cleanup: archive stale secrets/ + secrets-issuance/, add Infisical bootstrap script, update SOPS paths to archive/
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archive/secrets-sops-backup/README.md
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archive/secrets-sops-backup/README.md
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# secrets/
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SOPS-encrypted YAML files. The plaintext lives only in transit and in the
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operator's head — committed files are always ciphertext.
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## Conventions
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- One file per logical grouping (e.g. `gitea-tokens.yaml`, `webhook-hmacs.yaml`,
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`api-keys.yaml`).
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- Recipients are declared in `../.sops.yaml` by path-regex, not per-file.
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- The plaintext schema inside each file is free-form YAML; the consumer code
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decides what it expects (e.g. `gitea-tokens.yaml` contains
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`{"<host>": "ghp_xxx"}`).
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## How to add a secret
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```bash
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# 1. Decide which clients should be able to decrypt it; edit ../.sops.yaml to
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# list their age public keys for the new path_regex.
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# 2. Create the plaintext, encrypt in place:
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sops -e --in-place secrets/my-thing.yaml
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# 3. Commit + push. The 5-min sync propagates to every recipient.
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```
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## How to consume a secret
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```bash
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# On any client that's a recipient:
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homelab secret my-thing # prints plaintext
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# Or programmatically:
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sops -d /opt/homelab-context/secrets/my-thing.yaml
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```
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The `mcp` tool `list_my_secrets(caller_pubkey)` returns the names of secrets
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the caller can decrypt. The MCP server never reads plaintext — decryption
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stays client-side.
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## Granting / revoking access
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To grant a new recipient: edit `../.sops.yaml` to add their age pubkey, then
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re-key every affected file:
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```bash
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sops updatekeys -y secrets/my-thing.yaml
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```
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To revoke: remove the recipient from `../.sops.yaml` and `sops updatekeys` —
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but remember this only protects future ciphertext. Past plaintext the client
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already decrypted is gone from your control. Rotate the underlying credential
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if compromise is suspected.
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`homelab client remove <name>` does the recipient removal + `updatekeys` for
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you, and prints the rotation checklist as a follow-up.
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## hello.yaml — bootstrap decrypt test
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`secrets/hello.yaml` is encrypted to every enrolled client. Used by Phase 3a
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verification to confirm the end-to-end decrypt path works on a freshly-
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bootstrapped machine. Content is intentionally trivial:
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```yaml
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greeting: hello from the homelab
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```
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