
|
|
enumerable: true,
|
|
value: null
|
|
},
|
|
attributeNameCheck: {
|
|
writable: true,
|
|
configurable: false,
|
|
enumerable: true,
|
|
value: null
|
|
},
|
|
allowCustomizedBuiltInElements: {
|
|
writable: true,
|
|
configurable: false,
|
|
enumerable: true,
|
|
value: false
|
|
}
|
|
}));
|
|
/* Explicitly forbidden tags (overrides ALLOWED_TAGS/ADD_TAGS) */
|
|
let FORBID_TAGS = null;
|
|
/* Explicitly forbidden attributes (overrides ALLOWED_ATTR/ADD_ATTR) */
|
|
let FORBID_ATTR = null;
|
|
/* Config object to store ADD_TAGS/ADD_ATTR functions (when used as functions) */
|
|
const EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING = Object.seal(create(null, {
|
|
tagCheck: {
|
|
writable: true,
|
|
configurable: false,
|
|
enumerable: true,
|
|
value: null
|
|
},
|
|
attributeCheck: {
|
|
writable: true,
|
|
configurable: false,
|
|
enumerable: true,
|
|
value: null
|
|
}
|
|
}));
|
|
/* Decide if ARIA attributes are okay */
|
|
let ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = true;
|
|
/* Decide if custom data attributes are okay */
|
|
let ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = true;
|
|
/* Decide if unknown protocols are okay */
|
|
let ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = false;
|
|
/* Decide if self-closing tags in attributes are allowed.
|
|
* Usually removed due to a mXSS issue in jQuery 3.0 */
|
|
let ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR = true;
|
|
/* Output should be safe for common template engines.
|
|
* This means, DOMPurify removes data attributes, mustaches and ERB
|
|
*/
|
|
let SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES = false;
|
|
/* Output should be safe even for XML used within HTML and alike.
|
|
* This means, DOMPurify removes comments when containing risky content.
|
|
*/
|
|
let SAFE_FOR_XML = true;
|
|
/* Decide if document with <html>... should be returned */
|
|
let WHOLE_DOCUMENT = false;
|
|
/* Track whether config is already set on this instance of DOMPurify. */
|
|
let SET_CONFIG = false;
|
|
/* Pristine allowlist bindings captured at setConfig() time. On the
|
|
* persistent-config path sanitize() restores the sets from these before
|
|
* the per-walk hook clone-guard, so a hook's in-call widening cannot
|
|
* carry across calls. Null until setConfig() is called; reset by
|
|
* clearConfig(). */
|
|
let SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS = null;
|
|
let SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR = null;
|
|
/* Decide if all elements (e.g. style, script) must be children of
|
|
* document.body. By default, browsers might move them to document.head */
|
|
let FORCE_BODY = false;
|
|
/* Decide if a DOM `HTMLBodyElement` should be returned, instead of a html
|
|
* string (or a TrustedHTML object if Trusted Types are supported).
|
|
* If `WHOLE_DOCUMENT` is enabled a `HTMLHtmlElement` will be returned instead
|
|
*/
|
|
let RETURN_DOM = false;
|
|
/* Decide if a DOM `DocumentFragment` should be returned, instead of a html
|
|
* string (or a TrustedHTML object if Trusted Types are supported) */
|
|
let RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT = false;
|
|
/* Try to return a Trusted Type object instead of a string, return a string in
|
|
* case Trusted Types are not supported */
|
|
let RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE = false;
|
|
/* Output should be free from DOM clobbering attacks?
|
|
* This sanitizes markups named with colliding, clobberable built-in DOM APIs.
|
|
*/
|
|
let SANITIZE_DOM = true;
|
|
/* Achieve full DOM Clobbering protection by isolating the namespace of named
|
|
* properties and JS variables, mitigating attacks that abuse the HTML/DOM spec rules.
|
|
*
|
|
* HTML/DOM spec rules that enable DOM Clobbering:
|
|
* - Named Access on Window (§7.3.3)
|
|
* - DOM Tree Accessors (§3.1.5)
|
|
* - Form Element Parent-Child Relations (§4.10.3)
|
|
* - Iframe srcdoc / Nested WindowProxies (§4.8.5)
|
|
* - HTMLCollection (§4.2.10.2)
|
|
*
|
|
* Namespace isolation is implemented by prefixing `id` and `name` attributes
|
|
* with a constant string, i.e., `user-content-`
|
|
*/
|
|
let SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = false;
|
|
const SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX = 'user-content-';
|
|
/* Keep element content when removing element? */
|
|
let KEEP_CONTENT = true;
|
|
/* If a `Node` is passed to sanitize(), then performs sanitization in-place instead
|
|
* of importing it into a new Document and returning a sanitized copy */
|
|
let IN_PLACE = false;
|
|
/* Allow usage of profiles like html, svg and mathMl */
|
|
let USE_PROFILES = {};
|
|
/* Tags to ignore content of when KEEP_CONTENT is true */
|
|
let FORBID_CONTENTS = null;
|
|
const DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'audio', 'colgroup', 'desc', 'foreignobject', 'head', 'iframe', 'math', 'mi', 'mn', 'mo', 'ms', 'mtext', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'noscript', 'plaintext', 'script',
|
|
// <selectedcontent> mirrors the selected <option>'s subtree, cloned by
|
|
// the UA (customizable <select>) — including any on* handlers — and the
|
|
// engine re-mirrors synchronously whenever a removal changes which
|
|
// option/selectedcontent is current, even inside DOMPurify's inert
|
|
// DOMParser document. Hoisting its children on removal re-inserts a fresh
|
|
// mirror target ahead of the walk, which the engine refills, looping
|
|
// forever (DoS) and amplifying output. Dropping its content on removal
|
|
// (rather than hoisting) breaks that cascade; the content is a duplicate
|
|
// of the option, which is sanitized on its own. See campaign-3 F1/F6.
|
|
'selectedcontent', 'style', 'svg', 'template', 'thead', 'title', 'video', 'xmp']);
|
|
/* Tags that are safe for data: URIs */
|
|
let DATA_URI_TAGS = null;
|
|
const DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS = addToSet({}, ['audio', 'video', 'img', 'source', 'image', 'track']);
|
|
/* Attributes safe for values like "javascript:" */
|
|
let URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = null;
|
|
const DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = addToSet({}, ['alt', 'class', 'for', 'id', 'label', 'name', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'role', 'summary', 'title', 'value', 'style', 'xmlns']);
|
|
const MATHML_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML';
|
|
const SVG_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/2000/svg';
|
|
const HTML_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml';
|
|
/* Document namespace */
|
|
let NAMESPACE = HTML_NAMESPACE;
|
|
let IS_EMPTY_INPUT = false;
|
|
/* Allowed XHTML+XML namespaces */
|
|
let ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = null;
|
|
const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = addToSet({}, [MATHML_NAMESPACE, SVG_NAMESPACE, HTML_NAMESPACE], stringToString);
|
|
const DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = freeze(['mi', 'mo', 'mn', 'ms', 'mtext']);
|
|
let MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS);
|
|
const DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = freeze(['annotation-xml']);
|
|
let HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS);
|
|
// Certain elements are allowed in both SVG and HTML
|
|
// namespace. We need to specify them explicitly
|
|
// so that they don't get erroneously deleted from
|
|
// HTML namespace.
|
|
const COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS = addToSet({}, ['title', 'style', 'font', 'a', 'script']);
|
|
/* Parsing of strict XHTML documents */
|
|
let PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE = null;
|
|
const SUPPORTED_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPES = ['application/xhtml+xml', 'text/html'];
|
|
const DEFAULT_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE = 'text/html';
|
|
let transformCaseFunc = null;
|
|
/* Keep a reference to config to pass to hooks */
|
|
let CONFIG = null;
|
|
/* Ideally, do not touch anything below this line */
|
|
/* ______________________________________________ */
|
|
const formElement = document.createElement('form');
|
|
const isRegexOrFunction = function isRegexOrFunction(testValue) {
|
|
return testValue instanceof RegExp || testValue instanceof Function;
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
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* _parseConfig
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*
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* @param cfg optional config literal
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*/
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// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
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const _parseConfig = function _parseConfig() {
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let cfg = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};
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if (CONFIG && CONFIG === cfg) {
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return;
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}
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/* Shield configuration object from tampering */
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if (!cfg || typeof cfg !== 'object') {
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cfg = {};
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}
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/* Shield configuration object from prototype pollution */
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cfg = clone(cfg);
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PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE =
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// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
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SUPPORTED_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPES.indexOf(cfg.PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE) === -1 ? DEFAULT_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE : cfg.PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE;
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// HTML tags and attributes are not case-sensitive, converting to lowercase. Keeping XHTML as is.
