feat: Phase 0 of hexagonal refactor — ADR 0016, core scaffold, depguard rules

Problem: the hexagonal-architecture plan (plans/2026-08-15-hexagonal-
architecture.md) needs its foundation — an accepted ADR, the target
directory tree, and machine-checked dependency rules — before any
service extraction starts. Also folds the four outstanding review
findings (F3.1/F5/F6/F7) into the plan: ObservationService owns the
bounded probe-concurrency contract (scheduler.go:133), Phase 9 gates
ExecutionService+PolicyService ≥ 90% with a gating-matrix test,
per-phase abort criteria, and the §3.2 internal/config note.

Change:
- docs/adr/0016-hexagonal-ports-adapters.md records context, decision,
  and consequences of the ports & adapters migration.
- internal/domain → internal/core/domain (mechanical import rewrite,
  20 files), new internal/core/{ports,app}, internal/adapters trees
  with package docs.
- .golangci.yml: depguard rules for §3.1 (core purity, no agent-client
  tech in core, nomos isolation — the nomos rules self-activate when
  internal/nomos exists in Phase 8). Config migrated to golangci-lint
  v2 format so it loads at all (the v1 config errored under v2, masked
  by CI's advisory continue-on-error). Verified depguard fires on a
  planted openai-go import in internal/core/app.
- CONTRIBUTING.md layout section now shows the core/adapters tree.

Risk: import path churn is mechanical and tests pass unchanged; the
lint config migration surfaces the pre-existing 400-issue baseline
(advisory in CI, unchanged policy) — new/moved packages lint clean.

Verification: go vet ./..., make test (race, core/domain at 100%
coverage), make generate-check, golangci-lint on internal/core/... and
internal/adapters/... — 0 issues; depguard violation probe confirmed.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-15 22:09:19 +02:00
parent ec119566fd
commit e074f04bdf
37 changed files with 902 additions and 55 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
package domain
import "time"
// Approval is a short-TTL signed grant for a gated action.
type Approval struct {
EntityID UUID
SubjectEntityID UUID
Action string
RiskClass string
Kind string
Payload map[string]any
Status string
TokenHash string
ExpiresAt time.Time
DecidedAt *time.Time
DecidedBy UUID
CreatedAt time.Time
}
// Approval statuses.
const (
ApprovalPending = "pending"
ApprovalApproved = "approved"
ApprovalDenied = "denied"
ApprovalExpired = "expired"
ApprovalRevoked = "revoked"
)
// Approval kinds.
const (
ApprovalKindExecution = "execution"
ApprovalKindPolicyChange = "policy-change"
ApprovalKindPatternActivation = "pattern-activation"
)
// CheckDef defines a probe (R3-7: probes as data, not code).
type CheckDef struct {
EntityID UUID
TargetID UUID
TargetType string
Kind string
Config map[string]any
IntervalS int
TimeoutS int
Zone string
Enabled bool
UpdatedAt time.Time
}
// Check kinds.
const (
CheckHTTP = "http"
CheckTCP = "tcp"
CheckDisk = "disk"
CheckCertExpiry = "cert-expiry"
CheckDrift = "drift"
CheckSSHScript = "ssh-script"
)
// EntityStatus is the current health of an entity (R3-6: replaces state_snapshots).
type EntityStatus struct {
EntityID UUID
Health string
LastCheckAt *time.Time
Details map[string]any
UpdatedAt time.Time
}
// Health values.
const (
HealthHealthy = "healthy"
HealthDegraded = "degraded"
HealthDown = "down"
HealthUnknown = "unknown"
)
// RiskClass is the four-level safety model.
type RiskClass struct {
Name string
Description string
ApprovalRequired string
AutonomyAllowed bool
}
// Risk class names.
const (
RiskReadOnly = "read_only"
RiskReversibleLow = "reversible_low"
RiskConfigMutation = "config_mutation"
RiskDestructive = "destructive"
)
// ApprovalRule maps (entity_type, action) → risk_class + autonomy.
type ApprovalRule struct {
ID UUID
EntityType string
Action string
RiskClass string
AutonomyLevel string
ScopeEntity UUID
Version int
}
// Autonomy levels.
const (
AutonomyAuto = "auto"
AutonomyEscalate = "escalate"
AutonomyNever = "never"
)