# 2026-07-08 — Oikos gaps, broken things, and improvements

**Status:** In Progress — audited 2026-07-11. Done: A1 (approval FK bug),
A3 (Hermes→Nomos help text), D1 (`upsert_knowledge`), D4-partial (general
`run` tool). Still open: A2 (notifier flooding/dedup), A4 (`resolveHost`
dead code), A5 (`queryRows` stringly-typed columns), A6 (stale
`get_state_snapshot` description), B1-B5 (enrollment auth, fake Infisical
creds, `/query` mesh-only auth unenforced, insecure host key checking,
optional `caller_pubkey`), D2/D3 (no `get_approval_status`/
`list_pending_approvals`/signal ack-resolve-mute tools), E (README tool
count, Caddyfile placeholders, NOMOS.md duplicate line).

## Goal

Full-project review of Oikos from two vantage points — a user interacting
through Hermes, and an agent working through the MCP tool surface — with every
finding verified against source (file:line), plus a prioritized fix order.
This plan is the map; each numbered fix is small enough to land independently.

---

## A. Confirmed bugs (verified in source)

### A1. Approvals are never created — FK violation, errors swallowed (CRITICAL)

`createApproval` at `internal/mcp/server.go:970` inserts a fresh
`uuid.NewV7()` as `approvals.entity_id`, but
`migrations/003_operations.up.sql:41` declares
`entity_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES entities(id)`. The INSERT always
violates the FK, and both `pool.Exec` errors are discarded.

Net effect: `request_execution` for `systemctl enable/disable` or
`apt_upgrade` marks the execution `pending_approval`
(`internal/mcp/server.go:311`, `:366`) and tells the agent it's queued, but no
approval row exists → the notifier never sends a Matrix alert → the execution
is orphaned forever. From the Hermes user's perspective, config mutations
silently dead-end while appearing accepted.

Contrast: `request_execution` (server.go:286) correctly creates a companion
`entities` row for the execution first — approvals just never got the same
treatment.

**Fix:**
- Preferred: migrate `approvals` to its own `id UUID PRIMARY KEY` (not FK'd to
  `entities`), keeping `subject_entity_id` as the entity link. Update notifier
  and `DecideApproval` queries accordingly.
- Alternative (no migration): create a companion `entities` row like
  executions do.
- Either way: check and log every `Exec` error in `createApproval`, and verify
  the `UPDATE executions SET approval_id = $2 WHERE entity_id = $1` column
  semantics (`executions` is also keyed by `entity_id`).

### A2. Matrix message-flooding vectors (`internal/notifier/notifier.go`)

- Initial alert is guarded by `alert_sent_at` (notifier.go:103), but the guard
  is written *after* the Matrix send (notifier.go:111). If the UPDATE fails
  after a successful send, the ticker re-sends every cycle.
- No dedup of approvals by `(subject_entity_id, action, payload)`. Once A1 is
  fixed, every retried `request_execution` mints a new approval → one Matrix
  message each.
- `pollReactions` (notifier.go:118) issues one Matrix relations GET per
  pending approval per 30s poll, uncapped — ignored approvals accumulate for
  their 1h lifetime and multiply API calls. It also re-dispatches decisions
  for approvals stuck `pending` (no "already acted" guard if the
  DecideApproval call errors without flipping status).

**Fix:** mark-then-send (or transactional outbox) for `alert_sent_at`; upsert/
dedup open approvals on `(subject_entity_id, action, payload)`; cap + backoff
on reaction polling; guard against re-dispatching a decision already in
flight.

### A3. Hermes "help" is broken + dead code

`cmd/hermes/main.go:165` handles "what can you do"/"help" by calling
`client.callTool("tools/list", nil)` — a `tools/call` for a tool literally
named `tools/list`, which doesn't exist. The correct `listTools()` helper
(main.go:318) is dead code, never called. **Fix:** wire `listTools()` in.

### A4. `resolveHost` never returns a per-entity SSH user

`internal/mcp/server.go:943` — the named return `sshUser` is always `""`; the
per-entity user branch is dead and everything relies on `sshExec`'s global
default fallback. **Fix:** read the SSH user from entity attributes or delete
the dead return to make the behavior honest.

### A5. `queryRows` stringifies every column

`internal/mcp/server.go:861` renders all values via `fmt.Sprintf("%v", ...)`,
so numbers, bools, timestamps, and JSON all reach agents as strings.
**Fix:** type-preserving serialization (pass through pgx-native values into
`json.Marshal`) — improves every read tool at once.

### A6. `get_state_snapshot` description is stale

`internal/mcp/server.go:689` still advertises "disk, drift count" — columns
removed in commit 3ea43ad. **Fix:** update the description.

---

## B. Security gaps

### B1. Enrollment is unauthenticated, with a false comment

`internal/httpapi/server.go:97` says "unauthenticated (IP-gated in handler)"
but `EnrollClient` (`internal/httpapi/impl.go:1099`) performs no IP check at
all — the only gate is the target entity being in state
`planned`/`provisioning`. Caddy's `@enroll` matcher bypasses Authentik.
Anyone reaching `oikos.hubris.network` who knows (or guesses) a planned slug
receives that node's **age private key** in the HTTP response body.