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transformCaseFunc = PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' ? stringToString : stringToLowerCase;
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/* Set configuration parameters */
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ALLOWED_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_TAGS', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS, {
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transform: transformCaseFunc
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});
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ALLOWED_ATTR = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_ATTR', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR, {
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transform: transformCaseFunc
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});
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ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_NAMESPACES', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES, {
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transform: stringToString
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});
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URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR', DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, {
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transform: transformCaseFunc,
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base: DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES
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});
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DATA_URI_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS', DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS, {
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transform: transformCaseFunc,
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base: DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS
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});
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FORBID_CONTENTS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS', DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS, {
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transform: transformCaseFunc
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});
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FORBID_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_TAGS', clone({}), {
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transform: transformCaseFunc
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});
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FORBID_ATTR = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_ATTR', clone({}), {
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transform: transformCaseFunc
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});
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USE_PROFILES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'USE_PROFILES') ? cfg.USE_PROFILES && typeof cfg.USE_PROFILES === 'object' ? clone(cfg.USE_PROFILES) : cfg.USE_PROFILES : false;
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ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
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ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_DATA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
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ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = cfg.ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS || false; // Default false
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ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR !== false; // Default true
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SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES = cfg.SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES || false; // Default false
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SAFE_FOR_XML = cfg.SAFE_FOR_XML !== false; // Default true
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WHOLE_DOCUMENT = cfg.WHOLE_DOCUMENT || false; // Default false
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RETURN_DOM = cfg.RETURN_DOM || false; // Default false
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RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT = cfg.RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT || false; // Default false
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RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE = cfg.RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE || false; // Default false
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FORCE_BODY = cfg.FORCE_BODY || false; // Default false
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SANITIZE_DOM = cfg.SANITIZE_DOM !== false; // Default true
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SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = cfg.SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS || false; // Default false
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KEEP_CONTENT = cfg.KEEP_CONTENT !== false; // Default true
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IN_PLACE = cfg.IN_PLACE || false; // Default false
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IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = isRegex(cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP) ? cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP : IS_ALLOWED_URI; // Default regexp
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NAMESPACE = typeof cfg.NAMESPACE === 'string' ? cfg.NAMESPACE : HTML_NAMESPACE; // Default HTML namespace
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MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS') && cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS && typeof cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object' ? clone(cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS) : addToSet({}, DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS); // Default built-in map
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HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS') && cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS && typeof cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object' ? clone(cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS) : addToSet({}, DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS); // Default built-in map
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const customElementHandling = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING') && cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && typeof cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING === 'object' ? clone(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING) : create(null);
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CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = create(null);
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if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'tagNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.tagNameCheck)) {
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CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck = customElementHandling.tagNameCheck; // Default undefined
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}
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if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'attributeNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.attributeNameCheck)) {
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CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck = customElementHandling.attributeNameCheck; // Default undefined
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}
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if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'allowCustomizedBuiltInElements') && typeof customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements === 'boolean') {
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CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements = customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements; // Default undefined
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}
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seal(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING);
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if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
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ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = false;
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}
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if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
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RETURN_DOM = true;
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}
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/* Parse profile info */
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if (USE_PROFILES) {
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ALLOWED_TAGS = addToSet({}, text);
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ALLOWED_ATTR = create(null);
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if (USE_PROFILES.html === true) {
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addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, html$1);
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addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, html);
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}
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if (USE_PROFILES.svg === true) {
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addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, svg$1);
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addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, svg);
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addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
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}
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if (USE_PROFILES.svgFilters === true) {
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addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, svgFilters);
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addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, svg);
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addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
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}
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if (USE_PROFILES.mathMl === true) {
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addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, mathMl$1);
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addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, mathMl);
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addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
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}
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}
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/* Always reset function-based ADD_TAGS / ADD_ATTR checks to prevent
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* leaking across calls when switching from function to array config */
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EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = null;
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EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = null;
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/* Merge configuration parameters */
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if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_TAGS')) {
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if (typeof cfg.ADD_TAGS === 'function') {
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EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = cfg.ADD_TAGS;
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} else if (arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_TAGS)) {
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if (ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS) {
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ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
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}
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addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, cfg.ADD_TAGS, transformCaseFunc);
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}
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}
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if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_ATTR')) {
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if (typeof cfg.ADD_ATTR === 'function') {
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EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = cfg.ADD_ATTR;
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} else if (arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_ATTR)) {
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if (ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR) {
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ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
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}
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addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, cfg.ADD_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
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}
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}
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if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR)) {
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addToSet(URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
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}
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if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS)) {
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if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
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FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
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}
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addToSet(FORBID_CONTENTS, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc);
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}
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if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS)) {
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if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
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FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
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}
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addToSet(FORBID_CONTENTS, cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc);
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}
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/* Add #text in case KEEP_CONTENT is set to true */
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if (KEEP_CONTENT) {
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ALLOWED_TAGS['#text'] = true;
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}
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/* Add html, head and body to ALLOWED_TAGS in case WHOLE_DOCUMENT is true */
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if (WHOLE_DOCUMENT) {
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addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['html', 'head', 'body']);
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}
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/* Add tbody to ALLOWED_TAGS in case tables are permitted, see #286, #365 */
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if (ALLOWED_TAGS.table) {
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addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['tbody']);
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delete FORBID_TAGS.tbody;
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}
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// Re-derive the active Trusted Types policy from this configuration on
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// every parse. The active policy must never be sticky closure state that
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// outlives the config that set it: a caller-supplied policy left in place
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// after `clearConfig()` — or after a later call that supplied none, or
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// `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null` — could sign a subsequent "default"
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// `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` result with a foreign, possibly unsafe policy.
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// See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
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if (cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY) {
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if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createHTML !== 'function') {
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throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createHTML" hook.');
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}
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if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createScriptURL !== 'function') {
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throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createScriptURL" hook.');
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}
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// A caller-supplied policy applies to this configuration only.
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const previousTrustedTypesPolicy = trustedTypesPolicy;
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trustedTypesPolicy = cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY;
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// Sign local variables required by `sanitize`. If the supplied policy's
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// `createHTML` is circular (i.e. it calls `DOMPurify.sanitize`), this
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// throws via the re-entrancy guard. Restore the previous policy first so
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// the instance is not left in a poisoned state. See #1422.
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try {
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emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
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} catch (error) {
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trustedTypesPolicy = previousTrustedTypesPolicy;
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throw error;
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}
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} else if (cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY === null) {
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// Explicit opt-out for this call: perform no Trusted Types signing and
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// create nothing (so a strict `trusted-types` CSP that disallows a
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// `dompurify` policy can still call `sanitize` from inside its own
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// policy — see #1422). Resetting to `undefined` rather than a sticky
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// `null` also drops any previously retained caller policy, so it cannot
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// resurface on a later call, while still allowing the next config-less
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// call to restore the internal default policy. See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
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trustedTypesPolicy = undefined;
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emptyHTML = '';
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} else {
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// No policy supplied: keep the currently active policy if one is set — a
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// previously supplied policy is intentionally sticky across config-less
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// calls — otherwise fall back to the instance's own internal policy,
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// created at most once. (A policy supplied for a *single* call still
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// lingers by design; what must not linger is a policy whose configuration
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// has been torn down via `clearConfig()`, which restores the default.)
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if (trustedTypesPolicy === undefined) {
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trustedTypesPolicy = _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy();
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}
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// Sign internal variables only when a policy is active. A falsy policy
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// (Trusted Types unsupported, creation failed, or an explicit opt-out)
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// leaves `emptyHTML` as a plain string, so we never call `.createHTML` on
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// a non-policy and throw. See #1422.
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if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
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emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
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}
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}
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// Prevent further manipulation of configuration.
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// Not available in IE8, Safari 5, etc.
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if (freeze) {
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freeze(cfg);
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}
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CONFIG = cfg;
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};
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/* Keep track of all possible SVG and MathML tags
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* so that we can perform the namespace checks
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* correctly. */
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const ALL_SVG_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...svg$1, ...svgFilters, ...svgDisallowed]);
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const ALL_MATHML_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...mathMl$1, ...mathMlDisallowed]);
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/**
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* Namespace rules for an element in the SVG namespace.
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*
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* @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
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* @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
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* @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
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* @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
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*/
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const _checkSvgNamespace = function _checkSvgNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
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// The only way to switch from HTML namespace to SVG
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// is via <svg>. If it happens via any other tag, then
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// it should be killed.
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if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
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return tagName === 'svg';
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}
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// The only way to switch from MathML to SVG is via <svg>
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// if the parent is either <annotation-xml> or a MathML
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// text integration point.
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if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
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return tagName === 'svg' && (parentTagName === 'annotation-xml' || MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]);
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}
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// We only allow elements that are defined in SVG
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// spec. All others are disallowed in SVG namespace.
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return Boolean(ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
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};
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/**
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* Namespace rules for an element in the MathML namespace.
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*
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* @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
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* @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
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* @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
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* @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
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*/
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const _checkMathMlNamespace = function _checkMathMlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
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// The only way to switch from HTML namespace to MathML
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// is via <math>. If it happens via any other tag, then
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// it should be killed.
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if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
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return tagName === 'math';
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}
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// The only way to switch from SVG to MathML is via
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// <math> and HTML integration points
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if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
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return tagName === 'math' && HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName];
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}
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// We only allow elements that are defined in MathML
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// spec. All others are disallowed in MathML namespace.
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return Boolean(ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName]);
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};
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/**
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* Namespace rules for an element in the HTML namespace.
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*
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* @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
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* @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
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* @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
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* @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
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*/
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const _checkHtmlNamespace = function _checkHtmlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
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// The only way to switch from SVG to HTML is via
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// HTML integration points, and from MathML to HTML
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// is via MathML text integration points
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if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE && !HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
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return false;
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}
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if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE && !MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
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return false;
|
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}
|
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// We disallow tags that are specific for MathML
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// or SVG and should never appear in HTML namespace
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return !ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName] && (COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS[tagName] || !ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
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};
|
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/**
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* @param element a DOM element whose namespace is being checked
|
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* @returns Return false if the element has a
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* namespace that a spec-compliant parser would never
|
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* return. Return true otherwise.
