Oikos Week 3: scheduler, drift detectors, signals, classifier, approvals

New kernel modules, all wired into `homelab` CLI + tested against live
production where reachable:

- oikos/scheduler.py — Observe stage: HTTP health probes for every
  service, disk-usage probes on hubris/strong, writes oikos/state.json
  (gitignored — regenerates every run). `homelab service <name> health`
  is now cache-first; `--live` forces a fresh probe. Deploys via
  oikos/systemd/oikos-scheduler.{timer,service} on LXC 105.

- oikos/drift.py — SOPS-recipient-vs-inventory and lifecycle-consistency
  detectors (fully local, no SSH) plus pct-list and Caddy-backend
  detectors (best-effort SSH, degrade to an info finding when
  unreachable rather than a false drift alarm). Found real, currently-
  true drift on first run: republic-laptop's age key granted on every
  secret but missing from inventory.yaml, grimmory missing from
  hello.yaml's recipients, and an undocumented pve_id 131 on hubris —
  recorded in OIKOS.md for the operator, not auto-fixed (each is a
  config_mutation/destructive decision).

- oikos/signal.py — the attention layer: raised -> acknowledged ->
  acting -> resolved|muted lifecycle, severity-based routing, dedup via
  open_signal_for(). `homelab signal list|raise|ack|resolve|mute`.

- oikos/decide.py — the Decide-stage classifier: risk class x blast
  radius x ledger-history confidence -> auto-act/escalate. Adds an
  action-alias layer (oikos/policy.py ACTION_ALIASES) and auto-infers
  service_name from the entity for per-service policy overrides.
  `homelab decide <action> <entity>`.

- oikos/approve.py — the escalate route. No dedicated Matrix bot exists
  in this homelab, so this is the repo-side half only: request/reply/
  grant lifecycle with short-TTL HMAC-signed tokens (new secret
  secrets/oikos-approval-hmac.yaml, recipients apps+hubris). Matrix
  delivery is Hermes's existing @dtoro:avispero send path (documented
  integration contract in the module docstring), not a new bot.
  `homelab restart` now mechanically refuses config_mutation/destructive
  services without a valid --approval-id, regardless of -y/interactivity.

- oikos/report.py — daily brief + weekly report from signal/approval/
  ledger state (no Prometheus yet, so point-in-time counts only).

- plans/2026-07-05-oikos-prometheus-lxc.md — Prometheus is `planned`,
  not provisioned: no pve_id is guessed here since Proxmox assigns real
  IDs at creation time, and drift already found an unclaimed ID (131) to
  investigate first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

mcp/server.py

@@ -283,6 +283,21 @@ def get_relations(entity: str) -> list[dict]:
     return oikos_relations.relations_for_name(entity)
 
 
+@mcp.tool()
+def get_state_snapshot() -> dict:
+    """The Week-3 scheduler's last Observe-pass snapshot (service health,
+    host disk usage, drift-finding count, generated_at timestamp). This is
+    what makes cache-first reads work from ANY client, not just the one the
+    scheduler runs on: the CLI's local-file cache only helps on that host;
+    agents elsewhere should call this tool instead of assuming a local
+    oikos/state.json exists."""
+    from oikos import scheduler as oikos_scheduler
+    state = oikos_scheduler.read_state()
+    if state is None:
+        raise ValueError("no scheduler snapshot yet — has oikos-scheduler.timer run?")
+    return state
+
+
 @mcp.tool()
 def get_change_history(entity: str, limit: int = 20) -> list[dict]:
     """Ledger entries for `entity` (e.g. "service:jellyfin", "host:strong"),