**Fix:** enforce a real gate (mesh-CIDR check, one-time enrollment token
minted when the entity is created, or both), and stop returning the age
private key in the response — have the client fetch it from the secret store.

### B2. Fake Infisical credentials returned to enrollees

`internal/httpapi/impl.go:1191-1192` returns `"inf_client_"+uuid` /
`"inf_secret_"+uuid` — random strings wired to nothing. Enrolled clients hold
credentials that authenticate against nothing.
**Fix:** implement `CreateMachineIdentity` in `internal/secrets/infisical.go`,
or return no credentials and document the manual step.

### B3. Hermes `/query` has no auth

`hermes/config.yaml:9` sets `mesh_only: true` but `cmd/hermes/main.go` never
reads or enforces it — it serves any caller on :8092, who can invoke
`request_execution`. **Fix:** enforce mesh-CIDR (or bearer token) in the
handler; fail closed.

### B4. SSH host keys not verified

`ssh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` at `internal/mcp/server.go:920`.
**Fix:** known_hosts pinning (keys are already inventory-managed per node).

### B5. `list_my_secrets` enumerates all node pubkeys

Without `caller_pubkey`, `internal/mcp/server.go:709-720` returns every entity
that has an `age_pubkey`; nothing ties the caller to what it may list.
**Fix:** require `caller_pubkey` and scope results to the caller's
entitlements.

---

## C. User perspective (interacting via Hermes)

- `routeQuery` NLU is hardcoded `strings.Contains`; `extractEntity`
  (`cmd/hermes/main.go:173`) recognizes only 5 services (`authentik, caddy,
  vaultwarden, gitea, immich`) plus `mac-mini`/`hubris`. Any other entity →
  "no entity found", and *any* unmatched query silently falls back to
  `get_health_summary` — wrong answers that look like answers.
- No conversation/session context; no follow-up capability.
- Config mutations appear accepted but silently dead-end (A1).

**Recommendation:** either make Hermes a real LLM-backed agent loop (Claude
API driving the 28 MCP tools) or explicitly scope it as a structured-tool
gateway: remove the toy NLU, make the fallback say "I don't understand this
query; here are the tools" (via the fixed `listTools()`), and document that
natural language belongs to the calling agent, not the gateway.

---

## D. Agent perspective (MCP tooling gaps)

28 tools are registered in `internal/mcp/server.go` (README says 15, AGENTS.md
says 21 — both stale). Missing capabilities:

1. **No knowledge write.** AGENTS.md tells agents to register knowledge via
   `POST /api/v1/knowledge/{slug}`, but there is no MCP tool — MCP-only agents
   cannot write back what they learn. Add `upsert_knowledge`.
2. **No entity/signal mutation.** Create/patch entity, state transitions, and
   signal ack/resolve/mute all exist in REST (`internal/httpapi/impl.go`,
   `phase3.go`) but not in MCP. Add at least signal ack/resolve/mute and a
   policy-gated entity attribute patch.
3. **No approval visibility.** After `request_execution` returns
   `pending_approval`, an agent has no way to check or reference the approval.
   Add `get_approval_status` / `list_pending_approvals`.
4. Execution actions limited to `restart | systemctl | pct_exec |
   apt_upgrade` — no deploy/rollback/config-edit path.
5. Architecture/doc mismatch: `hermes/SOUL.md` claims "no SSH access; all
   mutations flow through the actuator", but the MCP server runs
   `restart`/`pct_exec` synchronously over SSH from inside the api process
   (`sshExec`, server.go:902). Align docs or move execution to the actuator.

---

## E. Doc drift / housekeeping

- Tool counts: README 15 / AGENTS.md 21 / actual 28 — regenerate from
  `internal/mcp/server.go` (consider a doc-gen make target).
- `compose/caddy/Caddyfile.oikos` retains literal `<mac-mini-mesh-ip>`
  placeholders in all three vhosts.
- `.agents/HERMES.md` lists "`inventory.yaml`, `inventory.yaml`" (duplicate).
- `plans/index.md` drift: fix-MCP-tools row sat in Active with a broken link
  after the file moved to `done/` (fixed alongside this plan); TRMNL listed
  active though in `done/`; Grimmory header says `in-progress` though in
  `done/`; `.hermes/plans/` (7 executed plans) missing from disk.
- `plans/2026-07-05-oikos-prometheus-lxc.md` (~0% done) references deleted
  `oikos/scheduler.py` and `bin/homelab`; LXC 131 collision unresolved.

---

## F. Prioritized fix order

1. **A1** approval FK + error handling — unblocks the entire
   approval → Matrix → execution path.
2. **A2** notifier flooding guards — this branch's namesake.
3. **B1/B2** enrollment security + **B3** Hermes auth.
4. **D** MCP tool additions — approval status first, then knowledge write,
   then signal ops.
5. **C** Hermes routing honesty + **A3-A6**, **B4/B5**, **E** drift cleanup.