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*/
|
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const _checkValidNamespace = function _checkValidNamespace(element) {
|
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let parent = getParentNode(element);
|
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// In JSDOM, if we're inside shadow DOM, then parentNode
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// can be null. We just simulate parent in this case.
|
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if (!parent || !parent.tagName) {
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parent = {
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namespaceURI: NAMESPACE,
|
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tagName: 'template'
|
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};
|
|
}
|
|
const tagName = stringToLowerCase(element.tagName);
|
|
const parentTagName = stringToLowerCase(parent.tagName);
|
|
if (!ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]) {
|
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return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (element.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
|
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return _checkSvgNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
|
|
}
|
|
if (element.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
return _checkMathMlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
|
|
}
|
|
if (element.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
return _checkHtmlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
|
|
}
|
|
// For XHTML and XML documents that support custom namespaces
|
|
if (PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' && ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
// The code should never reach this place (this means
|
|
// that the element somehow got namespace that is not
|
|
// HTML, SVG, MathML or allowed via ALLOWED_NAMESPACES).
|
|
// Return false just in case.
|
|
return false;
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _forceRemove
|
|
*
|
|
* @param node a DOM node
|
|
*/
|
|
const _forceRemove = function _forceRemove(node) {
|
|
arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
|
|
element: node
|
|
});
|
|
try {
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-remove
|
|
getParentNode(node).removeChild(node);
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
/* The normal detach failed — this is reached for a parentless node
|
|
(getParentNode() is null, so .removeChild throws). Element.prototype
|
|
.remove() is itself a spec no-op on a parentless node, so a recorded
|
|
"removal" would otherwise hand the caller back an intact,
|
|
payload-bearing node (e.g. a detached IN_PLACE root the mXSS canary or
|
|
the style-with-element-child rule decided to kill). Fail closed by
|
|
throwing — exactly as a clobbered root does at the IN_PLACE entry —
|
|
rather than trying to "neutralize" the node via its own methods.
|
|
Neutralizing would mean calling getAttributeNames()/removeAttribute()
|
|
on the node, both of which a <form> root can clobber via a named child
|
|
(and _isClobbered does not even probe getAttributeNames), so the
|
|
neutralize step could itself be silently defeated, leaving the payload
|
|
intact. A throw touches only the cached, clobber-safe remove() and
|
|
getParentNode(). Generalizes GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676 (clobbered-form root)
|
|
to every root-kill reason. REPORT-3.
|
|
This lives inside the catch, so it never fires for a normally-removed
|
|
in-tree node: those have a parent, removeChild() succeeds, and the
|
|
catch is not entered. Only a kept (parentless) root reaches here. */
|
|
remove(node);
|
|
if (!getParentNode(node)) {
|
|
throw typeErrorCreate('a node selected for removal could not be detached from its tree ' + 'and cannot be safely returned; refusing to sanitize in place');
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _neutralizeRoot
|
|
*
|
|
* Fail-closed teardown of an in-place root after the sanitize walk aborts
|
|
* (campaign-3 F2). An internal throw mid-walk — e.g. a page-registered
|
|
* custom element's reaction detaches a node so `_forceRemove`'s deliberate
|
|
* parentless guard throws, or any other re-entrant engine mutation — would
|
|
* otherwise leave the caller's *live* tree half-sanitized, with everything
|
|
* after the abort point still carrying its handlers. There is no safe way
|
|
* to resume the walk (the tree mutated under us), so we strip the root bare:
|
|
* remove every child and every attribute, then let the caller's catch see
|
|
* the original error. Clobber-safe (cached `remove`/`childNodes`/`attributes`
|
|
* getters; the root was already clobber-pre-flighted at the IN_PLACE entry).
|
|
*
|
|
* @param root the in-place root to empty
|
|
*/
|
|
const _neutralizeRoot = function _neutralizeRoot(root) {
|
|
/* Strip every disallowed attribute (on* handlers included) off the whole
|
|
subtree BEFORE detaching anything. Detaching first would hand back
|
|
handler-bearing originals (e.g. an already-loading `<img onerror>`)
|
|
whose queued resource event still fires in page scope after we throw.
|
|
Clobber-safe reads; a doomed clobbered node's own attributes are
|
|
irrelevant while its non-clobbered descendants are reached and scrubbed. */
|
|
_neutralizeSubtree(root);
|
|
const childNodes = getChildNodes(root);
|
|
if (childNodes) {
|
|
const snapshot = [];
|
|
arrayForEach(childNodes, child => {
|
|
arrayPush(snapshot, child);
|
|
});
|
|
arrayForEach(snapshot, child => {
|
|
try {
|
|
remove(child);
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
/* Best-effort teardown; a still-attached child is handled below */
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
const attributes = getAttributes(root);
|
|
if (attributes) {
|
|
for (let i = attributes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
|
|
const attribute = attributes[i];
|
|
const name = attribute && attribute.name;
|
|
if (typeof name === 'string') {
|
|
try {
|
|
root.removeAttribute(name);
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
/* Clobbered removeAttribute — ignore (fail-closed best effort) */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _removeAttribute
|
|
*
|
|
* @param name an Attribute name
|
|
* @param element a DOM node
|
|
*/
|
|
const _removeAttribute = function _removeAttribute(name, element) {
|
|
try {
|
|
arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
|
|
attribute: element.getAttributeNode(name),
|
|
from: element
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
|
|
attribute: null,
|
|
from: element
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
element.removeAttribute(name);
|
|
// We void attribute values for unremovable "is" attributes
|
|
if (name === 'is') {
|
|
if (RETURN_DOM || RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
|
|
try {
|
|
_forceRemove(element);
|
|
} catch (_) {}
|
|
} else {
|
|
try {
|
|
element.setAttribute(name, '');
|
|
} catch (_) {}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _stripDisallowedAttributes
|
|
*
|
|
* Removes every attribute the active configuration does not allow from a
|
|
* single element, using the same allowlist as the main attribute pass (so
|
|
* `on*` handlers go, but no `/^on/` blocklist is introduced). Used only to
|
|
* neutralise nodes that are being discarded from an in-place tree.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param element the element to strip
|
|
*/
|
|
const _stripDisallowedAttributes = function _stripDisallowedAttributes(element) {
|
|
const attributes = getAttributes(element);
|
|
if (!attributes) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
for (let i = attributes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
|
|
const attribute = attributes[i];
|
|
const name = attribute && attribute.name;
|
|
if (typeof name !== 'string' || ALLOWED_ATTR[transformCaseFunc(name)]) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
element.removeAttribute(name);
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
/* Clobbered removeAttribute on a doomed node — ignore */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _neutralizeSubtree
|
|
*
|
|
* Completes the audit-5 F1 fix across every removal path. The KEEP_CONTENT
|
|
* move-hoist neutralises only disallowed-tag removals; clobber, mXSS-canary,
|
|
* namespace, comment, processing-instruction and KEEP_CONTENT:false removals
|
|
* all drop their subtree wholesale via `_forceRemove`. On the IN_PLACE path
|
|
* those dropped nodes are detached from the caller's LIVE tree but a
|
|
* handler-bearing original among them (an `<img onerror>`/`<video>` that was
|
|
* loading) keeps its queued resource event, which fires in page scope after
|
|
* sanitize returns. This walks a removed subtree and strips every attribute
|
|
* the active configuration does not allow — so `on*` handlers are cancelled
|
|
* through the SAME allowlist that governs kept nodes, not a separate `/^on/`
|
|
* blocklist. Run synchronously before sanitize returns, i.e. before any
|
|
* queued event can fire. Hook-free by design: these nodes leave the output,
|
|
* so firing attribute hooks for them would be surprising. Clobber-safe reads;
|
|
* a doomed clobbered node may shadow `removeAttribute` (its own attributes are
|
|
* irrelevant — it is discarded — while its non-clobbered descendants, e.g.
|
|
* the `<img>`, are reached and scrubbed).
|
|
*
|
|
* @param root the root of a removed subtree to neutralise
|
|
*/
|
|
const _neutralizeSubtree = function _neutralizeSubtree(root) {
|
|
const stack = [root];
|
|
while (stack.length > 0) {
|
|
const node = stack.pop();
|
|
const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
|
|
if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
|
|
_stripDisallowedAttributes(node);
|
|
}
|
|
const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
|
|
if (childNodes) {
|
|
for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
|
|
stack.push(childNodes[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _neutralizePatchLinkage
|
|
*
|
|
* IN_PLACE entry pre-pass (declarative-partial-updates / streaming
|
|
* hardening, https://github.com/WICG/declarative-partial-updates).
|
|
*
|
|
* The main walk strips patch linkage (`for`/`patchsrc`) and removes range
|
|
* markers (PIs / markup comments) node-by-node, in document order, AS it
|
|
* reaches each node. On a live in-place root that leaves a window: from the
|
|
* moment the root is connected until the walk arrives at a given node, that
|
|
* node's linkage is live. A patch applied on connection/stream can fire as
|
|
* a microtask during the walk and inject or teleport an unsanitized DOM
|
|
* range into a region the iterator has already passed and will not revisit,
|
|
* so the post-return "tree is sanitized" contract is violated. Sweep the
|
|
* whole tree once up front and sever every linkage before the walk begins,
|
|
* closing that window.
|
|
*
|
|
* This CANNOT undo a patch that already fired before sanitize ran — that is
|
|
* the irreducible "do not IN_PLACE a live-connected attacker tree" caveat —
|
|
* but it closes everything from sanitize-start onward. Gated on SAFE_FOR_XML
|
|
* to group with the rest of the declarative-partial-updates handling and
|
|
* stay overridable, consistent with the codebase.
|
|
*
|
|
* Clobber-safe traversal (cached childNodes getter); per-node try/catch so a
|
|
* clobbered root cannot defeat the sweep of its non-clobbered descendants.
