dtoro
4560e25bd7
`bootstrap.sh --with-hermes` installs the Goose CLI, drops a Goose config pinning the OpenRouter provider + Nous Hermes model + the homelab MCP extension, symlinks `bin/hermes` and HERMES.md, and links HERMES.md as `.goosehints` so the persona is injected as the system prompt every session. `bin/hermes` decrypts `secrets/openrouter-api-key.yaml` via the existing `homelab secret` flow and execs `goose session`. `homelab client add --with-hermes` grants the new sops secret to the host's age_pubkey at finalize time (parallel to the existing shared-secrets grant). `client remove` revokes it. `operations/hermes-agent.md` covers the end-to-end flow, verification, troubleshooting, and queues one follow-up: the MCP server still runs SSE-only but Goose 1.x deprecated SSE — the Goose config targets `streamable_http` and the `homelab` extension won't connect until `mcp/server.py` migrates. The `developer` extension (shell + edit + `homelab` CLI) carries the agent in the meantime. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
secrets/
SOPS-encrypted YAML files. The plaintext lives only in transit and in the operator's head — committed files are always ciphertext.
Conventions
- One file per logical grouping (e.g.
gitea-tokens.yaml,webhook-hmacs.yaml,api-keys.yaml). - Recipients are declared in
../.sops.yamlby path-regex, not per-file. - The plaintext schema inside each file is free-form YAML; the consumer code
decides what it expects (e.g.
gitea-tokens.yamlcontains{"<host>": "ghp_xxx"}).
How to add a secret
# 1. Decide which clients should be able to decrypt it; edit ../.sops.yaml to
# list their age public keys for the new path_regex.
# 2. Create the plaintext, encrypt in place:
sops -e --in-place secrets/my-thing.yaml
# 3. Commit + push. The 5-min sync propagates to every recipient.
How to consume a secret
# On any client that's a recipient:
homelab secret my-thing # prints plaintext
# Or programmatically:
sops -d /opt/homelab-context/secrets/my-thing.yaml
The mcp tool list_my_secrets(caller_pubkey) returns the names of secrets
the caller can decrypt. The MCP server never reads plaintext — decryption
stays client-side.
Granting / revoking access
To grant a new recipient: edit ../.sops.yaml to add their age pubkey, then
re-key every affected file:
sops updatekeys -y secrets/my-thing.yaml
To revoke: remove the recipient from ../.sops.yaml and sops updatekeys —
but remember this only protects future ciphertext. Past plaintext the client
already decrypted is gone from your control. Rotate the underlying credential
if compromise is suspected.
homelab client remove <name> does the recipient removal + updatekeys for
you, and prints the rotation checklist as a follow-up.
hello.yaml — bootstrap decrypt test
secrets/hello.yaml is encrypted to every enrolled client. Used by Phase 3a
verification to confirm the end-to-end decrypt path works on a freshly-
bootstrapped machine. Content is intentionally trivial:
greeting: hello from the homelab