implements plan: agent execution safety — QEMU guest agent gate + health guard + policy docs
I — run pre-flights QEMU guest agent before queueing VM execution classifyAndGate now checks vm: targets for qemu_guest_agent attribute. If not_running/missing, returns immediate error instead of queuing forever. II — policy.yaml: documented host-mutation classifier rule Added comment clarifying that host-level package/kernel mutations (apt-get install, dpkg, systemctl enable) always classify as config_mutation and thus need operator approval. III — health attribute read-only in update_entity_attributes Strips scheduler-owned keys (health, last_check_at, last_check) from attribute updates with a clear message directing agents to get_health_summary / list_checks instead. IV — Recorded discovered dependency edges vm:zimaos → depends-on → lxc:nfs-export (NFS /media/library mount) vm:zimaos → depends-on → host:strong (NFS /media/ludo-library mount) Also updated the run tool description to mention both guardrails.
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@@ -87,10 +87,12 @@ entities:
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mesh: {netbird: {ip: 100.122.165.149, fqdn: netbird-ionos.netbird.selfhosted}}
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ssh: {user: root}
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note: netbird mgmt+signal+relay+dashboard + coturn; sshd locked to hubris pubkey
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monitoring: none # host unreachable from the lab (no ICMP, port 22
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# times out even via hubris); liveness is covered
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# by its services — authentik/matrix http checks
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# and the matrix cert-expiry dial it on :443
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monitoring: [http] # public HTTPS probe via https://mcp.hubris.network
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# (2026-08-05: was `none` — the VPS went silent for
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# 7 days because nothing probed it. The standalone-server
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# type inherits [ping,resource,updates] from machine, but
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# SSH/ICMP don't reach it from the lab; an HTTP probe on
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# the public endpoint is the reachable liveness signal).
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- slug: "ws:mac-mini"
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type: workstation
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name: mac-mini
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