|
|
*
|
|
* NOTE (pending real-Chrome confirmation, see test/declarative-patch-probe
|
|
* .html Q1): this mirrors the existing policy of keeping `for` on
|
|
* <label>/<output>. If the shipping feature can drive a patch through a
|
|
* surviving `for`-on-label/output + `id` pair, this pre-pass and the
|
|
* attribute check at _isBasicCustomElement's caller must additionally drop
|
|
* that pair on the IN_PLACE path. Left as-is until the taxonomy is verified.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param root the in-place root to sweep
|
|
*/
|
|
const _neutralizePatchLinkage = function _neutralizePatchLinkage(root) {
|
|
if (!SAFE_FOR_XML) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
const stack = [root];
|
|
while (stack.length > 0) {
|
|
const node = stack.pop();
|
|
const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
|
|
/* Remove range markers (the target side of a patch linkage): every
|
|
processing instruction, and any markup-bearing comment. */
|
|
if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.processingInstruction || nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, node.data)) {
|
|
try {
|
|
remove(node);
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
/* Best-effort */
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Strip patch-source attributes (the source side) off elements. */
|
|
if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
|
|
const element = node;
|
|
const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : node.nodeName);
|
|
try {
|
|
if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('patchsrc')) {
|
|
element.removeAttribute('patchsrc');
|
|
}
|
|
if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('for') && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output') {
|
|
element.removeAttribute('for');
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
/* Clobbered removeAttribute/hasAttribute on a doomed node — ignore */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
|
|
if (childNodes) {
|
|
for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
|
|
stack.push(childNodes[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _initDocument
|
|
*
|
|
* @param dirty - a string of dirty markup
|
|
* @return a DOM, filled with the dirty markup
|
|
*/
|
|
const _initDocument = function _initDocument(dirty) {
|
|
/* Create a HTML document */
|
|
let doc = null;
|
|
let leadingWhitespace = null;
|
|
if (FORCE_BODY) {
|
|
dirty = '<remove></remove>' + dirty;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* If FORCE_BODY isn't used, leading whitespace needs to be preserved manually */
|
|
const matches = stringMatch(dirty, /^[\r\n\t ]+/);
|
|
leadingWhitespace = matches && matches[0];
|
|
}
|
|
if (PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' && NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
// Root of XHTML doc must contain xmlns declaration (see https://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/normative.html#strict)
|
|
dirty = '<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head></head><body>' + dirty + '</body></html>';
|
|
}
|
|
const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Use the DOMParser API by default, fallback later if needs be
|
|
* DOMParser not work for svg when has multiple root element.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
try {
|
|
doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(dirtyPayload, PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE);
|
|
} catch (_) {}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Use createHTMLDocument in case DOMParser is not available */
|
|
if (!doc || !doc.documentElement) {
|
|
doc = implementation.createDocument(NAMESPACE, 'template', null);
|
|
try {
|
|
doc.documentElement.innerHTML = IS_EMPTY_INPUT ? emptyHTML : dirtyPayload;
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
// Syntax error if dirtyPayload is invalid xml
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const body = doc.body || doc.documentElement;
|
|
if (dirty && leadingWhitespace) {
|
|
body.insertBefore(document.createTextNode(leadingWhitespace), body.childNodes[0] || null);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Work on whole document or just its body */
|
|
if (NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
|
|
return getElementsByTagName.call(doc, WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? 'html' : 'body')[0];
|
|
}
|
|
return WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? doc.documentElement : body;
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Creates a NodeIterator object that you can use to traverse filtered lists of nodes or elements in a document.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param root The root element or node to start traversing on.
|
|
* @return The created NodeIterator
|
|
*/
|
|
const _createNodeIterator = function _createNodeIterator(root) {
|
|
/* Read ownerDocument through the cached Node.prototype getter, never the
|
|
direct property. HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns], so a
|
|
clobbering child (<input name="ownerDocument"> or a form-associated
|
|
external input) shadows the prototype getter and makes a direct read
|
|
return that <input>. createNodeIterator.call(<input>, ...) then throws
|
|
"Illegal invocation", and on the IN_PLACE path that throw lands before
|
|
the walk's fail-closed barrier - leaving the caller's live tree, with
|
|
any already-armed handler in it, un-neutralized. The cached getter
|
|
returns the real Document regardless of the clobber. */
|
|
const doc = getOwnerDocument ? getOwnerDocument(root) : root.ownerDocument;
|
|
return createNodeIterator.call(doc || root, root,
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
|
|
NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION, null);
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Replace template expression syntax (mustache, ERB, template
|
|
* literal) with a space; shared by all SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES scrub
|
|
* sites. Order matters: mustache, then ERB, then template literal.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param value the string to scrub
|
|
* @returns the scrubbed string
|
|
*/
|
|
const _stripTemplateExpressions = function _stripTemplateExpressions(value) {
|
|
value = stringReplace(value, MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ' ');
|
|
value = stringReplace(value, ERB_EXPR$1, ' ');
|
|
value = stringReplace(value, TMPLIT_EXPR$1, ' ');
|
|
return value;
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Strip template-engine expressions ({{...}}, ${...}, <%...%>) from the
|
|
* character data of an element subtree. Used as the final safety net for
|
|
* SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES on every DOM-returning code path so that expressions
|
|
* which only form after text-node normalization (e.g. fragments split across
|
|
* stripped elements) cannot survive into a template-evaluating framework.
|
|
*
|
|
* Walks text/comment/CDATA/processing-instruction nodes and mutates `.data`
|
|
* in place rather than round-tripping through innerHTML. This preserves
|
|
* descendant node references (important for IN_PLACE callers), avoids a
|
|
* serialize/reparse cycle, and reads literal character data — which means
|
|
* `<%...%>` in text content matches the ERB regex against its real bytes
|
|
* instead of the HTML-entity-escaped form innerHTML would produce.
|
|
*
|
|
* Attribute values are not visited here; SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES handling for
|
|
* attributes is performed during the per-node `_sanitizeAttributes` pass.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param node The root element whose character data should be scrubbed.
|
|
*/
|
|
const _scrubTemplateExpressions2 = function _scrubTemplateExpressions(node) {
|
|
var _node$querySelectorAl;
|
|
node.normalize();
|
|
/* Clobber-safe ownerDocument read, same reasoning as _createNodeIterator:
|
|
under SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES this runs on the live IN_PLACE root, which may
|
|
carry a form-named-getter override of ownerDocument. */
|
|
const doc = getOwnerDocument ? getOwnerDocument(node) : node.ownerDocument;
|
|
const walker = createNodeIterator.call(doc || node, node,
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
|
|
NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION, null);
|
|
let currentNode = walker.nextNode();
|
|
while (currentNode) {
|
|
currentNode.data = _stripTemplateExpressions(currentNode.data);
|
|
currentNode = walker.nextNode();
|
|
}
|
|
// NodeIterator does not descend into <template>.content per the DOM spec,
|
|
// so we must explicitly recurse into each template's content fragment,
|
|
// mirroring the approach used by _sanitizeShadowDOM.
|
|
const templates = (_node$querySelectorAl = node.querySelectorAll) === null || _node$querySelectorAl === void 0 ? void 0 : _node$querySelectorAl.call(node, 'template');
|
|
if (templates) {
|
|
arrayForEach(templates, tmpl => {
|
|
if (_isDocumentFragment(tmpl.content)) {
|
|
_scrubTemplateExpressions2(tmpl.content);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _isClobbered
|
|
*
|
|
* Detect DOM-clobbering on HTMLFormElement nodes. Form is the only HTML
|
|
* interface with [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]; a descendant element with a
|
|
* `name` attribute matching a prototype property shadows that property
|
|
* on direct reads. We use this check at the IN_PLACE entry-point and
|
|
* during attribute sanitization to refuse clobbered forms.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param element element to check for clobbering attacks
|
|
* @return true if clobbered, false if safe
|
|
*/
|
|
const _isClobbered = function _isClobbered(element) {
|
|
// Realm-independent tag-name probe. If we can't determine the tag
|
|
// name at all, we can't reason about clobbering — return false
|
|
// (the caller's other defences still apply).
|
|
const realTagName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : null;
|
|
if (typeof realTagName !== 'string') {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (transformCaseFunc(realTagName) !== 'form') {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' || typeof element.textContent !== 'string' || typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' ||
|
|
// Realm-safe NamedNodeMap detection: equality against the cached
|
|
// prototype getter. Clobbered .attributes (e.g. <input name="attributes">)
|
|
// makes the direct read diverge from the cached read; a clean form
|
|
// (same-realm OR foreign-realm) has both reads pointing at the same
|
|
// canonical NamedNodeMap.
|
|
element.attributes !== getAttributes(element) || typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' || typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' || typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function' ||
|
|
// NodeType clobbering probe. Cached Node.prototype.nodeType getter
|
|
// returns the integer 1 for any Element regardless of realm; direct
|
|
// read on a clobbered form (e.g. <input name="nodeType">) returns
|
|
// the named child element. Cheap addition — nodeType is read from
|
|
// an internal slot, no serialization cost — and removes a residual
|
|
// clobbering surface used by several mXSS / PI / comment branches
|
|
// in _sanitizeElements that compare currentNode.nodeType directly.
|
|
element.nodeType !== getNodeType(element) ||
|
|
// HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]: a descendant named
|
|
// "childNodes" shadows the prototype getter. Direct reads of
|
|
// form.childNodes from a clobbered form return the named child
|
|
// instead of the real NodeList, so any walk that reads it directly
|
|
// skips the form's real children. Compare the direct read to the
|
|
// cached Node.prototype getter — when the form's named-property
|
|
// getter intercepts the read, the two values differ and we flag
|
|
// the form. This catches every clobbering child type (input,
|
|
// select, etc.) regardless of whether the named child happens to
|
|
// carry a numeric .length, which a typeof-based probe would miss
|
|
// (e.g. HTMLSelectElement.length is a defined unsigned-long).
|
|
element.childNodes !== getChildNodes(element);
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Checks whether the given value is a DocumentFragment from any realm.
|
|
*
|
|
* The realm-independent replacement reads `nodeType` through the cached
|
|
* Node.prototype getter and compares to the DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE
|
|
* constant (11). nodeType is a numeric value resolved from the node's
|
|
* internal slot, identical across realms for the same kind of node.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param value object to check
|
|
* @return true if value is a DocumentFragment-shaped node from any realm
|
|
*/
|
|
const _isDocumentFragment = function _isDocumentFragment(value) {
|
|
if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
return getNodeType(value) === NODE_TYPE.documentFragment;
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Checks whether the given object is a DOM node, including nodes that
|
|
* originate from a different window/realm (e.g. an iframe's
|
|
* contentDocument). The previous `value instanceof Node` check was
|
|
* realm-bound: nodes from a different window failed it, causing
|
|
* sanitize() to silently stringify them and reset IN_PLACE to false,
|
|
* returning the original node unsanitized. See GHSA-4w3q-35jp-p934.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param value object to check whether it's a DOM node
|
|
* @return true if value is a DOM node from any realm
|
|
*/
|
|
const _isNode = function _isNode(value) {
|
|
if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
return typeof getNodeType(value) === 'number';
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
function _executeHooks(hooks, currentNode, data) {
|
|
if (hooks.length === 0) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
arrayForEach(hooks, hook => {
|
|
hook.call(DOMPurify, currentNode, data, CONFIG);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
/**
|
|
* Structural-threat checks that condemn a node regardless of the
|
|
* allowlists: mXSS via namespace confusion, risky CSS construction,
|
|
* processing instructions, markup-bearing comments. Pure predicate;
|
|
* the caller removes. Check order is load-bearing.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param currentNode the node to inspect
|
|
* @param tagName the node's transformCaseFunc'd tag name
|
|
* @return true if the node must be removed
|
|
*/
|
|
const _isUnsafeNode = function _isUnsafeNode(currentNode, tagName) {
|
|
/* Detect mXSS attempts abusing namespace confusion */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.hasChildNodes() && !_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) && regExpTest(ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.textContent) && regExpTest(ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Remove risky CSS construction leading to mXSS */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE && tagName === 'style' && _isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Remove any occurrence of processing instructions */
|
|
if (currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.processingInstruction) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Remove any kind of possibly harmful comments */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.data)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Handle a node whose tag is forbidden or not allowlisted: keep
|
|
* allowed custom elements (false return exits _sanitizeElements
|
|
* early - the namespace and fallback-tag removal checks are
|
|
* intentionally skipped for kept custom elements), else hoist
|
|
* content per KEEP_CONTENT and remove.
|
|
*
|
|
* A kept custom element is the ONLY case in which this function
|
|
* returns false, so the caller uses that return value to run the
|
|
* afterSanitizeElements hook on the kept element and keep the
|
|
* element-hook lifecycle consistent with normal allowlisted
|
|
* elements (GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4).
|
|
*
|
|
* @param currentNode the disallowed node
|
|
* @param tagName the node's transformCaseFunc'd tag name
|
|
* @return true if the node was removed, false if kept
|
|
*/
|
|
const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root) {
|
|
/* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
|
|
if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {
|
|
if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Keep content except for bad-listed elements.
|
|
Use the cached prototype getters exclusively — the previous code
|
|
had `|| currentNode.parentNode` / `|| currentNode.childNodes`
|
|
fallbacks, but the cached getters always return the canonical
|
|
value (or null for a real parent-less node), so the fallback
|
|
path was dead in safe cases and a clobbering surface in unsafe
|
|
ones. Falsy cached results stay falsy; the `if (childNodes &&
|
|
parentNode)` check already gates correctly. */
|
|
if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
|
|
const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode);
|
|
const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
|
|
if (childNodes && parentNode) {
|
|
const childCount = childNodes.length;
|
|
/* Hoist by moving each child up one level rather than deep-cloning
|
|
it. Moving transfers every descendant exactly once, so a chain of
|
|
nested disallowed elements costs O(n) instead of the O(n^2) that
|
|
re-cloning the shrinking subtree at each level produced; it also
|
|
empties the removed original, so `DOMPurify.removed` no longer
|
|
pins whole subtrees. Moving preserves the in-place guarantee too:
|
|
an original carrying already-queued resource events (`<img
|
|
onerror>`, `<video>`/`<audio>` error, lazy/`onload`, …) is
|
|
relocated and sanitised rather than left detached but still armed.
|
|
The sole case that must clone is removing the walk root itself.
|
|
The result is serialised from the root's subtree, so a restrictive
|
|
ALLOWED_TAGS that strips the root (`body` on the string path) must
|
|
leave the content inside it, which only cloning does. In IN_PLACE
|
|
the root is pre-validated as an allowed tag and so is never removed
|
|
here, so that path always takes the move branch.
|
|
`childNodes` is live; a tail-to-head walk keeps `childNodes[i]`
|
|
valid whether we move (drops the trailing entry) or clone (leaves
|
|
the list intact). */
|
|
for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
|
|
const hoisted = currentNode === root ? cloneNode(childNodes[i], true) : childNodes[i];
|
|
parentNode.insertBefore(hoisted, getNextSibling(currentNode));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Fork a hook-mutable allowlist off its shared binding the first time a
|
|
* (possibly lazily-installed) uponSanitize* hook is about to see it, so the
|
|
* hook cannot widen the per-instance default or the setConfig binding by
|
|
* reference and leak past the call. Returns the set unchanged once it is
|
|
* already call-local, so repeated calls across elements are idempotent.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param hookList the uponSanitize* hook array for this event
|
|
* @param set the current ALLOWED_TAGS / ALLOWED_ATTR binding
|
|
* @param defaultSet the per-instance DEFAULT_ALLOWED_* constant
|
|
* @param setConfigSet the captured setConfig() binding, or null
|
|
* @return a call-local clone if a hook is present and set is still shared,
|
|
* else set unchanged
|
|
*/
|
|
const _forkSharedAllowlist = function _forkSharedAllowlist(hookList, set, defaultSet, setConfigSet) {
|
|
if (hookList.length === 0) {
|
|
return set;
|
|
}
|
|
return set === defaultSet || set === setConfigSet ? clone(set) : set;
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _sanitizeElements
|
|
*
|
|
* @protect nodeName
|
|
* @protect textContent
|
|
* @protect removeChild
|
|
* @param currentNode to check for permission to exist
|
|
* @return true if node was killed, false if left alive
|
|
*/
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
|
|
const _sanitizeElements = function _sanitizeElements(currentNode, root) {
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
|
|
/* A hook may have detached the node - treat it as removed (see the
|
|
detached-node comment after the uponSanitizeElement hook below). On
|
|
the IN_PLACE path, neutralize the detached subtree first so a queued
|
|
resource handler on it cannot fire in page scope after we return. */
|
|
if (currentNode !== root && getParentNode(currentNode) === null) {
|
|
if (IN_PLACE) {
|
|
_neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */
|
|
if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Now let's check the element's type and name */
|
|
const tagName = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeName);
|
|
/* Close the pre-walk clone-guard's timing gap: an uponSanitizeElement
|
|
hook may have been installed after that guard sampled the hook arrays
|
|
(e.g. lazily from beforeSanitizeElements), leaving ALLOWED_TAGS still
|
|
aliasing a shared binding that a widening hook would mutate by
|
|
reference. Fork it before exposing it to the hook. */
|
|
ALLOWED_TAGS = _forkSharedAllowlist(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, ALLOWED_TAGS, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS, SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS);
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, currentNode, {
|
|
tagName,
|
|
allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS
|
|
});
|
|
/* A hook may have detached the node from the tree — a long-standing
|
|
user pattern (issue #469; draw.io-style foreignObject filtering).
|
|
Per the cached, unclobberable parentNode getter the node is
|
|
genuinely out of the tree, so it can reach neither the serialized
|
|
output nor an IN_PLACE live tree; treat it as removed and stop
|
|
processing it. Without this guard, the unsafe-node / namespace
|
|
checks below would call _forceRemove on a parentless node and hit
|
|
the REPORT-3 fail-closed throw — which exists for nodes DOMPurify
|
|
wants gone but *cannot* detach (clobbered / parentless roots), the
|
|
opposite of a node that is already safely gone. The walk root is
|
|
exempt: a detached IN_PLACE root is legitimate input and must still
|
|
be fully sanitized, and a kill-decision on it must keep hitting the
|
|
REPORT-3 throw. Nodes detached by hooks stay the hook's
|
|
responsibility for placement: they are not recorded in
|
|
DOMPurify.removed, so the post-walk IN_PLACE pass (which iterates
|
|
DOMPurify.removed) does not reach them. But a hook-detached subtree
|
|
can still hold a queued resource-event handler - e.g. an <img onload>
|
|
that began loading when the caller built the live tree - which fires
|
|
in page scope after sanitize returns even though the handler never
|
|
reached the returned tree. That is the audit-5 F1 hazard, and the
|
|
documented node.remove() hook pattern walks straight into it. So on
|
|
the IN_PLACE path we neutralize the detached subtree inline here,
|
|
stripping its non-allow-listed attributes before returning, exactly
|
|
as the post-walk pass does for _forceRemove'd subtrees. */
|
|
if (currentNode !== root && getParentNode(currentNode) === null) {
|
|
if (IN_PLACE) {
|
|
_neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Remove mXSS vectors, processing instructions and risky comments */
|
|
if (_isUnsafeNode(currentNode, tagName)) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */
|
|
if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName] || !(EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) {
|
|
const removed = _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root);
|
|
/* A false return means the node is a custom element kept via
|
|
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING - the only keep path through
|
|
_sanitizeDisallowedNode. Run afterSanitizeElements on it so the
|
|
element-hook lifecycle matches normal allowlisted elements: a
|
|
security policy applied in this hook (e.g. stripping an attribute
|
|
from every surviving element) must not silently skip kept custom
|
|
elements (GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4). This mirrors the normal-element
|
|
tail below - the hook runs, then the walker's subsequent
|
|
_sanitizeAttributes pass sanitizes the element's attributes. The
|
|
deliberately skipped namespace and fallback-tag removal checks stay
|
|
skipped; they are removal decisions, not the hook contract. */
|
|
if (removed === false) {
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
|
|
}
|
|
return removed;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check whether element has a valid namespace.
|
|
Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use the cached Node.prototype
|
|
nodeType getter rather than `instanceof Element`, which is realm-
|
|
bound and short-circuits to false for any node minted in a different
|
|
realm — letting a foreign-realm element with a forbidden namespace
|
|
slip past the namespace check entirely. */
|
|
const nt = getNodeType ? getNodeType(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeType;
|
|
if (nt === NODE_TYPE.element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Make sure that older browsers don't get fallback-tag mXSS */
|
|
if ((tagName === 'noscript' || tagName === 'noembed' || tagName === 'noframes') && regExpTest(FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Sanitize element content to be template-safe */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.text) {
|
|
/* Get the element's text content */
|
|
const content = _stripTemplateExpressions(currentNode.textContent);
|
|
if (currentNode.textContent !== content) {
|
|
arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
|
|
element: currentNode.cloneNode()
|
|
});
|
|
currentNode.textContent = content;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
|
|
return false;
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _isValidAttribute
|
|
*
|
|
* @param lcTag Lowercase tag name of containing element.
|
|
* @param lcName Lowercase attribute name.
|
|
* @param value Attribute value.
|
|
* @return Returns true if `value` is valid, otherwise false.
|
|
*/
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
|
|
const _isValidAttribute = function _isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value) {
|
|
/* FORBID_ATTR must always win, even if ADD_ATTR predicate would allow it */
|
|
if (FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Reject declarative-partial-updates patch-linkage attributes
|
|
(https://github.com/WICG/declarative-partial-updates).
|
|
Empirical note (Chrome 150, verified — see
|
|
test/declarative-patch-probe-v3.html): expansion is NOT applied after
|
|
sanitization. For the string path it fires during sanitize()'s own
|
|
parse, so the walk sees and sanitizes the fully materialized expanded
|
|
tree — teleports into MathML/SVG integration points included; a
|
|
weaponized `<template for>`->`<img onerror>` comes back with the handler
|
|
stripped. For the IN_PLACE path it fires on connection, before the walk.
|
|
Either way DOMPurify is NOT blind to the patch.
|
|
This removal is therefore defense-in-depth rather than the sole barrier:
|
|
it prevents live linkage from surviving into the OUTPUT and re-expanding
|
|
in the caller's context, and keeps behaviour deterministic if a future
|
|
engine defers expansion. `for` is legitimate only on <label>/<output>;
|
|
anywhere else (notably <template for>) it links the element to a patch
|
|
target and teleports or removes an arbitrary DOM range by id/marker name.
|
|
`patchsrc` fetches remote markup and is treated as a script-loading
|
|
mechanism (CSP). Gated on SAFE_FOR_XML so the removal groups with the
|
|
other structural-threat checks and stays overridable, consistent with
|
|
the rest of the codebase. PI range markers are already removed by
|
|
_isUnsafeNode. */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && lcName === 'patchsrc') {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && lcName === 'for' && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output') {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Make sure attribute cannot clobber */
|
|
if (SANITIZE_DOM && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && (value in document || value in formElement)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
const nameIsPermitted = ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName] || EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck(lcName, lcTag);
|
|
/* Allow valid data-* attributes: At least one character after "-"
|
|
(https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#embedding-custom-non-visible-data-with-the-data-*-attributes)
|
|
XML-compatible (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/infrastructure.html#xml-compatible and http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#d0e804)
|
|
We don't need to check the value; it's always URI safe. */
|
|
if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && regExpTest(DATA_ATTR$1, lcName)) ; else if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR$1, lcName)) ; else if (!nameIsPermitted) {
|
|
if (
|
|
// First condition does a very basic check if a) it's basically a valid custom element tagname AND
|
|
// b) if the tagName passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck
|
|
// and c) if the attribute name passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck
|
|
_isBasicCustomElement(lcTag) && (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, lcTag) || CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(lcTag)) && (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck, lcName) || CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck(lcName, lcTag)) ||
|
|
// Alternative, second condition checks if it's an `is`-attribute, AND
|
|
// the value passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck
|
|
lcName === 'is' && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements && (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, value) || CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(value))) ; else {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check value is safe. First, is attr inert? If so, is safe */
|
|
} else if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) ; else if (regExpTest(IS_ALLOWED_URI$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) ; else if ((lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href' || lcName === 'href') && lcTag !== 'script' && stringIndexOf(value, 'data:') === 0 && DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]) ; else if (ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS && !regExpTest(IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) ; else if (value) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
} else ;
|
|
return true;
|
|
};
|
|
/* Names the HTML spec reserves from valid-custom-element-name; these must
|
|
* never be treated as basic custom elements even when a permissive
|
|
* CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck is configured. */
|
|
const RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'color-profile', 'font-face', 'font-face-format', 'font-face-name', 'font-face-src', 'font-face-uri', 'missing-glyph']);
|
|
/**
|
|
* _isBasicCustomElement
|
|
* checks if at least one dash is included in tagName, and it's not the first char
|
|
* for more sophisticated checking see https://github.com/sindresorhus/validate-element-name
|
|
*
|
|
* @param tagName name of the tag of the node to sanitize
|
|
* @returns Returns true if the tag name meets the basic criteria for a custom element, otherwise false.
|
|
*/
|
|
const _isBasicCustomElement = function _isBasicCustomElement(tagName) {
|
|
return !RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES[stringToLowerCase(tagName)] && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT$1, tagName);
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Wrap an attribute value in the matching Trusted Types object when
|
|
* the active policy requires it. Namespaced attributes pass through
|
|
* unchanged (no TT support yet, see
|
|
* https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1305293).
|
|
*
|
|
* @param lcTag lowercase tag name of the containing element
|
|
* @param lcName lowercase attribute name
|
|
* @param namespaceURI the attribute's namespace, if any
|
|
* @param value the attribute value to wrap
|
|
* @return the value, wrapped when Trusted Types demand it
|
|
*/
|
|
const _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute = function _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute(lcTag, lcName, namespaceURI, value) {
|
|
if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof trustedTypes === 'object' && typeof trustedTypes.getAttributeType === 'function' && !namespaceURI) {
|
|
switch (trustedTypes.getAttributeType(lcTag, lcName)) {
|
|
case 'TrustedHTML':
|
|
{
|
|
return _createTrustedHTML(value);
|
|
}
|
|
case 'TrustedScriptURL':
|
|
{
|
|
return _createTrustedScriptURL(value);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return value;
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Write a modified attribute value back onto the element. On
|
|
* success, re-probe for clobbering introduced by the new value and
|
|
* remove the element when found; otherwise pop the removal entry
|
|
* recorded by the earlier _removeAttribute (long-standing pairing
|
|
* with the SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS path - do not "fix" casually). On
|
|
* failure, remove the attribute instead.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param currentNode the element carrying the attribute
|
|
* @param name the attribute name as present on the element
|
|
* @param namespaceURI the attribute's namespace, if any
|
|
* @param value the new attribute value
|
|
*/
|
|
const _setAttributeValue = function _setAttributeValue(currentNode, name, namespaceURI, value) {
|
|
try {
|
|
if (namespaceURI) {
|
|
currentNode.setAttributeNS(namespaceURI, name, value);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Fallback to setAttribute() for browser-unrecognized namespaces e.g. "x-schema". */
|
|
currentNode.setAttribute(name, value);
|
|
}
|
|
if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
|
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
} else {
|
|
arrayPop(DOMPurify.removed);
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (_) {
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _sanitizeAttributes
|
|
*
|
|
* @protect attributes
|
|
* @protect nodeName
|
|
* @protect removeAttribute
|
|
* @protect setAttribute
|
|
*
|
|
* @param currentNode to sanitize
|
|
*/
|
|
const _sanitizeAttributes = function _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode) {
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);
|
|
const attributes = currentNode.attributes;
|
|
/* Check if we have attributes; if not we might have a text node */
|
|
if (!attributes || _isClobbered(currentNode)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Same lazy-install guard as uponSanitizeElement (see there): fork the
|
|
attribute allowlist off its shared binding before a hook can see it. */
|
|
ALLOWED_ATTR = _forkSharedAllowlist(hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute, ALLOWED_ATTR, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR, SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR);
|
|
const hookEvent = {
|
|
attrName: '',
|
|
attrValue: '',
|
|
keepAttr: true,
|
|
allowedAttributes: ALLOWED_ATTR,
|
|
forceKeepAttr: undefined
|
|
};
|
|
let l = attributes.length;
|
|
const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
|
|
/* Go backwards over all attributes; safely remove bad ones */
|
|
while (l--) {
|
|
const attr = attributes[l];
|
|
const name = attr.name,
|
|
namespaceURI = attr.namespaceURI,
|
|
attrValue = attr.value;
|
|
const lcName = transformCaseFunc(name);
|
|
const initValue = attrValue;
|
|
let value = name === 'value' ? initValue : stringTrim(initValue);
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
hookEvent.attrName = lcName;
|
|
hookEvent.attrValue = value;
|
|
hookEvent.keepAttr = true;
|
|
hookEvent.forceKeepAttr = undefined; // Allows developers to see this is a property they can set
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute, currentNode, hookEvent);
|
|
value = hookEvent.attrValue;
|
|
/* Full DOM Clobbering protection via namespace isolation,
|
|
* Prefix id and name attributes with `user-content-`
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && stringIndexOf(value, SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX) !== 0) {
|
|
// Remove the attribute with this value
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
// Prefix the value and later re-create the attribute with the sanitized value
|
|
value = SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX + value;
|
|
}
|
|
// Else: already prefixed, leave the attribute alone — the prefix is
|
|
// itself the clobbering protection, and re-applying it is incorrect.
|
|
/* Work around a security issue with comments inside attributes */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && regExpTest(/((--!?|])>)|<\/(style|script|title|xmp|textarea|noscript|iframe|noembed|noframes)/i, value)) {
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Make sure we cannot easily use animated hrefs, even if animations are allowed */
|
|
if (lcName === 'attributename' && stringMatch(value, 'href')) {
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Did the hooks force-keep the attribute? */
|
|
if (hookEvent.forceKeepAttr) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */
|
|
if (!hookEvent.keepAttr) {
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Work around a security issue in jQuery 3.0 */
|
|
if (!ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR && regExpTest(SELF_CLOSING_TAG, value)) {
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Sanitize attribute content to be template-safe */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
|
|
value = _stripTemplateExpressions(value);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Is `value` valid for this attribute? */
|
|
if (!_isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value)) {
|
|
_removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Handle attributes that require Trusted Types */
|
|
value = _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute(lcTag, lcName, namespaceURI, value);
|
|
/* Handle invalid data-* attribute set by try-catching it */
|
|
if (value !== initValue) {
|
|
_setAttributeValue(currentNode, name, namespaceURI, value);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _sanitizeShadowDOM
|
|
*
|
|
* @param fragment to iterate over recursively
|
|
*/
|
|
const _sanitizeShadowDOM2 = function _sanitizeShadowDOM(fragment) {
|
|
let shadowNode = null;
|
|
const shadowIterator = _createNodeIterator(fragment);
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeShadowDOM, fragment, null);
|
|
while (shadowNode = shadowIterator.nextNode()) {
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeShadowNode, shadowNode, null);
|
|
/* Sanitize tags and elements */
|
|
_sanitizeElements(shadowNode, fragment);
|
|
/* Check attributes next */
|
|
_sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode);
|
|
/* Deep shadow DOM detected.
|
|
Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use nodeType against the
|
|
DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE constant rather than instanceof, so we
|
|
recurse into <template>.content from foreign realms too. */
|
|
if (_isDocumentFragment(shadowNode.content)) {
|
|
_sanitizeShadowDOM2(shadowNode.content);
|
|
}
|
|
/* An element iterated here may itself host an attached
|
|
shadow root. The default NodeIterator does not enter shadow
|
|
trees, so a shadow root nested inside template.content was
|
|
previously reached by no walk at all (the pre-pass at
|
|
_sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots descends via childNodes, which
|
|
doesn't enter template.content; the template-content recursion
|
|
above iterates the content but never inspected shadowRoot).
|
|
Walk it explicitly. The nodeType guard avoids reading
|
|
shadowRoot off text / comment / CDATA / PI nodes that the
|
|
iterator also surfaces. */
|
|
const shadowNodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(shadowNode) : shadowNode.nodeType;
|
|
if (shadowNodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
|
|
const innerSr = getShadowRoot(shadowNode);
|
|
if (_isDocumentFragment(innerSr)) {
|
|
_sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(innerSr);
|
|
_sanitizeShadowDOM2(innerSr);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
_executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeShadowDOM, fragment, null);
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots
|
|
*
|
|
* Walks `root` and feeds every attached shadow root we encounter into
|
|
* the existing _sanitizeShadowDOM pipeline. The default node iterator
|
|
* does not descend into shadow trees, so nodes inside an attached
|
|
* shadow root would otherwise be skipped entirely.
|
|
*
|
|
* Two real input paths put attached shadow roots in front of us:
|
|
* 1. IN_PLACE on a DOM node that already has shadow roots attached.
|
|
* 2. DOM-node input where importNode(dirty, true) deep-clones the
|
|
* shadow root because it was created with `clonable: true`.
|
|
*
|
|
* This pass runs once, up front, so the main iteration loop (and the
|
|
* existing _sanitizeShadowDOM template-content recursion) stay
|
|
* untouched — string-input paths are not affected.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param root the subtree root to walk for attached shadow roots
|
|
*/
|
|
const _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots = function _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(root) {
|
|
/* Iterative (explicit stack) rather than per-child recursion. DOM APIs
|
|
impose no depth cap, so an attacker-shaped tree (JSON/CRDT/editor data
|
|
built straight into the DOM — the IN_PLACE surface) deeper than the JS
|
|
call-stack budget would otherwise overflow native recursion here and
|
|
throw at the IN_PLACE entry pre-pass, before a single node is
|
|
sanitized, leaving the caller's live tree untouched (fail-open). See
|
|
campaign-3 F4. A heap stack keeps depth off the call stack.
|
|
Each work item is either a node to descend into, or a deferred
|
|
`_sanitizeShadowDOM` for an already-walked shadow root. The deferred
|
|
form preserves the original post-order discipline: a shadow root's
|
|
nested shadow roots are discovered before the outer shadow is
|
|
sanitized (which may remove hosts). Pushes are in reverse of the
|
|
desired processing order (LIFO): template content, then children, then
|
|
the shadow-sanitize, then the shadow walk — so the order matches the
|
|
previous recursion exactly. */
|
|
const stack = [{
|
|
node: root,
|
|
shadow: null
|
|
}];
|
|
while (stack.length > 0) {
|
|
const item = stack.pop();
|
|
/* Deferred shadow-DOM sanitisation: runs after its subtree was walked. */
|
|
if (item.shadow) {
|
|
_sanitizeShadowDOM2(item.shadow);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
const node = item.node;
|
|
const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
|
|
const isElement = nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element;
|
|
/* (pushed last → processed first) Children, snapshotted in reverse so
|
|
the first child is processed first. Snapshotting matters because a
|
|
hook may detach siblings mid-walk. */
|
|
const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
|
|
if (childNodes) {
|
|
for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
|
|
stack.push({
|
|
node: childNodes[i],
|
|
shadow: null
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* (pushed before children → processed after them, matching the old
|
|
"template content last" order) When the node is a <template>,
|
|
descend into its content. */
|
|
if (isElement) {
|
|
const rootName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : null;
|
|
if (typeof rootName === 'string' && transformCaseFunc(rootName) === 'template') {
|
|
const content = node.content;
|
|
if (_isDocumentFragment(content)) {
|
|
stack.push({
|
|
node: content,
|
|
shadow: null
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Shadow root (processed first): walk its subtree, then sanitise it.
|
|
Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
|
|
rather than `instanceof DocumentFragment`, which is realm-bound and
|
|
silently skipped foreign-realm shadow roots (e.g.
|
|
iframe.contentDocument attachShadow). */
|
|
if (isElement) {
|
|
const sr = getShadowRoot(node);
|
|
if (_isDocumentFragment(sr)) {
|
|
/* Push the deferred sanitise first so it pops after the shadow
|
|
walk we push next, i.e. nested shadow roots are discovered
|
|
before this one is sanitised. */
|
|
stack.push({
|
|
node: null,
|
|
shadow: sr
|
|
}, {
|
|
node: sr,
|
|
shadow: null
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
|
|
DOMPurify.sanitize = function (dirty) {
|
|
let cfg = arguments.length > 1 && arguments[1] !== undefined ? arguments[1] : {};
|
|
let body = null;
|
|
let importedNode = null;
|
|
let currentNode = null;
|
|
let returnNode = null;
|
|
/* Make sure we have a string to sanitize.
|
|
DO NOT return early, as this will return the wrong type if
|
|
the user has requested a DOM object rather than a string */
|
|
IS_EMPTY_INPUT = !dirty;
|
|
if (IS_EMPTY_INPUT) {
|
|
dirty = '<!-->';
|
|
}
|
|
/* Stringify, in case dirty is an object */
|
|
if (typeof dirty !== 'string' && !_isNode(dirty)) {
|
|
dirty = stringifyValue(dirty);
|
|
if (typeof dirty !== 'string') {
|
|
throw typeErrorCreate('dirty is not a string, aborting');
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Return dirty HTML if DOMPurify cannot run */
|
|
if (!DOMPurify.isSupported) {
|
|
return dirty;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Assign config vars */
|
|
if (SET_CONFIG) {
|
|
/* Persistent setConfig() path: _parseConfig is skipped, so the sets are
|
|
* not re-derived per call. Restore them from the pristine bindings
|
|
* captured at setConfig() time so a previous call's hook clone (mutated
|
|
* below) does not carry over. */
|
|
ALLOWED_TAGS = SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS;
|
|
ALLOWED_ATTR = SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR;
|
|
} else {
|
|
_parseConfig(cfg);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Clone the hook-mutable allowlists before the walk whenever an
|
|
* uponSanitize* hook is registered. The hook event exposes ALLOWED_TAGS
|
|
* and ALLOWED_ATTR by reference (as allowedTags / allowedAttributes), so
|
|
* a hook that widens them would otherwise mutate the shared set
|
|
* permanently: across later calls and across every element. Cloning per
|
|
* walk keeps documented in-call widening working while scoping it to the
|
|
* call. A single guard for both config paths - the per-call path rebinds
|
|
* the sets in _parseConfig each call, the persistent path restores them
|
|
* from the captured bindings just above - so the two cannot diverge. */
|
|
if (hooks.uponSanitizeElement.length > 0 || hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0) {
|
|
ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
|
|
}
|
|
if (hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0) {
|
|
ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Clean up removed elements */
|
|
DOMPurify.removed = [];
|
|
/* Resolve IN_PLACE for this call without mutating persistent config.
|
|
Writing the IN_PLACE closure variable here leaks under setConfig(),
|
|
where _parseConfig is skipped on later calls: a single string call would
|
|
disable in-place mode for every subsequent node call, returning a
|
|
sanitized copy while leaving the caller's node — which in-place callers
|
|
keep using and whose return value they ignore — unsanitized. REPORT-2. */
|
|
const inPlace = IN_PLACE && typeof dirty !== 'string' && _isNode(dirty);
|
|
if (inPlace) {
|
|
/* Declarative-partial-updates / streaming pre-pass: sever every patch
|
|
linkage across the live tree BEFORE the walk, so no patch can fire
|
|
mid-walk and inject into an already-processed region. Runs first, so
|
|
it also covers the forbidden/clobbered roots that throw below. */
|
|
_neutralizePatchLinkage(dirty);
|
|
/* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes.
|
|
Read nodeName through the cached prototype getter — a clobbering
|
|
child named "nodeName" on the form root would otherwise shadow
|
|
the property and let this check skip the root-allowlist
|
|
validation entirely. */
|
|
const nn = getNodeName ? getNodeName(dirty) : dirty.nodeName;
|
|
if (typeof nn === 'string') {
|
|
const tagName = transformCaseFunc(nn);
|
|
if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
|
|
/* Fail closed on a live root: neutralize handlers/children before
|
|
throwing, exactly as the mid-walk abort path does. */
|
|
_neutralizeRoot(dirty);
|
|
throw typeErrorCreate('root node is forbidden and cannot be sanitized in-place');
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Pre-flight the root through _isClobbered. The iterator-driven
|
|
removal path can not detach a parent-less root: _forceRemove
|
|
falls through to Element.prototype.remove(), which per spec
|
|
is a no-op on a node with no parent. A clobbered root would
|
|
then survive the main loop with its attributes uninspected,
|
|
because _sanitizeAttributes early-returns on _isClobbered. The
|
|
result would be an attacker-controlled form, complete with any
|
|
event-handler attributes the caller passed in, handed back to
|
|
the application unsanitized. Refuse to sanitize such a root
|
|
the same way we refuse a forbidden tag. GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676. */
|
|
if (_isClobbered(dirty)) {
|
|
/* Fail closed on a live clobbered root before throwing.
|
|
_neutralizeRoot's reads are clobber-safe (cached getters); the
|
|
form's non-clobbered descendants, e.g. an armed <img>, are scrubbed. */
|
|
_neutralizeRoot(dirty);
|
|
throw typeErrorCreate('root node is clobbered and cannot be sanitized in-place');
|
|
}
|
|
/* Sanitize attached shadow roots before the main iterator runs.
|
|
The iterator does not descend into shadow trees. Same fail-closed
|
|
barrier as the main walk (campaign-3 F2): a custom-element reaction
|
|
inside a shadow root could abort this pre-pass before the walk runs,
|
|
which would otherwise leave the entire live tree unsanitized. */
|
|
try {
|
|
_sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(dirty);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
_neutralizeRoot(dirty);
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (_isNode(dirty)) {
|
|
/* If dirty is a DOM element, append to an empty document to avoid
|
|
elements being stripped by the parser */
|
|
body = _initDocument('<!---->');
|
|
importedNode = body.ownerDocument.importNode(dirty, true);
|
|
if (importedNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element && importedNode.nodeName === 'BODY') {
|
|
/* Node is already a body, use as is */
|
|
body = importedNode;
|
|
} else if (importedNode.nodeName === 'HTML') {
|
|
body = importedNode;
|
|
} else {
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append
|
|
body.appendChild(importedNode);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Clonable shadow roots are deep-cloned by importNode(); sanitize
|
|
them before the main iterator runs, since the iterator does not
|
|
descend into shadow trees. The walk routes every read through a
|
|
cached prototype getter so clobbering descendants on a form root
|
|
cannot hide a shadow host from this pass. */
|
|
_sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(importedNode);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Exit directly if we have nothing to do */
|
|
if (!RETURN_DOM && !SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && !WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
|
|
dirty.indexOf('<') === -1) {
|
|
return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Initialize the document to work on */
|
|
body = _initDocument(dirty);
|
|
/* Check we have a DOM node from the data */
|
|
if (!body) {
|
|
return RETURN_DOM ? null : RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? emptyHTML : '';
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Remove first element node (ours) if FORCE_BODY is set */
|
|
if (body && FORCE_BODY) {
|
|
_forceRemove(body.firstChild);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Get node iterator */
|
|
const walkRoot = inPlace ? dirty : body;
|
|
/* Now start iterating over the created document.
|
|
The walk runs inside an exception barrier (campaign-3 F2): a re-entrant
|
|
engine/custom-element mutation can detach a node mid-walk so
|
|
`_forceRemove`'s parentless guard throws, aborting the loop. Without the
|
|
barrier the caller's in-place tree would be left half-sanitized with the
|
|
unvisited tail still armed. _createNodeIterator itself is inside the
|
|
barrier too: constructing the iterator dereferences the root's document,
|
|
and any failure there (e.g. an exotic/clobbered root) must still fail
|
|
closed rather than skip the neutralize. On any throw we fail closed -
|
|
strip the in-place root bare - then rethrow so the existing throw
|
|
contract is preserved. (String/DOM-copy paths never return the partial
|
|
body, so the propagating throw is already fail-closed there.) */
|
|
try {
|
|
const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(walkRoot);
|
|
while (currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode()) {
|
|
/* Sanitize tags and elements */
|
|
_sanitizeElements(currentNode, walkRoot);
|
|
/* Check attributes next */
|
|
_sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
|
|
/* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it.
|
|
Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
|
|
instead of instanceof, so foreign-realm <template>.content is
|
|
walked correctly. */
|
|
if (_isDocumentFragment(currentNode.content)) {
|
|
_sanitizeShadowDOM2(currentNode.content);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (inPlace) {
|
|
_neutralizeRoot(dirty);
|
|
/* Nodes _forceRemove'd earlier in the aborted walk are already
|
|
detached from the root, so _neutralizeRoot's subtree pass does not
|
|
reach them. Defuse them too, mirroring the success-path loop below. */
|
|
arrayForEach(DOMPurify.removed, entry => {
|
|
if (entry.element) {
|
|
_neutralizeSubtree(entry.element);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
/* If we sanitized `dirty` in-place, return it. */
|
|
if (inPlace) {
|
|
/* Fail-closed completion of the audit-5 F1 fix: every node removed from
|
|
the caller's live tree is detached but may still hold a queued
|
|
resource-event handler that fires in page scope after we return. The
|
|
move-hoist covers only disallowed-tag KEEP_CONTENT removals; strip the
|
|
non-allow-listed attributes off every other removed subtree (clobber,
|
|
mXSS, namespace, comments, KEEP_CONTENT:false, …) so those handlers are
|
|
cancelled before any event can fire. Runs synchronously, pre-return. */
|
|
arrayForEach(DOMPurify.removed, entry => {
|
|
if (entry.element) {
|
|
_neutralizeSubtree(entry.element);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
|
|
_scrubTemplateExpressions2(dirty);
|
|
}
|
|
return dirty;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Return sanitized string or DOM */
|
|
if (RETURN_DOM) {
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
|
|
_scrubTemplateExpressions2(body);
|
|
}
|
|
if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
|
|
returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);
|
|
while (body.firstChild) {
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append
|
|
returnNode.appendChild(body.firstChild);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
returnNode = body;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ALLOWED_ATTR.shadowroot || ALLOWED_ATTR.shadowrootmode) {
|
|
/*
|
|
AdoptNode() is not used because internal state is not reset
|
|
(e.g. the past names map of a HTMLFormElement), this is safe
|
|
in theory but we would rather not risk another attack vector.
|
|
The state that is cloned by importNode() is explicitly defined
|
|
by the specs.
|
|
*/
|
|
returnNode = importNode.call(originalDocument, returnNode, true);
|
|
}
|
|
return returnNode;
|
|
}
|
|
let serializedHTML = WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? body.outerHTML : body.innerHTML;
|
|
/* Serialize doctype if allowed */
|
|
if (WHOLE_DOCUMENT && ALLOWED_TAGS['!doctype'] && body.ownerDocument && body.ownerDocument.doctype && body.ownerDocument.doctype.name && regExpTest(DOCTYPE_NAME, body.ownerDocument.doctype.name)) {
|
|
serializedHTML = '<!DOCTYPE ' + body.ownerDocument.doctype.name + '>\n' + serializedHTML;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Sanitize final string template-safe */
|
|
if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
|
|
serializedHTML = _stripTemplateExpressions(serializedHTML);
|
|
}
|
|
return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
|
|
};
|
|
DOMPurify.setConfig = function () {
|
|
let cfg = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};
|
|
_parseConfig(cfg);
|
|
SET_CONFIG = true;
|
|
SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS = ALLOWED_TAGS;
|
|
SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR = ALLOWED_ATTR;
|
|
};
|
|
DOMPurify.clearConfig = function () {
|
|
CONFIG = null;
|
|
SET_CONFIG = false;
|
|
SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS = null;
|
|
SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR = null;
|
|
// Drop any caller-supplied Trusted Types policy so it cannot poison later
|
|
// `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` output. The internal default policy (cached, and
|
|
// never recreated — Trusted Types throws on duplicate names) is restored by
|
|
// the next `_parseConfig`. See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
|
|
trustedTypesPolicy = defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
|
|
emptyHTML = '';
|
|
};
|
|
DOMPurify.isValidAttribute = function (tag, attr, value) {
|
|
/* Initialize shared config vars if necessary. */
|
|
if (!CONFIG) {
|
|
_parseConfig({});
|
|
}
|
|
const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(tag);
|
|
const lcName = transformCaseFunc(attr);
|
|
return _isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value);
|
|
};
|
|
DOMPurify.addHook = function (entryPoint, hookFunction) {
|
|
if (typeof hookFunction !== 'function') {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Reject unknown entry points. Without this, a non-hook key (e.g.
|
|
* '__proto__') indexes off the prototype chain rather than a real
|
|
* hook array, and arrayPush then writes to Object.prototype. Guard
|
|
* with an own-property check against the known hook names. */
|
|
if (!objectHasOwnProperty(hooks, entryPoint)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
arrayPush(hooks[entryPoint], hookFunction);
|
|
};
|
|
DOMPurify.removeHook = function (entryPoint, hookFunction) {
|
|
if (!objectHasOwnProperty(hooks, entryPoint)) {
|
|
return undefined;
|
|
}
|
|
if (hookFunction !== undefined) {
|
|
const index = arrayLastIndexOf(hooks[entryPoint], hookFunction);
|
|
return index === -1 ? undefined : arraySplice(hooks[entryPoint], index, 1)[0];
|
|
}
|
|
return arrayPop(hooks[entryPoint]);
|
|
};
|
|
DOMPurify.removeHooks = function (entryPoint) {
|
|
if (!objectHasOwnProperty(hooks, entryPoint)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
hooks[entryPoint] = [];
|
|
};
|
|
DOMPurify.removeAllHooks = function () {
|
|
hooks = _createHooksMap();
|
|
};
|
|
return DOMPurify;
|
|
}
|
|
var purify = createDOMPurify();
|
|
|
|
module.exports = purify;
|
|
//# sourceMappingURL=purify.cjs.js.map
|